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Note on Cover:
In the United States, Germany and Korea the scales of justice are frequently
used as an image for law and justice. The equities of each case are weighed.
In Germany the section sign from law codes (§) is also used. Sometimes they
appear together. Juxtaposing the two here makes the point that civil justice in
the United States would be furthered were Americans to pay more attention
to drafting statutes and deciding cases according to written law.
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Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too
inefficient for a truly civilized people.
Warren E. Burger
Chief Justice of the United States (1984) 1

[T]he United States in its judicial procedure is many
decades behind every other civilized Government in the
world, and I say that it is an immediate and an imperative
call upon us to rectify that, because the speediness of
justice, the inexpensiveness of justice, the ready access to
justice, is the greater part of justice itself.
Woodrow W. Wilson (1915)
President of the United States 2

1
The State of Justice, Annual Report of the Chief Justice of the United States to the Midyear
Meeting of the American Bar Association, Las Vegas, Address, February 12, 1984, 70 A.B.A. J.
62, 66 (1984).
2
Jackson Day Address at Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, reprinted in PRESIDENT WILSON’S
STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES, INTRODUCTION BY ALBERT SHAW 80 (1917).
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Summary:
Civilizing American Civil Justice
In 1776, when Americans declared independence from
Britain, they also declared their rights. Their declarations of
rights count “open courts” as among the best means for
constitutional development. Open courts should secure to every
man, without regard to wealth, a just remedy for every wrong
suffered, according to the law of the land, by fair and speedy
procedure.
Since 1776 Americans have invested heavily in creating
open courts. They have been disappointed by returns that fall
“far short of perfection” (Maurice Rosenberg). They have found
reform to be an “unending effort to perfect the imperfect” (Jay
Tidmarsh).
That Americans have built on the imperfect, i.e., that they
have looked only to the system that they have, explains their
disappointing results. Contemporary critics can diagnose
disorders, but cannot contribute cures known to work.
Reformers must imagine how proposed new methods might
work; they have no guide to ways proven to work.
Elsewhere in the world there are civil justice systems that
work better. American reformers need not imagine the
unproven; they can study the proven. Yet contemporary
reformers have not done so. They have foregone international
insights. Why? Those better-functioning foreign systems are in
non-English speaking countries. Their civil law methods seem
distant from American common law practices.
This book is intended to make our three systems of civil
justice, the German and the Korean, more familiar and less
foreign to each other. It demonstrates that civil processes in
Germany and in Korea are closer to American understanding
than Americans assume. German and Korean civil justice values
are familiar; their means of implementing those values are
known and often practiced in America. Far from fearing foreign
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processes, American reformers should find them fonts of tested
ideas.

Ten Points for Civil Procedure Reform
that Promote Justice that is Civilized 3
1) Legal rules seek justice through statutes.
2) Civil justice is accessible independent of wealth.
3) Those in right are not burdened with high litigation
expenses.
4) Judges are professionals.
5) Trusted institutions coordinate civil justice.
6) Jurisdiction is determined without litigation.
7) Parties tell courts about their disputes.
8) Judges work with parties to prepare cases for decisions
according to law.
9) Judges oversee taking evidence.
10) Courts base their judgments on law and explain them.

3

Cf. MAURICE ROSENBERG, DEVISING PROCEDURES THAT ARE CIVIL TO PROMOTE JUSTICE
CIVILIZED (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, 1971), reprinted in 69 Mich. L. Rev. 797
(1971); See also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE: TOO MUCH FIGHT? TOO LITTLE
TRUTH? EQUAL JUSTICE?, 101 (“Chapter 8. For Procedures More Civil”); Ernst C. Stiefel &
James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States: Opportunity for Learning from
Civilized European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation? in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL
BEUSCH, 853 (1993), reprinted in 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 167 (1994)..
THAT IS
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Preface
Why don’t you take advantage of what has been done by
the civil law, that governs at least twice as many people as
the common law, is two thousand years older, and
embodies a much greater amount of human experience?
Pierre Lepaulle (1929)
Pioneering French international lawyer,
on judicial procedure in America,
as quoted by Edson R. Sunderland 4

Litigation is merely a means to an end, like transportation,
and the same tests should apply to both. No American
objects to the use of the Diesel engine because it is of
German origin, nor to the radio because it is Italian, and
the victims of rabies make no protest against the
employment of Pasteur’s treatment because it was
developed in France. In every field of human activity
outside of the law men are constantly searching for new
and better methods, overcoming the barriers of language
and forgetting the prejudices of nationality and race.
Professor Edson R. Sunderland (1929) 5

It may be the oldest use of comparative law: you want to fix something
at home that does not work. You look next door to see how your neighbor
does it. 6
In our book the subject of neighborly inquiry is civil justice. That
American civil justice does not work well is recognized worldwide. Those
subject to it were among the first to complain, but today many American
lawyers, law professors and judges will tell you the same thing.
Professor Jay Tidmarsh of Notre Dame Law School and co-author of a
leading introductory work on civil procedure 7 has stated the magnitude and
persistence of the problem: “our civil justice system is broken. … The
4
Edson R. Sunderland, Current Legal Literature, 15 A.B.A. J. 35 (1929). Professor Sunderland
was co-drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and principal drafter of its pretrial
provisions.
5
Id.
6
See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign
Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361 (I977).
7
SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSENTIALS (2007).
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history of Anglo-American procedure has been an unending effort to perfect
the imperfect. … Our system is not sustainable in the long run.” 8 He is not
alone in his assessment. 9
We are not first to urge comparative inquiry as route to American law
reform. For generations foreigners, and Americans, have been telling
Americans of virtues of the Roman-law based legal systems of the European
continent (known as “civil law” in contrast to Anglo-American “common
law” systems). Jeremy Bentham was among the first. 10 The molders of
American law were keenly aware of civil law virtues and sought to adopt
many of them. 11
Nor are we first to bring civil law insights specifically to American civil
justice. The four Americans most important in development of American
civil procedure, Joseph Story, David Dudley Field, Jr., Edson R. Sunderland,
and Charles C. Clark, appreciated foreign civil justice systems. 12 Yet
American law reformers today pay civil law systems little mind. 13 We hope
to help change that.
Today both need and opportunity for foreign insights to inform
American civil justice are greater than ever. Need arises from the
dysfunctional performance of American civil justice and from the long
history of ignoring Continental systems. Opportunity springs from the dearth
of domestic ideas which parochialism has produced and from the wealth of
ideas that globalization is revealing. Today, Americans have available in
good number treatises in English on specific foreign systems together with
8

Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases on the Merits, 87 DENVER L. REV. 407 (2010).
See the list of over 150 titles in the Bibliographic Notes.
10
See JEREMY BENTHAM, PAPERS RELATIVE TO CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION:
INCLUDING CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE RUSSIAN EMPEROR, AND DIVERS CONSTITUTE
AUTHORITIES IN THE AMERICAN UNITED STATES, reprinted in JEREMY BENTHAM, COLLECTED
WORKS, ‘LEGILSATOR OF THE WORLD’: WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW, AND EDUCATION 1
(Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris, eds., 1998).
11
See The RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD, 1820-1920
(Matthias Reimann, ed., 1993).
12
See text at notes ** infra.
13
John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 545 (1995); John H. Langbein, The Influence of German Émigrés on American Law:
The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUSS DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN
AUF DIE RECHTS ENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 321 (Marcus Lutter, Ernst
Stiefel, & Michael H. Hoeflich, eds. 1993); Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay: Putting
American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005)
(“American proceduralists have not been comparativists.); Linda Mullinex, American
Exceptionalism and Convergence Theory, in COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
CATEGORIES 41, 45 (Janet Walker & Oscar G. Chase, eds. 2010) (“the one common
characteristic among American law reform projects is the lack of reference to foreign law”). See
also Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States—
Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?,
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147 (1994), originally published in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL BEUSCH ZUM
68. GEBURTSTAG 853 (1993); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why are U.S. Lawyers not
Learning from Comparative Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 213 (Nedim
Vogt, et al., eds., 1997).
9
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supporting literature such as not been seen before. The success of the
European Union portends still more opportunities for Americans to learn
how civil law systems work.
Yet these books and articles alone will not be sufficient to induce
Americans to learn about civil law civil justice systems. Many are
descriptive of foreign systems and are couched in those systems’ own terms.
They do not relate foreign solutions to American problems. They are written
by non-Americans with non-American audiences in mind.
For Americans the civil law is different and exotic; 14 civil justice in civil
law countries is mysterious and unfamiliar. Common law jurists have for
centuries been suspicious of continental procedures. They assume that the
civil law has a “different moral and legal framework;” 15 its adoption in the
United States is an “absolutely foreign” notion. 16 This suspicion has blocked
meaningful learning about foreign alternatives. It must be cleared way and
knowledge substituted if Americans are to benefit from foreign experiences.
For when it is cleared away, one can see that a particular civil law institution
is “hardly exotic” and that its elements may be “equally applicable to our
own.” 17
Professor Kevin M. Clermont, an author of a leading introduction to
American civil procedure, 18 demurs to borrowing, not because of suspicion,
but because “foreign practice is not sufficiently familiar to most lawyers for
the comparison to serve the practical purpose of a guiding hand.” 19 The
knowledge deficit is, indeed, great. Few Americans scholars have seriously
studied even one civil law system. American law schools pay civil law
systems little mind. Sometimes, what they do teach is simplistic at best and
misleading at worst; a generation ago one critic spoke of “a smattering of
ignorance.” 20 Thanks to neglect, today most Americans, if they have any
knowledge of civil justice abroad, have a comic book picture of “the
inquisitorial system.”

14

See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 190 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J. for
Court, quoting prior decision describing Puerto Rican sociedad en comandita form of business
organization as “an exotic creation of the civil law”). Some would avoid comparison by the
moniker of “American exceptionalism.” See Appendix.
15
Antonin Scalia in Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin
Scalia and Stephen Breyer, American University, Washington College of Law, January 13,
2005.
16
Antonin Scalia, Address, January 4, 2010, Jackson Mississippi, sponsored by Mississippi
College School of Law, quoted saynsumthn.wordpress.com/.../supreme-court-justice-antoninscalia-on-abortion-and-international-law/.
17
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. at 208 (O’Conner, Brennan, Marshall and Blakmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
18
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONCISE HORNBOOK (2nd ed. 2008).
19
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, THREE MYTHS ABOUT TWOMBLY-IQBAL 8 (May 22, 2010, Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1613327.
20
Benjamin Aaron, Labor Courts: Western European Models and Their Significance for the
United States, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 847, 851 (1969).
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It is our purpose in writing this book to help make civil justice in
Germany and Korea more familiar and less frightening to Americans. So we
have written a book that is not a treatise for specialists, but is an introductory
textbook for civil justice in the United States, Germany and Korea. 21 We
intend for it to be accessible to people with an educated layman’s knowledge
of a modern legal system. We do not limit our audience to Americans. We
want this book to help introduce Germans and Koreans to American civil
justice. We want it to work for readers from all lands interested in civil
procedure. Non-Americans need, too, to find familiarity and not only fear in
the American system. 22
To present three entire systems of civil justice, even at an introductory
level, is a daunting task which we do not undertake. We have a more modest
approach that we believe is sufficient to achieve our goal of making each of
our systems a little less foreign to readers from other systems.
Familiarizing Foreign Civil Justice:
The Biography of a Lawsuit in Three Countries
We present our three systems by looking at a particular dispute as it
would develop differently in each. We present, in effect, a biography of a
lawsuit. This is a genre with a long tradition in the United States and before
that in England. 23 What makes our biography unusual is that it is a biography
of the same lawsuit in three different systems. 24 By using a particular case
we can focus on those aspects of our systems of civil justice that are most
relevant to understanding without being diverted by consideration of matters

21
In this book we use “American” to describe the United States of America and do not include
Canada, Mexico, or other parts of the Americas. We use “Korean” to describe the Republic of
Korea, i.e., South Korea and do not include the People’s Republic of Korea, i.e., North Korea.
22
Foreigners are no less frightened of the prospect of an American lawsuit: it gives them
nightmares! See James R. Maxeiner, Book Review, 23 INT’L LAWYER 321 (1989); ROLF
STÜRNER, WHY ARE EUROPEANS AFRAID TO LITIGATE IN THE UNITED STATES (2001).
23 Compare ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
TENNESSEE: ADDRESSED TO A LAW STUDENT (1st ed. 1852; 6th ed. by Sam B. Gilreath 1937)
with MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE BIOGRAPHY OF A LEGAL DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1968); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO,
LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 59 (2006) (“Chapter 4. An American
Civil Litigation From Beginning To End”). See also RICHARD BOOTE, AN HISTORICAL
TREATISE OF AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW: AND OF THE PROCEEDINGS USED IN THE KING'S
BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS FROM THE ORIGINAL PROCESSES TO THE JUDGMENTS IN BOTH
COURTS (1781); JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, AN ELEMENTARY VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN AN
ACTION AT LAW, AMERICAN EDITION FROM THE THIRD LONDON EDITION BY DAVID
BABINGTON RING (1848).
24
This is not the first such biography. Catalyst for this book and the first such biography is
ANDREW J. MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU & LUIS EDUARDO SPROVIERI, PRACTICAL GLOBAL
TORT LITIGATION: UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND ARGENTINA (2007).
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not germane to that case. The particular case gives a “contextual anchor” so
that readers can move from one system to another without being cast adrift. 25
We present all three systems of civil justice in their daily workings. We
avoid the technical, the unusual and the abuses. By focusing on the usual, we
hope to make all three systems more familiar. In the usual we see common
cause in working to realize common values. 26 To address the technical or the
usual or the abuses would accent differences among our systems; it would
make difficult appreciation of what all three systems have in common. The
unusual do not appear across all systems, at least, not in the same way.
To keep our book focused on the goal of American law reform, we have
limited it to three systems of civil justice. We chose the German system
because throughout world the German system is rightly viewed as a success
story. Perhaps more than any other, it has been the principal counterpoint to
American civil justice. Among civil law systems, only the French system is a
competitor. While we might have chosen the French system as a second
system, that would introduce a different world of legal concepts while
remaining a Euro-centric comparison. We have instead chosen the Korean
system. Korea is a non-Western society that has been greatly influenced in
its law by both the German and the American systems. The Korean system
of civil justice straddles the German/American divide. It provides an
example of a system choosing between our two principal competing
approaches.
As American readers know, we have also had to make a choice from
among the civil justice systems of the fifty United States. We chose the
federal system. Focusing on the federal system is a common convention in
American works on civil procedure. Practically, one can present only one
American system. The federal system is the closest that there is to a model
for all systems. While there is no better choice as model for lawsuits, it has
an important deficiency: the federal system focuses on cases that are large
cases in most systems of civil justice, i.e., where the amount in controversy
is in excess of $75,000. 27
We have also chosen not to address “alternative dispute resolution” or
“ADR” as it is known. ADR is a way that parties, by agreement before a
dispute arises, often in a standard form agreement, or after a dispute arises,
by special agreement, arrange to have a private body resolve their dispute. It
is particularly popular in the United States, in part, because the alternative,
ordinary civil justice, is less palatable in the United States than elsewhere.

25
See Andrew J. McClurg, Preface xii, in MCCLURG ET AL., supra note 24; cf. Markesinis, infra
note 29, at 30.
26
While we assert common values and common cause, we are not injecting our book into what
comparative scholars speak of as a search for a “common core” of legal systems.
27
See Oscar G. Chase, Reflections on Civil Procedure Reform in the United States: What has
been learned? What has been accomplished? in THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 163, 164 (Nicolò Trocker & Vincenzo Varano, eds. 2005).
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We choose not to address it, because our point in this book is to provoke
making American civil justice more palatable. 28
The Provocative in Our Book
Lay readers may think that our book is provocative because we see
American civil justice as flawed. 29 To observe that American civil justice is
flawed, however, is not provocative. It is conventional wisdom; others have
said that for a long time. 30 What makes our book provocative is that we urge
Americans to look abroad for insights for improving their system of civil
justice. 31 Here are five objections that we expect to locating insights in
foreign law in general and in German law in particular: 32
1. American civil justice is the best in the world (“not invented here”). 33
2. German civil justice is not as good as we assert (“not so good
there”). 34
28

Cf. Langbein, The Influence of German Émigrés, supra note 13, at 323-324 (“Rather than
confront the problem directly and undertake to solve it, we escape the problem by encouraging
propertied persons to buy their way out, which leaves the poor and the unsophisticated to bear
the main burden of victimization.”).
29
See Basil Markesinis, Ways and Means of Teaching Foreign Law, 23 TULANE EUR. & CIVIL
L. FORUM 175, 204-206 (2008).
30
We list in the Bibliographic Notes more than 150 such critiques. The most famous such
critique is: Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 ABA REP. 395 (1906).
31
Common law systems are found in those countries where English is a national language and
where Englishmen are either native or colonized the land. Civil law systems are found in most
other modern countries.
32
We need not be good soothsayers to foresee it: similar objections greeted John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) and recent references
by United States Supreme Court justices to foreign law.
33
E.g., Gerald Walpin, America's Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 175-176 (2003) (drawing a parallel to Churchill’s famous
aphorism about democracy). See generally Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice
Reform in the United States—Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European Procedure
Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147 (1994), originally published in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL BEUSCH ZUM 68. GEBURTSTAG 853 (1993); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R.
Maxeiner, Why are U.S. Lawyers not Learning from Comparative Law?, in THE
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 213 (Nedim Vogt, et al., eds., 1997). See also, Schlesinger,
supra note 6, at 363 (noting the same xenophobia for criminal procedure).
34
Professor Allen of Northwestern University Law School is Professor Langbein’s principal
protagonist on this point. See Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure:
A Plea for Fewer Generalities and Greater Detail in Comparative Law Scholarship, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 705 (1988). For Professor Langbein’s response, see John H. Langbein, Trashing "The
German Advantage," 82 NW. U. L. REV. 763 (1988). While Professor Allen questions the
factual claims made for German civil justice, Professor Cappalli of Temple University School of
Law argues the positive case that American common law methods are better. See RICHARD B.
CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD (1997); Richard B. Cappalli, Richard B.
Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's. Advantage over the Civil Law, 12
TEMPLE INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 87 (1998). See also Robert Adriansen, At the Edges of the Law:
Civil Law v. Common Law: A Response to Professor Richard B. Cappalli, 12 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 107 (1998).
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3. American institutions of dispute resolution embody American cultural
values that are incompatible with cultural values embodied in German
dispute resolution institutions (“American exceptionalism”). 35
4. American civil justice serves public law functions that German and
Korean civil justice do not and which limits the value of international
insights. 36
5. Practically, for the foregoing reasons, and because of the self-interest
of those who preside over the system, it is foolish to think that Americans
would ever adopt foreign models of civil justice (“real reform is
hopeless”). 37
We do not in this book answer these objections directly. Instead, we
present information that we hope will enable readers to reach their own
conclusions. 38 We want first to help overcome the knowledge deficit.
Throughout the book we point to factors that bear on these questions. We
seek to provide helps to readers in pursuing these issues on their own.
With respect to one of these objections—the asserted exceptional public
law functions of American civil justice—our pedagogic approach of looking
at how our respective systems handle a single hypothetical case necessarily
35

Professor Oscar G. Chase of New York University School of Law is the eloquent proponent
of this view. His argument is that it is the general culture itself and not the legal culture that
determines these differences. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and
Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002); Oscar G. Chase, Culture and
Disputing, 7 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 81 (1999); OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND
RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005); Oscar G. Chase, Legal
Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1997); Oscar G. Chase,
Reflections on Civil Procedure Reform in the United States: What has been learned? What has
been accomplished? in THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 163
(Nicolò Trocker & Vincenzo Varano, eds. 2005). For Professor Langbein’s response to one of
these, see John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 41 (1997). In as similar direction, see Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The
Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987). Professor Chase is not, however,
the first proponent of the view. See already Samuel Tyler, Introduction, in HENRY JOHN
STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (Samuel Tyler ed.,
3d Am. ed., 2d London ed. 1871). We cannot resist commenting on Professor Chase’s selection
of four features that demonstrate the influence of American culutre on civil procedure: the civil
jury, pretrial discovery, the role of the judge, and the role of the expert witness. “American
Exceptionalism,” supra at 287-301. Only the third would support not making changes in
contemporary civil justice. As we show below the civil jury has practically disappeared. On the
other hand, pretrial discovery as we know it today originates only in 1938 and in the present
form later, so that we cannot see it as an immutable part of American culture. We cannot easily
imagine that culture has much to say about expert testimony.
36
See Appendix
37
Professor Langbein reports that Max Rheinstein, the dean of the generation of émigré German
scholars from the 1930s, thought the vested interests of those who run the defective legal
machinery make reform of procedure “hopeless.” See Langbein, The Influence of German
Émigrés on American Law, supra note 13, at 322-323, 326-327. See also John C. Reitz, Why We
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987
(1990).
38
See Basil Markesinis, Book Review Essay: Ways and Means of Teaching Foreign Law, 23
TULANE EUR. & CIVIL L. FORUM 175, 206 (2008).
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means that we do not consider that argument in our principal discussion. So
as not to leave it unaddressed, se summarize it in the Appendix and explain
why we believe that it does not undercut the utility of comparative
examination.
***
Finally, a word on responsibilities: while we share the conclusions
stated, our experiences and knowledge on which those conclusions are
stated, vary. Professor Maxeiner bears primary responsibility for the work as
a whole and, in particular, for comparative conclusions.

.
James R. Maxeiner
Bronxville NY USA
Gyooho Lee (이규호)
Seoul Korea
Armin Weber
Munich Germany EU
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C H APT E R 1
I NT R ODUC T I ON:
T H E P UR POSE OF C I V I L J UST I C E
T HE T HE M E OF T HI S B OOK
T H E ST R UC T UR E OF T H I S B OOK
T H E F A C T S OF T H E H Y POT H E T I C A L C A SE

THE YOUNG AMERICAN (popular schoolbook, 1844)

39

Civil justice describes the system of the administration of justice in civil
matters. The law of civil procedure is the law that governs lawsuits, i.e., civil
actions, among private parties.

39

S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING
th
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY. FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS 23 (4 ed., 1844).
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Whether in the United States, Germany or Korea, the course of a
civil action is simply stated and similar in outline. One person feels
aggrieved by another person. Usually before bringing a lawsuit, the
aggrieved person asks the other to make the matter right. Only if the
latter fails to make the matter right does the aggrieved person take the
matter to court.
The aggrieved person, i.e., the plaintiff, commences a civil action
with a formal complaint. The complaint declares a claim against one
or more defendants. It asserts the plaintiff’s right or defendant’s duty
or both and asks the court to recognize and enforce the rights or
duties claimed. Upon officially receiving the complaint, the defendant
has three principal alternatives: comply with the claim, ignore the
claim and accept a judgment by default, or contest the claim.
Together, complaint and any written answer or subsequent reply
to such an answer, constitute pleadings. Pleadings define the subject
matter of the lawsuit; they begin a process of applying law to fact.
Subsequent proceedings find facts that are then judged according to
law. At the end of that process, if parties do not themselves otherwise
resolve the dispute, the court issues a judgment that concludes the
matter. A party dissatisfied with that judgment ordinarily may appeal
to a higher court. After all appeals are exhausted, there is a final
decision according to law.
The Purpose of Civil Justice
The purpose of civil justice is determination of rights and duties
among private parties according to law. Determining rights and duties
of parties resolves their disputes.
If there were no civil justice, private parties might use self-help
to realize rights and to resolve disputes. The stronger, rather than the
righteous, would prevail. To preserve peace and right, modern legal
systems prohibit self-help except in a few cases.
Primitive legal systems worked differently. They emphasized
dispute resolution over right determination. Process—not substantive
law—resolved disputes. Resolving the dispute determined the right
rather than determining the right resolved the dispute. Primitive
systems used methods of decision, such as trial by ordeal or trial by
battle, which were unrelated to parties’ rights. At least since the
eighteenth century Enlightenment, however, modern systems of civil
procedure have rested on the idea that rights of parties as set forth in

21

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

law and not the skills of the parties or of their representatives should
determine outcomes of disputes. 40
Realizing rights and resolving disputes are essential purposes of modern
systems of civil justice. They lie at the heart of American law. Sir William
Blackstone, whose famous Commentaries once were the Bible of American
lawyers, began his third book on Private Wrongs: “The more effectually to
accomplish the redress of private injuries, courts of justice are instituted in
every civilized society, in order to protect the weak from the insults of the
stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws, by which rights are
defined, and wrongs prohibited.” 41 Nearly two-and-one half centuries later, a
report of a committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers echoes
Blackstone: “Our civil justice system is critical to our way of life. In good
times or bad, we must all believe that the courts are available to us to enforce
rights and resolve disputes – and to do so in a fair and cost-effective way.” 42
Civil procedure is more important than the lawsuits it governs. Civil
procedure implements substantive law. Thomas W. Shelton, a founding
father of modern American civil procedure, likened procedure to the arteries
through which our blood flows: “so surely as the human heart connected
with clogged arteries must eventually cease to beat, so certainly will a
government retarded by clogged judicial procedure surely decay.” 43
Civil justice makes civil society possible. People comply with law
because they know what it requires and because they believe that it applies
to everyone. Most people most of the time observe most laws. They apply
laws to themselves. Effective civil justice is essential if law is to provide
guidance that makes self-application possible. For every instance of
application of law in a lawsuit, there are millions of instances of individuals
applying law to themselves without lawsuits. 44
The Theme of This Book:
Civil Justice that is Just, Speedy, Inexpensive and Accessible to All
We take the theme of our book from the “open courts” clause of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights of November 3, 1776. The Declaration of
Rights is intended to be “the best means of establishing a good constitution
40

Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1522-1523 (1998). Professor Carrington was Reporter, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 1985-1992.
41
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1768; 1st Am. ed.,
Philadelphia, 1772).
42
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 23 (2009). If one doubts this judgment,
one need only examine conditions in countries where this is not the case.
43
THOMAS W. SHELTON, THE SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 17 (1918).
44
See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the
Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 517, 523-524 (2006).

22

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

in this state, for the surer foundation, and more permanent security thereof.”
The open courts clause promises a civil justice system that works well
routinely:
17. That every freeman, for any injury done to him in his
person, or property, ought to have remedy by the course of
the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right,
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily
without delay, according to the law of the land. 45
In this book we present our three systems of civil justice in comparative
perspective; we examine the methods that each system uses to pursue those
goals. In the clause we find four promises:
(1) Substantive accuracy: does the system work to decide disputes
correctly, that is, accurately according to substantive law and consistent
with justice? (Does the system provide “justice and right … according
to the law of the land?”)
(2) Procedural fairness: does the system work to decide disputes
fairly, that is, does it secure the right to be heard, that is, a “day in
court,” as the right to be heard is known in the United States? (Does the
system decide “by the course of the law of the land?”)
(3) Access to justice: does the system assure access to courts to all?
(Does the system make justice available to all persons “freely without
sale [and] fully without any denial?”)
(4) Efficiency: does the system decide disputes efficiently and
timely? (Does the system decide “speedily without delay?”)
We adopt these promises from the Maryland Declaration of Rights as
our theme because they are timeless and universal in modern legal systems.
They are not limited to the eighteenth century; they speak to our time. 46
They are not peculiar to the American legal system; they are fundamental to
the German and Korean legal systems. 47 The promises of accuracy, fairness,
access and efficiency are elementary legal learning. 48 We return to these
45

Maryland Declaration of Rights of Nov. 3, 1776, in THE DECISIVE BLOW IS STRUCK, A
CONSTITUTION CONVENTION OF 1776 AND

FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THE FIRST MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (1977).

46
E.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable
Justice, 87 DENVER U.L. REV. 437, 442 (2010).
47
See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47. 2000/C O.J. 364/01.
48
See JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 90-91 (2000).
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promises throughout the book, for these promises are ideals of every modern
system of civil justice.
The open courts clause goes back to the earliest days of AngloAmerican law. Its origin is Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta of English law.
Chapter 40 found resonance in colonial America. Maryland was not alone in
adopting it; most states followed suit. Article XI of the 1780 Declaration of
the Rights of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is similar. Another close
relative was proposed by Virginia for inclusion in the federal Bill of
Rights. 49 Today the open courts clause is in force in Maryland as part of the
state constitution. Most states of the United States of America have similar
or related provisions in their constitutions. 50
The ideals of the open courts clause are fundamental to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 on which modern American civil
procedure is based. The Federal Rules “seek the costless application of
substantive law onto specific disputes in the form of judicial decisions.” 51
Rule 1 provides that the Rules are to “be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” When the drafters formally unveiled the Rules to the legal
profession at the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association in 1936, the Secretary of the drafting committee blessed them by
reading from Magna Carta Chapter 40: “To none will we sell, to no one will
we deny, or delay, right or justice.” 52 He explained the need for the then new
rules: “What is the matter with present methods of the trial of cases? Every
one, I think, will agree that our methods of procedure have three major
faults. First, delay; second, expense; third, uncertainty.” 53 The then new rules
were to remedy these maladies. They were to fulfill the promises of open
courts: accuracy, fairness, access and efficiency.
Making Civil Justice Just, Speedy, Inexpensive and Accessible to All
In this book we ask how our respective systems work to make civil
justice just, speedy, inexpensive and accessible. We engage in a comparative
examination because we believe that that is one way to indentify those
methods that work better than other methods. We are not conducting a
contest over which is better. 54 Each system has its unique properties. Each
49

See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 284-297 (overview), 458 (Massachusetts), 464 (Virginia),
483-487 (cataloging state constitutional provisions (1968).
50
See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1311
(2003).
51
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2nd ed. 2009).
52
Edgar B. Tolman, Statement, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 423, 432, 433 (1936).
53
Id. at 437.
54
See, e.g., DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (The International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2004); Benedicte Favuarque-Cosson &
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system has its successes and its failures. None is perfect. Our search is for
better ways for each system. 55 Necessarily each solution will be different;
but each system can profit from experiences of the others.
While our intention is not to judge one system better than the other, we
cannot avoid a seemingly competitive observation: the consensus judgment
of Americans of their own system of civil justice is that it fails to achieve the
goals that it sets out for itself. It does not deliver justice justly, quickly and
inexpensively to all. 56 The consensus judgment of Germans of their own
system of civil justice, in contrast, is that it does do these things well, if not
perfectly. The consensus judgment of Korean jurists is that their system—
still in historical terms a relatively new one—is on its way to achieving these
goals and that their job is to win the confidence of a skeptical public by
making sure that it does achieve them.
A natural consequence of these different judgments is that we give
attention to those aspects of the American system that undermine and to
those aspects of the German and Korean systems that promote realization of
a civil justice system that is just, quick, inexpensive and accessible. We turn
now to consider the states of civil justice in our countries.
The State of American Civil Justice
That American civil justice did not work well until the 1938 Federal
Rules—that it was expensive, time-consuming and even incoherent—has
become an “organizing perspective” for law school classes. 57
That the Federal Rules, despite great hopes, have led to ever more
expensive and time-consuming lawsuits has become a commonplace of our
Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business
World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2009).
; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 76 (1996)
(asking that question of England and America).
55
See, e.g., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way,” Litigation, Alternatives,
and Accommodation, Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L.J. 811; LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE
OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, infra note 99.
56
Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENVER U.L. REV., 407 (2010) (“I start
from the premise that our civil justice system is broken. ... [O]ur system is not sustainable in the
long run.”) The perception of failure to satisfy open courts values is not limited to the United
States. According to Justice Ronald Sackville civil justice systems in common law countries
generally are thought “unable to meet basic objectives of fairness, affordability and efficiency.”
Ronald Sackville, Reforming the Civil Justice System: The Case for a Considered Approach, in
BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM (Helen Stacy & Michael Levarch, eds., 1999). With these
hopes in mind, England and Wales changed their civil justice system. See LORD WOOLF,
MASTER OF THE ROLLS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996).
57
John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, ed., 1999). Cf.
Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy?, supra note 57, at 932 (“nineteenth century civil
procedure was a sport of chance in which the substantive merits of claims and defenses played a
minor role.” [citations omitted]).
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generation. 58 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 have not lived up
to the hopes of their drafters. While few jurists doubt the continued validity
of the drafters’ ideals, 59 many question their system’s fidelity to them. 60
In 2009 a committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers reported
that the civil justice system “is in serious need of repair. In many
jurisdictions, today’s system takes too long and costs too much.” 61 A survey
of the members of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association
found general agreement that it is not cost-effective to litigate cases for less
than $100,000. 62 That amount is nearly double the median American
household income. 63 Thirty-seven percent of litigating lawyers responding
said the Federal Rules are not conducive to attaining the Rules’ goals of just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of all suits.
Criticisms of American civil justice are legion. The history of American
civil procedure is said to be “an unending effort to perfect the imperfect.” 64
While in the last generation criticisms have swelled, 65 there has scarcely
been a time in American history when there was not substantial criticism.
Already Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack of 1733 included a
satirical poem on the “Benefit of Going to Law.” 66
In finding the American system as in need of fixing, we are not being
unduly critical or fair in our comparison. So that no reasonable reader shall
doubt whether we are even-handed, we list in a bibliographic note more than
150 mostly separately published critiques; many make more dire judgments
than ours. We begin our list with titles that predate Jesse Higgins’ 1805
pamphlet, Sampson against the Philistines, or the Reformation of Lawsuits;
and Justice made Cheap, Speedy, and Brought Home to Every Man’s Door,
and conclude with titles that postdate Al Sampson’s 2004 book, Lawyers
Under Fire: What a Mess Lawyers Have Made of the Law! We note Chief
58

Leubsdorf, supra note 58 at 53.
But see Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENVER
U.L. REV. 287, 288 (2010).at 288 (asserting that Rule ‘s statement of them is “misleading and
counterproductive” and has three assumptions that “make little sense for modern litigation ....”).
60
E.g., Steven S. Gensler, Justice! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to the Revolution of 1938
Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 273 (2008) (“the
future of federal rule making depends not on finding new ideals but on fidelity to the ones we
have.”).
61
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 2.
62
Id. at 6.
63
In 2008 the median household income was $52,029. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County
Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
64
Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” supra note 56, at 407.
65
One of the first and best of the new wave is MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1976).
It was reviewed by the then director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Private Law in Hamburg. Hein Kötz, The Reform of the Adversary Process, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
478 (1981). Kötz concluded his review with the exhortation: “If there is a desire to reform
American civil procedure, either by making changes within the adversary system or by
developing alternative methods of dispute resolution, the Continental experience may be well
worth studying.” Id. at 486.
66
Quoted below in the Bibliographic Notes.
59
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Justices of the United States (e.g., Taft, Warren and Burger) and presidents
(e.g., Taft, Wilson and Bush) who have joined in the clamor for civil justice
reform.
The State of German Civil Justice
According to the German Minister of Justice, German civil justice
approximates the ideals of the open court’s clauses. It “is predictable,
affordable and enforceable. [German] legislation balances the various
interests in a fair and equitable manner, ensuring just solutions. Everyone
has access to law and justice, independent of their financial means. ...
German courts decide without delay ....” 67 While to a skeptic this can only be
political puffery, the minister’s claim is credible. Legal aid is available to
most people who need it. The system is not limited to large claims, but
handles them all. While in the United States only cases in excess of
$100,000 are considered viable, in Germany, few cases are that large. 68
Courts deal with most cases with dispatch: in 2009 the courts of general
jurisdiction in first instance concluded 56.9% within 6 months and 80.1 %
within a year. 69
We explain in the Appendix that the present day German civil justice
system is the system established in the first twenty-five years following
German unification in 1871 in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877, the
Court Organization Law of 1877 and the Civil Code of 1896. That system
worked well then and does today. It has long been admired in the world, 70
including in the Common Law world. 71 At home it has long been held in
high regard; it has been subject to no criticism remotely comparable to that
of its American counterpart. As we shall discuss it is the task of the Federal
67

LAW—MADE IN GERMANY; GLOBAL–EFFEKTIV–KOSTENGÜNSTIG 3 (2008), available at
www.lawmadeingermany.de.
68
About 20% exceed about €50,000 (about $62,500).
69
STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RECHTSPFLEGE, ZIVILGERICHTE, JUSTIZSTATISTIK DER ZIVILGERICHTE (FACHSERIE 10 REIHE 2.1) Table 5, 50-51 (2009), available at www.destatis.de.
70
See DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEßRECHT UND SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN (Walther J. Habscheid, ed. 1991). In Bavaria, the numbers were still better, 60.7%
within six months and 83.2% within a year.
71
See Frederick William Maitland, The Making of the German Civil Code in 3 THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 484 (Fisher, ed., 1911); Roscoe Pound, The Causes
of the Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 397
(1906) (“the wonderful mechanism of modern German judicial administration”); FREDERICK
FRANK BLACHLY & MIRIAM EULALIE OATMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
GERMANY (Brookings Institution 1928); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985). Langbein’s article created a stir in the American
legal community. For reviews of that stir, see Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage
Revisited: An Inside View of German Civil Procedure in the Nineties, 13 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F.
25, 33 (1998); Bradley Bryan, Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein’s
Conception of Comparative Law and Procedural Justice in Question, 11 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 521, 523 (2004).
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Ministry of Justice to watch over that system to assure that it continues to
work well. 72
The principal problem that the system has had to cope with in recent
years has been resources: demand for civil justice continues to rise, but
financial means available to meet the demand have not kept pace. To keep
costs within bounds, many first instance cases that were formerly would
have been handled by three judges are now handled by one. Appeals that
formerly would have conducted as proceedings de novo now concentrate on
correction of incorrect decisions.
The State of Korean Civil Justice
Korea today has a modern legal system that in structure and methods
differs little from western legal systems. The goals of civil justice in modern
Korea are the same as they are in the United States and in Germany.
Conditions are, however, different. As we explain in the Appendix, due to
thirty-five years of foreign occupation (1910-1945), when judicial
administration was part and parcel of repressive government and the legal
system was seen as a means of obliterating national identity, and thanks to
another forty-two years of authoritarian rule (1945-1987), the Korean system
is a newcomer to the rule of law. In the last quarter century, however, Korea
has had success in building a firm and sound system suitable to support its
modern economic and social systems. So great has been that success that
Korea is often seen as a model for other developing countries. 73
Korean jurists recognize that they are still overcoming a deep alienation
to law that developed in those dark years. 74 The long-tradition of faith in
institutions found in the United States and the similar tradition of faith in law
found in Germany are both under construction in Korea. Korean jurists
cannot count on the benefit of doubt that long traditions bring; more than
their counterparts in the United States and in Germany, they must prove the
virtues of their institutions and rules.

72

For example, although the system handles most cases expeditiously, to meet claims that it is
too slow in some instances, the Ministry has proposed a law that would give litigants subject to
undue delay a modest monetary claim for damages. See, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung:
Gesetz über den Rechtsschutz bei überlangen Gerichtsverfahren und strafrechtlichen
Ermittlungsverfahren (12. August 2010).
73
See Youngjoon Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap between Korean substance and Western
form, in LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND
INNOVATIONS 151, 152 (Ann Black & Gary F. Boll, eds., 2011); Won-Ho Lee, Kurzer Abriss
über Koreanisches Recht in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD
GROßFELD ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG at 687 (Ulrich Huber & Werner Ebke, eds., 1999).
74
Id. See Chang-Rok Kim Where is the Korean Legal System Going?, in LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD - ASIAN ALTERNATIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH KOBE LECTURES BEING THE
FIRST ASIA SYMPOSIUM IN JURISPRUDENCE, TOKYO AND KYOTO, 10 AND 12TH OCTOBER 1996,
11, at 14-16 (Yasutomo Morigiwa, ed., 1998).
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Among the greatest challenges to modern Korean civil justice is
improving public confidence in the legal professions. Surveys find public
confidence in the judiciary at a low level (only 50% in one). In Chapter 3 we
discuss some of the possible sources for this lack of confidence. One is a
civil service system for judges that finds ex-judges representing clients
before former colleagues. Another is a lawyer licensing system that until
recently allowed only a very few people to become lawyers and which meant
that most parties in civil cases represent themselves.
In building the rule of law Korean jurists have taken profound interest in
foreign legal systems and, in particular, in the Japanese system (which they
inherited from the occupation), in the German system (on which the
Japanese system is based) and in the American system (thanks to the
overwhelming economic and political presence of the United States and of
English in Korea). Many Korean jurists have journeyed abroad looking for
optimal solutions for their civil justice system. As we shall see below, in
civil justice, while Korean jurists have flirted with American innovations,
they have largely gravitated toward modern German methods.
Structure of this Book
This book is a comparative introduction to civil procedure in the United
States, Germany and Korea. 75 We present civil procedure in three countries
using the medium of examination of a particular factual situation as it might
develop differently in each. We present, in effect, a biography of a lawsuit.
This is a genre with a long tradition in the United States and before that in
England. 76 What makes our biography unusual is that it is a biography of the
same lawsuit in three different jurisdictions. 77
The idea is that placing rules of foreign law in context of their
application facilitates their learning and appreciation. By using a particular
case we can present rules against the context of those aspects of the systems
that are most relevant for understanding, without being diverted by
consideration of matters not germane to that case. 78 The particular case gives
75

In this book we use “American” to describe the United States of America and do not include
Canada, Mexico, or other parts of the Americas. We use “Korean” to describe the Republic of
Korea, i.e., South Korea and do not include the People’s Republic of Korea, i.e., North Korea.
76
Compare ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
TENNESSEE: ADDRESSED TO A LAW STUDENT (1st ed. 1852; 6th ed. by Sam B. Gilreath 1937)
with MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE BIOGRAPHY OF A LEGAL DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1968). See also JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, AN ELEMENTARY VIEW
OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION AT LAW, American Edition from the Third London Edition
by David Babington Ring (1848).
77
Professor Andrew J. McClurg, whose own book was catalyst to this one, deserves credit for
the idea. See ANDREW J. MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU & LUIS EDUARDO SPROVIERI, PRACTICAL
GLOBAL TORT LITIGATION: UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND ARGENTINA (2007).
78
For example, we discuss jurisdiction in general and as it applies to the case, but do not
consider other than with a passing mention jurisdiction over things (i.e., in rem jurisdiction).
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readers a “contextual anchor” for what they are learning. 79 Thus we do not
give comprehensive introductions to our three systems. We chosen a simple
case to show how ordinary cases develop. Our case is Mary Roh v. John Doh,
Jr.80
The Facts of the Hypothetical Case 81
Mary Roh and John Doh, Sr. have been personal friends and business
associates for decades. Their two children, Rosa Roh and John Doh, Jr., fell
in love in college and were engaged to get married.
Mary Roh has a Honda dealership in the nation’s capital; John Doh, Sr.
holds the regional Honda distributorship, Honda Capital Area
Distributorship, Inc., that supplies the dealership. The Distributorship is
located in Second City. John Doh, Sr., intends for his son John Doh, Jr. to
take over the family business. To foster that goal, in January he set up his
son as manager of a new Honda dealership, DohSon Honda, LLC, in Second
City.
In April 2011 Mary Roh and John Doh, Jr. attended the annual spring
party of the national Honda dealers’ association. The meeting was sponsored
by Capital Honda Distributorship Inc. and held in the nation’s capital. John
Doh, Sr. was not there. John Doh, Jr. and Roh disagree about what was said
between them at the party, but they agree that the next day Roh transferred
[$75,000—€60,000—₩75 million] to the account of DohSon Honda LLC.
In June the Roh-Doh engagement fell apart acrimoniously.
Later Roh said that John Doh, Jr. had come to her with an urgent request
for cash. DohSon Honda LLC, suddenly had a shortfall. It didn’t need
much—just [$75,000—€60,000—₩75 million]—but Doh, Jr. did not want
to go to his father for it, since that would shake his father’s faith that he
could handle the dealership. He wanted a short-term loan—four months at
the longest.
John Doh, Jr.’s version of events was different. He said that Roh’s
version was nonsense: if he had needed money, he had personal credit lines
of [$75,000—€60,000—₩75 million]. He said that the money was a gift.
Roh denied that the money was gift: if the money had been a gift, it would
have been motivated by Doh, Jr.’s announced marriage to her daughter Roh.
79
See Andrew J. McClurg, Preface, in MCLURG et al., supra note 77, at xii; Basil Markesinis,
Ways and Means of Teaching Foreign Law, 23 TULANE EUR. & CIVIL L. FORUM 1, 30 (2008).
80
John & Jane Doe and Richard & Mary Roe are names used for fictitious or anonymous parties
in the United States. E.g., Mary Roe v. John Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971); Joan Roe v. Jane Doe,
420 U.S. 307 (1975). To give the names a more international flavor and names more familiar in
Germany and Korea, we have made them Roh and Doh.
81
The case facts find inspiration in:Armin Weber & Harriet Weber, “Geldsegen,” material
distributed at the Richterfortbildung seminar of the Bavarian State Ministry of Justice,
December 2006; 2 E.J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 191-97 (1971); and Ver Bryck v. Ver
Bryck, 379 Md. 669, 843 A.2d 758 (2004), affirming in part, reversing in part, 150 Md. App.
623, 822 A.2d 1226 (2003).
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A broken engagement wasn’t the only problem the two families had.
Both parties’ automotive businesses experienced unexpected industry-wide
crises. At a summit of Honda dealerships held in early September to address
the problem, Mary Roh asked Doh, Jr., when was he going to pay the loan
back. It had been due, she said, August 15. She demanded that he pay it back
immediately. Doh, Jr. looked surprised and asked why she was asking.
Hadn’t she always intended it as a gift? If you want your money back, he
asked sarcastically, why don’t you ask your daughter for it? Roh was
speechless.
When Doh, Jr. paid nothing, Roh asked Doh, Sr., to intercede with his
son. She told him that the money was a loan, but even if it had been a gift,
now that the engagement was off, Doh, Jr. should give it back. When Doh,
Sr. could not persuade his son to repay the money, Roh decided to bring a
lawsuit to get back the money that she now desperately needed.
The Dohs and the Rohs live in three incarnations: in Maryland/Virginia,
United States; Bavaria/Berlin Germany; and Busan/Seoul, Korea. The
American Dohs live in Baltimore, Maryland, while the Rohs live in
Alexandria, Virginia, in suburban Washington, DC. The German Dohs live
in Munich, Bavaria, while the Rohs live in Berlin. The Korean Dohs live in
Busan, while the Rohs live in Seoul.

Plaintiff Mary Roh
Defendant John Doh, Jr.
DohSon LLC
John Doh, Sr.
Location of meetings

United
States
Virginia
Maryland
Maryland
Maryland
D.C.

Germany

Korea

Berlin
Bavaria
Bavaria
Bavaria
Berlin

Seoul
Busan
Busan
Busan
Seoul

Our book consists of this introductory chapter, six topical chapters, a
concluding chapter, an appendix of historical notes and an appendix of
bibliographic notes. The subsequent chapters are:
Chapter 2. Thinking Like a Lawyer
Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice
Chapter 4. The Court: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
Chapter 5. Pleading: Structuring the Matter in Controversy
Chapter 6. Process: The Right to Be Heard
Chapter 7. Judgments, Appeals & Outcomes: Decisions According to Law
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Lessons
Appendix—Historical Notes
Bibliographic Notes
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C H APT E R 2
L E G AL M E T HOD
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER

Contemporary Korean Lawyer

Before we discuss our lawsuit in three systems, we address basic legal
methods. What we say may seem obvious, but our experience suggests that
that which is obvious in one legal system, may not be in another. 82 We
consider what it means to think like a lawyer and we look at sources of law,
i.e., principally statutes and court decisions.
Deciding according to law requires determining applicable rules, finding
facts, and applying rules to facts. This is considerably more difficult than is
generally supposed. The legal rule cannot always be read from a single
statute or precedent. It often is necessary to search statutes and precedents,
analyze them, compare them to facts, revisit statutes and precedents in light
of the facts, and again examine facts in light of the law. The end result is to
bring facts and law together.
Substantive law, as distinguished from procedural law, determines rights
and duties abstractly. Civil procedure translates those abstract statements of
rights and duties into determinations of rights and duties in individual cases.
Its method is legal reasoning. Some form of legal reasoning is universal
among modern legal systems. Legal reasoning is familiar to anyone who has
studied in law school for only a single term. In America, it is known as

82

See, e.g. James R. Maxeiner, Law without Justice? Do the Right Thing and Reform Legal
Reasoning, forthcoming (comparing two discussions of thinking like a lawyer).
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“thinking like a lawyer.” 83 In Germany and Korea it is called “legal
thinking.” 84
One introductory text provides a concise definition of legal reasoning in
the United States. Legal reasoning requires that one:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

identify the applicable sources of law, usually statutes and
judicial decisions;
analyze these sources of law to determine the applicable rules
of law and the policies underlying those rules;
synthesize the applicable rules of law into a current structure in
which the more specific rules are grouped under the more
general ones;
research the available facts; and
apply the structure of the rules to the facts to ascertain the
rights or duties created by the facts, using the policies
underlying the rules to resolve difficult cases. 85

This formulation is not the only one found in the United States. Other
formulations emphasize legal argument more and law application less. But it
is within the American mainstream. It is a theory of legal reasoning that
relies principally on syllogisms for application of law. 86 The classic
syllogism consists of a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion. A
famous example is: “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore,
Socrates is mortal.”
There is nothing mystical about syllogistic reasoning. Justice Antonin
Scalia of the United States Supreme Court and his co-author rhetorician
Byron A. Garner wryly observe that even though we may have never studied
logic, all of us use syllogistic reasoning. 87 A legal rule typically states that
whenever a generally described prerequisite (P) exists, a certain consequence
(C) applies. The rule thus takes the form of a syllogism: whenever the rule’s
prerequisite (P) is realized in a factual situation (F), then the consequence
(C) applies. This is the major premise. The minor premise is that this factual

83

See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING (1996).
84
See, e.g., KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN (9th ed. 1997); Ok-Tae
Chung, Eine Einführung in die koreanische Rechtskultur und in die Grundzüge des koreanischen Rechtsdenkens, http://www.dkjg.de/download/online1_1.pdf (1989) (Deutsch-Koreanische Juristische Gesellschaft e.V.).
85
VANDEVELDE, supra note 83, at 2.
86
Id. at 19-20, 67-70.
87
ANTONIN SCALIA & BYRON A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 41 (2008). Accord, DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 4 (2001) (“We use
syllogistic every day in our thinking ….”).
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situation (F) fulfills the prerequisite (P), that is, F is a case of P. 88 The
conclusion then logically follows that for the factual situation F,
consequence C applies. Schematically:
P → C (For P—that is, for every case P—C applies)
F = P (F is a case of P)
F → C (For F, C applies).
Typically a rule’s prerequisite consists of more than one element.
Each element may itself require application of other rules to
determine if the prerequisite is satisfied. Only if all elements are
present in a particular case, does the rule apply. 89
The process of rule application thus requires finding substantive
law governing the case (law-finding), finding facts that fulfill a
governing substantive rule (fact-finding) and applying the rule to the
case to produce the consequence mandated by it (law-applying). Thus
rule application brings facts and law together to produce a legal
consequence (often a right or duty). It presupposes that someone has
already made the laws to be applied (lawmaking).
The quoted definition of legal reasoning in the United States is
sufficiently general that we may use it as a reference point for
considering legal reasoning in Germany and Korea as well. There,
too, legal reasoning relies principally, although not exclusively, on
syllogisms for application of law. In German civil procedure the method
for applying law to facts is called the “Relationstechnik,” that is, in English,
literally “relationship technique.” 90 Korean civil procedure has comparable
methods.
Thinking like a lawyer, i.e., syllogistic law application, is not
universally approved. It bewilders some laymen. A recent report on legal
education by the Carnegie Foundation can stand for the general skepticism. 91
Its objection is that legal reasoning “consists in the abstraction of the legally
relevant aspects of situations and persons from their everyday contexts.” The
Report laments that “the rich complexity of actual situations that involves
full dimensional people, let alone the job of thinking through the social

88
See, e.g., Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237, 248 (1866) (“Every action at law to
redress a wrong or enforce a right, if properly instituted, is a syllogism, of which the major
premise is the proposition of law involved, and the minor premise the proposition of fact, and
the judgment the conclusion.”)
89
See V ANDEVELDE supra note 83, at 19; James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A
European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 T ULANE J. I NT ’ L &
C OMP . L. 542, 556 (2007).
90
See James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 113 PENN
STATE L. REV. 469 (2009).
91
See CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
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consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusion, remains outside the
method.” 92
Even American professionals are skeptical of thinking like a lawyer.
Professor Frederick Schauer, in a book intended to support rules, observes
that: “every one of the dominant characteristics of legal reasoning and legal
argument can be seen as a route toward reaching a decision other than the
best all-things considered decision for the matter at hand.” 93 In Germany it is
otherwise. The Latin maxim, justice is the cornerstone of the state: Justitia
est fundamentum regnorum, prevails. Professor Reinhold Zippelius, in a
classic that is counterpart to Schauer’s book, describes justice as an essential
element of laws and legal methods applying law. 94
There should be no need to apologize for thinking like a lawyer.
Thinking like a lawyer helps reach just solutions to legal problems. 95 It is
what makes positive law a constraint on law’s abuse. Those charged with
applying the law, including those subject to the law and applying it in their
daily lives to themselves or to others, cannot easily escape it or bend it to
their own needs when they are required to apply law syllogistically.
A. Sources of Law Generally
In legal reasoning the law provides the major premise, while the facts
furnish the minor one. When the law is self-evident, as ideally it would be all
of the time, legal reasoning can and does revolve around establishing that
minor premise, the facts of the case. Lawyers around the world recognize
that most cases turn on facts.
The principal sources of law in modern legal systems are statutes and
precedents. Statute law consists of rules promulgated by legislatures or by
their delegates (such as regulations adopted by administrative bodies).
Sometimes statutes are integrated together in the form of codes. Precedents
are the legal grounds for decision stated by courts or court-like bodies in
their decisions of individual cases. Precedents as a group constitute case law.
Statute Law
Statutes are designed to govern a multitude of cases. They are of general
application. They are written as rules. They are designed for legal
syllogisms. They are written in abstract terms to cover some classes of cases
and to leave uncovered other classes. They originate in a legislative process.
They are enacted by persons who are politically responsible. They are
92

Id. at 187.
FREDERICK SCHAUER: THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 7 (2009). See Maxeiner, Law without Justice? supra note 82.
94
See REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 13 (2008); see also
Maxeiner, Law without Justice?, supra note 82.
95
Id.
93
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promulgated to provide for the common good. They are to govern the
people. And, they are to apply generally and equally to all.
Well-drafted statutes have many benefits. They legitimate political
decisions. They create comprehensive and effective legal solutions to social
problems. They provide predictability and impose uniformity. They facilitate
their application by drawing bright lines. They prescribe the elements for
rules that they create. They state when they may be invoked, by whom, and
with what consequences. They are published in conveniently accessible and
understandable form. When they coordinate well with each other, they bring
coherence and consistency to the legal system as whole. In short, statutes
inform people of what is expected of them. They should provide legal
certainty.
Precedents (Case Law)
Precedents are decisions of courts that are followed by courts in
deciding later cases. While every precedent is a court decision, not every
court decision is cited as a precedent. Most are not.
Precedents originate not in legislative but in judicial process. Judicial
process determines individual rights in specific cases. Only exceptionally do
precedents arise out of that process. In ordinary cases, beginning with the
court of first instance and continuing to the first appellate level, judicial
decisions are concerned principally with correct application of existing law.
Commonly an appellate court determines that a lower court was right or
wrong in its determination of a question of substantive law or was right or
wrong in its use of existing procedures. Creation of new law or of new
procedures is exceptional and incidental to decisions of particular cases. 96
Appreciation of this distinction—generality versus particularity—helps
understand the respective benefits and detriments of statutes and precedents.
Basically, judicial process is backward looking; legislative process is
forward looking. When, in judicial process, new law is being made, the
effect on future cases assumes importance. 97 Yet even then the law created is
particularist rather than systematic. The new law may address some element
of a syllogism, but rarely does it create new rights requiring totally new
syllogisms. The law created is said to be “interstitial,” that is, it fills in gaps.
A virtue of finding law in precedents is that a precedent can provide a
specific answer to a particular question, while leaving free for later
consideration those issues not then before the court. Precedents can
maximize freedom of future decision while eschewing regulation. They can
permit law to change with time; they can facilitate dealing with changing
social and economic circumstances. They are able to do this thanks to the
96
See Paul D. Carrington, A Critical Assessment of the Cultural and Institutional Roles of
Appellate Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 233-237 (2007).
97
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 155.
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process of “distinguishing” precedents. That is, each precedent is an example
of a legal rule announced being applied to specific facts; when those facts
change, the reason and the applicability of the rule applied in the
precedential case may no longer apply. This flexibility, however, also makes
difficult and time-consuming consulting precedents. The statement of law
found in a precedent alone is not enough; an ideal precedent should also be
based on facts similar to those in the case to which its application is under
consideration. It should reach a similar application.
Even well-crafted precedents cannot provide the benefits that less welldrafted statutes provide. Only exceptionally can precedents legitimate
political decisions. Judges are not expected to make political decisions; they
should not “legislate from the bench.” Even if judges had the expertise and
time available to drafters of legislation, precedents could not create
comprehensive legal solutions to social and economic problems. Precedents
are created by ad hoc resolution of specific issues in particular disputes
before the court. They are not well suited to drawing bright lines or to
prescribing precise elements for norms. Rooted as they are in decisions of
individual controversies, precedents are by their nature uncoordinated. This
is all the more so when they emanate from many courts of many judges
instead of from one court with few judges. Today’s world does not permit of
the small number of courts and of judges that characterized the glory days of
the English common law.
Statutes versus Precedents
There was a time when it was commonplace to see in different sources
of law a principal difference between two great families of systems of law in
the world, i.e., between English-law based common law and Roman-law
based civil law systems. According to this view, common law countries were
governed by precedents, while civil law countries were governed by codes.
Common law judges were bound to decide according to precedents, while
civil judges were required to decide according to codes.
This cliché was never entirely true. Today it has little application to the
three legal systems that we are discussing. In the United States, Germany
and Korea alike, statutes and precedents are recognized sources of law. In
all three statute law is primary and case law is secondary. Differences in
theory drawn from different sources of law are less important in practice
than is commonly supposed. The differences that matter lie less in what are
the sources of law than in how the sources of law are created and utilized in
legal reasoning. These differences we turn to momentarily.
A legal system that relied exclusively on either statutes or precedents
would be incomplete. Societies and economies are constantly changing.
They are changing faster than legislatures can legislate and faster than courts
can decide. While statutes have the virtue of generalizing rules, precedents
have the benefit of particularizing them. Even if societies and economies
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were not changing, human imperfections would require precedents to fill in
statutes. Legislatures cannot foresee and determine all possible cases
beforehand. They cannot abstractly govern all foreseen cases so that none is
overlooked. They cannot use language so precisely that they correctly
classify all cases that they do abstractly decide. Statutes draw outer
boundaries; precedents guide decisions in particular cases. Statutes and
precedents are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. 98
All three of our systems follow precedents in practice despite
differences in theory. In the American system, theory says that precedents
are binding. In the German and Korean systems, theory says that precedents
are not binding. In practice, however, the three systems give most precedents
similar binding effect: precedents are followed, unless there is a good reason
to depart from them. An appellate court is not bound by its own precedents,
but ordinarily follows them. A lower court is expected to and does ordinarily
follow precedents of those courts to which it is subordinated, but is not
required to follow precedents of coordinate courts or of other courts to which
it is not subordinate. Those latter precedents are merely “persuasive”
authority. 99 We now examine these two principal sources of law in each of
our three countries.

B. United States
In the fact that no man knows what the law is, lie two
thirds of the evil of despotism.
New York Times (1858) 100
Statutes in the United States
Although Americans revere common law, they live in “the Age of
Statutes.” 101 Few practicing lawyers spend much of their time finding cases
and distinguishing precedents. They leave such “legal research”—if they
98

See JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 26-31, 157 n. 109 (1986).
99
See VANDEVELDE, supra note at 33; REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 82
(8th ed., 2003), 10th ed., 2006, in English translation, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL
METHODS (Kirk Junker & P. Matthew Roy, transl. 2008) § 13 II; GYOOHO LEE, IN SEARCH OF
THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM: REFLECTIONS ON KOREA’S CIVIL PROCEDURE
THROUGH INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 152 (J.S.D. dissertation, Washington
University in St. Louis, 1998), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656205.
100
Editorial, Our Judiciary—Conflict of the Judges and Uncertainty of the Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov, 10, 1858, at 4.
101
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). See also Peter L.
Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 229 (1998); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (2000).
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need it—to neophyte lawyers. Practicing lawyers have better things to do
with their billable hours. Their day-to-day job consists of finding facts and
applying existing rules—be they rules of statute law or of case law—to those
facts. Clients pay a premium for senior lawyers because senior lawyers
already know the law and are experts in finding facts and applying law to
those facts.
American statutes are uneven in quality. Some federal statutes and some
state statutes, particularly uniform state statutes, are carefully crafted. They
achieve clarity and consistency of content and coordinate well with other
statutes. But many American statutes, perhaps most, do not achieve even a
minimal level of efficacy. “Carefully prepared legislation,” writes Professor
Peter L. Strauss, “is a rarity.” 102 American legislation, he says, instead of
being systematic rules for the population at large, sometimes is just another
way of resolving private disputes or of achieving private goals. 103
In well-functioning legal systems the pieces fit well together. Individual
rules do not contradict each other. One definition serves for most purposes.
Conflicting rights and duties are reduced or ideally avoided altogether. That
American legislation often fails this test was stunningly proven by the 2000
election. A constitutional crisis was created because two statutes of the state of
Florida commanded inconsistent ways of counting votes.
Precedents in the United States
Precedents are little systematized when they are not based on statutes.
They are thousands of points of light; every year many thousands of new
ones are added to the inventory. Thanks to the ingenuity of American
publishers, beginning even before the index-digest systems of the nineteenth
century and continuing well into today’s computer-assisted searching, it has
been easy to find not just one, but many precedents on just about any point.
The numerosity of precedents results in the importance of any one precedent
being determined less by the strength of the precedent’s reasoning and more
by the place of the rendering court in the judicial hierarchy relative to the
court considering it. A lower court is bound by a decision of appellate courts
that review its decisions, especially when those decisions are recent. It is less
bound by older decisions or by decisions of courts that do not review its
cases. 104
The uncertainty that results from so many precedents of so many courts
is exacerbated by the form of federalism practiced in the United States. In
most areas of American law, state law controls. This means that courts of
fifty different states generate precedents. If a particular question is not
102

Strauss, supra note 101, at 231.
Id. at 243.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 53. (discussing how to “master the relative weight
of precedent.”).
103
104
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resolved in the law of the state where a lawsuit is pending, lawyers are
expected to examine the law in other states to help determine how the state
where the law is unsettled would resolve the issue.
Preeminence of Statutes
Statutes have had preeminence in American law for over a century. In
the nineteenth century the United States debated codification, that is,
systematizing all law into codes. The two principal protagonists were David
Dudley Field, Jr., author of New York’s Code of Civil Procedure or 1848,
and James C. Carter. 105 Carter defeated Field’s codes, but he could not defeat
statutes. Over Carter’s objection and at Field’s insistence the American Bar
Association resolved in 1886: “The law itself should be reduced, so far as its
substantive principles are settled, to the form of a statute.” 106 When Carter’s
book, Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function appeared in 1907, Roscoe
Pound dismissed it as out of touch with a day in which “legislation is the
source, the form and the formulating agency ....” of our rules. 107 Today
Americans live in “an Age of Statutes.” 108 They debate how much room
statutes leave for judicial lawmaking. 109 They still pine for the common
law. 110 Many legal educators remain wedded to common law methods and
give statutes short shrift. 111 Despite a century of domination of statutes,
American lawyers still do not know how to “deal with statutes.” 112

B. Germany
The statute is the friend of the weak.
Friedrich Schiller (1803) 113
105

Field’s writings, other than the codes themselves, are collected in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (3 vols., 1884, 1890). Carter’s classic
contemporary challenges to codification are THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON
LAW (1884); THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW (1889); and THE
IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL IN THE LAW (1890), reprinted in 13 A.B.A. REP. 305 (1890) and in 24
AM. L. REV. 752 (1890).
106
REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 74 (1886).
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Roscoe Pound, Review, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 317, 320 (1909).
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See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 15 (2008).
110
See RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD (1997).
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LEGAL REASONING (2009). See also James R. Maxeiner, Law Without Justice, Do the Right
Thing and Reform Legal Reasoning, forthcoming (2010-2011).
112
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982). See also James R. Maxeiner,
Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41
VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 517, 527-534 (2006).
113
DIE BRAUT VON MESSINA 51 (1803).
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Statutes in Germany
In Germany, the statute—das Gesetz—is the fundamental concept of all law.
It is the central category of legal thinking. It is the primary source of law. It is the
basis for legal certainty. The statute is a legal norm. It is a rule of law. Taken
together, rules form an abstract and objective legal order that governs behavior.
Rules are interrelated; they form a system. While it may be that the ideal cannot
be realized, the goal is a system organized as if a single plan governed. Different
laws should mesh with each other—none should command contrary action.
Inconsistency among norms should be avoided. 114 Among statutes, the national
code has first place, subject, of course to the German constitution (Grundgesetz,
Basic Law) and European Union law.
A preconception common among American lawyers is a belief that civil law
judges apply law mechanically without giving thought to whether results are just
or accord with purposes of the statutes that they apply. This prejudice is
fallacious; the German constitution commands the contrary. Its Article 20 binds
judges to law and justice (Gesetz und Recht).115 In German understanding, in a
democracy, statutes are followed, or at least tolerated, only if they are consistent
with ideas of justice. Formal adoption by parliament is not enough. Every statute,
therefore, must have a minimum connection to justice. At the very least, it must
not contradict basic ideas of justice. Because statutes are binding on the
executive and the judiciary, it is essential that they mirror justice in substance and
in application as much as is reasonably possible. Judges, in applying statutes, are
responsible for assuring that results are in accordance with statutory purposes
and justice. 116
In Germany drafting of legislation is subject to quality control. A
commonplace in the United States—that a third party drafts a law and finds a
lone legislator to introduce it in the legislature—cannot happen in Germany.
German parliamentary procedure requires that at least five percent of legislators
join in proposing legislation. 117
Precedents in Germany

114

See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal
Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 556-558 (2007).
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20(1). The translation “law and justice” is that of
Christian Tomuschat and David Kurrie as revised by Christian Tomuschat and David P.
Kommers in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag and published by
the German Federal Ministry of Justice in 2010, available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#GGengl_000P20. Gesetz might be translated “statute”
and Recht “law.”
116
See Maxeiner, Law without Justice?, supra note 82.
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See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal
Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 542, 562-567 (2007).
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Long ago the German legal system abandoned the ideal of a gap-free
statutory legal order. There is no question whether there are precedents, there is
only a question of their extent. Within an existing framework of statutes, judges
may and do fill gaps. “The judicial decision then fills this gap according to the
standards of practical reason and the ‘community’s well-founded general ideas of
justice.’”118

C. Korea
In Korea there has been enormous progress toward a
consolidation of the Rule of Law. … The existing regime of
law had to be transformed to meet the rising needs of the
people for a renovated, rational system of governance. The
changes took place basically in three directions: (1) legislative
innovations propelled by the government; (2) development of
case law through vitalized law-finding activities of the courts;
and (3) growing demand and pressure from the people for
Rule of Law in Public Administration.
Professor Dr. jur. (Göttingen) Joon-Hyung Hong 119
Statutes in Korea
Korea, like Germany, has a civil law tradition; statutes are the primary
source of law. The judge’s role is to interpret those statutes and to apply them
to concrete cases. 120
Korean treatment of statutes is between the untidy American treatment
and the more systematic German approach. In traditional Korean law,
statutes concerned principally punishment. During the Japanese occupation
statutes were edicts of Japanese occupiers. Only in the 1960s did Korean
laws become subject to academic analysis. As a result, to this day in Korea
there is less attention to abstract theories and less predictability in judicial
interpretation of statutes than in Germany.
Korean civil procedure is less subject to criticism for mechanical
judging than is German procedure. The Korean constitution’s counterpart to
118

Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 14 February 1973 (“Soraya”), BVerfGE 34,
269, 287, as translated in Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Statutory Interpretation in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 73, 80 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
119
The Rule of Law and Its Acceptance in Asia: A View from Korea, in THE RULE OF LAW:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM (Mansfield Center for Public Affairs, 2000), available at
http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/rol/rol_perspectives.htm,
120
§ 1 Korean Civil Code. See Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 156-162, 165;
LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 152-153.
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Article 20 of the German constitution (binding judges to statute and justice),
Article 103, binds judges to statute and conscience: “Judges shall rule
independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the
Constitution and Act.”121 Korean judicial practice is mindful of what is termed
“appropriateness in the concrete.” Put simply, judges are required “to think
of who must win apart from the superficial logic.” 122 Korean jurists are more
likely to apologize for uncertainty of law’s application than for it being
overly mechanical.
Precedents in Korea
As in Germany, while Korean courts are not bound to follow
interpretations of other courts, generally they do. Lower courts are loath to
deviate from precedents of appellate courts to which they are subordinated, for
fear that they may be reversed. Even where they need not fear reversal, in
common law and civil law countries alike lower courts often follow decisions of
other courts. Economic efficiency explains why. The principal role of judges is
finding and interpreting law and applying that law to facts in particular cases.
Following precedents serves legal systems generally through reducing caseloads
that judges must hear by making legal decisions foreseeable. Following
precedents serves judges individually by reducing their own costs of decision
and of judicial administration.123
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, translation of the Constitutional Court of Korea,
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/.
122
Chaewong Lim, A Study on the Target of Avoidance in Korean Bankruptcy Law: When There
is No Debtor’s Action, 7 J. KOREAN L. 333, 344-345 n. 24 (2008).
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C H APT E R 3
L AW Y E R S AND L E G AL S Y ST E M S:
A C C E SS T O J UST I C E

Early American Christian Tract (1827)

124

Deciding to bring a lawsuit is a difficult decision. One should make
every effort to avoid going to court. Even someone who “wins” a lawsuit, as
measured by legal outcome, may lose more in time, energy and in damaged
personal relations than the victory is worth. In all three of our legal systems
lawyers advise: sue only if a lawsuit cannot be avoided.
Mary Roh has reached that point. She has decided to sue. Most likely,
that means she needs to find a lawyer. While a lay person might present a
small case to a court without being represented by a lawyer, in a civil case of
consequence, such as we have here, a lawyer is a practical necessity; in
Germany, it is a legal requirement. In this chapter we consider when one
needs a lawyer and how one goes about finding and engaging one. We then
consider the legal systems within which they operate.

124
Simon Greenleaf (attributed), To a Person Engaged in a Lawsuit, 6 PUBS. AM. TRACT SOC.
No. 168 (1827). Greenleaf was the leading authority on evidence law in nineteenth century
America and professor at Harvard Law School.
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Even before Roh decides to sue, she may find a lawyer helpful to
negotiate a settlement. Ordinarily parties try to settle disputes without suing.
Introducing the right lawyer may make John Doh, Jr. realize that Roh is
serious about the dispute and is thinking about suing. On the other hand,
introducing the wrong lawyer could undermine settlement. Roh will decide
whether and when to use a lawyer based on convenience, cost and other
personal considerations.
Once Roh decides to use a lawyer, whether in the United States,
Germany or Korea, she is likely to follow a similar approach to finding one.
Most likely, she will speak first with friends and business contacts that have
used lawyers. If she is sophisticated, she will look for someone who has
experience with lawyers in lawsuits. She might consult listings of lawyers
maintained by local or national bar associations, i.e., associations of lawyers
themselves. She might do her own hunting through visits to the Internet sites
of possible lawyers. She is not likely to rely on media advertising. While in
the United States there is much lawyer advertising, most of that is for
plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking high-award personal injury, contingent-fee
litigation. Below we discuss contingent fee (i.e., success-based)
arrangements.
In finding a lawyer Roh has an advantage that other potential litigants do
not have: she already has had dealings with lawyers, or at least the company
that she controls has. In the United States, where litigation practice is usually
separate from corporate counseling, the company’s lawyer is not likely to
take on lawsuit representation personally, but if the lawyer is part of
corporate law firm, the firm almost certainly will. The firm’s corporate
clients are an essential source of business for lawyers who handle lawsuits. If
the lawyer is independent of a firm, the lawyer will feel a responsibility to
find suitable counsel. In Germany and Korea, Roh Honda’s regular lawyer
might personally take on Roh’s case. Usually there is no conflict of interest
in the company’s lawyer taking on responsibilities for a company executive,
particularly in a small “closely-held” company where management and share
owners are the same. In our hypothetical, Mary Roh has as her lawyer, Harry
Hahn, whose firm regularly represents Roh Honda.
Specialization in law, as in other fields of human endeavor, can be
desirable. The specialist is familiar with the tasks involved. Experience can
contribute to handling those tasks more efficiently and more effectively.
Specialization among lawyers has proceeded farther in the United States than
it has in either Germany or Korea. In the United States conducting lawsuits
(“litigation”) is a specialty. General corporate lawyers might handle smaller
matters (say less than $100,000) in their initial stages, but are not likely to
take sole responsibility for larger matters or for taking even smaller matters
to court. In Germany and Korea, where judges have greater responsibility for
conduct of proceedings and opportunities for lawyer-missteps are fewer,
there is less specialization in litigation, although even still, there are trends
toward greater specialization in practice. This trend is particularly evident in
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criminal procedure, where most criminal work is done by criminal law
specialists in all three of our countries.
What will lawyer Hahn do for Roh? Before commencing litigation,
Hahn will evaluate the case to help Roh decide whether bringing the lawsuit
is worth it. That involves not only evaluating its legal merits, but also
predicting the likelihood of success and estimating the costs and risks.
Assuming that Roh decides that it is worth bringing a lawsuit, Hahn will help
her decide in which court to bring the case and against which parties. Hahn
will make a tentative application of law to the facts as they are known to
Roh. That requires that Hahn determine which law is likely to govern the
case, and which defendant(s) are likely to be liable to Roh. Hahn will explain
the process and the litigation risks. In the court proceedings the lawyer will
represent Roh to the court and to the other parties to the proceedings. The
lawyer will help present Roh’s case to the court.
In this chapter we describe the diversity of personnel that handle the
machinery of justice. These differences profoundly affect fulfillment of the
promises of the open courts clause: decisions according to law, with access
for all, reached efficiently and without delay.
What is the principal difference among our legal professions? In short
form: the American legal system is organized by the bar, that is, by private
lawyers. The bar largely determines the structures of court procedures. It
runs the legal system as a service for clients who have particular needs. The
German and the Korean legal systems, on the other hand, are run, by German
state and federal ministries of justice, and by the Korean Supreme Court.
These government bodies treat provision of justice as a public service that
should be available to all members of the public. One might say that the
American bar runs a taxi service, while the German and Korean governments
run public transit systems.

A. United States
The machinery by which justice is wrought out has
always been, and must forever remain, the creation of
the profession. … No one thinks of challenging the
right of the bar to determine the methods of which
the remedies affecting the profoundest concerns of
life shall be administered.
Charles M. Wilds,
Address Before the Vermont State Bar Association
(1894) 125
125

AN ADDRESS ON COMMON LAW PLEADINGS, BEFORE THE VERMONT BAR ASSOCIATION,
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1. Access to Justice in the United States
Pro Se Representation
In the United States and in Korea, Roh is not required to use a lawyer to
bring her lawsuit. By law she is required to do so in Germany. In the United
States and in Korea Roh could represent herself and proceed, as it is termed,
pro se. Federal law, first adopted in section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
permits her in federal court to “plead and conduct [her] own case[]
personally.” 126 While the right to proceed pro se is said to be “a basic right
of a free people,” 127 and is constitutionally protected in criminal cases, its
rationale today is more pragmatic: to provide theoretical access to justice.
In the United States, with limited exceptions, there is no right to courtprovided lawyers in civil cases. 128 The right to proceed alone, without a
lawyer, i.e. pro se, is thus essential to participating in legal proceedings.
Were there no right to pro se representation, the United States would either
have to provide indigent parties with legal representation as Germany does
(civil legal aid), or deny people the right to be heard. As it is, without a right
to civil legal aid, the indigent are left to public or private charity; only a few
get lawyers. Most have only the choice to proceed pro se or not at all.
If the right to be heard is to be meaningful, and if legal aid is not
provided, then the legal system should be so fashioned as to be usable to
parties without lawyers. To compensate for a lack of civil legal aid and to
promote access to courts, there have been efforts in the United States to
facilitate pro se representation. Some federal courts provide clinics and
websites to assist pro se litigants. Well intentioned that those projects are,
they are destined to fail unless the system is reconfigured to anticipate pro se
litigation. Lawyer-free litigation is not likely to work in any but the most
mundane of American lawsuits. Complex cases call for competent legal
counsel if only because procedures are complicated.
Relying on pro se representation to increase access to justice challenges
fulfillment of other promises of the open courts clause. While parties
ordinarily have the best knowledge of the facts, they have little knowledge of
law and no experience in the system’s process for applying law to facts. If
self-representation is to be successful in American courts, it practically
requires that courts assist pro se litigants in ways that they have not
previously assisted parties; it pushes courts to provide new services to such
parties. 129
126

28 U.S.C. § 1654.
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Permitting parties to represent themselves burdens, rather than assists
judges in applying law to facts. 130 It denies judges the assistance of trained
counsel while it practically compels them to be active in litigation to assure
that justice is done. Otherwise the side represented by a lawyer will prevail
over the party without one. The American Poet Laureate Robert Frost is
supposed to have said “A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide
who has the better lawyer.” 131
While American litigants are not legally required to use lawyers, the
passive role of the judge practically compels them to do so. Few plaintiffs in
the position of Mary Roh represent themselves: it is too difficult, it distracts
too much from daily life, and it puts too much at risk, not just in asserting
claims, but in resisting counterclaims. In the American federal courts about
10% of civil non-prisoner cases are brought pro se. 132
Civil Legal Aid
Civil legal aid in litigation is the provision of a lawyer or other legal
professional to a party who is unable to provide for his or her own lawyer.
Around the world civil legal aid takes many forms. The legal aid lawyer or
legal professional may be from a legal aid office that exclusively conducts
legal aid cases, a law student from a legal aid clinic, a lawyer from private
practice chosen by the party but paid by the court, or a lawyer from private
practice chosen by the party or appointed by the court to work for no fee
(pro bono). In the United States, all forms of civil legal aid combined
support only a small percentage of those in need.
The United States is said to stand almost alone among modern states in
its near total failure to provide civil legal aid. 133 Other countries recognize
that legal aid is fundamental to realizing equal justice under law. Equal
justice under law is compromised when financial considerations compel
parties to forgo legal rights.
Americans have long recognized that legal aid is important for access to
justice. In 1876 German immigrants founded America’s first organization
dedicated to using private resources to provide legal aid. 134 In the early
130
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twentieth century legal aid began to achieve political recognition. In 1908
William Howard Taft, the only person ever to serve both as President of the
United States and as Chief Justice of the United States, pointed to the ill
effects that the costs of litigation were having for the poor. 135 In 1919
Reginald Heber Smith published what remains the legal aid classic: Justice
and the Poor. In 1920 the American Bar Association established a Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants” and named Charles
Evans Hughes, later Supreme Court Justice, as its first chair.
In the 1960s proponents of a legal right to legal aid achieved success
when the United States Supreme Court found a constitutional right to legal
aid in criminal prosecutions in the iconic case of Gideon v. Wainright. 136
Today Americans speak of a comparable right in civil matters as “civil
Gideon.” 137 Civil Gideon still eludes the United States despite repeated
efforts to achieve it. Litigation based on the open courts clause has failed to
achieve recognition of a constitutional right to counsel. 138 Legislation
recognizing a limited right may be making headway. In 2006 the American
Bar Association resolved that legislatures should adopt statutes mandating
legal aid in a small class of cases “where basic human needs are at stake ….”
In 2010 it adopted a Model Access Act and Basic Principles of a Right to
Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings providing for a legal right to counsel so
limited. 139 For the Association’s proposals to be effective, legislatures must
adopt them.
Among principal obstacles to substantial legal aid in the United States
have been (1) fear and (2) cost.
Fear. Legislators are not anxious to give money to anyone, but they fear
giving legal aid to the poor particularly. They worry that the poor will make
instrumental uses of the American legal system. Their fear manifests itself in
restrictions that they impose on such legal aid as they do provide. One
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supporter of legal aid observes that countries that provide extensive legal aid
do not rely on courts for law reform. 140
Cost. Cost may be a still more important obstacle to a legal right to legal
aid. 141 The costs of American litigation are high: beyond what even the welloff can afford. American law, both litigation and counseling, is timeconsuming. Clients pay for the inefficiencies of the system. To fund legal aid
completely could cause, as it is reported to have done in England, an
overhaul of the system of civil justice.
Mary Roh is too well-off to qualify for the limited legal aid available in
America. She, like most people in the middle class, must pay the ordinary
charges. We turn now to those fees.
2. The Cost of Lawyer Representation in the United States
If the American Mary Roh uses a lawyer in her lawsuit, she will pay a
price that her counterparts in Germany and Korea will not pay. That price
does not stop with higher fees. Unless she is able to obtain contingent fee
representation, she will have to pay the fees all herself, even if she wins the
case. The practice that each party must bear his or her own attorneys’ fees is
usually called the “American rule.” Since it is based on no rule, but is only a
practice, we refer to it as the “no indemnity practice.” 142 In Germany and in
Korea (and in most modern systems), plaintiffs who bring claims that courts
affirm are right, are entitled to some indemnity for their attorneys’ fees from
the losers who resisted their rightful claims. Here we refer to this rule as the
“loser pays rule.”
American No Indemnity Practice
The American practice of no indemnity means that the American Mary
Roh, even if she “wins” her lawsuit, after paying lawyers’ fees, will take
home less—perhaps much less—than $75,000. How much less no one can
say with certainty. In the best case, she might end up with $70,000 if Doh
does not resist the claim. If she manages to use a lawyer who agrees to a
contingent fee, but Doh contests, she might end up with as much as $40,000.
140
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In the worst of cases, if Doh vigorously defends the action and uses all the
tools the system places at his disposal, Mary Roh might end up owing her
lawyer more money than the $75,000 she wins. As we shall see in Chapter 6,
the American system puts lawyers in charge of litigation and allows them to
determine just how much time (and fees) they put into the case. Without
control of costs, and in the absence of a loser pays system, defense counsel,
through a vigorous defense, can render a $75,000 claim valueless. In Chapter
8 we compare likely outcomes in the United States, Germany and Korea.
To a foreign jurist the American result is “incredible, strange, terrible
and intolerable.” One eminent émigré, Albert A. Ehrenzweig, lamented that
the United States “which has taken it on itself to play the decisive role in
building the Rule of Law throughout the world, has forgotten the little man
in his struggle for civil justice.” 143
Ehrenzweig, an Austrian judge who became a law professor in the
United States, spoke out “in sorrow and in anger” because the loser pays rule
has the logic of right on its side. A plaintiff begins a lawsuit because a
defendant, the plaintiff alleges, has failed to pay an obligation that is owed as
right. If the court finds the plaintiff right, then justice requires that the
defendant pay those expenses which defendant in effect imposed on plaintiff
by refusing the justified demand. Otherwise, plaintiff gets back less than the
right claimed.
The founders of American civil procedure recognized this logic of
right. 144 Loser pays provided the rule in parts of the United States through
the nineteenth century. 145 It continues unquestioned to provide the rule when
court costs, and not attorneys’ fees, are assessed. Loser pays, if the loser is
defendant, is the rule under many statutes. But today as a general rule
applicable to plaintiffs and defendants alike it survives only in Alaska.
How can it be that the United States is almost alone among modern
nations in not having a loser-pays rule for lawyers’ fees as well? 146
One explanation for the absence of the loser pays rule is that United
States has no ministry of justice (as in Germany) or no supreme court (as in
143
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Korean) that looks out for the interests of parties to lawsuits. The bar, quite
naturally, tends first to its own interests. Only long after no indemnity
became routine practice, did American lawyers offer the rationalization that
no indemnity facilitates access to justice. 147 Legal rights, these lawyers say,
are uncertain; no one should be penalized for asking a court what those
rights are. 148
Such access to courts that the American practice of no indemnity
facilitates is inefficient and unfair to those with righteous claims. It denies
full compensation to all parties in order to benefit only a few parties with
“plausible” claims. By most accounts the American practice encourages
parties to bring marginal or even frivolous lawsuits, since parties suffer little
risk in suing. 149
Replacing the American practice with a loser-pays rule would face
practical and political obstacles. Loser pay rules work when fees shifted are
modest and are proportionate to amounts in dispute. In Germany, as we shall
see, total legal fees for both sides of a lawsuit are usually well below the fees
for one side in the United States. To maintain modest levels German civil
justice imposes statutory limits on total fees that may be recovered. In the
United States, the practicing bar is politically powerful: it opposes the
occasional proposal to bring back loser-pays. 150
Calculating Lawyers’ Fees
In the United States payment arrangements are private contracts
between lawyers and their clients. While there are some legal limitations on
legal fees, there are no statutory fee schedules such as one finds in Germany
and Korea.
In American litigation two approaches to payment predominate:
contingent fee and hourly billing. Sometimes the two are combined. In
contingent fee arrangements plaintiffs pay little or nothing—sometimes not
even court fees and out-of-pocket expenses—but then grant to lawyers a
percentage of the amounts recovered. Typically those percentages are
between 33% and 50%. In some states statutes or professional regulations
limit these percentages. In hourly billing arrangements plaintiffs and
defendants pay their lawyers charges that typically range from $150 to $500
147
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or more per hour depending on market factors. Flat-rate billing—used in
some areas of legal services in the United States and the norm in litigation in
Germany and Korea—is unusual in civil cases.
Contingent fees. By their nature self-funding contingent fee
arrangements are available only to plaintiffs, since defendants ordinarily
recover no damages from which they could compensate their lawyers.
Defendants can, of course, make their payment of fees incurred in defense
contingent on success.
Practically contingent fee arrangements are not available to all plaintiffs.
Most plaintiffs are not attractive contingent fee clients: their cases are too
uncertain, potential costs are too high, or the relief sought will not generate
money (e.g., an order for child custody). Most lawyers are loath to take on
contingent fee clients except in high-value cases for individuals (e.g., severe
personal injury cases) or in extremely simple commercial cases (e.g.,
uncontested unpaid invoices). Their reluctance to represent means that
parties unable to pay high-hourly charges and accept the risk of loss,
practically are prevented from bringing lawsuits at all.
Roh has an ordinary case that is neither high value nor as simple as an
unpaid invoice. Particularly in a high-cost urban area, she may have
difficulty finding a lawyer willing to work on a contingent fee basis. The
potential lawyer will assess her as a possible witness and evaluate the
complexity of the case (to estimate how much time it might require). Her
company’s corporate law firm is unlikely to represent her on a contingent fee
basis. If she is lucky, Hahn might accept a mixed form of representation, i.e.,
a lower-hourly rate in exchange for a percentage fee contingent on any
recovery.
Retainer fees and hourly rates. If Roh is unable to obtain contingent
fee representation, her lawyer is likely to require her to make what is called a
“retainer” payment of typically around $5,000 to $10,000. Depending upon
their representation agreement, the lawyer might deduct his or her charges as
incurred from the retainer, or might hold it in reserve just in case Roh fails to
pay the lawyer’s bills when they come due.
Legal expenses insurance. While there have been attempts to provide
legal insurance in the United States, these have found little application in
providing insurance to plaintiffs. What may be the largest provider of legal
expenses insurance in the United States is ARAG Legal Solutions, a
subsidiary of the German firm Allgemeine Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs
Aktien Gesellschaft. 151
3. R epresenting R oh in the United States: I s a L awsuit Worth it for R oh?
Inevitably Roh will get around to talking with her lawyer Hahn about
the expense of representation. He will remind her of all of the collateral costs
151

See www.araggroup.com.

54

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

of the lawsuit in terms of her lost time, possible lost time of employees,
frustrations and so on. Then he will be sure to establish his fee arrangement
with her. They might have a conversation such as the following one found in
a teaching text for law practice and slightly modified to meet our case:
Hahn: We’ll file a complaint and thereafter prosecute this suit vigorously through trial,
correct?
Roh: Exactly.
Hahn: I’ll want to meet with you at least once more before we file any papers with the
court to talk more specifically about how I think we ought to proceed. But earlier you
asked about my fees, and I think I know enough now to five you a general estimate
based on what I know at this point. I’ll handle this on an hourly basis; my fee is $300.00
an hour. Some of the work can be handled by my paralegal assistant, whose hourly
rate is $100.00 an hour. I estimate that I’ll need to spend about 70 to 100 hours to get
ready for a possible trial, though it could go higher if the other side is obstinate and I
have to get court orders requiring them to give me material that they should turn over
voluntarily. My estimate includes taking or attending 3-4 depositions. Other fees will be
court costs, costs of the deposition transcripts, and a few other miscellaneous costs for
a pretrial total of $4,000. If the court decides in our favor, as I suspect it will, we will be
able to recoup those [court] costs from the other side. In light of all this, I suggest an
initial retainer of $10,000.00. I’ll bill you monthly if and when the retainer is used up.
Does that sound OK?
Roh: I guess so. Of course, I wish it weren’t so expensive but I guess that’s the way
things go these days. This a probably a dumb question, but I assume that if the case
settles in just a few hours, I’d get the unused part of the retainer back?
Hahn: Of course. You only pay for the time I actually spend. At the same time,
remember that if he does take the case to trial, the number of hours that I have to
spend may go way up. If that starts to happen, I’ll let you know. One other thing that I’m
ethically required to inform you of is that should you fall too far behind in your
payments, I may have to withdraw as your counsel. I’m sure that won’t happen, but it’s
something you should be aware of. Do you have any other questions? 152

The client in the text cited had no further questions, but our Mary Roh does.
We add them here:
Roh: Yes. I have two questions. First of all, what will your total fee be? At $300 an hour
and seventy hours, we are talking $21,000, and that doesn’t count—you said—
paralegal time or trial or trial preparation time?
Hahn: Oh, I am sorry. I should have mentioned that you will also have to pay the
court’s filing fee. It’s $350, no matter how big or small your claim is. But at least you will
get that back if you win.
Roh: That’s no big deal. But can’t you give me at least an approximation of what your
fee will be, say, something between $15,000 and $18,000?
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Hahn: I am sorry, but I cannot tell you what my total fee will be. I will do all that I can do
to keep my fee down. I won’t take any depositions more than are absolutely necessary:
I think we can get by with just taking John Doh, Jr.’s deposition, although, depending
upon how the facts turn out, we may have to take the deposition of his father, John
Doh., St., or of someone at DohSon Honda LL.C. Unfortunately in contested litigation, it
is impossible to predict beforehand how much work will be needed. It all depends on
how the case develops and how John Doh, Jr. and his lawyer pursue the case. We
don’t know what claims they will make. It would not be fair to either of us were I to
charge you a flat rate. I might take less time; I might take more than I predict.
Roh: That’s troubling you cannot give me at least an approximate figure on the total,
but, you said that if we win, we get the costs back. That includes your fee, right?
Hahn: No.
Roh: No? What do you mean, then, that your fee depends upon how the case
develops? Can’t you see to it that we don’t waste time? Isn’t this case basically just a
question whether the judge believes me or John, Jr.? Can’t you fast forward the
process?
Hahn: You may be right and you may ultimately prevail, but the process does not allow
us to “fast forward” to the end game. You will be forced to bear the cost and burden of
litigation until you have an opportunity—at the trial—to present the evidence that will
show Doh is liable. And if you win, although Doh will owe you $75,000, you will have no
153
ability to recover from anyone what you have spent in lawyers’ fees.
As a plaintiff, though, you are better off, we lawyers believe, with this American
practice. If we did what they do in other countries, if you lost, you would have to pay not
only my fee, but also the fee of the lawyer.
Roh: Better off? I am not so sure. It sounds like, that at the end of the day, from the
$75,000 that John Jr. owes me, I will be lucky to end up with only $50,000; if I am
unlucky, it might get only $25,000 or nothing at all.
Hahn: I am afraid so. That is why, if he makes a settlement offer after the complaint for
as little as $10,000, we should give it consideration. For the moment, go ahead and fill
out the information sheet that I gave you to prepare for our next meeting. That is
Wednesday at 2:00. You don’t have to give me the retainer until then. Take the time to
think about whether you want to go ahead.
Roh: I will.

We now consider the people who make up the American legal system.
4. Legal Professions in the United States
Americans lawyers and judges by and large value the legal system, and
their roles in it, instrumentally, that is, as a means for resolving concrete
disputes and achieving specific goals. It is the role of the judge in the
153
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American system to preside over a clash of competing interests and to clarify
what is the law that governs the dispute’s resolution. The role of the
advocate is to find a way to the client’s desired resolution through shaping of
the law, the facts, and the judgment of the dispute. American lawyers like to
think of themselves as “social engineers” and as “problem solvers”; judges
revel in the role of making political decisions.
The trial lawyer embodies this public persona of the jurist in the United
States. The lawyer-advocate is both hero and scourge: hero as champion of
the underdog doing justice, scourge as the “hired gun” of the rich or as the
“shyster” promoting frivolous lawsuits. 154
Lawyers
The practicing bar dominates the professions of law in the United States.
It measures jurists largely by the practical results that they as lawyers
achieve for their clients and for themselves. Leading lawyers are typically
high-powered litigation lawyers in smaller litigation boutiques (fifty or fewer
lawyers) or business lawyers in huge law firms (many hundreds of lawyers).
These lawyers, while the best remunerated, are only a small fraction of the
more than one million lawyers in the United States. The United States has
among the highest per capita number of lawyers of all legal systems.
Although the bar oversees the professions of law, it takes little direct
care for the development of lawyers and judges. Unlike the bars in other
countries, it provides no formal apprentice training to aspiring lawyers.
While its role in legal education is limited, it is a controlling one. The
accrediting body for law schools is the Council of the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association. State
attorneys general and education departments have little say over legal
education. State Supreme Courts have more.
While bar associations supervise practice, they are ill-suited to bring
about substantive changes. They lack the political clout or the continuity of
leadership of a German state or federal ministry of justice or of the Korean
Supreme Court. Of course they are outside the government; many leadership
positions are for only one year. For example, the Constitution of the
American Bar Association permits a President in his or life to serve only a
one year term. It is not surprising that American bar associations produce
progressive position papers but often have difficulty realizing them.
American lawyers are advocates for their clients. Robert W. Gordon, a
long-time student of the legal profession, has stated comparative perspective
the extent of that devotion in a manner that many American lawyers might
find objectionable:

154

For an illustration of a shyster bringing a frivolous lawsuit, see 40 PUCK No. 1169 (July 17,
1899), reprinted in Maxeiner, Cost and Fee Allocation, supra note 142 at 220.

57

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

Compared to other nations’ legal professions, the American legal
profession has always stressed lawyers’ duties to their clients over
duties to the courts, legal system, third parties or the public interest.
As late as the 1980s, lawyers’ rhetoric continued to celebrate the
contrasting ideal of the lawyer as a high minded independent
counselor as well as an adversary or hired gun who steers his client
in the paths of legality and warns of adverse consequences if the
client strays. Yet as a practical matter the bar’s ethics rules and
informal norms aligned lawyers’ interests almost entirely with those
of clients and—most of all—other lawyers. Successive revisions of
the bar’s ethics codes, such as the ABA’s Model Code of 1969 and
Model Rules of 1983, made fidelity to clients mandatory; lawyers
should keep quiet even if the client were about to commit crime or
fraud, unless they believed the criminal act was ‘likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.’ 155 Duties to the courts
remained vague and mostly unenforced; duties to the public were
hortatory and optional. 156
Judges
In the United States, as in other common law countries, judges do not
begin their careers as judges. Typically they come from the practicing bar in
mid-career. They begin judicial service without any formal training as
judges. They are not subject to probationary appointments. Some are
appointed for life: others are appointed for a term of years and are subject to
re-election or confirmation in office. After appointment few must undergo
judicial training or are subject to continuing judicial training requirements.
Some voluntarily participate in training programs lasting a few days. None
undergo professional training comparable to that required of their
counterparts in Germany or Korea. 157 Those German and Korean programs
resemble the residency programs all American physicians undergo.
In American legal lore, judges are heroes. The heroes among judges are
not judges who conduct trials, but judges who make law in appellate courts.
In recent years, as federal constitutional law has achieved ascendency, these
heroes are invariably federal appellate judges and most of them are justices
of the United States Supreme Court.
The focus on lawmaking and on federal judges has effects for ordinary
cases. It has long been an adage of American law: “don’t make a federal case
of it.” Some federal judges disdain the routine of applying law to facts and
155
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yearn for the novelty of path-breaking, society-shaping decisions. Many
federal judges do not welcome additions to their ranks, even though more
judges would assist in lightening their workloads, for they fear that more
judges will dilute their status.
Federal judges enjoy material support shared by few judges elsewhere in
the world. Not only are their salaries among the highest for judges in the
world, the accouterments of their offices, in terms of support staff and office
facilities, for judges of the lowest courts, exceed those of justices of some of
the world’s supreme courts.
The practicing bar has embedded its measures of lawyer quality into
selection standards for judges. In federal appointments historically a
committee of the American Bar Association has rated judicial nominees. The
committee prefers nominees who are successful litigation lawyers (trial
lawyers are too rare to insist on) and successful business lawyers. The bar’s
success is remarkably revealed in the Annual Report of the Chief Justice of
the United States for 2006.
In the 2006 report the Chief Justice of the United States worried that the
nature of the federal judiciary is changing, because federal judges “are no
longer drawn primarily from among the best lawyers in the practicing bar.”
While a half century ago, he noted, two-thirds of new federal judges came
from private practice, today only 40% do. Ominously, he reported, some
50% of new federal judges come from prior work as judges (as magistrates
or as state judges, presumably), while another 10% come from some other
form of federal service.
The Chief Justice attributed the shift from relying on the practicing bar
to relying on people experienced in the public sector to a “dramatic erosion
of judicial compensation” that “will inevitably result in a decline in the
quality of persons willing to accept lifetime appointment as a federal judge.”
The situation, he observed, has reached a “level of crisis.” Federal judges, he
noted, have not been treated fairly. The sacrifice that they must make is too
great. 158 The thousand judges of the District Courts have salaries of about
$170,000 a year, the same as Congressmen receive, while the three hundred
judges of the Courts of Appeal receive salaries of about $180,000 a year.
The eight Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court have
salaries of about $210,000, while the Chief Justice himself gets paid a bit
more. 159 Those incomes, particularly for district and appellate judges, would
be considered high in Germany and Korea and are suggestive of the high
status of federal judges in the United States. Salaries and status in state
courts varies more and are not uniformly so high.
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Judicial selection is everywhere by political process. In some systems
judges are appointed by the governor (e.g., Maryland) or by the legislature
(e.g., Virginia); in other states they are elected (e.g., New York). In the
federal system judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The confirmation role of the Senate gives the senator from the state
of appointment a de facto veto on the appointment. The term and manner of
retention likewise varies from state-to-state. In the federal system the
appointment is for life, so there is no retention issue.
Throughout American history reformers have sought to remove judicial
selection from politics. In particular, many have seen judicial elections, such
as is common in the state courts, as anathema. Reformers’ successes have
been limited. The American Judicature Society, founded in 1913, has
spearheaded the effort. Its internet site tracks the methods of selection in
each state. 160
Once selected federal judges are free of almost all control; state judges,
on the other hand, usually are subject to popular votes or reappointment.
Contrary to the organization of the German and Korean judiciaries,
American judges are not subject to the administration of a ministry of justice
or of a supreme court.
Law Professors
American law professors are closely tied to American judges. In recent
years an increasing percentage of American law professors have begun their
professional careers as law clerks for federal judges. Today a federal
clerkship is almost a necessary condition to appointment as law professor at
a leading law school. The preferred clerkship is with the highest federal
court and most renowned judge possible. A clerkship with a justice of the
United States Supreme Court is the most desired of all clerkships. Service as
a clerk gives the clerk a fascinating window into the law and policy making
role of America’s highest appellate courts. That service is distant, however,
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from the vast majority of ordinary cases, many of which, owing to the
deficiencies of the system, never make it into any American court at all.
American law professors differ from their German and Korean
counterparts is two important respects. When at the beginning of their
careers aspiring American law professors are clerking for judges, their
German and Korean counterparts are working on dissertations. Those
dissertations deepen their knowledge of law and contribute to legal science.
Many of those German and Korean law professors-to-be study law abroad.
Few American law professors have done either. Non-Americans are typically
surprised to learn that American law professors do not meet the usual
scholarly requirements, i.e., dissertation in field, of university appointments.
Legal Education
In the United States all legal professionals are trained to be advocates.
The system of legal education was established to train lawyers for
practice. 161
Someone who wishes to become a lawyer must successfully graduate
from an undergraduate college with a degree in any subject. That
presupposes twelve years of primary and secondary education and four years
of undergraduate college education. Students apply to one or more of nearly
two hundred accredited law schools. Most are colleges of law within
universities, either public or private. A significant number, however, are
private law schools independent of any university.
The system of university legal education began as a private substitute
for an existing informal private system of apprenticeship training conducted
by practicing lawyers. That system was generally one of easy admission. The
apprenticeship system continued to exist alongside the university system
throughout the nineteenth century.
In the twentieth century the apprenticeship system disappeared as an
independent route to bar admission. Law school training became a necessary
condition for bar admission. Remarkably, although for a time apprenticeship
survived as a necessary complement to law school training, it has
disappeared in that form too. The United States is virtually alone among
modern legal systems in not requiring post law-school practical training.
Law school study consists of three years of academic work. Since
tuitions are high, students rarely take more than time or more courses than
the required minimum. Because there is no post-graduation practical
training, most American law schools offer “clinical legal education” courses
where students act as lawyers under the direction of a faculty member. Few
law schools require students to take these courses and the majority of
students do not. Upon graduation from law school, a student receives the
Juris Doctor degree. This is not a true doctorate, in that no dissertation is
161

See MAXEINER, EDUCATING LAWYERS NOW AND THEN, supra note 91.

61

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

required. Upon graduation from law school, a student may take a bar
examination in one of the fifty states. Admission to practice is by state.
In most states the bar examination consists of a one-day multiple-choice
test and of a one-day essay test. Most students (65% to 90%, depending upon
the state) pass a bar examination on the first try. Without further training
they are legally qualified to practice law.
Relatively few graduates begin work as independent lawyers. More
commonly they begin their careers as junior lawyers in law firms
(associates) or otherwise as junior lawyers in larger organizations. Most get
their practical training in on the job work. 162
Attorneys General
The Attorney General of the United States is the head of the United
States Department of Justice. The attorney general of each state is the chief
legal officer of the state. The offices of the attorneys general are not
American counterparts of ministries of justice in Germany and Korea. The
attorneys general in the United States are principally lawyers for the heads of
state. They do not administer courts. They have limited or no authority to
direct public prosecutors, who are largely independent of attorneys general.
Attorneys general do not have major responsibilities for drafting or
application of the laws of the land other than those directly related to their
responsibilities for executing the law (e.g., criminal prosecution).
The United States Department of Justice is not well-suited in its present
form to assume the role of a ministry of justice. Much like the professional
organization of the bar, its leadership lacks continuity. Moreover, its top
leaders are political appointees. Typically they remain in office for only two
to three years. 163 Repeatedly presidents have sought to control politically not
only the top dozen officials but lawyers in the Department generally.

B. Germany
We are the ministry responsible for upholding justice,
rights and democracy.
Federal Minister of Justice
Ministry Website Homepage 164
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1. Access to Justice in Germany
Mandatory Legal Representation
In Germany Roh is required to use a lawyer to bring a lawsuit in the
Landgericht. § 78 ZPO. The Landgericht is the ordinary court of general
jurisdiction for civil claims that exceed € 5000. If Roh’s claim were for less
than that, she could sue in the Amtsgericht, a civil court of limited
jurisdiction, without a lawyer, either pro se, or represented by another person
who is not necessarily a lawyer. § 79 ZPO. In other courts, such as the labor
courts, pro se representation is routine.
In Germany mandatory representation is thought to contribute to a
productive process. Lawyers filter cases and prepare them for court
determination. 165 Lawyers facilitate the judicial job of applying law to facts.
They protect clients against judicial overreaching. Having legally qualified
lawyers on each side assures a level of comparable skill in conduct of the
lawsuit (“equality of arms” Waffengleichheit). Whether these benefits justify
mandatory representation, or whether lawyer self-interest should be seen as
the motivator of the requirement, is debated. Mandatory representation
impels the state to take responsibility for the quality of the legal
representation and, pursuant to the equal protection guarantee of the German
constitution, to assure that representation is available. The requirement of
mandatory representation does not discourage many lawsuits, since fees for
lawsuits are modest and awarded to winners and because, as we now discuss,
civil legal aid and legal services insurance are widely available.
Civil Legal Aid
Parties who sue in the Landgericht are required to be represented by a
lawyer admitted to practice, but that requirement does not preclude many
parties from suing as it might in the United States. In Germany, if a party is
unable to afford representation or other costs of litigation because of
personal or commercial circumstances, the party has a statutory right to
financial support. 166 The right extends to legal persons, such as DohSon
Honda, LLC. 167
Civil legal aid is designed to assure that no one is forced to forego his or
her rights for financial grounds; it serves to realize the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under law. Already the German Code of Civil
Procedure of 1877 recognized a right to legal aid. Its drafters saw that the
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See Judgment of 6 May 2008, German Supreme Court (BGH), File X ZR 28/07.
§ 114 ZPO.
167
§ 116 ZPO.
166
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rule of law, to be worthy of the name, is meaningful only if the poor as well
as the rich have access to legal protection. 168
In Germany a party asserts the right to legal aid by making application
to the court stating the requisite circumstances. The court is to grant the
application, at a level and upon terms (e.g., possibly repayment)
commensurate with the circumstances shown, provided that it determines
that the claim has a sufficient prospect (hinreichende Aussicht) of success
and that it appears not to be brought spitefully (mutwillig). Courts regularly
receive and routinely grant legal aid applications, which are commonly
prepared by lawyers that the applicants have already consulted. Parties are
not limited in their choice of lawyers, but may use any lawyer willing to
accept representation for statutory fees. While not all lawyers accept
statutory fees, most do and rarely are parties unable to secure competent
representation. If a party entitled to legal aid is unable to find a lawyer, on
application the court is to order representation. 169
2. The Cost of Lawyer Representation in Germany
“Loser pays”
In the German civil justice system the loser in a lawsuit pays the
winner’s lawyers’ fees and court costs. The justification for this rule is that
the lawsuit determines which party has right on his or her side. The other
party should have paid the claim of right without a lawsuit; it is unfair to
burden the righteous party with the costs of the lawsuit.
The loser pays rule discourages frivolous lawsuits. It also discourages
excessive damage claims in well-founded lawsuits, since determination of
which party wins depends on whether the amount claimed is recovered.
Although the “loser pays” rule is colloquially known in the United
States as the “English rule,” some variation of it prevails in most modern
legal systems. England has modified its rule to incorporate aspects of the
German rules. 170
The loser pays rule discourages some meritorious lawsuits of uncertain
prospects for success. We surmise that the number is not great. Legal
services insurance, discussed below, reduces the risk for many cases. In
other cases, claim-splitting does. A party with a large claim of uncertain
168

See 1 BERNHARD WIECZOREK & ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG UND
NEBENGESETZE: GROSSKOMMENTAR, vorb § 114, 2049 (3rd ed., 1994) (citing to legislative
history of the CPO).
169
§ 121(5) ZPO.
170
See John Peysner, Learned in Germany: Applied in England in THE RECEPTION AND
TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY, LEGISLATIVE AND
LEGAL EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN PROCEDURAL LAW 339 (Masahisa
Deguchi & Marcel Storme, eds. 2008).
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success may test the waters by bringing one small claim first. Finally, at least
compared to American fees, German fees that are shifted to losers are
modest. Often in German litigation, fees for both sides combined are less
than fees for one side would be in the United States.
Calculating Lawyers’ Fees
Fee regulation. The requirement that losers pay winner’s lawyers’ fees
practically requires regulating the amount of the fees that may be recovered.
It would be unfair to burden losers with whatever fees winners might choose
to incur. Such a system would permit powerful parties to spend their
opponents to death.
While charges in excess of statutory fees may not be recovered,
powerful parties, such as large corporations may and do agree with their
lawyers to pay higher fees. Most parties, however, pay and most lawyers
work at statutory rates. The system of regulated fees helps keep the costs of
lawsuits proportionate to the amounts in dispute.
The Lawyers’ Compensation Statute (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz)
sets the rates. It uses a fee system in which lawyers earn fee-units for
accomplishing specific tasks. The statute bases the size of each fee-unit on
the amount in controversy. In the ordinary case the statute provides that
lawyers receive one-fee unit for each of three tasks: preparing a case, filing a
complaint, and attending court. The statute provides for additional fee-units
for cases that settle or are appealed.
The statutory fee schedule does not adjust fees to account for time
actually required. Consequently, the statute encourages lawyers to
accomplish tasks efficiently and discourages wasting time. Of course, it
similarly discourages them from thoroughly handling these tasks if the time
spent promises little gain. The statutory system can encourage lawyers to let
courts take the lead in difficult issues. 171
The statutory system results in fees that, in comparison to their
American counterparts, are modest. For example, in Roh v. Doh, since the
amount in controversy is €60,000, Hahn’s fee would be three fee-units, or a
total of €3536. In the United States, if Hahn won the case, a ⅓ contingent fee
would be $25,000, but nothing if he lost. If he took the case on an hourly
basis, if the time required were 70 hours, then @ $300 per hour, his fee
would be $21,000.
Legal expenses insurance. While Mary Roh is not likely to qualify for
legal aid, she may have legal services insurance, which is readily available in
Germany at moderate cost. Unlike liability insurance, which commonly
covers only legal services for defense of claims, legal services insurance
covers lawyers’ fees for prosecution of claims. It contributes to access to
courts for persons of modest means, for it both supports bringing lawsuits as
171

See PETER MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 115 (2004).
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well as relieves plaintiffs of the burden of having to pay the other sides costs
and lawyers’ fees in the event of loss.
Contingent fees and similar arrangements. Until 2006 contingent fees
(i.e., fees conditional on success in the lawsuit) were illegal. It was, and
remains possible, to obtain third party financing of large litigation.
Following a decision of December 12, 2006 of the German Constitutional
Court, and a federal law of April 25, 2008 implementing that decision,
contingent fee arrangements are now permitted, provided that the
prospective party is otherwise financially unable to bring the lawsuit. The
law would not likely permit Roh to reach a contingent fee arrangement.
3. Representing Roh in Germany: Is a Lawsuit Worth it for Roh?
Inevitably in Germany too Roh will get around to talking with her
lawyer Hahn about the expense of representation. He will remind her of all
of the collateral costs of the lawsuit in terms of her lost time, lost time of
employees, frustrations and so on. Then he will be sure to establish his fee
arrangement with her. They might have a conversation such as the following
one:
Hahn: We’ll file a complaint and thereafter prosecute this suit vigorously through to
judgment, correct?
Roh: Exactly.
Hahn: I’ll want to meet with you at least once more before we file any papers with the
court to talk more specifically about how I think we ought to proceed. But earlier you
asked about my fees, and I think I know enough now to tell you what the fees will be.
While we could agree that you pay me a different fee, I usually do my job for the fee set
by law. That is the maximum fee that you get back from the other side if you win the
case. The fees for lawyers are determined by the amount in controversy: here €60,000,
i.e., the amount of the loan claimed without interest or additional fees. You can actually
go to a website to calculate your fees. It is www.rechtanwaltsgebuehren.de. For work
opening the case and preparing to bring it, my intake fee is €729. I need you to pay that
today if you want me to go ahead and prepare a complaint. I will count it toward your
total process fee of €2807. On filing with the court, you will have to pay the court fee of
€1668, and I will want you to pay the balance of my fee, i.e., €2078.
If you win, assuming that Mr. Doh has the money, he will have to pay you both my
process fee and the court fee. If either of you decides not to accept the decision of the
court, then there will be fees for the appeal. Whoever loses the appeal will have to pay
all of the lawyers’ fees and all of the court costs for both proceedings from the start. Is
everything clear?
Roh: I guess so. Of course, I wish it weren’t so expensive but I guess that’s the way
things go these days. This a probably a dumb question, but I assume that if the case
settles in just a few hours after we file it, I’d get most of the €4475 back?
Hahn: Not if we have begun the lawsuit. If we settle before we begin the lawsuit, then
you will get back most of it. But once the lawsuit is underway, even if we settle nearly
immediately, while you will get back €1112 of the court fee, you will then, by law, have
to pay me a settlement fee of €1123. The idea is that will encourage me to help bring
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about a settlement. Of course, in the case of a settlement, we will have to apportion the
lawyers’ fees. Usually the parties pay their own lawyer’s fees. Shall we meet again on
Wednesday at 2:00 to discuss the complaint? You can approve it then and I will file it.
Roh: Sure. I am good to go.

We turn now to consider the people who make up the German legal
profession.
4. The German Legal Professions
American lawyers in their focus on the instrumental role of achieving
specific results can easily overlook that a legal system measured by the ends
that the system produces for society as a whole. Civil justice is a public
good, just as are national defense, public highways and public education.
Nowhere is that recognition stronger than in Germany than in the institution
of the ministry of justice.
The Ministries of Justice
There are in Germany one federal and sixteen state ministries of justice.
Their responsibility is to minister to and provide for the peoples’ needs for
civil and criminal justice. Some of the most revered of American jurists,
including long-time Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound and the iconic
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, have pointed enviously to
foreign ministries of justice. 172
In Germany federal and state ministries of justice coordinate among
themselves along lines typical for German federalism: the Federal Ministry
provides for a uniform national structure, while the state ministries carry it
out. The employment figures given on the ministries’ websites demonstrate
the division of responsibilities: the Federal Ministry has fewer than 1,000
employees, while the Bavarian Ministry, which is just one of sixteen state
ministries, has more than 19,000 employees.
The Federal Ministry of Justice is principally responsible for
maintaining a codified and rational body of laws and for overseeing the
administration of the federal courts.
The state ministries of justice are responsible for state legislation and,
above all, for the full range of the administration of justice. Their tasks
include:
•
172

administration of the civil and criminal courts;

Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921) (citing two
contemporary works by Roscoe Pound); ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 736-37 (1959); see
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 14-15 (6th ed.
1998).

67

Civilizing Civil Justice
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2010-11-17

administration of the offices of public prosecution;
administration of the system of legal aid in criminal, civil and
counseling cases;
administration of the prisons;
administration of post-incarceration supervision;
crime victim programs;
witness assistance;
employment of judges, prosecutors and prison employees to
staff the forgoing;
admission of applicants to legal practice, including prescribing
the required course of their preparatory studies;
practical training of apprentice lawyers in the courts; and
supervision of practical training by the bar of apprentice
lawyers.

Judges
Where once German judges may have had a uniform self-image as
appliers of the law, today there is no single self-image, but a plurality of
images. These images range from strict law-appliers to equity judges; from
political judges through people protectors to public service providers. On the
one hand, one former President of the German Supreme Court called upon
judges to place first the need for predictability and accountability
(Berechenbarkeit) for the sake of business; another to place in the forefront
protection of the weak. 173
Germany has among the highest, possibly the highest, number of judges
per capita of any modern country. There are over 20,000 German judges;
The United States with more than three times the population, does not have
30,000 judges.
Judicial selection for the state courts in Germany is not political. Almost
all new judges are chosen within a few years of completion of their legal
education when they are twenty-five to thirty-five years old. The principal
basis for selection is high performance on the two state examinations in law.
For many years most applicants have scored in about the top 10% of those
taking the examinations.
Typically new judges begin their careers in one of the two courts of first
instance, the Landgericht, the court of general jurisdiction, or the
Amtsgericht, the principal court of limited jurisdiction. About one half of
German judges are judges of an Amtsgericht. New judges in a Landgericht
are assigned to multi-judge chambers. Before 2002 these chambers usually
173

See Peter Kauffmann, Richterbilder heute—Eine rechtssoziologische Betrachtung,
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decided in panels of three; today mostly they decide as single judges.
Nevertheless, Landgericht judges typically work together. Junior judges may
share offices, while experienced judges usually have offices in suites or
otherwise close together. Since Amtsgericht judges have long decided alone,
they historically have acted more on their own and, for this reason, some
judges prefer to work there.
Judicial compensation is little different between Landgericht and
Amtsgericht, so many judges have no difficulty staying with the formally
lower courts for their careers. Supervisory judges in an Amtsgericht can earn
more than judges in a Landgericht. This pattern continues even to the courts
of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte). Judicial salaries are based principally on
years of service, age, family status and supervisory responsibilities. Typical
annual salaries run from about €40,000 to €70,000.
Appointment to the federal courts, on the other hand, does have a
political element. Appointment to the Constitutional Court is deliberately
political and is so provided in the Constitution (Basic Law). In the case of
the other federal courts, appointments are not overtly political, but since they
originate in the state ministries of justice, they have a non-partisan, yet not
entirely merit-based component. 174
In Germany, almost all federal judges are appellate judges. They are
paid annual salaries of about €90,000 to €130,000, most at the lower rate.
Fourteen of the sixteen justices of the Constitutional Court are paid at
roughly the higher of these rates; the President and Vice President are paid
somewhat more. Almost all federal judges, except Constitutional Court
judges, were state court judges before they become federal judges. Few have
any post-bar admission private practice experience. Justices of the
Constitutional Court often are former law professors.
Lawyers
More than its American counterpart, the German bar is in the shadow of
the judicial profession. In Germany, the system of legal education was
established to train civil servants for the State. All persons who wish to
become legal professionals, whether as lawyers or as judges or otherwise,
are trained as judges. The bar has sought to escape from the judicial
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On selection to the federal courts other than the Constitutional Court (which has its own
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domination of education as education for judges, but so far, without
success. 175
The image of the judge has colored the historical ideal of the legal
professional. Judges have the leading roles among all legal professionals: it
is judges who apply law to facts of cases to decide them. 176 Lawyers and
other legal professionals play supporting roles in helping judges apply law.
The classic model of German lawyers is as “independent organ of the system
of the justice system” (unabhängiges Organ der Rechtspflege 177). Within
that system, lawyers are independent advocates (freie Advokatur).
In the past generation the German bar has experienced great growth and
terrific turbulence. In the middle of the twentieth century, the bar was still
relatively small and relatively homogenous. Through most of the century it
was sheltered from competition by professional rules that limited law firms
to practice in one city and lawyers to practice before one court. Lawyers
practiced alone or in firms with fewer than ten members. Lawyers did not
vastly outnumber judges.
The idyllic picture—for lawyers, anyway—changed in the last decade of
the twentieth century. The number of attorneys sky-rocketed while protective
limitations on practice were undone (by courts applying European Union and
constitutional law.) While in 1959, there were 16,000 lawyers authorized to
practice law in Germany, in 2009 there were nearly 150,000, or almost ten
times as many with little population growth. As late as 1973 there were only
two lawyers for every judge (25,000 lawyers to 13,000 judges). 178 By 2005
there were seven (150,000 lawyers to 20,000 judges). German lawyers now
may practice German law throughout Germany and throughout the European
Union. Law firms of ten or fifty lawyers are common. Still larger firms lead
in international practice; most of the ten largest law firms in Germany are
branches of law firms headquartered in England or in the United States. In
today’s global world of free competition, German lawyers are looking for a
new professional model. 179
Legal Education
In Germany all legal professionals are trained to be judges. People who
wish to become lawyers must successfully graduate from an academic high
school with the Abitur degree. This requires 12 years of study and usually
175
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occurs at age 18. With a single exception, law faculties are all faculties in
public universities. There is minimal or no tuition at public universities, so
students may and do spend more than the required seven or eight semesters
of study. When students feel ready, they take the first state examination.
About two-thirds of all students are successful in passing this examination.
These examinations are more challenging and longer (they take longer than a
week) than their American counterparts. Students who fail the first time,
usually may retake the exam only once.
Students that pass the first state examination are admitted to a two-year
period of practical training sponsored by the courts of the different states. In
that training program they called in German, Referendare, or in English,
legal interns. Referendare are paid a small stipend that helps cover basic
living costs. Upon successful completion of this period, Referendare take a
second state exam. If successful they are qualified to become lawyers or
judges.
In the practice training period after the first state examination
prospective lawyers learn practical skills needed by for legal practice as
judges, lawyers or government officials. They do internships with courts,
lawyers and government agencies. They begin their practical training at the
courts and, although only a few become judges, all are required to learn
judicial skills. Of greatest importance is the Relationstechnik of relating facts
to law and of crafting judgments. Judges as classroom teachers didactically
teach classes that lay out the fundamentals of this technique, while other
judges are assigned to tutor the aspiring legal professionals, the Referendare
or interns, as apprentice judges. The interns learn how to take the substance
of the law they learned at the university, how to conduct legal proceedings to
determine facts, and how to justify in legal judgments their correct
determinations of how law applies to particular cases. In short, they learn to
do what a judge has to do. And it is the mastery of the techniques of
applying law to facts (Relationstechnik) that defines the judge. 180
Qualification as judges (Befähigung zum Richteramt) is the necessary
prerequisite to admission to practice as lawyers.
C. Korea
We must continue to devote our time to ensure that justice
becomes a part of the national reality, and not simply an
ideal. To this end, our courts will undergo significant
changes. These efforts will allow the court to listen to even
the smallest voices from the public and to resolve their
deepest concerns.
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Yong-hoon Lee,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Korea (2007) 181
1. Access to Justice in Korea
Pro se Representation (본인소송)
Korea has a higher incidence of pro se participation than do either the
United States or Germany. Even in substantial cases it is common that one or
both parties is without a lawyer. Even leaving small claims to one side
(jurisdictional amount below ₩100,000,000), in fewer than 20% of all cases
are both sides represented by lawyers. Here are the figures for 2008 for the
number of cases where a party or parties were represented by lawyers before
a district court (or branch court) of original jurisdiction in civil meritorious
cases (민사본안사건) in Korea:

Number
of
Disposit
ions
48,880

Collegiate Division
Plaintiff Defend
only
ant
only
12,213
25.0%

3,042
6.2%

Both
Parties

Number
of
Disposit
ions
22,991 283,011
47.0%

Single Judge Division
Plaintiff Defend
Both
only
ant only Parties

111,414
39.4%

10,181
3.6%

29,021
10.3%

182

Because judges in Korea take more responsibility for proceedings than
do their counterparts in America, it is easier for the Korean system to accept
unrepresented parties than it is for the American. When parties are not
represented by lawyers, judges proactively direct procedures and explain
relevant legal principles to help unrepresented parties participate. Frequently
judges direct lay parties to material points in dispute and away from personal
attacks on opponents. Without a study comparing per se to lawyer
representation in Korea, we are not able to evaluate reliably whether these
measures are sufficient to overcome the inequality of arms that inevitably
results when one side is represented by a lawyer and the other it not.
Civil Legal Aid 183
181
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182
Office of Court Administration, Annual Judicial Report for Year 2008,
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See generally Gyooho Lee, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure in Korea,
forthcoming, temporarily available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/events/2010congress/reports/National_Reports/II_C_1_Cost_and
_Fee_Allocations/Korea.pdf?rd=1
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The Korean Civil Procedure Act allows, but does not require, courts to
provide civil legal aid. The legal aid provided is usually in the form of
deferment of payment rather than provision of free services. 184 While the
German system delivers civil legal aid through the ordinary bar, the small
number of lawyers in Korea makes that approach difficult. In Korea, such
legal aid as there is, is largely provided by the Korea Legal Aid Corporation.
Established pursuant to the Legal Aid Act enacted in 1987, it is a public
interest organization under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. Korean
scholars criticize government support for legal aid by private organizations
as trivial. Where the amount in controversy in less than ₩50 million (about
$50,000), with permission of the court, parties may choose to be represented
by someone who is not qualified to practice law.
2. Cost of Legal Representation in Korea
“Loser pays” 185
Korea follows the international norm and shifts litigation expenses,
including legal fees, to losing parties. The system is less effective in Korea
than in Germany, however, because the relatively small bar is less willing to
work for statutory fees. Parties often have to pay their lawyers at rates in
excess of the statutory fees. 186
The Korean Civil Procedure Act authorizes the Supreme Court of Korea to
set legal fees for indemnification in litigation. 187 The Supreme Court’ Rules
Regarding Lawyers’ Fees, when first issued in 1981, were unsatisfactory in that
they did not account adequately for economic growth and the increase in
amounts in controversy. After study of the American no indemnity practice and
the international “loser-pays” standard, the Supreme Court reissued the Rules.
The Rules limit only reimbursable fees and not the fees that lawyers charge
their clients. Party autonomy prevails so that parties may agree to pay their
lawyers more. Typically parties and lawyers agree on a two part fee that consists
of a non-refundable initiation fee and an additional fee contingent on success in
the action. In 1983 the Korean Bar Association recommended fees, but withdrew
these recommendations in 2000 when they were questioned as competition law
violations.
Calculating Legal Fees in Korea
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The reissued Rules Regarding Lawyers’ Fees provide for a reimbursable fee
of a designated percentage of the amount in dispute. That amount begins at 8%
for an amount in dispute of ₩10 million (roughly $10,000) and drops for
additional amounts in 1% increments until it is only 1% for amounts in excess of
₩100 million but below ₩200 million, and ½ % for amounts in excess of ₩500
million.188
The statutory system results in fees that, in comparison to their
American counterparts, are modest, but are in line with their German
counterparts. For example, in Roh v. Doh, since the amount in controversy is
₩75 million, the fee would be ₩4,050,000 (roughly $4000). As we saw in
Germany, based on an amount in controversy of €60,000, Hahn’s fee would
be €3536.
Initiation Fees (Retainers). Initiation fees normally range from ₩2
million to ₩5 million (roughly $2000 to $5000). Typically they are
refundable only in the event of breach of duty by the lawyer.
Contingent fees. Contingent fees are common in Korea. Their use was
subject to limits recommended by the Korean Bar Association’s rules that
were abolished in 2000. Today they are not controlled. Proposed legislation
to limit their use in criminal cases was defeated in 2007 by a coalition of
former judges and prosecutors who saw the legislation as interfering with
their ability to take full advantage of their former status.
Contingent fees in civil cases are usually determined on a case-by-case
basis and typically range between 5% and 10% of the amount recovered.
They usually take into account the importance and difficulty of the case, the
amount in controversy, where the case occurred and where the parties reside.
Often contingent fees are waived if the case is resolved quickly in the course
of provisional proceedings.
Fee competition. Korean lawyers compete for clients based on fees.
LawMarketAsia is an internet site that offers an auction service where
lawyers bid on cases. It asserts that it saves clients 20% to 50% on fees. The
site also provides support for parties who represent themselves.
Legal expenses insurance. The Korean public has long sought legal
event insurance. In 2009 D.A.S., a subsidiary of Munich Re Group in
Germany, began to offer such insurance. It covers legal costs, such as
lawyers’ fees, stamp fee, fees on service of process, up to ₩50 million.
3. Representing Roh in Korea: Is a Lawsuit Worth it for Roh?
Hahn: We’ll file a complaint and thereafter prosecute this suit vigorously through to
judgment, correct?
Roh: Exactly.
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Hahn: I’ll want to meet with you at least once more before we file any papers with the
court to talk more specifically about how I think we ought to proceed. But earlier you
asked about my fees, and I think I know enough now to tell you what the fees will be.
The initiation fee generally ranges from ₩3 million to ₩5 million [$3000 to $5000]
irrespective of how much the amount in controversy will be. Besides the initiation fee, I
will be paid for contingency fees amounting to 5% to 10% of the amount of settlement
or judgment if you settle or win the case. We can negotiate how much you will pay
initiation fee for me, taking into account several factors such as the difficulty of the case
or the length of disposition of the case. In this case, I would like to propose ₩4 million
for the initiation fee. How do you think it is reasonable? Also, I want to be paid for 7%
of the amount of settlement or judgment if you settle or win the case. If that is ₩75
million exactly, then my fee contingent fee would be ₩5.25 million additional. If you
accept my offer for the attorney fee arrangement, why don’t you sign this retainer
agreement?
Roh: I agree. I will sign it.
Hahn: Here you are. O.K. It’s done. Before we file the court, I want you to pay both of
my initiation fees and the court fee including stamp fee. On filing, you will have to pay
the stamp fee of ₩342,500 because the amount in controversy is ₩75 million and, in
accordance with Art. 2 sec. 1 (2) of the Stamp Fees Act, the stamp fee is computed by
the formula, “(amount in controversy multiplied by 45/10,000) + ₩5,000” when amount
in controversy is ₩10 million or more and less than ₩100 million.
Roh: I would like to inquire whether I get the costs back if we win. That includes your
fee, right?
Hahn: Not quite. Let me explain. If you win, John Doh, Jr. will be required to pay the
court costs and most of my contingent fees. The general rule is that the losing party
has to pay the court costs and the legal fees for the winning party. That is stated in
Article 98 of the Korean Civil Procedure Law. Article 109 (1) of the Act tells us how
much of my contingent fee Doh has to pay. It’s somewhat less. In this case, it would be
₩4.05 million because the amount in controversy is ₩75 million. Of course, that
assumes that Roh has the money to pay your claim.
Also, I have to tell you, that if he wins, then you will have to pay his court costs
and ₩4.05 million KW of his lawyer’s fees. While it seems unlikely in this case, if the
court were to find that he owes you something less than ₩75 million, then, depending
upon how that court finds, you would end up getting less or perhaps even owing Doh
money.
Roh: Now, I got it. When can I meet you to discuss the complaint? Recently, I am very
busy.
Hahn: You do not need to come by my office because I fully understand how this case
will go. As soon as you remit the initiation fees to my law firm’s bank account, I will file
the complaint. Afterwards, I will let you know as soon as the date for early hearing is
set.
Roh: Thank you. I will remit the initiation fees to you right away. I am sure that you will
do your best to win the case. Still, I would feel better if we meet one more time before
you file the complaint. I can review it and ask you questions about what to expect in the
proceedings. How about Wednesday next week at 2:00 PM
Hahn: OK with me. See you then.
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4. Korean Legal Professions
Lawyers (변호사)
The Korean legal professions shares features of the Japanese legal
professions out of which they grew. Historically the legal professions in both
countries had very few lawyers; the number of lawyers was limited to
artificially low levels. Even today, the Ministry of Justice, after consulting
with the Supreme Court of Korea and the Korean Bar Association, sets the
total number of successful applicants. Until 1978 that number of successes
was below one hundred; until 1995 it was below three hundred. The
percentage of successful takers was three percent or lower. While the
number admitted has increased, it remains subject to government control.
This contrasts to the open bar admissions of Germany and the United States,
where everyone who demonstrates minimal legal competency on the bar
examination is eligible to practice law.
Joining the legal profession has been a symbol of fulfilling the “Korean
dream.” 189 The limited number of bar admissions has led some Koreans to
regard lawyers as an exclusive social caste. In the course of recent reforms,
the organized bar has sought to gain influence over the number of students
admitted to study law and thereby to retain influence over the number of
persons eventually admitted to practice law. 190
The Korean bar historically has been closely-knit and grouped into three
types of legal practice: relatively large international business firms, medium
size domestic firms, and courthouse area lawyers mostly practicing on their
own or in small groups in individual litigation. The international firms
typically have fifty to two hundred-fifty lawyers and focus on international
transactions such as mergers; the domestic business firms usually have
around ten lawyers. 191 Roh’s lawyer Hahn in Korea likely would come from
that group of firms.
Whether the closely-knit bar will survive the rapid increase in number of
lawyers is an open question. Not only will numbers increase, but future
lawyers are also likely to have more diverse experiences. The common
experience of training at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, in a
few years time, may become a thing of the past.

189

Kyong-Whan Ahn, Law Reform in Korea and the Agenda of Graduate law School, 24 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 223, 227 (2006)
190
Chang Rok Kim, The National Bar Examination in Korea, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 252
(2006).
191
Hyung Tae Kim, Legal Market Liberalization in South Korea: Preparations for Change, 15
PAC. RIM L. & POLICY J. 199, 204 (2006).
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The Supreme Court of Korea (대법원)
From its sixteen story, 66,500 square meter building in southern Seoul
the Supreme Court of Korea literally towers over the Korean legal system.
Its American and German counterparts sit in smaller buildings and have
nowhere near the influence over their respective legal systems. And yet the
Court consists of only one Chief Justice (대법원장)—appointed to a single,
non-renewable six year term by the President of Korea with the consent of
the National Assembly—and thirteen justices—similarly appointed, but to
renewable six year terms. One of the Justices is the Minister of National
Court Administration and is not allowed to participate in judgments rendered
by the Court.
The Supreme Court has the following responsibilities:
• It is the court of last resort for all courts, civil, criminal,
administrative, patent, except for the Constitutional Court;
• The Chief Justice designates three of the nine justices appointed by
the President of Korea to the Constitutional Court;
• The Chief Justice has general control over judicial administrative
affairs, and appoints and directs the officials charged with judicial
administration, including the Minster and the Vice Minister of
National Court Administration;
o Other courts, i.e., the High Courts, the District Courts, the
Patent Court, the Family Court and the Administrative
Court are administrative subdivisions of the Supreme
Court of Korea;
• The Chief Justice with the consent of the other Justices (대법관)
sitting in the Council of Supreme Court Justices appoints all judges;
o The Chief Justice can evaluate service of judges and affect
their personnel record.
• The Chief Justice appoints and supervises the President of the
Judicial Research and Training Institute;
o All Korean judges and lawyers are trained by the Judicial
Research and Training Institute;
• The Chief Justice appoints and supervises the President of the
Training Institute for Court Officials;
• The Chief Justice appoints the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Sentencing Commission;
• The Supreme Court establishes the Supreme Court Rules and
Regulations and other rules and regulations concerning judicial
proceedings, discipline and management;
• The Chief Justice has the right to present his or her opinion to the
National Assembly on matters related to the administration of
justice;
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The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputed
presidential and parliamentary elections;
The Supreme Court reviews the constitutionality or legality of
orders, rules, regulations and actions taken by administrative
entities;
The Supreme Court’s Judicial Disciplinary Committee is
responsible for disciplining judges. 192

The Ministry of Justice (법무부)
The Korean Ministry of Justice functions more like the United States
Department of Justice than like the German ministries of justice. Its principal
tasks are acting as legal counsel for the government and directing and
supervising criminal law enforcement, corrections and immigration. In
recent years it has taken on some legal system responsibilities: in 2002 it
took over administration of the National Bar Examination; since 2005
through what is now the Commercial Affairs Division it reviews commercial
legislation. The Office of Legal Counsel is responsible for updating and
improving the Korean Civil Procedure Act. It also provides legal advice to
the President, Prime Minister and Ministers, and authoritative interpretations
of laws to government bodies.
The Ministry of Government Legislation (법제처)
The Korean Ministry of Government Legislation corresponds to the
German Federal Ministry of Justice. Its primary duties are the
comprehensive control and coordination of the government's legislative
affairs, statutory examination, statutory interpretation, and statutory
improvement.
Judges (법관)
The Chief Justice and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Korea are
appointed by the President with the confirmation of the National Assembly.
The Chief Justice with the consent of the Council of Supreme Court Justices
appoints all other judges. They also determine the number of judges
appointed to each court. There is no age requirement for judges. 193

192

See THE SUPREME COURT OF KOREA (published by the Court, August 2007) and available at
http://eng.scourt.go.kr/eng/main/Main.work as 2008 INTRODUCTORY BOOK OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF KOREA.
193

See Woo-young Rhee, Judicial Appointment in the Republic of Korea from Democracy
Perspectives, 9 J. KOREAN L. 53, 60-62 (2009).
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Korean judges have all passed the difficult National Bar Examination
and studied for two years at the Judicial Research and Training Institute.
While outwardly similar in organization and careers to German judges,
Korean judges are subject to greater career pressures. Initially they are given
ten-year appointments. But in practice an up-or-out system prevails. The
Chief Justice can evaluate the service of judges and the result is reflected in
their promotion. In this regard, the judges in Korea are likely to be
encouraged to settle the cases in question. While German judicial
organization is essentially flat and there is little pressure to advance, in the
Korean system there are ten or more promotional steps which every judge is
expected to climb. Those that fail to do so in a reasonable period are
expected to resign. Indeed, if ever someone junior is promoted over a more
senior judge, the more senior judge is expected to resign.
The early severance system has contributed to low levels of public
confidence in the Korean judiciary. On the one hand, judges and prosecutors
who separate from service prior to retirement may register as lawyers and
represent clients before the courts and agencies with which they formally
served. The public believes that these former judges and prosecutors turned
lawyers have a higher rate of success than do other lawyers. They pay them
better. Newspaper studies of statistical data lend credence to those beliefs. 194
The practice is known in Korean as Jeon-gwan ye-u (전관예우 ).
On the other hand, judges, so long as they remain in service, are
vulnerable to adverse performance evaluations. This puts their independence
at risk. That control can come directly from the top: from the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court.
The introduction of the law school system (discussed in the next
subsection) makes uncertain what will be the background of future judges.
The Judicial Research and Training Institute in the future will only train
judges. There is to be increased emphasis on recruiting as future judges
lawyers from the practicing bar in mid-career.
Legal Education
In 2009 Korea followed the example of Japan of five years earlier and
introduced a law school system to replace partly the former law faculties. 195
194

See Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIANPACIFIC L. & POLICY J. 45, 50-53 (2001); Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at
172-173, 179.
195
See generally Ahn, Law Reform, supra note 189; Young-Cheol K. Jeong, Korean Legal
Education for the Age of Professionalism: Suggestions for More Concerted Curricula, 5 EAST
ASIA L. REV. 155 (2010); Chang Rok Kim, The National Bar Examination in Korea, 24 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 243 (2006); Jasper Kim, Socrates v. Confucius: An Analysis of South Korea's
Implementation of the American Law School Model, 10 ASIAN PACIFIC L. & POLICY J. 322
(2009); Kwon, Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 173-175. For Japan see James R. Maxeiner &
Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law Schools, 13 PACIFIC RIM L. & POLICY J. 303 (2004).
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In the former system, university law faculties provided undergraduates
with non-professional education in law. Nearly all students who were
interested in becoming lawyers, studied as well at cram schools to prepare
for the National Bar Examination. Applicants could, if they wished, forego
university studies altogether, for the bar exam itself had no prerequisites.
The deleterious effect such a system had on the legal education of successful
takers and on the lives of unsuccessful applicants was widely decried.
In the old system, all students who passed the National Bar Examination
were admitted to a two year period of theoretical and practical studies at the
Judicial Research and Training Institute to be prepared to become judges,
prosecutors or lawyers. That institute is a branch of the Supreme Court of
Korea. Under the new system the study period is reduced to one year and
only those students selected to be judges will study at the Institute.
Under the new system, students who have an undergraduate education
are admitted to law schools to study law professionally. The government
controls the number of law schools and the number of law students. As of
2009 the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology certified only
twenty-five law schools with a total approved enrollment of only two
thousand. The new system permits only graduates of law schools to take the
National Bar Examination. The government continues to set quotas on the
number of applicants allowed to pass the examination. That quota is
expected to be substantially higher than the historic quota; at least more than
half of all applicants and perhaps as high as four-fifths.
D. Comparative Statistics
These statistics are for approximate comparisons only. Any proper
detailing would require discussion of classifying legal professionals as
lawyers, judges or other personnel.
Statistics
Approximate population
Lawyers
Lawyers per 100,000
Judges—total

United States

308 million
1,162,124 197
386
28,723

Germany
82 million
146,910 198
179
20,138 199

Korea 196
50 million
7,007
14
2,008

196
Chang Rok Kim, The National Bar Examination in Korea, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 259
(2006). The statistics are for 2005.
197
American Bar Association, National Lawyer Population by State, as of December 31, 2007.
http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2008_NATL_LAWYER_by_State.pdf.
198
Bundesrechtanwaltskammer, Großer Mitgliederstatistik, as of January 1, 2008, at
http://www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/Statistiken/2008/MGgross2008.pdf
199
Bundesamt für Justiz, Referat III 3, 3110/6 - B7 17/2007, available at,
http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/3f68e11a4fd244d6b92a2c3833dc885e/1196/Gesamtsttistik_Anza
hl_Richter_Staatsanw%C3%A4lte_Vertreter_des_%C3%B6ffentlichen_Interesses_04.11.2006.
pdf. Statistics as of December 31, 2006.
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40 ½
862 200
27,861 201
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24 ½
7¼
455
19,683

4
3½
na
na

200
Authorized Article III judges, appellate 28 U.S.C. § 44(a), district court 28 U.S. C. §133(a),
and U.S. Supreme Court. Does not include magistrate judges or bankruptcy judges.
201
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: State Court Organization, 1987-2004, at 3
(2006), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov.
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C HAPTER 4
THE COURT
J URISDICTION AND A PPLICABLE L AW

THE YOUNG AMERICAN
202
(popular schoolbook, 1844)

Mary Roh now has a lawyer. She still has no lawsuit.
What does Roh want from a lawsuit? She, like most litigants not bearing
grudges, wants her money back. She cares all about result and not at all
about process. The faster and cheaper she gets result she wants, the happier
she will be.
At her first meeting with her lawyer Harry Hahn, Roh asks: “when do
we go to court?” Hahn answers: “Not so fast. The first thing that we have to
consider is in which court we can bring a lawsuit. We need a court that has
what lawyers call ‘jurisdiction.’ The court must have jurisdiction both over
the subject matter of the lawsuit and over the parties. Lawyers call the first
type ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ and the second type ‘personal jurisdiction.’
202

S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING
th
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY. FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS 23 (4 ed., 1844).
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If more than one court has both subject matter and personal, we will have to
choose among them. In the United States, the American Hahn is likely to
add, “I will look for the court that I think will get you the best result based
on the law of the court and its personnel.” American lawyers call the practice
of looking for the most favorable court “forum-shopping.”
Roh does not care how Hahn answers these questions, so long as the
court chosen gives her what she wants. To Roh jurisdiction is legal
nitpicking. All she just wants to hear from Hahn is that there is a court that
can give her the result she wants and is likely do so soon.
While Roh understandably sees jurisdiction as mere detail—it has little
to do with her claim of right—in all three of our systems it is an essential
detail. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is not enforceable; it is no
judgment at all.
In this chapter we begin with a section that addresses jurisdiction
generally. We continue with three national sections, each of which considers
for the relevant system: the system’s courts, the system’s rules of subject
matter jurisdiction, the system’s rules of personal jurisdiction and applicable
law. The United States section includes an historical note on personal
jurisdiction. Finally we conclude the chapter with a section on forumshopping.
Jurisdiction
The two types of jurisdiction we have just identified, personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, are different. Subject matter
jurisdiction is concerned with the relationship between the court and the
subject matter of the controversy. Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is
concerned with the relationship between court and parties. We consider the
two seriatim. Questions of jurisdiction should be easily and quickly
answered. Answering them should not delay lawsuits materially. Answers in
ordinary cases should be mere details that are answered quickly. The
German and Korean systems achieve this goal; the American system does
not. While concepts and goals of all three systems are similar, the German
and Korean systems are efficient, while the American is not. Their efficiency
promotes justice and fairness, while the American piles on costs.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with which courts within a
national court system is or are competent to decide particular cases. For
examples, a criminal court is not competent to decide civil controversies; a
small claims court is not competent to decide large claims. If subject matter
jurisdiction is a complicated issue, it is because within a given national
system, it has been poorly governed.
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As we shall see, compared to the German system, the American and
Korean legal systems make less use of courts of special competencies. We
might expect that the more courts of special competency there are, the more
complicated are issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Yet subject matter
jurisdiction questions figure prominently in American civil justice, where
there are few specialized courts, and rarely arise in Germany, where there are
many.
The reasons for this are three: (1) the German system offers litigants less
choice. While different courts may have subject jurisdiction, plaintiffs rarely
get to choose among them. (2) Where there is choice, as we discuss in the
section on forum shopping, the choice makes little difference for the
outcome. (3) Whatever questions may arise, are resolved quickly and
conclusively at the outset of lawsuits.
Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is concerned with whether a court has authority
over all parties to a lawsuit. As we discuss below in the Historical Note,
originally personal jurisdiction was concerned with whether a court had
physical power over all participants. Today authority suffices.
German and Korean systems of civil justice resolve questions of
personal jurisdiction using a handful of bright line rules most of which both
systems share. The principal rule is that plaintiffs should sue defendants
where defendants are at home. This is consistent with the underlying
principle of civil procedure that plaintiffs have the burden of persuading
courts to intervene in defendants’ lives. This principle that plaintiffs must
sue where defendants are at home is modified in certain classes of cases
where that is deemed to be unfair to plaintiffs. In these cases, plaintiffs may
choose to sue where defendants are at home, i.e., the defendants’ court of
general jurisdiction, or in some other jurisdiction which a statute deems fair.
These latter courts have “special jurisdiction.” Three of the most common
cases are: (1) when plaintiff accuses defendant of a civil wrong, plaintiff may
sue in the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred; (2) when plaintiff is a
consumer, plaintiff may sue in the jurisdiction the transaction took place;
and, (3) when plaintiff dealt with defendant through a local branch of
defendant, plaintiff may sue in the jurisdiction of the branch. In certain other
classes of cases, based on the nature of the subject of the dispute, the law
requires that plaintiffs sue in a particular court’s jurisdiction. For example
the law may require that disputes over title to real estate be brought in the
jurisdiction where the real estate is located.
The American approach is different. It is not based on clear rules but on
a more “textured” or “nuanced” test of fairness in individual cases. That is to
say, the American approach eschews bright line tests and prefers to examine
each case on its own to determine whether it should be heard in that court.
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A. United States
[J]urisdictional questions do not arise naturally and inevitably.
Rather, they arise because one of the lawyers—typically the
plaintiff’s lawyer—has brought the case to a certain court to
obtain an advantage.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Colin C. Tait,. William A. Fletcher &
Stephen McG. Bundy (2007)
from their casebook’s teacher’s manual 203
1. American Courts
There is no one American system of courts. There are fifty-one
American court systems: one federal system and one state system for each
state. Each of these systems is separate one from the other: each has its own
rules of jurisdiction; each has its own rules of civil procedure; and each has
its own substantive laws, i.e., the laws that determine the parties’ rights.
The fifty-one different systems of courts, while different in detail, are
mostly similar in outline. Most have multi-tiered systems of courts of general
jurisdiction. Typically they consist of:
(1) “courts of limited jurisdiction,” i.e., entry level courts for specific—
usually smaller—cases;
(2) “courts of general jurisdiction,” i.e., entry level courts for legal
disputes generally;
(3) “intermediate appellate courts,” i.e., courts that review decisions of
entry level courts; and
(4) “courts of last resort,” i.e., courts having final appellate jurisdiction
to maintain integrity of law.
Roh’s lawyer Hahn will consider only (1) courts of limited jurisdiction and
(2) courts of general jurisdiction, since only these courts are “courts of first
instance,” i.e., courts where lawsuits can be begun. Courts of limited
jurisdiction (1) have specifically-assigned areas of competence and are
commonly limited to cases where amounts in dispute are below fixed levels;
courts of general jurisdiction (2) have responsibility for everything else.
Appellate courts review decisions of other courts and do not act as entry
level courts. One difference among American states is that some of the
smaller states by population do not have an intermediate appellate court.
State Courts
203

TEACHER’S MANUAL, CASES AND MATERIALS PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND
FEDERAL 12 (9th ed. 2007) (quoted with permission).

85

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

American state systems vary in detail, but all have a similar structure of
courts. In the Maryland system, for example, there are twenty-four District
Courts of limited jurisdiction and twenty-four Circuit Courts of general
jurisdiction. The District Courts handle small civil claims (below $5000 in
controversy) as well as certain other mostly minor matters; the Circuit
Courts handle larger matters, as well as all matters not handled by the
District Courts or by other special courts. In other states, there are similar
courts with similar functions, although they may have different names and
different jurisdictional amounts. In Maryland courts of first instance are
subject to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals, an
intermediate appellate court, and to that of the Court of Appeals, Maryland’s
court of last resort. In most states the courts of last resort are termed
“supreme courts.”
Federal Courts
Existing alongside the state courts in every state is a parallel system of
federal courts. Federal courts in the United States are courts of limited
jurisdiction; they are competent to decide only certain types of cases
specifically assigned them. The cases are an eclectic mix of about three
dozen matters most of which have some connection to the federal system. 204
Exceptionally federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases
unrelated to the federal system that are based on state law but which involve
parties from different states, provided that the matter in controversy exceeds
$75,000. 205
In Maryland the federal court of first instance is the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, which is located in Baltimore and
in Greenbelt, Maryland; it is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which is in Richmond
in the adjacent state of Virginia, and to the final appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court in the District of Columbia, coincidentally and
conveniently located between Maryland and Virginia.
Plaintiffs are not required to bring diversity cases in federal court and
most do not. When plaintiffs could sue in federal court but do not,
defendants may have the case transferred to federal court (“removal”). 206
Ordinarily, once a party properly brings a case into federal court, that court
is required to decide the case and cannot transfer it to a state court. The court
can, however, transfer the case to another federal court. 207 Exceptionally it

204

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1389 (listing bases of federal jurisdiction).
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“diversity jurisdiction”).
28 U.S.C. § 1441.
207
28 U.S.C. § 1404.
205
206
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may, under the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismiss the
case to permit parties to bring it in a different court. 208
Federal Courts & Federalism
Many Americans assume that existence of parallel state and federal
court systems is a necessary feature of federalism, but as German readers
know, it is not. Germany is a federal state, but there state courts carry out
federal law. German federal courts are, with one minor exception, not courts
of first instance, but appellate courts that oversee decisions of state courts in
applying federal law.
The United States Constitution mandates “one Supreme Court;” it
allows, but does not require “such inferior courts as Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.” Section 1, Art. III. When in 1789 Congress
chose to create inferior federal courts, consistent with the Constitution, it
could just as well have chosen not to; it could have relied on state courts to
apply federal law. That possibility was discussed in the course of ratification
of the Constitution. Federalists created lower federal courts because they
feared that state courts might not carry out federal law.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In the United States, since most courts are not specialized, questions of
subject-matter jurisdiction are uncommon. They arise most frequently in
connection with whether federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
disputes between parties from different states, i.e., under diversity
jurisdiction
Diversity Jurisdiction
The First Congress, in creating separate federal courts, bestowed on
those courts diversity jurisdiction. The rationale was that state courts might
not be “wholly without state prejudice, or state feelings” in deciding matters
concerning parties from other states. Even in those early years, however, that
fear was seen to be overstated. 209 It was, as Professor Carrington notes, a
product of eighteenth century compromise that “no sensible person” with a
choice would design. 210

208

See Elizabeth Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on
the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IA. L. REV. 1147 (2006).
209
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1684, at
561-562, 368 (1833).
210
Paul D. Carrington, Moths to the Light: The Dubious Attractions of American Law, 46
KANSAS L . REV. 673, 674 (1998), also in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD GROßFELD ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 129, (Ulrich Hübner & Werner Ebke, eds. 1999).
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Today, diversity jurisdiction has few friends, but the friends that it does
have are powerful. The original and only rationale for existence—the idea
that state courts are or might appear to be biased against parties from out-ofstate—is not seriously maintained. In-state parties are as likely to use
diversity jurisdiction as are the out-of-state parties that diversity jurisdiction
supposedly protects. Despite repeated calls to eliminate it, diversity
jurisdiction survives, it is predicted to survive well into the future because
the organized bar supports it. 211
In its present form diversity jurisdiction requires that plaintiffs show two
elements to establish jurisdiction: (1) complete diversity of citizenship
between all plaintiffs and all defendants; and (2) that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.
Diversity of Citizenship. Plaintiffs must establish complete diversity of
citizenship, that is, that no plaintiff shares the same citizenship with any
defendant. Often determining citizenship for diversity purposes of a
particular party can be problematic. The United States has no civil
registration requirement for individuals and no commercial register for
corporations, so there is no convenient way to establish state citizenship.
Jurisdictional Amount. To spare federal courts the burden of handling
small cases, today, as always, diversity cases must meet high minimums.
Today a diversity case must claim more than $75,000 in damages. The
minimum requirement is an incentive for plaintiffs to inflate and even to
create damage claims. An easy way to meet the threshold is to include a
claim that is not easily measured, e.g., for emotional damage, for pain and
suffering or for punitive damages. As we saw in Chapter 3, there is little risk
to asserting higher claims, since losing parties do not indemnify winning
parties for legal fees. Federal courts take a tolerant view of claims made to
establish diversity jurisdiction. They reject claims based on insufficient
amounts only if they conclude “to a legal certainty” that recovery of the
jurisdictional amount is not possible.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
American law provides a variety of bases for personal jurisdiction.
Some, such as domicile, i.e., the place where a defendant has his or her
home, are familiar to non-Americans. Others, such as serving papers on a
person while in the state (“personal service,” colloquially called “tag
jurisdiction,” after the children’s game, or “catching jurisdiction”), seem
exorbitant to non-Americans. Later in our discussion of Roh v. Doh we
discuss some of these other bases of jurisdiction.
One form of jurisdiction that is ubiquitous in American proceedings and
yet in other countries is considered exorbitant is “minimum contacts”
211

STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET
IN CONTEXT 89-90 (2006).

Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE
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jurisdiction. In the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 212
the United States Supreme Court held that American courts may decide
cases concerning defendants over whom they do not have physical power,
provided that “certain minimum contacts” exist with the state of the original
court “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
What makes the minimum contacts test complicated and timeconsuming for Americans and exorbitant for non-Americans is that it is
applied on a case-by-case basis. The decision in International Shoe could
have been the basis for simplification of American law of personal
jurisdiction. It could have been the basis of national rules authorizing
particular special bases of jurisdiction as known in Germany and Korea, e.g.,
jurisdictions where a civil wrong occurred, where a consumer bought a
product or where a defendant maintained an office. It did not turn out that
way.
Congress did not legislate national rules; it allowed the individual states
to write their own rules. Legislate the states have done, but not in
coordination with one another. Instead of one uniform national rule, the
states have created fifty non-uniform state rules. While some of these rules
created special bases of jurisdiction, almost all have general clauses that
operate on a case-by-case basis to extend the state’s jurisdiction to the
uncertain constitutional limit.
State jurisdiction statutes take three principal forms: (1) statutes that
assert jurisdiction only in cases of certain enumerated situations; (3) statutes
that assert jurisdiction in cases of certain enumerated acts and in other cases
to the limits of due process; and (3) statutes that assert jurisdiction to the
“limits of due process” without enumeration of any specific cases. These
statutes vary materially one from another. 213
This multiplicity of vague and competing state statutes means that there
is no authoritative statutory solution. There is only the amorphous Supreme
Court minimum contacts standard that is applied ad hoc in individual cases.
It takes a charitable German observer to credit the argument that “[t]his
enables the judge to focus on achieving justice in individual cases even if it
hampers predictability for the parties.” 214 A more perspicacious German
observer is not misled: “[J]urisdiction needs certainty and predictability. The
minimum contacts test as presently applied does not meet this goal. Courts in
their exaggerated concern for justice in individual cases drown themselves
and the legal profession in an ever swelling flood of case-by-case
adjudication.” 215 A critical American professor puts it plainly: the reality is
212
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an American test that “really makes first-year law students crazy.” 216 We
may add that it impoverishes litigants. It can make personal jurisdiction a
complicated issue even in minor cases, and the most significant issue in
high-stakes cases. It benefits lawyers, who can keep cases to themselves
rather than refer those cases to colleagues in distant cities.
How did the American system get to this point?
4. Historical Note: Jurisdiction from Power to Authority
In the past personal jurisdiction was an issue of power over all parties to
a lawsuit; today, in civil matters, it is an issue of authority. 217
In ordinary lawsuits, personal jurisdiction is not an issue. Neighbor sues
neighbor. Together they go to their local court. The neighbors are from the
same place. The court has power (and authority) over both of them. Both
must do as the court directs.
Personal jurisdiction becomes an issue when a party comes from outside
the court’s jurisdiction. When parties come from different jurisdictions, it
may be that no one court has power over both of them. That used to be a big
problem; today usually it is not.
Personal Jurisdiction in the Past—A Matter of Power
In the eighteenth century a court had to have physical power over all
parties to a lawsuit because, without that power, it could not enforce its
judgments. Parties not subject to its power could ignore the court with
impunity. Hence English common law courts did not entertain lawsuits until
plaintiff could demonstrate power over defendant. Well into the nineteenth
century American courts sought to obtain physical power over distant
defendants either directly, through physically arresting them while within the
court’s jurisdiction, or indirectly, through taking control of their property.
Another way to deal with distant defendants is to require plaintiffs to go
to courts where defendants are at home. Those distant courts ipso facto have
power, and therefore personal jurisdiction, over defendants living within
their jurisdiction; they gain power over plaintiffs when plaintiffs subject
themselves to the courts’ personal jurisdiction by suing there. But it is not
always fair to require plaintiffs to litigate in courts at defendants’ homes.
Today, one might chose not to require impecunious consumers to sue
mammoth corporations doing business worldwide in the courts of the
corporations’ home offices.
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Personal Jurisdiction in the Present—A Matter of Authority
A court that decides a lawsuit need not have power over a party if some
court somewhere has such power and that court will enforce the former
court’s judgment. In such cases the latter court “recognizes” and “enforces”
the judgment of the former. There are three principal ways that this happens:
(1) pursuant to federal law, courts in one state of a federal entity are required
to recognize and enforce judgments of courts of other states; (2) pursuant to
international treaty one country commits to another country that its courts
will recognize and enforce judgments of courts of the other provided that
those judgments satisfy specific criteria; and, (3) unilaterally courts in one
state recognize and enforce decisions of courts of other states out of respect
for those courts and their processes (international “comity”).
All three of these approaches assume that the courts that recognize and
enforce judgments of other states’ courts are prepared to assume that the
original judgments are legally correct and that those judgments were reached
by fair process.
(1) Federal law. In both respects, of these three approaches, least
problematic are judgments of other courts within federal entities. Then the
quality of the original judgments, both substantively and procedurally, is
better known and presumed of equal quality; federal law can establish
specific criteria that qualify judgments for recognition and enforcement.
(2) International treaty. More problematic are judgments recognized
and enforced pursuant to international treaty. Then the quality of original
judgments and of their process are less well-known, even at the time of
treaty adoption, and cannot be easily changed after treaty adoption. Treaties
can set specific criteria that qualify judgments for recognition and
enforcement.
(3) International comity. Most problematic is unilateral recognition
and enforcement pursuant to comity. Then the original court must assume
that a later court will grant comity; the later court has to make ad hoc
judgments about the substantive and procedural qualities of the first court
and may have no statutory guidelines to direct it when to do that.
Statutory Simplicity—German and Korean Solutions in Interstate Cases
In the nineteenth century commerce increased greatly. More and more
people interacted with people from distant places. More contacts meant more
disputes among people from different jurisdictions. More interstate disputes
meant more disputes where no local court had jurisdiction over all parties.
Requiring all plaintiffs all of the time to pursue defendants in their home
states became unacceptable.
In federal states, such as Germany and the United States, the issue of
jurisdiction was felt more acutely than in unitary states. A major purpose of
federation in both Germany and the United States was to increase commerce
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among constituent states. In both Germany and in the United States, personal
jurisdiction was subject of decisive action in the 1870s.
Action came a little earlier in Germany; it was simple, and resolved the
issue to this day. German unification in one federal state occurred in 1871. In
1874 the federal constitution was amended to give the federal legislature
authority to adopt a national Code of Civil Procedure. Such a code was
adopted and became effective January 10, 1877. As we discuss in the section
on Germany, the German solution sets clear criteria for when courts have
personal jurisdiction, provides that such judgments are enforceable in all
states of the federation, and provides for expeditious and inexpensive
resolution of any jurisdiction questions that do arise. German courts spend
little time or energy on issues of jurisdiction.
The German statutory solution of 1877 is a time-tested success. Without
fundamental changes it prevails in Germany today, where it justly, fairly and
quickly determines personal jurisdiction issues. The Korean solution is
essentially similar. So, too, is the rule for personal jurisdiction in the twentyseven member states of the European Union. 218
Case Law Complexity—American Indeterminacy
Supreme Court precedent and Congressional inaction are principally
productive of perplexity. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 219 decided just one year after
the successful statutory solution of the German Code of Civil Procedure
went into force, the Court held that courts in one state of the United States
are powerless to decide cases governing litigants outside their states unless
they have acquired power over the out-of-state parties or their property. 220
The Court rejected arguments that the “Full Faith and Credit” clause of
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution always required recognition
and enforcement by one state court of judgments of another state’s courts.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution was in 1789 a
prescient provision for integrating a nation that was only then coming into
being. Justice Robert H. Jackson said that it is the “foundation of any hope
for a truly national system of justice.” 221 It requires “Full faith and credit
218
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shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other State.” It authorizes Congress to make general
laws “to prescribe ... the effects thereof.” It allows Congress to allocate
jurisdiction in interstate cases through general venue rules much as Germany
and Korea do. It provides, according to Justice Jackson, “legislative power
better to integrate our legal systems.” 222
While the Constitutional Convention of 1787 seems to have expected
that Congress would flesh out details of this clause, 223 and while judges in
the early Republic awaited such instruction, 224 other than prescribing rules
for proving judicial proceedings from other states, Congress has never
adopted a general law prescribing prerequisites and effects for Full-Faithand-Credit treatment of jurisdiction. Why not? Justice Jackson answered:
“we are so accustomed to the delays, expense, and frustrations of our system
that it seldom occurs to us to inquire whether these are wise or
constitutionally necessary.” Relevant to this book, he continued, “[p]erhaps
the best perspective for judging whether our society is being well served ... is
by the comparative study of the methods and degree of integration employed
by other peoples ....” 225 Since Justice Jackson spoke in 1944, the European
Union has come into being and has integrated twenty-seven separate legal
systems that are more disparate in language and in culture than are
America’s fifty state systems. 226
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v. Neff did not slow creation
of a national market. Requiring courts to obtain physical power over all
parties soon proved inconvenient in a world where interactions among
people in different jurisdictions occurred with ever greater frequency and
complexity. Through legal fictions lawyers sought to avoid the effect of
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991). See also Walter Wheeler Cook, The
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919) (noting
the success of another federal common law country, Australia, with an act based on a similar
clause and proposing such an act for the United States). The issue of same sex marriages has
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Pennoyer v. Neff. By 1945 the Supreme Court stepped back from it. As we
have seen, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 227 the Supreme Court
held that American courts may decide cases concerning defendants over
whom they do not have physical power, provided that “certain minimum
contacts” exist. The United States has not yet, however, sought to move from
state jurisdiction to interstate venue. 228
5. Applicable Law in American Courts
Applicable law refers to the jurisdiction whose laws govern a case (e.g.,
Korean law), as well as to the particular laws of that jurisdiction that govern
(e.g., Civil Code). While a court must always decide which country’s laws to
apply, usually it does so without thinking; it applies its own laws. Where a
case has connections to more than one country, a court may consider and
decide to apply the law of country different than its own. It might do that to
protect the parties’ expectations where that other country has a closer
connection to the case. The process of deciding which country’s law governs
is called “choice of law;” the body of law that governs that choice of law is
called the “law of conflicts of law” (or in some countries “private
international law.”)
Since our case touches only one country, it concerns the laws of only
one country. In Korea and in Germany, choice of law is not an issue, because
in both countries, no choice of law is needed. Korea is a unitary, i.e., not
federal state, and hence it has only one set of laws. While Germany is a
federal and not a unitary state, and has separate state laws, most private law
matters are governed by nationally applicable federal law, most commonly,
the Civil Code.
In the United States, on the other hand, applicable law is an issue in
domestic cases that touch more than one state. Each state has its own
substantive law and that law, rather than a national code, usually applies.
Those different state laws mean courts frequently decide which state’s law
applies. To help courts decide which state’s law applies, each state has its
own (and different) law of conflicts of law.
So far we have just been speaking of a choice of substantive law. If a
plaintiff sues under diversity jurisdiction in federal court, however, choice of
law gets more (!) complicated. In federal court in diversity cases, while
federal law of civil procedure applies, state substantive law governs. It is not,
however, always clear when a rule should be regarded as a procedural law
and when as a substantive one. The federal courts led by the Supreme Court
have developed a complicated jurisprudence stating when a rule is
considered substantive and then must be the state rule.
227

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. REV. 103
(1971).
228

94

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

6. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping refers to parties choosing the court in which to bring a
lawsuit from among more than one possible court. Forum shopping is routine
in international litigation, but except in the United States, it is uncommon in
domestic litigation. Forum shopping has a pejorative connotation, since its
aim is to gain an advantage in process. Outside the United States, although
not unknown (choice is explicitly recognized as the plaintiff’s prerogative in
§ 35 ZPO), it is offensive to some.
Forum shopping is seen negatively because it accents the contest aspect
of civil procedure. Through choice of forum, one seeks a location that is
convenient for the plaintiff, inconvenient for the defendant, procedural rules
that favor the plaintiff, or a court that is likely to be more favorably disposed
toward the plaintiff. The sporting analogy is apt: the plaintiff aspires to a
“home-court” advantage.
Laymen think that law is simply “there;” when one has a dispute, one
turns to the neighborhood court. Law is, or at least should be, a matter of
one’s right and not of one’s power. Civil procedure is, or should be, the
process by which that right is determined. If these lay propositions are true,
then forum selection should not be outcome determinative. Right is right. At
most, choice of forum should concern convenience, but not determine
outcome. German and Korean lawyers share this view. American lawyers do
not. American trial lawyers in particular see choice of forum as one of the
most significant factors in a case’s outcome; some say it is the most
significant factor. 229
That American lawyers are more oriented toward forum shopping than
are their German and Korean counterparts is attributable more to practical
than to philosophical differences. There are in the United States more
reasons to engage in forum shopping, just as there are in Germany and Korea
fewer opportunities to do so. The primary reason to forum shop is to get a
better result; convenience is only a distant secondary reason. It is said one
cares more whether one is hanged than where. Both reasons make forumshopping more attractive in the United States than in either Germany or
Korea.
Outcome Determinative
There are three principal areas in which a choice of forum can advantage
one party or disadvantage the other and thereby lead to am outcome the
chooser prefers: (1) substantive law; (2) procedural law; and (3) personnel
229
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and institutional conditions (e.g., faster, better). Of these three, only the last
is a real consideration in most civil cases in Germany and Korea, but all
three are important in American cases.
More favorable substantive law. We have seen that in nearly all cases
in Korea and in most cases in Germany, the substantive law applied is the
same regardless of forum. In the United States substantive law varies from
state-to-state. Moreover, since substantive law is often uncertain, it can vary
from judge to judge.
More favorable procedural law. We have also seen that all civil cases
in Germany and Korea are subject to only one code of civil procedure. In the
United States, on they other hand, procedure varies significantly from stateto-state and from state to federal. While similarities in general are great,
litigation is concerned with differences in particular, which in particular
cases may be outcome determinative.
More favorable personnel—Judges and Courts. Not all courts have
personnel of the same quality. Not all courts are at the same level of efficacy.
To get a better court or a court that decides faster, a plaintiff may choose one
court over another. These variations are found everywhere, but are perceived
to be of greater importance in the United States than in either Germany or
Korea.
Juries. Juries in one jurisdiction may be more generous than in another.
Because federal courts draw their juries from larger geographic areas than do
state courts, one side might prefer a more narrowly or a more broadly drawn
jury. Since American communities are often de facto ethnically or
economically segregated, a narrower or a broader source of jurors may be
thought beneficial. While quality control of juries is more difficult than
quality control of judges, here too institution of uniform standards for jurors
and for their work could reduce the importance of forum selection.
Whose convenience
Party and witness convenience. Party convenience once was a
motivating factor for forum shopping. Thanks to development of modern
means of transportation and communication, beginning with the railroad and
the telegraph and continuing to commercial air service and internet texting
and conferencing—convenience has lost much importance. Insofar as
differences remain, however, they are greater in the United States, where
distances are much larger than either Germany or Korea.
Lawyer convenience. This too has lost importance in a day of easy
travel and free permission to act in other courts. Today lawyer convenience
is most important in the comfort lawyers get from dealing repeatedly with
the same courts, the same rules and the same judges.
Opportunities to forum shop
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In Germany and Korea there are relatively few courts to choose from.
There are no parallel systems of courts. The principal choice is between
defendant’s general Gerichtsstand or 보통재판적, usually defendant’s place
of residence, and a special Gerichtsstand 특별재판적, such as the place of
contract fulfillment or the place of a wrong.
Diversity Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping:
What the American Bar Likes About Diversity Jurisdiction
Procedural options. The plaintiff’s bar, i.e., lawyers who represent
individual plaintiffs in contingent fee personal injury and similar cases, like
the options in procedural law that a choice of courts offers. One
practitioner’s checklist identifies ten different procedural differences a
litigator should consider. These range from the time generally spent in
depositions to the location of the courthouses.
Among options that the defense bar likes is ability to undercut the
plaintiff’s attempts to get a favorable jury. State courts, because they serve
small parts of states, draw jurors from smaller geographic areas. These may
be areas that are homogenous economically and ethnically. By shifting a
case to federal court, which has a larger geographic area, a defendant
changes the make up of the potential jury.
Familiarity. Litigators with big firms have cases that may be all over
the country. They have a handful of large cases rather than a mountain of
small ones. do not have many cases. For them, federal courts offer
familiarity with rules and with judges. Rules are the same the nation over
and judges are few in number in the local court.
Better courts. The most frequently-voiced ground for preferring federal
courts to state courts is a perception that federal courts are better. This
perception is near universal, although it should be made on a state-by-state
basis. Federal judges generally have more prestige than do state court judges.
Their tenure is more secure. They are thought less subject to political
pressure. They generally have lower volume caseloads. And they have more
support staff than do state court judges. 230
7. Jurisdiction in Roh v. Doh
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In our case Roh filed suit in federal court. Why? We confess: because
that is the only way that we can describe a procedural system applicable
throughout the United States. Roh might have been better served to have
filed in state court.
230
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In this case, there is no issue regarding diversity of citizenship. Roh is a
Virginia citizen; all of the potential defendants, i.e., John Doh, Jr., John Doh, Sr.,
and DohSon Honda, LL.C., are Maryland citizens. That means that there will be
complete diversity of citizenship.
There is, however, a possible issue regarding the amount in controversy
that the lawyer for John Doh, Jr. might raise and even more likely, that a
lawyer for DohSon Honda, LLC, if made a defendant would raise. To
qualify for diversity jurisdiction in federal court, Roh’s claim must exceed
$75,000. It is, however, on its face exactly $75,000, i.e., one cent too low. If
Roh’s claim is for a loan, then that claim is probably permissible, since the
loan arguably assumed an interest payment or, in any case, John Doh, Jr.’s
failure to repay it timely created incidental or consequential damages that
would take the case over the jurisdictional minimum. But if Roh’s claim is
only for unjust enrichment, which probably is the case in an action against
DohSon Honda LLC, then it is does not exceed the magic amount. DohSon
Honda LLC then might move to dismiss the case against it for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 231
Personal Jurisdiction
Since no national law determines personal jurisdiction, whether personal
jurisdiction exists is a matter of the law of each separate state. As we have
seen, there is national constitutional law that sets limits to the state exercise
of personal jurisdiction but does not determine by class when it does.
Four different systems of American courts potentially have personal
jurisdiction over Doh and DohSon Honda LLC: the federal, that of the State
of Maryland, that of the Commonwealth of Virginia and that of the federal
District of Columbia. Since the federal system adopts the jurisdictional rules
of the district court of the state in which the federal court sits, Hahn has to
consult “only” three sets of personal jurisdiction rules: those of Maryland,
Virginia and the District of Columbia and no additional federal rules.
While the jurisdictional rules of Maryland, Virginia and the District of
Columbia are substantially similar in general terms, the differ materially in
what can be critical details. All three have variations of the same three basic
approaches to personal jurisdiction: domicile, “tag” (or “catching”) and
“long-arm” (or “minimum contacts”).
Domicile. Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia assert
personal jurisdiction over defendants “domiciled” in their respective
territories. While domicile has a technical legal definition, for purposes of
the book, it is sufficient to regard it as meaning the place of a natural
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person’s habitual residence and the place where a legal entity is organized as
a legal entity.
Based on domicile, Maryland has jurisdiction over all of the three
possible Doh defendants: John Doh, Jr., and John Doh, Sr. both live there;
DohSon Honda LLC is incorporated there. Virginia has jurisdiction based on
domicile over Roh. The District of Columbia has no jurisdiction based on
domicile over any party.
“Tag” or “Catching” Jurisdiction. Maryland, Virginia and the
District of Columbia all permit their courts to assert jurisdiction over persons
found within their territory, if they are personally given (“served”) the
summons and complaint in a lawsuit. It is a relic of the power orientation of
personal jurisdiction.
Catching does not meet the minimum contracts requirement of the
International Shoe case, yet the Supreme Court in more recent case upheld it
as basis for personal jurisdiction, even when the party served was only
temporarily in the state on grounds unrelated to the lawsuit. The Court
upheld catching for no better reason than that the United States has always
done it that way: “… it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system
….” 232 {This is a reminder that the American legal system is built more on
history than on system.}
Since the Doh parties are all domiciled in Maryland, there is no need to
tag them there. Tagging them in Virginia or the District of Columbia is
possible. Were that desired, Roh’s lawyer Hahn could employ a private
investigator to follow them around and tag any of them the moment they step
into the desired jurisdiction. As bizarre as it may seem, American plaintiffs
have tagged defendants as they fly in planes over the desired jurisdictions.
Minimum Contacts Jurisdiction. Hahn will consider whether there
may be personal jurisdiction in either the District of Columbia or Virginia
under minimum contacts jurisdiction. In Roh’s case, arguably the event that
gave rise to the cause of action was the meeting in the District of Columbia
that led to the transfer of the money. That act could satisfy the jurisdictional
prerequisite of District of Columbia Code § 13-423(a)(1) for a claim to relief
arising out of “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” This
provision raises questions, however. With respect to a suit against Doh for
breach of contract, the claim probably arises out of transacting business in
the District. But what if the claim is for unjust enrichment? If Roh is seeking
return of a gift, is that sufficient to constitute “transacting” business? On the
other hand, if obtaining of the gift were characterized as fraud, then it might
come under (3) as a claim for relief arising from the person’s “causing
tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the
District of Columbia.” But is that true? While the causal act took place in the
District of Columbia, where did the tortious injury occur?
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But wait. There are other issues with the District of Columbia’s
minimum contact law. Hahn might like to include DohSon Honda, LL.C., as
defendant. In that case, if Roh sues in the District, she will need to show that
Doh acted as agent of DohSon Honda, LLC.
The courts of Virginia are another possible place to bring suit. There,
however, the only contact to the state is Roh’s domicile. However, that
conceivably could provide the basis for jurisdiction. Virginia Code § 901.328.1(A)(1) allows for jurisdiction over a non-resident who transacts
business in the state. Obligating oneself to repay a loan to someone residing
in the state might constitute “transacting business.” Alternately, if a fraud
claim is viable, then possibly Roh could assert jurisdiction based on
subsection (4): “Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or
omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
this Commonwealth.” This provision might also support jurisdiction over
DohSon Honda LLC, since it sells many automobiles to Virginia residents,
but is of less certain applicability to Doh himself.
B. Germany
Disputes about jurisdiction should delay the consideration
and decision of lawsuits as little as possible.
Professor Dr. jur. Kurt Kuchinke (1969) 233
1. German Courts
Germany has five separate systems of courts: the courts of general
jurisdiction and the administrative, labor, social, and tax courts. As we shall
see, conflicts among the five court systems are not common; choices for
litigants to make among them are few, are easily made, and are ratified or
rejected expeditiously without great expense or severe adverse
consequences.
Although Germany is a federal state, its federal courts do not parallel
state courts. Federal courts are (with exception of a Patent Court), appellate
courts that oversee separate systems of state courts. So there is a Federal
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof responsible for civil and criminal justice)
a Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), a Federal Labor
Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), a Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht)
and a Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof). Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, the German Supreme Court is not responsible for issues of
233
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constitutional law. Instead, there is a Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).
Each of the sixteen German states has its own court system. Although
each state is responsible for administration of its own courts, state courts are
all built on the same model provided by federal statute (the
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz). The court of first instance in civil matters of
general jurisdiction is the Landgericht (state district court; plural
Landgerichte). Inferior to the Landgerichte is a court of first instance of
limited jurisdiction, the Amtsgericht (county court; plural, Amtsgerichte).
The Amtsgerichte are competent for family law matters and for civil matters
where the amount in controversy is less than €5,000. From an Amtsgericht,
except in family law matters and in certain international cases, an appeal is
taken to the competent Landgericht. For a matter begun in a Landgericht,
appeal is taken to the competent Oberlandesgericht (state appellate court;
plural Oberlandesgerichte). Because some states have more than one such
appellate court, there are in all twenty-four Oberlandesgerichte. For most
cases, the Landgerichte (for appeals from the Amtsgerichte) and the
Oberlandesgerichte (for appeals from the Landegerichte) are the courts of
last resort. Further appeal is to the Federal Supreme Court, mostly, as in the
United States, in the discretion of that court upon determination that a case
raises new questions of law or if there is a divergence of authority in the
lower appellate courts.
Characteristic of German courts generally is specialization of judges by
subject matter. The Federal Supreme Court itself has more than one hundred
judges. It usually sits in panels of five. Each panel is assigned specific areas
of law for internal competence.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
German law distinguishes two types of subject matter jurisdiction:
between German court systems (Rechtswegzuständigkeit) and within court
systems (sachliche Zuständigkeit). Here we refer to the former as inter-court
system subject matter jurisdiction and to the latter as intra-court system
subject matter jurisdiction. Inter-court system issues in the German judicial
system are not between court systems of different countries or states, but
between different court systems within the same state. Each state has
ordinary, administrative, finance, social and labor courts, from which final
appeals lie to corresponding federal courts in matters applying federal law.
Although the German system provides five systems of courts (seven if
one adds the Federal Patent Court and the Federal and State Constitutional
Courts), these neither compete with one another nor do they share
jurisdiction. Which system is competent depends on the “nature of the
disputed claim, i.e., legal relationship” as defined by statute. Section 13 of
the Court Organization Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG) assigns to the
ordinary courts all criminal cases and most private law disputes, with the
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principal exceptions of employment-related disputes and social law, i.e.,
pension and medical insurance, disputes, which it assigns to labor courts and
to social Courts. It assigns public law disputes either to those two courts in
their fields, or to administrative or tax courts. In addition, the Federal Patent
Court, the Federal Constitutional Court and the state constitutional courts
have special competencies. Despite the cornucopia of courts, inter-system
subject matter jurisdiction issues in ordinary civil disputes are not common.
When they occur they are usually between civil courts and either
administrative or labor courts.
In any case, choice of the wrong court system has minimal adverse
consequences. The judge on the judge’s own motion, after giving parties
opportunity to take a position, but without necessarily holding a hearing, is
to decide whether plaintiff has brought suit in the correct court. If the judge
finds that the court is without jurisdiction, the judge is to transfer the case to
the correct system. The decision to transfer is binding on the transferee court.
In either case, the transferor court’s decision binds all other courts once it is
final. Before it is final, parties may take an interlocutory appeal
(Beschwerde). 234 The only adverse consequence for plaintiffs who chooses
the wrong court is imposition of modest costs of transfer. The case continues
in the transferee court as if it had been begun there. For statute of limitations
purposes, commencement of the suit is dated from the original filing.
Intra-court system subject matter jurisdiction is likewise no big deal. In
the civil courts, the Landgericht has general subject matter jurisdiction. The
other possible courts of first instance are only the Amtsgerichte, which have
jurisdiction over landlord tenant and family law matters without regard to the
amount in controversy.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is straight-forward in Germany. Although
Germany is a federal state, the national Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO)
provides rules for personal jurisdiction that govern in all Länder. So when
Hahn in Berlin considers which court has jurisdiction, he looks at the same
rules for Bavaria as for Berlin. Rules do not vary from state to state; they are
the same in Bavaria and in Berlin. Those rules today are fundamentally the
same as they were when the Code of Civil Procedure first went into force in
1877. The German system provides plaintiffs with few choices; it makes
consequences of most wrong choices inexpensive and not outcome
determinative.
General jurisdiction. The key concept for personal jurisdiction is
Gerichtsstand, which is a place where suit may be brought (plural
Gerichtsstände). The Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes among three
types of Gerichtsstand: general (allgemeiner), specific (besonderer) and
234

§ 17a GVG (Gerichtsverfassungesetz = Court Organization Law).
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exclusive (ausschließlicher). It defines the general Gerichtsstand as the court
which has jurisdiction over all claims against a person, except for those
claims for which another provision of the code or a another law designates
an exclusive Gerichtsstand. § 12 ZPO. For natural persons the code
designates as the general Gerichtsstand the place of permanent residence
(Wohnsitz) (§ 13 ZPO), i.e., domicile in American law for natural persons,
assuming they have one, and for legal persons, their seat, which is ordinarily
their place of their administration. § 17 ZPO. The code has other provisions
that designate a general Gerichtsstand for Germans abroad (§ 15 ZPO), for
persons without permanent homes (§ 16 ZPO) and for various government
authorities (§§ 18-19a ZPO).
German law imposes a general registration of residence requirement on
natural and legal persons. A party to a lawsuit or potential lawsuit may
obtain from the relevant registration authority confirmation of registration
and the address of a potential party or witness. Thus the Code of Civil
Procedure assures that there is at least one court that has personal jurisdiction
over a defendant domiciled in Germany.
Specific jurisdiction; exclusive jurisdiction. In addition to providing a
general jurisdiction for every person in Germany, the code establishes a
series of specific Gerichtsstände that are available in addition to the general
Gerichtsstand. Where one (or more) of these is available, and there is no
exclusive Gerichtsstand, plaintiffs have free choice among them. § 35 ZPO.
Among specific Gerichtstände the code establishes are: temporary residence
(dauernder Aufenthalt) (§ 20 ZPO), place of a commercial branch (§ 21
ZPO), place of contract performance (§ 29 ZPO) and place of commission of
a legal wrong (tort) (§ 32 ZPO). For each of these the code defines specific
prerequisites and provides that there is personal jurisdiction specific to
claims arising from those prerequisites. Likewise it defines a few exclusive
Gerichtsstände, mostly involving realty and other immovables. E.g., § 24
ZPO. It specifically authorizes, under detailed circumstances, merchants to
agree upon a forum that would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction. § 38
ZPO. Germany has its own exorbitant jurisdiction rule, but it can have no
application to cases such as this book discusses, or indeed to any cases
limited to parties within Germany or within the European Union.
4. Applicable Law in Germany
Although German states have substantial authority to make laws of their
own, the federal government has authority to issue national laws for most
aspects of civil law. All the potential claims discussed here are claims under
the German Civil Code, which is a national law.
C. Korea

103

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

[Summarizing Korean rules of jurisdiction:] Basically, the
district court at the place of address of the defendant is a
competent jurisdiction court. A civil lawsuit over real
estate is under the jurisdiction of the district court in the
place where the real estate is located and a civil lawsuit
over a tort is under the jurisdiction of the district court
where the tort is committed.
The Supreme Court of Korea (2008) 235
1. Korean Courts
Korea is a unitary, rather than a federal state. There are no federal
courts. Like the German system, which it in many respects resembles, the
Korean court system has some, although not as many, separate court systems
for specific areas of law. It has specialized branch courts for family
(가정법원), patents and industrial property (특허법원) and administrative
law (행정법원). 236
The ordinary courts have three levels: the District Courts (지방법원),
the High Courts (고등법원), and the Supreme Court (대법원). District
Courts (as well as the Family Court) may establish Branch Courts and
Municipal Courts and delegate some matters, including registration matters
to them.
The ordinary court of first instance of general jurisdiction is the District
Court or one of its subsidiary Branch Courts. Presently there are eighteen
District Courts with forty Branch Courts; the Family Court has three Branch
Courts. Each court is competent for a specific geographic area. District
Courts (or the Branch Courts) decide in panels of three when the amount in
controversy exceeds ₩100 million (on the order of $100,000). When the
amount in controversy is ₩100 million or less, the District Court or the
Branch Court decides by one judge. In that case, an appeal is to a panel of
three judges in the same court, if the amount in controversy does not exceed
₩80 million. Municipal courts are responsible for cases where the amount in
controversy is ₩20 million or less. Appeals from a District Court judgment
by a three judge panel is to the competent High Court. There are five high
courts: one in each of the countries’ major cities: Seoul (서울), Busan (부산),
Daegu (대구), Gwangju (광주) and Daejon (대전). Judgments of the High
235

LEE JINMAN (Judge and Executive examiner of civil policy in Judicial Administration Office
at Supreme Court), CIVIL PROCEDURE SYSTEM IN KOREA 2-3 (9 September 2008), available at
http://eng.scourt.go.kr/eboard/NewsViewAction.work?gubun=43&seqnum=18&currentPage=1
&searchWord=&pr=.
236
Cf. Youngjoon Kwon, Litigating in Korea: A General Overview of the Korean Civil
Procedure, 7 J. KOREAN L. 109, 115-118 (2007), reprinted in LITIGATION IN KOREA 1, 6-8
(Kuk Cho, ed., 2010).

104

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

Courts, as well as judgments as Appellate Courts of the District Courts, may
be appealed to the Supreme Court. For constitutional questions, there is a
separate Constitutional Court (헌법재판소). 237
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Since Korea does not have separate court systems, such as the United
States (with federal and state courts) and Germany (with subject matter
systems), strictly speaking, there are no subject matter jurisdiction issues.
There is only the lesser issue of which court within a system with subject
matter jurisdiction is the competent court to hear the claim. These issues are
analogous in the system of the State of Maryland, discussed above, whether
the District Court or the Circuit Court, is competent to hear the case, or in
Germany whether the Amtsgericht or the Landegericht. Unless there is a
possibility that an administrative or family court is competent, plaintiffs do
not even need to think about the issue. In Korea, upon filing, the court will
assign the case to the correct judge according to the rules of subject matter
competence (사물관할; samul kwanhal) of the Court Organization Act
(법원조직법; bopwonjojik bop). The Court Organization Act mechanically
assigns lawsuits by the amount claimed or other aspects of the case (e.g.,
promissory note, real property) to either a three-judge panel or to a single
judge. Presently it provides that cases involving more than ₩100 are for
three judge panels, while those for ₩100 million or less are for single judges.
For our case that means that the court will assign it to a single judge panel. 238
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Korean principles of personal jurisdiction are similar to the German
ones on which Korean provisions are indirectly based. The court of the
defendant’s domicile is the court of general jurisdiction (보통재판적) in
cases where the defendant is a natural person. KCPA §§ 2 and 3. Unlike both
Germany and the United States, domicile in Korean law does not require.
The law provides rules where a party has no domicile in Korea. It further
provides that the court of general jurisdiction for a legal person is the court
where the entity has its principal place of business. KCPA § 5(1). The law
provides for special jurisdiction In certain cases, other courts have special
jurisdiction(특별재판적) in a number of cases, including, place of
temporary residence, KCPA § 8, place of a commercial branch, KCPA § 12,
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See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, TWENTY YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OF KOREA (2008).
238
See LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 131.
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place of contract performance, KCPA § 8, and place of commission of a tort,
KCPA § 18. 239
4. Applicable Law in Korea
Since Korea is a unitary state there is rarely a question of applicable law
in domestic litigation.

239

See generally Kong-Woong Choe, Jurisdiction in Korean Conflict of Laws—A Comparison
with American Rules of Jurisdiction, KOREAN J. COMP. L. 89, 103-113 (1977); Kwon, Litigating
in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 124-126, reprint at 14-16.

106

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

CHAPTER 5

THE

P LEADING
M ATTER IN C ONTROVERSY

Your Honor a day for me set/
On which I my right may get.
16th Century German Codex

240

Mary Roh has decided to sue. She has a lawyer; she has a court. Now
she is ready to bring her case to court. Starting a lawsuit requires that she tell
the court what it is that she wants. Otherwise, the court will not know which
matters it is to decide and which remedies, if any, it is to order. What the
court is to decide—the matter in controversy—is fundamental to all three of
our systems of civil procedure.
In all three of our systems plaintiffs begin lawsuits by telling courts
what they want from whom. They answer the classic question that law
professors pose to first year American law students: who is suing whom for
what? They do this in documents called complaints. Defendants are formally
“served with process,” that is, they are informed of the lawsuit and are
240

JOHANN FREIHERR ZU SCHWARZENBERG, CONSTITUTIO CRIMINALIS BAMBERGENSIS,
BAMBERGER HALSGERICHTSORDNUNG leaf 14 (1543 ed.).
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formally given the complaint. Defendants are “summoned” to appear within
a certain period of time (usually, less than a month) and, if they do not, they
are deemed in default. They respond either in documents called answers, or
in motions to the court. Plaintiffs may reply to these answers and motions.
Collectively this written give-and-take between the parties at the beginning
of the lawsuit constitutes the pleadings.
Pleadings identify the controversy before the court; they determine who
is party to the lawsuit (“party joinder”) and which events are before the court
(“claim joinder”). They tell the court what the parties want by way of relief
(“demand”).
In all three of our systems pleadings are principally the work of the
parties. In the American system, they are reviewed by the court only on
request after they have been served. In the German and the Korean systems,
on the other hand, complaints are reviewed by the court before they are
served on defendants.
In our case Roh will state in her complaint that she gave money to John
Doh, Jr. She will demand that Doh give her back the money with interest.
She may demand that someone else, perhaps Doh’s former firm, DohSon
Honda LLC, or Doh’s father, John Doh, Sr., pay the money. Doh will answer
that he is not required to pay the money. The court now knows who is suing
whom for what.
In this chapter we discuss pleadings generally and then turn to pleadings
as used in our respective systems.
A. Pleading Generally
It is easy for lawyers to get wrapped up in the technicalities of their craft
and to forget the mundane aspects of what they are doing in lawsuits.
Looked at from a purely practical perspective, pleadings have all the
romance of a car owner going to the shop and telling the mechanic what is
wrong with the car or a patient going to the physician and telling the
physician how it hurts. Both mechanic and physician will respond similarly:
they will talk with the car owner or the patient and diagnose the problem
before taking the car apart or prescribing treatment. Pleadings, and how they
are handled, should be the counterpart of the first trip to the mechanic’s shop
or to the physician’s office.
For generations American lawyers began their study of civil procedure
with the lesson that before a court decides, it must know what it is to decide.
In American civil procedure one talks about framing an issue for decision. In
German and Korean civil procedure one speaks of the subject of the lawsuit,
the matter in controversy, the Streitgegenstand or 소송물 (sosongmul). As
we shall see, behind that small difference in describing what is being done
lie important differences in our systems and in their handling of pleadings.
Nevertheless, in all of our systems, before a court can go to work to
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determine who is right by determining law and finding facts, it needs to
know what plaintiff thinks is wrong.
1. Purposes of Pleadings
Three purposes of pleading are: (1) establishing jurisdiction of the court
to consider the controversy; (2) directing process to material issues that the
parties dispute; and (3) bounding the controversy. 241
Establishing jurisdiction to consider the controversy. In Chapter 4
we examined jurisdiction. Pleading subject matter jurisdiction confirms that
the court has responsibility for determining disputes of this type. Pleading
personal jurisdiction confirms that this defendant is subject to the authority
of this court, usually because the court’s jurisdiction is his or her home, or
because the court’s jurisdiction is where the matter arose. In Chapter 4 we
saw that German and Korean courts decide these issues quickly based on the
pleadings. American courts, if presented with the issue, can require more
time. We refer readers back to Chapter 4 for consideration of this purpose of
pleading.
Directing process to material issues in dispute. While establishing
jurisdiction is a necessary part of every lawsuit, that finding is incidental to
the purpose of the lawsuit: determination of parties’ rights. Ideally every step
that parties and court take in the course of a lawsuit should contribute to the
accurate, fair and prompt determination of the parties’ rights. Since a lawsuit
is about different views of what is right, pleadings can advance that eventual
determination by setting out not only what one party thinks is wrong, but by
informing the court of the factual basis for that claim and by setting out those
matters about which the parties agree and those matters about which they
disagree.
Bounding the controversy. Deciding what to decide is essential to any
legal decision; deciding what not to decide, i.e., bounding the controversy, is
important for an efficient decision. Going off point not only delays final
decision of right, it makes that decision more costly. Setting bounds to the
controversy conserves party resources. Matters which are not raised in the
pleadings, parties need not consider. Setting bounds to the controversy
protects parties from surprise. Parties need prepare their cases only on
matters before the court.
Bounding the controversy has an importance that transcends process
efficiency: protection of autonomy of parties and the privacy of the public.
In all three of our systems of civil justice, while courts are required to decide
all private disputes properly brought to them, they are prohibited from
investigating on their own initiative matters not brought to them by the
241

Cf. Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common Law—
Codes—Federal Rules, 14 VANDERBILT L. REV. 399 (1961); FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (1965).
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parties. Those matters not before the court, the court cannot properly
examine or decide.
2. Limits on Pleading—the Interdependency of Law and Facts
Directing process to material points in dispute and bounding process
from going off on unproductive paths are benefits that pleading can deliver.
While essential to efficient process, directing and binding process are
necessarily tentative if process is to achieve correct decisions according to
law. It is a truism of lawsuits that no one can predict with certainty what the
process will turn up in the way of facts and legal issues. An issue that may
not have been apparent at the outset, may become central to decision.
Civil procedure aims at correct application of all law to true facts. The
process starts out, however, with imperfect knowledge of which rules are
applicable and of which alleged facts are true. Applying law to facts thus
requires determining the rules that are applicable to the facts and finding the
facts that are material to the applicable rules.
Determining applicable rules and finding material facts are
interdependent inquiries: until one knows which rules are applicable, one
cannot know which facts are material. Until one knows the facts, one cannot
know which rules are applicable. Settle the applicable rules too soon, and
facts may be overlooked which would change results were other rules
applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules soon enough and the process may
detour to find facts that are not material under the rules actually applied. This
process of going back and forth was identified in the first part of the
twentieth century, but to this day is only occasionally noted. 242
242

In contemporary American civil procedure the question, when it is discussed at all, is seen
from the lawyer’s perspective as one of case theory development. See, e.g., THOMAS A.
MANUET, PRETRIAL 21 (7th ed. 2008) (“This process, going back and forth between
investigating the facts and researching the law, is ongoing and is how you will develop your
‘theory of the case’ ….”). But American practitioners saw it as a practical problem before case
theory took over. See JESSE FRANKLIN BRUMBAUGH, LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING: LOGIC
APPLIED TO THE PREPARATION, TRIAL AND APPEAL OF CASES, WITH ILLUSTRATIVE BRIEFS AND
FORMS 364-367 (1917). American academics Hart & Sacks noted it in their iconic work on legal
process. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 351 (1958 Tentative Edition published 1994) (“the law
determines which facts are relevant while at the same time the facts determine what law is
relevant.”) They concluded, as German practice does, that “[w]hat comes last, however, is
always the job of law application.” But they had no more to say about it. Comparativists seem to
have seen the issue most clearly. Arthur T. von Mehren conceived of the problem in terms of
concentration and surprise at trial. See Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural
Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, 2 EUROPÄISCHES
RECHTSDENKENS IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT COING ZUM 70.
GEBURTSTAG 361 et seq. (Norbert Horn, ed. 1982), relevant parts substantially reprinted in
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, & PETER L. MURRAY, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed, 2007).
The German comparativist, Oskar Hartweig, saw the issue in his studies of English pleading.
See Dieter Stauder with David Llewellyn, Oskar Hartwieg’s Thoughts on the English Legal
System, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

110

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

B. United States
In the course of administering justice between litigating
parties, there are two successive objects,—to ascertain the
subject for decision, and to decide.
Henry John Stephen (1824)
In nineteenth century’s leading book on pleading243
One might think that such a mundane matter as informing the court what
the case is all about would be non-controversial. Yet again and again over
the two century long history of American civil procedure, pleading and its
consequences have been at the heart of controversy. Points of procedure end
up dominating the work of the appellate courts. Today, pleading is again
center stage in American debate over civil procedure.
In this section we discuss contemporary American pleading in general,
then examine historical pleading, issues of joinder and turn finally to how
pleading would be handled in Roh v. Doh.
1. Contemporary American Pleading
Modern American pleading is termed “notice pleading.” That is because
it serves principally to give the other party notice of the proceedings. As we
shall shortly discuss, earlier approaches to pleading forced the parties to
develop specific issues for trial. The result, in view of the back-and-forth
nature of law applying just discussed, was to deny meritorious claims. The
notice pleading system seeks to avoid those problems by making less of the
former issue narrowing role of pleadings.
Some legal scholars nevertheless assert that American pleadings “define
the issues presented in a legal dispute.” 244 In modern notice pleading,

WILLIAM R. CORNISH 47, 51 (D. Vaver and L. Bently, eds. 2004). Hartwieg brought the
problem and its relevance to the German system to the attention of a wider circle of German
readers in a challenging introductory book. OSKAR HARTWIEG & H.A. HESSE, DIE
ENTSCHEIDUNG IM ZIVILPROZEß: EIN STUDIENBUCH ÜBER METHODE, RECHTSGEFÜHL UND
ROUTINE IN GUTACHTEN UND URTEIL at 78-79 (1981). See OSKAR HARTWIEG,
SACHVERHALTSARBEIT ALS STEUERUNGSINSTRUMENT IM ZIVILPROZESS (Stephan Meder, ed.,
2010). Already the idea is discussed in a doctoral dissertation done under Prof. Dr. Reinhold
Zippelius in 1971. HERBERT SCHÖPF, DIE WECHSELBEZIEHUNG ZWISCHEN SACHVERHALT UND
NORMENORDNUNG BEI DER RECHTSANWENDUNG (Diss. Erlangen 1971). See generally James
R. Maxeiner, It's the Law—The Missing Measure of Civil Law/Common Law Convergence 49
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 469 (2010) reprinted in COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
CATEGORIES (Janet Walker and Oscar G. Chase, eds., 2010).
243
HENRY STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 1 (1824).
244
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN
INTRODUCTION 108 (1993)
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however, they do not do much to direct the court to what the dispute is
about. They barely begin to direct the case toward material points in dispute;
they hardly bound the scope of process. Serving the complaint corresponds
to dropping the starter’s flag at the beginning of a race. A complaint may be
sufficient even though it has no “legally relevant allegations at all.” 245 In
theory, structuring the case in order to decide it is in “the bailiwick of
discovery and motion practice.” 246 In practice, that is seen as myth. 247 We
discuss discovery and motion practice in Chapter 6.
Formal Requirements of Complaints
The building block of notice pleading is the “claim.” The claim is the
legal basis for relief required by Rule 8(a)(2); it is the legal cause of action.
Under Rule 26(b)(1) the claim in theory determines the scope of pretrial
discovery discussed in Chapter 6; in theory it facilitates the eventual
subsumption of facts of the case under law.
The formal requirements of American complaints are few. Rule 8(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets them out. Besides a statement of
the ground for federal jurisdiction (1) and a demand for relief (3), all that it
requires is “(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” 248 For money lent it is sufficient to state: “The
defendant owes the plaintiff $ _______ for money lent by the plaintiff to the
defendant on date.” 249 Only if the complaint asserts fraud or mistake must it,
under Rule 9(b), “state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud of mistake.”
Lazy lawyers can make short work of a complaint: it is said less than
thirty minutes on their way to the golf course. The best lawyers take more
time. They draft complaints that take into account secondary objectives such
as impressing opposing counsel with their attention to the case and using the
complaint to begin to tell a story. 250
Rule 8(a) does not require that plaintiffs identify in the complaint
“specific facts;” plaintiffs need only “give the defendant fair notice of what
the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 251 The Rule does not
require that parties choose a single claim, let alone a single issue, to present
to the court. 252 The Rule does not require that a party plead all the elements
245

Geoffrey C. Hazard, From Whom No Secrets are Hid, 76 TEX L. REV. 1665 (1998).
THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 117 (7th ed., 2008).
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87
DENVER U. L. REV. 245, 247 (2010).
248
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(a).
249
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10(d).
250
CHARLES H. ROSE & JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, FUNDAMENTAL PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE LITIGATION 144, 158-159 (2008).
251
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
252
See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1000
(2003).
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of any cause of action. 253 The Rule does not normally require that parties
even state facts that support the claims they make. 254 The Rule imposes no
requirement similar to the German requirement that matters asserted must be
substantiated by naming the proof to be used to prove them. In the American
system all that is unnecessary.
Contemporary Controversy
Pleading is again a hot topic in spirited debate in the United States about
civil justice. In 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 255 the United States
Supreme Court, with an eye to the high cost of the discovery phase that
follows pleading in the United States (discussed in Chapter 6), tightened up
pleading standards with the goal of sparing innocent defendants those costs.
The Court interpreted the “short and plain” standard of Federal Rule 8(a)(2)
to require that plaintiffs allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” The Twombly decision reversed (or as the Court more
gently said, “retired”) “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).” The Twombly
decision focuses on the function of pleadings as gate-keeper or bounding
device; it does not give much attention to pleading as device to direct
process.
Some scholars find the Twombly decision startling. It means, they
believe, that notice pleading is dead—to be replaced by plausibility pleading.
In the view of other critics of Twombly, however, access to justice means
that plaintiffs should have access to a particular form of process that permits
discovery or even creation of legal rights that they are not able to state when
they plead. Plaintiffs, according to this view, should be allowed to assert
claims that to some may appear “tenuous,” to initiate their claims without
“full and complete information,” and to have ability “to investigate their
claims under the aegis of the courts,” and only after that, to have tested the
factual sufficiency of their claims. 256 Others scholars are less surprised; they
see only a modest departure from past practice. From historic and
comparative perspectives, the change—if there is one—is slight. Plaintiffs
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still are not required to plead evidence or even to allege facts that would
fulfill all of the elements of an applicable legal rule. 257
2. American Pleading in Historical Perspective
After over two hundred years of failed attempts, it is obvious that
American pleading has failed. It has failed, we believe, because American
civil procedure leaves to the parties’ lawyers principal control of the process
of applying law to facts, starting already with pleading.
In permitting the parties’ lawyers to control application of law to fact,
American civil procedure has vacillated between extremes in how it uses
pleading. At both extremes it reserves only a modest supporting role to
courts and directs the parties’ lawyers to share the leading role. It expects the
parties’ lawyers to cooperate among themselves, not only to advance
applying law to fact, but to carry out nearly the entire job beginning with
determining of law, continuing through finding of fact, and ending with
subsuming found facts under determined law. At the one extreme, pleading
was to accomplish all that; at the other extreme, pleading was to accomplish
none of it and all was to be left to post-pleading, pre-trial procedure or to
trial itself.
Common law special pleading was the extreme where pleading was to
do it all. Common law pleading required that plaintiffs choose one specific
legal claim (the form of action) on which to base their claims and to force
facts into that form. To do that often required that plaintiffs plead false or
fictitious facts. Defendants had to respond to plaintiffs’ pleadings with the
object of reaching one material issue, of law or of fact, the determination of
which disposed of the case. That precise issue the parties put on the record
without any action on the part of the court. When laweyrs got law and facts
right, special pleading made for efficient process. Pleadings directed the
court to the issue and pleadings bounded the process. When lawyers got it
wrong, however, and chose the wrong rule, or facts turned out to be other
than expected, the righteous were punished for their wrong procedural
choice. Hence common law pleading was overthrown and code pleading
substituted. 258
Code pleading occupied a middle ground between common law special
pleading and modern notice pleading. In code pleading plaintiffs’ lawyers no
longer selected a single form of action under which they had to subsume
their cases. They were to plead facts and not law. Those facts, however, had
to constitute a “cause of action,” or multiple causes of action. In code
257
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pleading defendants’ lawyers were no longer restricted to disputing one point
of law or one point of fact, but could dispute multiple points of each.
Code pleading was more like common law pleading or more like
modern notice pleading depending upon the extent to which courts using it
restricted the parties’ lawyers to the assertions that they made in their
pleadings. Courts concerned with guiding and bounding process might
review pleadings strictly. They were concerned with how plaintiffs’ lawyers
were to present at trial all of the different possible causes of action and
issues. They worried how practically defendants’ lawyers could prepare for
all that plaintiffs’ lawyers might throw at them. Reformers underestimated
the complexity of the problems that they created in pleading and in eventual
application of law to fact at trial. The back-and-forth nature of law
application defeated the reforms. Strict courts could and did make “fact
pleading” every bit as onerous as the common law pleading that preceded it.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Edson R. Sunderland, drafter of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s pretrial provisions, considered the federal
rules to be “in effect code pleading emancipated from the various technical
requirements which a century of experience has shown to be
unnecessary.” 259 Sunderland’s vision for how pleading should work was not
so very different from older forms and rather distant from the notice pleading
we know today and described above. Shortly after adoption of the federal
rules he wrote: “The purpose of pleading is to analyze controversies between
parties, and to segregate and formulate the points in dispute, in such a
manner that the parties may have sufficient information to enable them to
properly prepare for trial and that the court may know exactly what questions
are to be decided.” 260 Pleading was still then, according to one
contemporary, “absolutely essential to the orderly administration of justice.”
Without some means to develop an issue for trial: “the proceedings would be
a mere groping in the dark. An unknown point of difference could not be
intelligently tried by the court; nor could the parties intelligently prepare for
trial.” 261 A dozen years after their adoption, however, another scholar feared
that pleadings under the federal rules no longer had a rationale. They failed
to fulfill their “ultimate objective”: “to advise the court, lawyers and parties
prior to trial what questions are to be decided.” 262
As we shall see in the Chapter 6, Sunderland provided or strengthened
other means for developing material issues in dispute, namely pretrial
conferences and summary judgment motions. Their nonuse, together with
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the demise of pleading, has led to the other key development in American
procedure discussed in that chapter, the vanishing of trials.
3. Joinder of Claims and of Parties
While formal requirements for American complaints are few, the
practical consequences are sufficient to impel plaintiffs’ lawyers to evaluate
their cases before filing them. In particular they need to decide which claims
to raise (joinder of claims) and against which parties they will raise them
(joinder of parties).
In our case, should Roh sue only for an unpaid loan, or for other claims,
such as for unjust enrichment or fraud? Should she sue only John Doh, Jr., or
perhaps other parties, such as John Doh, Sr. or DohSon Honda, LL.C.?
Decisions concerning both forms of joinder are largely for the parties
and not for the court. They are reached as matters of litigation strategy.
Usually they are made by the lawyers themselves and are influenced by their
interests. 263
Joinder of Claims
The contemporary American system of pleading and discovery
encourages rather than discourages adding claims. Here we speak both of
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and those arising out
of completely different events. There is no restriction on parties joining
completely different claims against each other, although the court may order
their severance. 264 Free joinder is a change from common law pleading,
which with its need to produce a single issue between the parties, was hostile
to any form of joinder, be it of claims or of parties.
There is no price to pay for adding claims; plaintiffs can drop them at
any time. Since a claim is a legal characterization of facts, caution suggests
raising every conceivable legal claim in case the court prefers one
characterization or another. Since a claim defines the scope of pretrial
discovery, flexibility in discovery encourages raising every conceivable
claim. Since different claims support different remedies, maximizing one’s
options pushes one toward calling for all claims.
In our case Roh’s lawyer, Harry Hahn, will write a complaint that
asserts at least two different claims: repayment of a loan and unjust
enrichment. For the first claim (styled variously “cause of action” or “count”
in court papers), Roh will allege that she and defendant Doh, Jr. agreed to a
loan of $75,000 which loan Doh, Jr., has failed to repay. For a second claim,
she will assert, that were the court to find the payment a gift and not a loan,
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it was a gift conditioned on the marriage of Doh, Jr. and Roh’s daughter
Rosa, which condition failed and, therefore gives rise to a right to its return.
Hahn will also consider other possible causes of action. In particular, he
might for tactical reasons wish to add a claim of fraud. That might be that
Doh, Jr. sought the money as a loan, but never intended to repay it, and now
claims it as a gift. By adding a fraud claim, Roh could then also add a claim
for punitive damages. Punitive damages are damages awarded not to
compensate, but to punish. Although they thus serve a public function, they
are paid to the plaintiff. They can be very high: commonly a multiple of the
underlying compensatory damages claimed. Merely the presence of a claim
for punitive damages can alarm defendants and can achieve for plaintiffs
tactical benefits.
The only limit to the number of claims that Hahn asserts are his
imagination and his brazenness. The system permits him creativity in claim
creation. He may properly make any claim that he can imagine, even if not
supported by the law, provided that it is warranted “by a non-frivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.” 265
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that Hahn limits himself to two
claims: (1) a contract claim for repayment of a loan; and (2) an unjust
enrichment claim for repayment of a conditional gift.
Joinder of Parties
Just as today’s system of pleading encourages plaintiffs to add claims,
so too does it encourage plaintiffs to add parties. Unlike in the days of
common law pleading—which had complicated and convoluted rules when
plaintiffs could or sometimes had to join parties—the present-day system
does not discourage plaintiffs from adding parties; sometimes it requires that
they do (“compulsory joinder”). It is generally easier to join parties at the
outset of litigation than later. The system allows joinder of parties not yet
known through the device of fictitious names, e.g., John Doe, Mary Doe or
Richard Roe. The generous rules of personal jurisdiction allow joining many
parties, while the elasticity of those rules encourages plaintiffs to join nonobvious parties.
Naming multiple parties confers many benefits on plaintiffs. Perhaps the
most important of these is to draw into the lawsuit so-called “deep pockets,”
that is, parties who are financially able to pay large judgments—or better
yet—large settlements early on. If defendants are “jointly and severally
liable,” as often is the case, plaintiff can collect the full amount of a
judgment from any of them. Thus it is typical to name as party just about
anyone in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Naming a third party
as defendant offers the further benefit of the generous rules of party
265
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discovery to obtain information that may be in that party’s hands. It offers
the possibility that in the course of litigation defendants may quarrel among
themselves to the benefit of plaintiff. Finally, the third party may have clout
over the real defendant and be willing to use that clout to “help” that party
reach a settlement.
Plaintiffs who chose to sue in federal court under federal diversity
jurisdiction have special considerations. By adding or omitting parties they
can make or destroy diversity, i.e., the basis for subject matter jurisdiction of
the court. Federal courts assume diversity jurisdiction only when there is socalled complete diversity, i.e., all the plaintiffs are from different states than
are all defendants. The same technique can be used to create or destroy
venue. 266
In the case of Roh v. Doh, Roh is the only plaintiff on the scene, but
John Doh, Jr. is not the only possible defendant. Hahn will give thought to
adding DohSon Honda LLC or John Doh, Sr. as defendants. He might add
DohSon Honda LLC as defendant, since Roh paid the money directly to it.
Hahn might add John Doh, Sr. as defendant, even though the basis for such a
claim is not presently clear. Perhaps Doh, Sr., explicitly or impliedly
guaranteed loans to Doh, Jr. Or perhaps, discovery will show that Doh, Sr.,
so participated in the management of DohSon, LLC that a court would be
justified in “piercing the corporate veil” and assessing liability against him
for the actions of that legal entity. Hahn need have no present factual basis
for these claims. It is sufficient if he believes that such factual assertions as
are necessary to support such claims “will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 267
To simplify our discussion, we assume that Hahn adds no additional
defendants.
4. Handling Complaints
Once Hahn has prepared the complaint and obtained Roh’s approval of
it, he will file it with the court. Roh will have to pay a filing fee. It is small.
In federal court, the fee is the same whether one demands $100 or $100
million (presently in Maryland the fee is $350). It is no deterrent to lawsuits.
In Germany and Korea, on the other hand, the filing fee depends on the
amount in controversy; in Roh’s case it would be €1,668 (about $2000); in
Korea ₩342,500 (about $350). The more plaintiffs ask for, the more they
must pay into the court. As we shall see later in this chapter, this leads some
plaintiffs in Germany to split claims. Claim-splitting is unusual in America.
Upon filing the court assigns a judge to handle the case. In the federal
courts, each district court individually decides how to assign judges to cases.
In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, as in most
266
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federal district courts, assignment is random. The judge assigned is
potentially any one of the judges in the court, without regard to subject
matter of the case and without consideration of the expertises of the judge.
Federal judges are assigned both civil and criminal matters at the same time.
The assigned judge might be busy with a high profile criminal case.
Filing and immediate assignment of a judge were not always federal
practice and, to this day, are not the practice in all states. As late as 1992, in
New York plaintiffs commenced civil actions by serving process on
defendants rather than by filing with courts. 268 They needed never file with
the court, if they settled the lawsuit; if they did not settle, they could wait as
late as until they wanted the court to summon a jury. The parties needed to
contact the court only when they needed a judicial ruling; then they would
file what is still called a “request for judicial intervention.”
Since 1992 plaintiffs in New York commence cases by filing. But still
today the court does not assign a judge when filed. Still today New York
courts await filing by parties of requests for judicial intervention. The idea of
this system is that most cases can be worked out among parties without
judges being involved. Courts should assign judges only when parties need
judicial rulings, such as, the decision of motions, the setting of discovery
deadlines (discussed in Chapter 6), or the setting of trial dates (discussed in
Chapter 7).
This belated assignment of a judge to the case is a vestige of a practice
known as the calendar system that is still used in some states. While in an
individual assignment system, one judge handles the entire case from
beginning to end, in a calendar system, judges supervise specific stages of
cases, e.g., motion practice, trials, etc. The calendar system was thought
more efficient, particularly for routine cases, for then a matter could go
forward without waiting for a particular judge to have time to hear it.
Reviewing Complaints before Serving
Unlike in Germany and Korea, American courts do not review
complaints before they are served. Even after complaints are served, courts
review them only on request. As we discuss below, courts leave it to
defendants to object to sufficiency of plaintiffs’ complaints. Barring
defendants’ motions, they do not concern themselves with whether plaintiffs
have sufficiently stated legal claims or adequately alleged jurisdiction and
other necessary procedural prerequisites.
Serving Complaints
Unlike in Germany and Korea, American courts usually do not serve
complaints on defendants. That task falls on plaintiffs. Today, service is
268
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simpler than in the past. Once service is accomplished, Hahn will, however,
have to file proof of service with the court.
As Hahn and Roh discussed in Chapter 3, Roh comes back to review the
compliant and to discuss with Hahn what to expect from the process that she
is bringing into life. In Chapter 6 we related part of that conversation. In this
chapter we provide the a complaint such as her lawyer might bring.

COMPLAINT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Jane Roh,
Plaintiff
v.

No. ________________

John Doh, Jr.

Civil Action
Defendant

COMPLAINT
1. The plaintiff is a citizen of Virginia. The defendant John Doe, Jr. is a citizen of Maryland.
The amount in controversy, without interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value specified
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 [i.e., $75,000]. [Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Form 7(a).]
COUNT I
2. The defendant John Doh, Jr. owes the plaintiff $ 75,000 principal plus additional loan
interest, for money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant on April 15, 2011. [Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
Form 10(d).]
COUNT II
3. Defendant John Doh, Jr. received from plaintiff $75,000 on the condition that John Doh, Jr.
and plaintiff’s daughter, Rosa Roh, were engaged to marry.
4. John Doh, Jr. and Rosa Roh have broken off their engagement and no longer plan to
marry.
5. For John Doh, Jr. to retain the $75,000 would be unjust enrichment.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against defendant John Doh, Jr. for $75,000, such
loan interest as the Court may determine is applicable, plus interest and costs. [Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. Form 10.]
Date: November 15, 2011
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Harry Hahn
Hahn & Traurig
1601 K Street NW
Washington DC 20006
Hahn@Hahntraurig.com
202-555-5555

Responding to Complaints
Once John Doh, Jr. and DohSon Honda LLC are served with the
complaint, the lawsuit begins in earnest. Defendants have four alternatives:
acquiesce, default, move to dismiss, and answer on the merits. We address
each in turn:
Acquiesce. For a defendant to acquiesce is the simplest of all solutions.
The defendant contacts the plaintiff, offers to accept plaintiff’s demand and
requests that the plaintiff withdraw the lawsuit. Of course, in cases where
plaintiffs have been diligent in letting potential defendants know of their
intention to file suit, acquiescence is not likely, for if on demand the
defendant refused to pay, why would he or she now pay? Still, defendant
may have had a change of heart. Or, in the case of a corporate defendant, the
lawsuit may have brought the case to attention of senior management.
Default. If defendant does nothing, the court, after the period of time for
answering the complaint expires, plaintiff may apply for entry of a judgment
by default. If the plaintiff’s claim is for a “sum certain,” that is a determined
amount, and if defendant is neither a minor (child under 18 years old) or
mentally incompetent, the clerk of the court, without the involvement of a
judge, and without review of legal sufficiency of the complaint, must enter
judgment for plaintiff in that amount. 269 If the claim is not for a sum certain,
then plaintiff must apply to the court. The court may, but is not required, to
hold a hearing or take evidence. It could conduct an accounting to determine
the amount of damages, take evidence to establish the truth of any allegation,
or investigate any matter. 270 Evidence is mostly taken by affidavits without
hearing.
Move to dismiss. While courts do not without request review plaintiffs’
complaints for legal sufficiency or for procedural requirements, defendants’
lawyers should. With respect to certain defenses, defendants may choose
between raising them as defenses in their answers, or presenting them by
motion to the court before answering. The latter is known as motion
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practice. 271 In the federal system these defenses are seven: “(1) lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper
venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (7) failure to join a
party under Rule 19.” 272
Of these choices it seems defendants most often raise (1) to (3). If
successful, these motions may lead to plaintiffs dropping their case or, at
least, forcing them to bring them to go to different courts. Less often, it
seems, but still not unusual, defendants raise other defenses. In challenges to
process, i.e., (4) and (5), if there is no statute of limitations issue (that would
bar the claim if served later than it was initially), if successful the motion at
best gains for defendants a few weeks’ time. In case of (6), failure to state
claim, and of (7), failure to join a party, tactical and strategic considerations
come into play. For example, if plaintiffs have only novel claims not
previously recognized in law, defendants may challenge those claims at this
stage to avoid discovery expenses. If, on the other hand, plaintiffs have
claims well recognized in law, but have not stated them well, defendants
often choose not to challenge the claims at this stage for fear that the court
would instruct plaintiffs on how better to formulate their claims and then
permit them to do just that.
When defendants raise any of these defenses by motion, then that is
their only response until the motion is decided. If the motion does not end
the lawsuit, defendants will have further time to answer the complaint. When
defendants decide not to make motions to raise these issues, they may
include them as affirmative defenses in their answers and then contest them
later in pretrial and trial. Just as plaintiffs are encouraged to assert in their
complaints a wide variety of claims, so too are defendants encouraged to
raise in their answers all conceivable affirmative defenses (e.g., that an
agreement should have been in writing, that the statute of limitations has
run).
Answer. Defendants who take none of these three steps must answer
complaints timely (in the federal courts, usually within 20 days). With
respect to each allegation of the complaint defendants must admit, deny or
state that they have “no knowledge or belief” sufficient to answer the
allegation. The assertion of lack of knowledge must be made in good faith,
but is subject to no further limitation. A response is not in good faith if
defendant could easily determine the matter. There is no obligation to give
reasons why the defendant might deny the truth of the allegations.
To limit the scope of admissions, defendants typically admit only one
part of an allegation, but deny knowledge about the balance. For example, in
271
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an automobile accident case the allegation might be: “7. At 11:05 PM on
May 10, 2011 Witness W had just left the Main Street liquor store with a
pint of vodka and an open umbrella.” The response might be: “Admits that
Witness W had just left the Main Street liquor store, but does not have
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the
other allegations in paragraph 7, and therefore denies them.”
The answer must also set out all of the applicable 12(b) defenses not
raised by motion as well as any affirmative defenses. An affirmative defense
is defined in Rule 8(c) and amounts to any defense that admits the truth of
the plaintiff’s assertion but gives a ground for defeating the defendant’s
claims. An example might be a defense of fraud or duress to an otherwise
valid contract claim. In the case of doubt whether a defense is an affirmative
one, the prudent lawyer will include it in the answer.
If defendant wants a jury trial, defendant in the answer must request one
or forever waive that right.
The answer is also where defendant should bring claims against plaintiff
(counterclaims) and may bring claims against third parties (third party
claims). Counterclaims and third party practice are beyond the scope of this
book.
Counterclaims. Counterclaims are of two types: compulsory and
permissive. Compulsory counterclaims are governed by Rule 13(a); they are
claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as that event
alleged in the complaint. Permissive counterclaims are governed by Rule
13(b); they are all other counterclaims. For tactical reasons alone, defendants
will attempt to find some basis for a counterclaim if at all possible. Claims
against third parties are governed by Rule 14 and are permissive. When a
defendant makes counterclaims or third party claims, there are additional
pleadings.
Doh’s Answer
John Doh, Jr. consulted his own lawyer, Betty Bahn. Upon advice from
Bahn, in his answer he will deny both the claims that the money was a loan
and that it was a gift in contemplation of marriage. Moreover, he will raise as
affirmative defenses that if the payment was a loan, (1) it was a loan to
DohSon Honda, Inc. and not to him; and (2) if it he was guarantor of that, it
is not enforceable because it is not in writing. While he might make a third
party claim for contribution or indemnity against DohSon Honda, Inc., for
the sake of simplicity, in this case he will not.
Directing further Proceedings
Even after Roh has served Doh, unless Doh responds with a motion, the
initiative remains with the parties. Rule 26 requires that the parties’ lawyers
confer as soon as practicable, and in no event later than 89 days after the day
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Doh is served or 69 days after he files an appearance or an answer with the
court. The lawyers are to discuss the nature and basis of their clients’ claims
and the possibilities for settlement, to disclose certain material and to make
plans for discovery (discussed in Chapter 6). The court has authority to
order lawyers to confer in person or to direct that parties themselves
personally participate, but since lawyers usually confer without informing
the court, the court does not ordinarily make such orders. Within fourteen
days of conferring, the parties are to submit a written report outlining a
proposed discovery plan. 273
After the lawyers for the parties have conferred and submitted their
report, the court may order that the lawyers meet with the judge for a pretrial
conference. The frequency of such early pre-trial conference varies from
court-to-court and from judge-to-judge. In any case, within 120 days after
Doh or any other defendant is served, or within 90 days after Doh or any
other defendant appears or answers, the assigned judge is required to issue a
scheduling order. That order must limit the time to join other parties, to
amend pleadings, to complete discovery and to file motions. Typically it
allows six to twelve months for discovery. It may set tentive dates for future
conferences and for trial. 274
C. Germany
da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius
(“give me the facts; I will give you right”).
Roman law maxim
German pleading practice puts the goal of civil procedure—the judicial
determination of the rights of the parties—front and center. It focuses the
attention of the parties on the task at hand. It insists that parties state clearly
why relief is, or is not, in order. German pleading practice facilitates the
work of judges: the determination of competing claims of right. It helps
judges clear out technical issues immediately. It permits them to direct
proceedings to material points in dispute between the parties.
1. Substantive Requirements of Complaints
The complaint need make no mention of legal grounds for relief. The court
knows the law (jura novit curia). The court needs no instruction on law. The
parties may, in subsequent proceedings, suggest alternate legal grounds for
recovery, but they are not required to. Their suggestions of which law might
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apply do not bind them in the evidence that they may present. The court is
required to test the facts presented against all possible legal grounds for relief.
While German pleading practice does not require that the complaint
name legal claims, it does require that the facts alleged do fulfill some legal
claim. The foundation of the complaint is the factual basis for the claim
(Klagegrund). That is the concrete set of facts, i.e., the life events, from
which plaintiff claims right to request a legal remedy. 275 Thus the complaint
must allege facts sufficient to fulfill all the elements of at least one legal
claim. It is insufficient if it asserts merely a legal claim without alleging the
factual elements. German pleading is thus similar to the fact pleading that
applied under the Field and other American reform codes in the nineteenth
century. 276 As we shall see, however, it is different in the practice of how it
implements that pleading requirement.
In one respect, the pleading of evidence, German pleading practice
imposes requirements that no American system has ever required. Not only
must plaintiffs allege facts that they intend to prove, they must also identify
evidence that they intend to rely on to prove those facts.
A German complaint determines “the matter in controversy”
(Streitgegenstand). The matter in controversy is “the central concept” of
German civil procedure. 277 The court has no authority go beyond the matter
in controversy, except as parties may appropriately raise additional claims.
The matter in controversy determines not only the definiteness of the
complaint, but also subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, joinder
of claims and of parties, amendments of the complaint, and effect of the
lawsuit for pending and future lawsuits.
The matter in controversy is independent of the legal basis for relief. 278
It determines the scope of legal protection the court can award. 279 German
pleading practice gives the complaint the ambitious function of beginning
the structuring of the lawsuits by identifying material facts in dispute
between the parties. A German complaint can be the most important
submission the plaintiff makes to the court.
A German complaint is a map for the dispute, but it is not an itinerary. It
facilitates travel without constraining it. Only at its outer edges does it set
boundaries. This sets it apart from the complaint of classic American
common law pleading, which allowed only one route to the destination.
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As we discuss below, German courts review complaints for formal
procedural requirements and substantive sufficiency before they, and not
plaintiffs, serve complaints on defendants.
Substantiation
A German complaint must be “substantiated.” That means that it must
state the facts on which it rests as well as identify the evidence to be used to
establish those facts. The complaint must state facts so exactly that, based on
the information provided, the court could determine that the legal relief
sought should be granted, if the allegations are true. Thus the complaint must
state all the facts that a legal norm requires for application. The complaint
may, but need not, carry through the subsumption of the particular facts
alleged under an applicable legal rule. If the plaintiff has more than one
possible legal claim, the complaint should state facts that satisfy all the
requisite elements of each claim. Facts that do not support one of the
elements of a possible claim have no place in a complaint. It is a matter of
tactic—disputed among experts—whether the complaint should assert facts
that undercut defendant’s possible defenses.
The degree of substantiation required for each fact alleged varies. When a
fact is not seriously disputed, it can be stated in general terms. When it is
disputed, it should be substantiated precisely. More detail is indicated if the legal
concepts involved are indefinite (e.g., negligence). Proffering too little support in
the initial complaint is ordinarily not fatal, but good practice is to err by
substantiating too much rather than too little.
Plaintiff’s complaint anticipates the court’s final judgment. One might
describe the complaint as a draft—from the plaintiff’s perspective—of the
judge’s final judgment, or as directions to the judge on how the judge might
write the final judgment, or at the least, as the materials on which the judge
may base the judgment.
2. Formal Requirements of Complaints
Under § 253 ¶ 2 ZPO (in connection with § 130 ZPO), a complaint must
contain:
1. Caption with subject matter and amount in controversy;
2. Request(s) for legal relief;
3. Position regarding invocation of single judge in Landgericht;
4. Introductory sentence;
5. Statement of facts (basis for claim) (Tatsachenvortrag
(Klagegrund));
6. Identification of proof;
7. Legal evaluation of the case; and
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Signature. 280

A plaintiff takes the first step toward commencing a lawsuit by filing a
complaint with the court. Here, since the amount in controversy is more than
€5,000, the proper court is the District Court (Landgericht) where John Doh, Jr.
lives in Munich (Munich I since he lives in the city, not Munich II in the area).
The complaint must include all facts on which the claim rests, not merely what
the claim is. Moreover, it must state the means of proof that are to prove the
factual assertions, i.e., the complaint must be “substantiated.” Relevant
documents in possession of the plaintiff are to be appended to the complaint.
Documents in possession of others as well as expected witness testimony are
indicated by designation.
Below is a complaint in the case of Roh v. Doh. While the demands of the
German complaint are particular, in a simple case such as this, the German
complaint is not so greatly different from a fuller American complaint.
COMPLAINT
In the Matter Of Mary Roh v. John Doh, Jr.

Berlin, November 15, 2011
To the
District Court (Landgericht) Munich I
Prielmayerstraße 7
80335 Munich
-Civil ChamberCOMPLAINT
Of the merchant Mary Roh, Bismarkstraße 11, 10400 Berlin
-Represented by: Lawyer Harry Hahn,
-Plaintiffagainst

the merchant John Doh, Jr., Kaiserplatz 11, 84471 Munich
- Defendant For repayment of a loan
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See MARIUS BREUCKER, ANWALTSSTRATEGIEN IM ZIVILPROZESS: AUßERGERICHTLICHE UND
GERICHTLICHE MANDATSBEARBEITUNG 93 (2006).
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Amount in controversy: €60,000.
In the name of and on behalf of the Plaintiff I bring this Complaint and request
scheduling of an oral hearing, in which I will petition,
to adjuge the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff €60,000.
together with 5 % interest over Prime Rate since April
16, 2011.
Justification:
I.
Plaintiff and Defendant, whose father has been a friend of Plaintiff for many years, are
both independent Honda Automobile dealers.
At the traditional spring party of the regional Honda dealers on April 15, 2011 at the
Hotel Kaiser Hof in Berlin Defendant asked Plaintiff for a loan in the amount of €60,000.
At the time Defendant was engaged to be married to Plaintiff’s only daughter; his
urgent request for money was a complete suprise to Plaintiff. Defendant justified it with
the explanation that his company had a sudden cash shortfall. Since this problem was
only temporary, he did not want to go to his father—the regional Honda distributor—
with it. He did not want his father to get the impression that he was having trouble
managing his company.
Proof: Testimony of the Parties
Since Plaintiff wanted to help Defendant, her friend’s son and her own prospective sonin-law, she promised to transfer the requested sum of money as quickly as possible.
Both agreed that Defendant would pay the money back as soon as the financial
problem was overcome and in any case no later than August 15, last year.
Proof: Testimony of the Parties
On the following day, April 16, 2011, Plaintiff transferred the money requested to
Defendant’s company’s account at the Deutsche Bank, Munich, Account No. 22 38 40,
Bank Identification No. 700 700 10.
Proof: in case of dispute, submission of the application
for transfer and the account excerpt of the bank.
Plaintiff has to this day not paid the money back. When the parties met at a meeting of
dealers September 7, 2011 in Berlin, Plaintiff asked Defendant, why he had not yet
paid the loan back as he had promised. She explicitly demanded that he immediately
repay the loan. Defendant reacted astonished. He replied that there was nothing to
repay; the transfer of €60,000 was clearly a gift. Plaintiff was speechless.
Proof: Testimony of the Parties
II.
A Complaint is required because Defendant not only has not repaid the money, he has
expressly refused repayment. Pursuant to § 488(1) of the Civil Code (BGB) Plaintiff is
obligated to repay the loan.
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Under § 286(1) BGB Defendant has been in default on his repayment obligation since
April 16, 2011. Because he has not repaid the loan, he must also pay default interest at
the level provided in § 288(1) BGB.
Proof: Bank confirmation if disputed.
Assignment of the case to a single judge is acceptable.
Harry Hahn
Lawyer for Plaintiff

3. Joinder of Claims, Splitting of Claims and Joinder of Parties
Joinder of Claims
The German system of pleading facts makes raising different legal
grounds for the same factual transaction unnecessary. Nevertheless, if
lawyers have in mind different legal grounds, they need to allege facts
sufficient to support each of those claims.
In our case Hahn will write a complaint that alleges facts sufficient to
support the basic claim of a loan by Roh to John Doh, Jr.: she and defendant
Doh, Jr. agreed to a loan of €60,000 which loan, after due demand, Doh, Jr.,
has failed to repay. Hahn will take care, however, in the event that that claim
fails and Doh, Jr. is successful in his assertion that the payment was gift, to
allege facts that prove it was a gift conditioned on the marriage of Doh, Jr. to
Roh’s daughter Rosa, and that that condition failed and, therefore gives rise
to a right under principles of unjust enrichment to its return.
The German system offers no incentive such as punitive damages to
encourage Roh to add different legal grounds for the case against Doh, Jr.
Roh can get her money back only once; so as long as she has a right to the
money under either her or Doh, Jr.’s view of the facts, there is no point in
stretching existing legal grounds or creating new ones. Such imagination
would only serve to complicate her case and delay her recovery.
As in the American system, Roh, if she has other claims against Doh, Jr.
based on other facts, may raise those claims in this lawsuit, provided the
court has jurisdiction over those claims. Adding different factual grounds for
relief could create additional court and attorneys’ fees, but at a lower level as
if Roh brought the claims as separate lawsuits.
Here we assume that Hahn writes the complaint to allege facts
supporting the contract claim and additional facts sufficient to support an
unjust enrichment claim for repayment of a conditional gift.
Claim Splitting Instead of Claim Joinder
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Instead of joining claims to improve one’s negotiation position, the
German system of loser-pays legal fees encourages splitting claims to reduce
litigation risks. For example, if defendant failed to make payments when
due, plaintiff may reduce litigation risks by suing only for one missed
payment. Suit for the single payment will disclose, at lower risk, any defense
defendant has. If plaintiff wins, defendant may pay all amounts due without
further plaintiff having to bring another lawsuit. If defendant fails to pay, the
earlier judgment in the first suit will not foreclose, but may facilitate, a later
suit for the other missed payments.
Joinder of Parties
Joinder of parties is only exceptionally required, most commonly, “if the
disputed legal relationship of all members of the suit group can only be
determined on a unitary basis.” 281 In other cases, while joinder is possible, it
rarely raises issues of litigation strategy comparable to those it presents in
the United States, where it is frequently used to create or destroy federal
diversity jurisdiction. The greater precision of the German system in
determining liability and its extent, the lower costs of litigation in general,
and the loser-pay allocation of expenses, discourages adding additional
parties just to bring in more defendants who might contribute to a settlement.
The greater control of proof-taking likewise strips joinder of advantages it
might have in the United States in widening discovery (discussed in Chapter
6).
3. Handling Complaints
As in the United States, in Germany plaintiffs commence lawsuits by filing
complaints with courts. Unlike in the United States, the filing fees can be
substantial and can themselves deter litigation. The fee is based on a percentage
of the amount in controversy (Streitwert) and constitutes an advance on eventual
court costs. In Roh’s case against Doh, with an amount in controversy of
€60,000, the filing fee would be €1,668. If she prevails, Doh will be responsible
for paying it.
In Germany, once Roh has filed her complaint and paid the fee, the court
will assign a judge or judges to the lawsuit. While formerly German district
courts assigned three judges, today in cases such as this, they assign only one. To
prevent corruption of civil justice, the court assigns a judge predetermined by the
court’s organization plan. In Germany, litigants have a constitutional right to
what is termed their “statutory judge” (gesetzlicher Richter). Each year the court
issues a plan that abstractly assigns cases based on subject matter to specific
chambers of judges within the court.

281
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In Roh v. Doh the judge assigned will be a member of a civil chamber. Each
chamber has its own special competencies beyond just civil or criminal matters.
Specific chambers handle specific types of case, e.g., construction cases. There
are special commercial law chambers which may use lay judges alongside a
professional judge.282 Specialization facilitates judicial familiarity with particular
areas of law and with the environments from which those cases come. In those
cases where three judges are appropriate, all judges come from the same
chamber. One of the chamber’s judges is the chairman of the chamber and has
administrative responsibilities for the chamber and its personnel.
Reviewing Complaints before Serving
As in most American jurisdictions, in Germany plaintiffs file complaints
with courts to commence lawsuits. While in America courts only
exceptionally serve complaints, in Germany they always do. Moreover,
while in America, courts never review complaints before they are filed, in
Germany they always so
In Germany the judge who is assigned the case on filing, reviews it
before directing it to be served. The judge tests the complaint for procedural
permissibility (Zulässigkeit) and for substantive soundness (Schlüssigkeit).
Procedural permissibility refers to whether the complaint adequately alleges
formal prerequisites for litigation (e.g., jurisdiction.); substantive soundness
relates to whether the complaint alleges facts, which if true, and evidence
which if credited, would support ordering a legal remedy.
Procedural permissibility. The judge first reviews the complaint for
procedural permissibility. If one or more procedural prerequisites is absent, the
judge is to dismiss the complaint on the basis that is most easily and quickly
determined. The procedural prerequisites of German civil procedure are familiar
to American lawyers. Five correspond to requirements of the American Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), nos. (1) to (5): (1) subject matter
jurisdiction, (2) personal jurisdiction, (3) venue, (4) process, and (5) service of
process. In American federal civil procedure, however, these issues are
reviewed—ordinarily only upon a party’s initial response to service of a
complaint—if the defendant requests such a review.
Substantive soundness. If the complaint is procedurally permissible,
then the judge examines it for substantive soundness. The judge is required
to examine all bases for the claim which seriously come into question. As
with the review for permissibility, the judge is to conduct the review in the
most economical order.
In reviewing for substantive soundness the judge must examine whether
the individual assertions of the plaintiff's submissions satisfy the abstract
elements of the claim made. The judge is not to take into account factual
allegations that are not substantiated.
282
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Responding to deficiencies. If the judge finds that a complaint is
deficient on procedural grounds, the judge is not to dismiss the complaint
immediately, but is to call the deficiency to the attention of the plaintiff and
to request supplementation. 283 If the judge finds that the complaint is
deficient on substantive grounds, the judge is to serve the deficient
complaint, 284 but under the judge’s general duty of elucidation discussed
below, it to notify plaintiff promptly of the deficiency. 285
Challenging Sufficiency of Service and of Complaints
That German courts review complaints before serving them, does not
preclude defendants from challenging the sufficiency of either. If defendant
makes a challenge—most commonly to procedural permissibility—the court
may hold a hearing. If the court finds a complaint impermissible on grounds
of no subject matter jurisdiction, or on grounds of improper venue, on
application of plaintiff, it is to transfer the case to the correct court. Its
decision to transfer cannot be appealed and binds the transferee court. 286 If
plaintiff fails to make such application, the court must dismiss the claim. If
the court finds the complaint impermissible other grounds, it is to dismiss the
case. 287
Responding to Complaints
As in the United States, once John Doh, Jr. is served with the complaint, the
lawsuit begins in earnest. In Germany, defendants have the same four
alternatives as in the United States: acquiesce, default, answer on the merits and
challenge the sufficiency of the complaint.
Acquiesce. Acquiescing is largely the same in Germany as in the United
States, although in Germany, thanks to the cost system, defendants may be less
likely than defendants in the United States to receive complaints that are not
preceded by formal demand letters.
Default. German law does not permit a clerk to enter a default judgment
against a defendant who has failed to appear. 288 While the court is not required to
hold a hearing, it must (again) review the plaintiff’s complaint for soundness to
determine that the complaint sets forth the existence of all facts necessary to
uphold a legal claim and make certain that the complaint does not itself set out
facts that if proven would fulfill an affirmative defenses that would negate the
claim.
Answer. Once the complaint is served, a defendant who chooses to
283
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contest the case, must respond with an answer. The answer is subject to
requirements similar to those governing complaints: it must be true,
complete, specific, and substantiated. The court will then review the
complaint and the answer for materiality, i.e., materiality to the relationship
between assertions of the defendant and those of the plaintiff.
Directing further Proceedings
Coincident with preliminary review the judge determines how the case is to
proceed further: whether the case will use additional written proceedings or will
use a so-called early first hearing. The judge’s choice is purely pragmatic: the
judge selects the method that the judge thinks is more likely in this case to be
more efficient, i.e., is more likely to simplify and hasten framing of the material
and disputed issues.
Most German judges prefer early oral hearings in most routine, contested
cases. They regard written proceedings as productive of complexity. They see the
oral hearing as the means to move the case along expeditiously and dynamically.
Most judges direct oral hearings as soon as possible. Through oral hearings
points in dispute can be quickly clarified; events and dates can be mutually
acknowledged. Routes to settlements can be developed
Prior to the first hearing, or prior to the exchange of further written
pleadings, as the case may be, the judge is required to prepare future
proceedings. Preparations may include: (1) directing parties to supplement their
pleadings, (2) directing government authorities to provide information and
documents, (3) ordering the personal appearance of the parties, (4) summoning
witnesses named by a party to the hearing, and (5) ordering production of
documents or things and making premises and other things available for
observation. In some cases, based on these preparations, the judge may be able to
resolve the entire case at the first hearing.
We consider the first hearing in Chapter 6.
D. Korea
Korean pleading practice parallels the practice of the German system on
which it is based: plaintiff commences a lawsuit by filing with the court a
complaint that sets out a claim of right and establishes the subject matter of
the controversy, a judge reviews the complaint for procedural and
substantive sufficiency, the court serves the complaint, the defendant
responds to the complaint, and the judge uses the pleadings to narrow the
case and take it in the direction of decision. As in Germany, pleadings define
the boundaries of the lawsuit and facilitate reaching a final decision
according to law.
1. Substantive Requirements of Complaints
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While Korean pleading practice in general outline parallels German
practice, it differs in particular respects as to what it requires of complaints.
While Korean practice is similarly concerned with setting out the matter in
controversy, it does not follow the maxim da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius that
makes unnecessary party identification of the legal basis of the claim.
Korean practice requires plaintiffs state the applicable legal rule. In this
respect, Korean practice resembles historic American common law pleading.
In a further departure from German practice, Korean practice allows
plaintiffs to state facts generally and does not require that they be
substantiated. In this respect, it resembles modern American pleading. The
difference is apparent in how differently Korean practice defines the matter
in controversy.
As we have seen, German practice is oriented toward a definition in fact
of the matter in controversy. Korean practice draws a distinction—not
always easily understood by non-Koreans, or even by Koreans—between the
“gist of the claim” (청구취지, cheong gu chi ji) and the “grounds for the
claim” (청구원인, cheong gu ₩in). Academic commentary defines the claim
(청구, cheong gu) to be plaintiff’s assertion of a substantive right against
defendant which he or she requires the court to adjudicate in the lawsuit. It
sees the claim as defined both by its gist and by its grounds. The gist of the
claim, which corresponds to the German Anspruch, addresses the legal basis,
while the grounds, which correspond to the German Sachverhalt, concern the
factual relationship. In common usage, the term claim (청구, cheong gu) is
used interchangeably with and as a synonym for “matter in controversy”
(소송물, sosongmu), Streitgegenstand in German), “subject of the action”
(소송의 객체, sosong eo kaekche), and “subject of the adjudication”
(심판의 대상, sympal eo daesang).
Alleging facts. The factual requirements that Korean complaints must
satisfy tend toward the looser requirements of American notice pleading.
Korean complaints do not have to state the ground for the claim in the broad
sense of identifying facts that support every constituent element of the legal
rule. They are sufficient if they identify facts that establish the claim in a
narrow sense that permits court and defendant to distinguish this claim from
other claims. Since Korean complaints are not required to allege all material
elements, they likewise need not identify evidence necessary to prove those
element, i.e., they need not be substantiated. These looser requirements
notwithstanding, better lawyers usually state their clients’ claims in the
broader sense. In this way they can give the court a better idea of their
clients’ cases.
Identifying the legal rule. While Korean procedure spares plaintiffs
from identifying all material elements of the applicable rule and of
substantiating the facts that they assert, it does require that they identify the
legal rule relied on. It makes that requirement meaningful by limiting judges
to ordering remedies only on the legal basis claimed. While the legal basis is
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not invariably fixed finally in the complaint, usually it is. Once plaintiff
finally fixes the basis of the claim, the plaintiff’s choice binds the court.
Thus, for example, where plaintiff has claimed breach of contract, the court
could not then find for plaintiff on a tort ground. This requirement is
reminiscent of historic American common law pleading. While the Korean
Supreme Court continues to insist on this approach, scholars criticize it.
They see it as particularly inappropriate in pro se cases where laypersons are
unlikely to appreciate or be able to make the choice. 289
Comparing German and Korean complaints. While Korean practice
requires plaintiffs to identify legal claims, otherwise it is less demanding of
complaints than is German practice. As noted it requires stating facts only
generally. It does not require stating all facts necessary to a claim or
indentifying the evidence expected to be relied on. These looser
requirements may be attributable to the high incidence of pro se
representation in Korea. In Germany almost all complaints in the District
Court are drafted by lawyers; in Korea, more than half are drafted by nonlawyers. 290 It would be impractical to hold lay-drafted complaints to the
same technical standards as lawyer drafted complaints. Significantly in
Germany, in the lowest courts, the Amtsgerichte), where parties are not
required to use lawyers, complaints are more loosely drafted and are held to
less rigorous standards.
2. Formal Requirements of Complaints
The formal requirements of complaints are set out in the Civil Practice
Act: (i) identification, including name and address, of parties and their legal
representative(s) if any; (ii) gist of the claim; and (iii) grounds for the claim
in a narrow sense. 291 Ordinarily the complaint also includes: (i) case title; (ii)
documents to be attached; (iii) the date when the complaint was drawn up;
(iv) the name of the court which has accepted the lawsuit; (v) allegations of
facts satisfying procedural requisites including competence of the court of
the suit; (vi) the factual allegation which the claim is based on, i.e., grounds
for the claim in a broad sense; and (vii) special statement regarding evidence
upon which the action is founded. 292
3. Joinder of Claims and Joinder of Parties
Joinder of Claims (소의 객관적 병합)
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Joinder of claims (소의 객관적 병합; so ui kaekgancheok byunghap)
arising out of separate factual events is available when the following
conditions are satisfied: (i) the adjudication of each of two or more claims
can be subject to the same kind of proceedings; and (ii) the court is
competent to adjudicate each of the claims. 293 The claims, as a rule, need not
be related to each other. 294
The court, upon its own authority, reviews whether requirements for
joinder of claims are met. When it believes the requirements are not
satisfied, it may not dismiss the case but must adjudicate each claim
independently as if it had been asserted in a separate action. 295 However, it
must transfer one of claims to another court if it finds that the claim is within
exclusive competence of that court. §§ 31, 34 KCPA. After requirements of
joinder of claims are found to be met, the court determines whether each
claim, standing alone, complies with procedural requisites. The court is to
dismiss those claims that it finds do not comply and is to proceed with those
that do.
Joinder of Parties (소의 주관적 병합)
There are several procedural devices by which the court allows parties
or nonparties to litigate together. 296 For reasons similar to those discussed
with respect to the German system, joinder of parties does not lead to
strategic issues the way it does in the United States.
Fees Due on Filing
Plaintiffs must pay upon filing of complaints a “stamp fee.” The fee is
determined by the amount in controversy. It starts at 5% for an amount in
controversy of less than ₩10 million and, as a percentage, declines from
there. In this case Roh would be required to pay ₩342,500. If plaintiff
prevails, plaintiff receives the fee back and defendant will be responsible for
paying it.
4. Handling Complaints
Procedural permissibility. In Korea, as in Germany, the court reviews
the complaint for procedural permissibility before serving it on defendant.
Where the case is before a three-judge panel, the presiding judge is
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responsible for the examination. 297 The judge makes sure that the complaint
meets procedural prerequisites (소송요건, sosong yokeon) as to form, party
competence (당사자능력, dangsaja nuing’ryuk), procedural capacity
(소송능력, sosong nuing’ryuk) and subject matter jurisdiction. If the judge
finds the complaint defective, the judge is to provide plaintiff an opportunity
to make necessary corrections. For example, if plaintiff provides an incorrect
address, and the judge detects it, the judge will direct plaintiff to correct the
mistake within a reasonable time. If plaintiff does not or cannot make the
correction timely, the judge is to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs may
appeal dismissal orders immediately. 298
Substantive soundness. Unlike in Germany, in Korea the judge does
not review the complaint for substantive soundness. The judge does confirm
that the complaint states the gist and the grounds for the complaint. While
the judge does not evaluate those, if the judge considers the claims made
legally groundless, the judge is to follow the procedures just outlined and is
to direct plaintiff to revise the complaint.
While Korean complaints need not be substantiated, when plaintiffs
refer in complaints to documentary evidence and fail to include those
documents with their complaints, judges may and usually do direct parties to
submit them. 299
Service of the Complaint
If the judge determines that the complaint satisfies these requirements, the
judge will direct the court clerk to serve the complaint on defendants. 300

COMPLAINT
Case

Claim for repayment of a loan

Plaintiff Mary Roh
100 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul
Plaintiff’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Harry Hahn
111 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul
Defendant John Doh, Jr.
300 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan

297
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Defendant’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Betty Bahn
313 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan

TENOR OF CLAIMS
1. Defendant shall pay plaintiff ₩7,500,000 and default charge at a rate of 20% per
annum from next date of service of this complaint copy to the date of full payment.
2. Defendant shall be liable to all of litigation expenses.
3. Paragraph 1 can be executed provisionally.
The above tenor of claims is sought for judgment.
RATIONALE OF CLAIMS
1.

Plaintiff transferred ₩7,500,000 to the account of DohSon Honda LLC run by
Defendant on April 16, 2011 and Defendant promised to repay the said
amount of money to plaintiff by August 15, 2011.

2.

However, arguing that Plaintiff gifted Defendant with the said money,
Defendant refused to repay it to Plaintiff even after August 15, 2011.

3.

Hence, Plaintiff institutes this action to seek from Defendant the payment of
₩7,500,000 and default charge at a rate of 20% per annum from next date of
service of the complaint copy to the date of full payment.

Dated: November 15, 2011

Responding to the Complaint
Acquiesce. Acquiescing is largely the same as in Germany and in the
United States. The party who has brought the lawsuit will want to have the costs
previously paid to the court.
Default. Korean law does not permit a clerk to enter a default judgment
against a defendant who fails to appear. While the court is not required to
hold an oral hearing for a defendant who fails to answer, it must review the
plaintiff’s complaint for soundness to determine that the complaint sets forth
the existence of all facts necessary to uphold a legal claim and does not itself
set out facts that would suffice to fulfill affirmative defenses that would
negate the claim. The failure to answer is deemed an admission of the facts
asserted in the complaint. Notwithstanding the default, the defendant may
appeal that judgment. 301
Answer. The defendant contests the complaint by filing an answer with
the court. The answer may raise procedural and substantive defenses. In the
case of procedural defenses, the judge may order the plaintiff to cure the
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deficiencies, dismiss the complaint, or continue proceedings on the matter
generally and as part of those proceedings determine whether the procedural
defense is not well founded.
Until the 2002 Reform defendants were not required to respond to
complaints. Many did not. Those that did, did so with simple denials that did
not give any substantiation. Now defendants are required to respond within
30 days from the date when a copy of complaint was served to the
defendant. 302 If they fail to do so, the facts on which claims of the plaintiff
are based are deemed admitted and the judge may enter judgment without a
hearing. 303 In their answers defendants must specifically respond both to the
gist of and to the ground for the claim raised in the plaintiffs’ complaints. 304
Judges are authorized to permit court clerks to urge defendant to substantiate
their answers. 305
Directions for Further Proceedings
Until the amendments of 2002 subsequent proceedings were written.
Since 2002 oral preliminary proceedings such as occur in Germany are
preferred. 306 This change was undertaken in reliance on the German model.
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C H APT E R 6
P R OC E SS
T HE R IGHT T O BE HE AR D

Contemporary Korean Court Proceeding

The civil action has commenced. Mary Roh has filed a complaint; John
Doh, Jr. has interposed a defense. They have reached the critical point in
their lawsuit when by “the course of the law of the land,” they are to be
heard in the cause before the court.
In this chapter we examine “process.” Process occurs in the period after
a lawsuit is commenced by party pleading and before it is concluded in
judicial judgment. Process is the legal consideration of material facts and of
applicable law. If parties dispute which facts are true, or which are material,
process provides them opportunity to persuade the court which are material
and to present proof to the court of which are true. If parties disagree with
which law governs their dispute, or interpret law differently, process
provides them opportunity to express their views on governing law.
At the conclusion of process, the court applies the determined law to the
facts found to produce the characteristic product of civil litigation: a decision
according to law of the parties’ rights and duties. That decision is known as a
judgment and is the subject of Chapter 7.
In this chapter, after an introduction of process generally and of the
centrality of the right to be heard to process, we discuss process in each of
our countries specifically and how process might unfold in the case of Roh v.
Doh. In our discussion we consider two remarkable differences between
process in the United States, on the one hand, and process in Germany and
Korea, on the other hand. In the United States, process is bifurcated into two
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distinct and consecutive stages, pre-trial and trial. In the pretrial phase,
mostly through what is called discovery, the parties’ lawyers independent of
the court, but with the authority of the court, investigate the facts of the case.
In the second phase, trial, the parties’ lawyers present their findings to the
court for determination. Not until that second phase do parties usually
discuss the case with the court. Until then parties are not heard by the court
on the facts of the case.
In Germany and Korea, where process is continuous, there is no courtsanctioned private investigation of the case. There is no taking of testimony
out of the presence of the court, except such testimony as the court may
direct be taken by another court at a distance. In American terms, there is no
discovery. The parties may investigate beforehand, but then they do so
without authority of the court and without the court’s power to compel
testimony of uncooperative witnesses. While there is no discovery in
German and Korean law, there is in the continuous court proceeding constant
opportunity for parties and their lawyers to discuss with the court facts to be
found, law to be determined and eventual application of law to those facts.
Below, after giving an overview of American discovery, we discuss
three perspectives on pretrial discovery: contemporary, non-American and
that of the drafters. For many Americans today, civil litigation without
discovery is unthinkable. For many non-Americans, American discovery is
unthinkable when unrelated to material facts in dispute. For the drafters,
discovery has become something different than what they had in mind.
The Right to be Heard
The right to be heard is fundamental to fair process. It means that one is
fully informed about the proceeding, that one may give one’s views on legal
and factual questions, and that one’s views are taken into account before the
court reaches its decision.
In the United States the due process guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution “include a right to be heard and
to offer testimony.” 307
In Germany the constitution (Basic Law, Grundgesetz) explicitly
guarantees a right to be heard: “In the courts everyone is entitled to a hearing
in accordance with the law.” Article 103(1).
In Korea, the right to be heard is a fundamental tenet of constitutional
law. Article 27(1) of the Korean constitution guarantees a right to be heard;
although stated in terms of criminal process it is recognized to be of general
applicability. 308
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Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987).
See generally Jibong Lim, Korean Constitutional Court and the due process clause, in
LITIGATION IN KOREA, supra note 236, at 160.
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Determining Law and Finding Facts
Process prepares the way for judgment. It clarifies for the matter in
controversy the issues in dispute between the parties. It identifies facts
material to the parties’ claims of right and duty. It provides opportunity to
dispute which facts are material and which are true. It determines the law to
be applied. It provides opportunity to dispute the meaning of that law. By
identifying material facts and determining the law to be applied, it structures
the case and makes it ripe for decision.
Thanks to the pervasive presence of Hollywood movies and American
television productions, the American public and much of the world identifies
civil court process with trial. Yet trial is only one part of American civil
process and a vanishing part at that. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
address these two stages in separate subdivisions: Title V, “Disclosures and
Discovery,” and Title VI, “Trials.” Contemporary American trials, when
they happen, provide parties with opportunity to present to courts results of
their pretrial investigations and to produce a picture of their theory of the
case. In most American cases pretrial is all the process there is; there is no
trial.
Court proceedings in Germany and Korea are not bifurcated. There is no
trial. There is no single event where parties present to courts their theory of
the case. There are structured proceedings in which judges determine
whether facts exist that fulfill the elements of a legal rule. We do not use the
term “trial” to describe German or Korean court processes. We title this
chapter “Process” instead of “Trial” not only to be inclusive of all three
systems, but to remind American readers that in the great majority of
American cases trials are not held.
Day in Court or Inquisition
In the United States, among the public, the right to be heard is known as
the right to one’s “day in court.” 309 The right to a day in court is one of the
most firmly rooted, long-standing, and widely-held ideals in American law.
A day in court is one’s chance to present one’s argument in court. One gets
“to tell it to the judge,” i.e., “talk to someone who can do something about
your problems.” It is a right to be heard, but it is more than that. It prefers
oral testimony in open court, subject to cross-examination, to other forms of
proof.
The opposite of the day-in-court in American popular perception is the
inquisition. The greatest of Anglo-American legal historians, Frederic
William Maitland, relates that in the twelfth century Pope Innocent III
introduced the new procedure of the inquisition to combat heresy. The
inquisition procedure had three characteristics: “The judge proceeds ex
309
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officio either of his own motion, or on the suggestion of a promoter …; he
collects testimony against the suspect, testimony which the suspect does not
hear; it is put in writing.” 310 Under the procedure of the inquisition, the
suspect may never be heard by the judge.
One unfortunate aspect of contemporary discussions of comparative
civil procedure is that American scholars often call civil law systems of civil
procedure “inquisitorial, even as they acknowledge that such descriptions are
misleading. As we discuss in this chapter, German and Korean systems of
civil procedure are not inquisitorial. German and Korean judges do not
investigate anything ex officio. They are strictly limited by submissions of
the parties. Judges cannot consider matters not raised by parties and cannot
take evidence not proposed by parties. Judges do not collect testimony in
private, but only in open hearings, in the presence of the parties, of the
parties’ lawyers and of the interested public. Proceedings are oral. The
parties themselves, and not just their lawyers, address the court directly and
participate personally in the proceedings. The substance of testimony, but
not the testimony itself, is put in writing. There are no verbatim transcripts
such as are usual in the United States.
It is ironic that American scholars describe civil law process as
inquisitorial, for not only is process in Germany and Korea not inquisitorial,
present-day American process better fits Maitland’s definition of the
inquisition. As we will discuss, the bifurcation of discovery and trial has led
to a world in which trial has vanished and in which American litigants
almost never get to “tell it to the judge” or to a jury. Trial, its advocates say,
is dead. 311 Instead of trial American parties are subjected to discovery by the
other side. In discovery, as in the inquisition, the investigator, i.e., the other
side’s lawyer, proceeds ex officio, either of his or her own motion, or on the
suggestion of a promoter (i.e., his or her client). He or she collects testimony
in private—usually in the lawyer’s private conference room, without the
public present, which often the party against whom the evidence is collected
does not hear. Finally that testimony is put in writing verbatin for use later.
No judge is present. In most cases the only “hearing” American parties ever
get is from lawyers in the case. 312 Parties to American litigation do not
expect a kind of Spanish Inquisition. 313 But that is what they get, while their
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2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 657 (2nd ed., 1899).
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See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009).
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See, e.g., Mark Wolf, The purpose-driven interrogatory response, TRIAL, vol. 44, no. 12, 48
at 49 (Dec. 2008).
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MONTY PYTHON, THE SPANISH INQUISITION SKETCH (Flying Circus, Series 2, Episode 2,
first broadcast Sept. 22, 1970), transcript at http://www.montypython.net/scripts/spanish.php.
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counterparts in Germany and Korea get the adversarial procedure that
Americans have long valued. 314

A. United States
The vanishing trial may be the most important issue facing
our civil justice system today.
Patricia Lee Refo, Chair, Section of Litigation, American
Bar Association (2004) 315
Trial is understood to determine material issues of disputed facts in
order to permit courts to apply law to facts to determine rights and resolve
disputes. 316 As expectations of trials have moved beyond these relatively
modest ambitions, the number of trials has declined dramatically.
Mary Roh has less than a two percent chance of getting a trial. Although
trial by jury is said to be the “backbone of the American justice system” and
the “hallmark of [American] participatory democracy,” it is, as Professor
John H. Langbein acidly, but accurately, observes, “a goner.” 317 Even
insiders acknowledge that “more trials are held on TV than in the
courtroom.” They see that “the trial has vanished as a means to resolve
disputes.” 318
We cannot stress this point enough: while trial, in particular trial by jury,
is the model for American legal procedures, while it is what Americans think
of when they think of legal process, and while it is what American films
present to the world as justice, it is a rare bird nearing extinction. To
characterize the American system as a jury trial system is wrong. More
accurate is to say that the American system is a process with a remote
possibility of trial of any kind.
314
Cf., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 41 (2004) (Scalia, J., for the Court: “The
common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the
civil law condones examination in private by judicial officers.”). See also McNeil v. Wisconsin.,
501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (Scalia, J. for the Court: “What makes a system adversarial rather than
inquisitorial is not the presence of counsel, much less the presence of counsel where the
defendant has not requested it; but rather, the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor
does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of
facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties. … Our system of [criminal] justice is,
and has always been, an inquisitorial one at the investigatory stage (even the grand jury is an
inquisitorial body), and no other disposition is conceivable.”)
315
The Vanishing Trial, LITIGATION, vol. 30, no. 2 at 4 (2004).
316
ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 10-33 (2001) (Chapter I “The Received View
of the Trial”).
317
John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal
Jury Trials, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUBLIC POLICY 119 (1992).
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2007).
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Allow us to bring home the point: trials hardly ever happen. New
judicial clerks (interns) are told: “A few actions eventually wind their way
through the lengthy process of dispositive motions and settlement conference
to reach trial.” 319 Experienced judges acknowledge: “The vast majority of
cases do not go to trial.” 320 A proposal for reinvigorating the American
litigation system sets a goal that every litigator “takes at least one case to
trial every five years.” 321 Read that again: one case in every five years for a
professional litigator. And that is the goal. An “experienced” litigator may
have thirty trials in his or her career. There are actors who have made more
trial movies than some “trial lawyers” have had trials.
The numbers are clear. In the year ending September 30, 2009, a typical
year, 276,397 civil cases were filed in the federal court system. Of all the
cases pending that year there were only 3,154 trials aimed at final judgments.
Of these, 2,138 were jury trials and 1,026 were non jury trials. In addition,
there were 2,146 contested hearings in matters not aimed at final judgments.
Even counting those contested hearings as “trials,” not even one case in fifty
got a “day in court.” In the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, that is, in the court of Roh v. Doh, in 2009 there were only thirty
civil trials. The thousand federal judges of first instance averaged only three
civil trials a year each (two jury and one non-jury). 322
State courts were no more productive of trials. We do not have numbers
for bench trials, but the number of jury trials is not impressive. A study
conducted by the National Center for State Courts and the State Justice
Institute estimated that in 2006 all American state courts combined—in a
country of 300 million people—conducted 45,459 civil jury trials (30.6% of
148,558 jury trials of all kinds). 323
To put these numbers in perspective, we look to the courts in Bavaria.
Bavaria is just one German state of sixteen; it has a population of 12½
million people, i.e., about one twenty-fourth of the population of the United
States and about double the population of Maryland. Its first instance courts
of general jurisdiction are the Landgerichte; their jurisdiction in civil matters
319
CALVERT G. CHIPCASE, FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT LAW CLERK HANDBOOK 20 (American
Bar Association, 2007).
320
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION: A WHITE PAPER OF
THE AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION, THE VOICE OF THE JUDICIARY 17 (Judges Kevin Burke
& Steve Leben, Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/hrdocs/AJAWHitePaper9-2607.pdf.
321
Brad D. Brian, Section Chair’s Opening Statement, Have a Litigation Plan in Litigation—It
Works and It’s Cheaper, 32 LITIGATION No. 2, 1, 73 (Winter 2006).
322
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 13 (TABLE Judicial Caseload
Indicators), 38 (Table 12), 388-390 (Table T-1). (2008), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/contents.cfm. About one-third of the judges are senior
judges who are semi-retired. The same thousand judges also conducted a like number of
criminal trials (3052 jury trials and 308 non-jury trials).
323
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE STATE-OF-THESTATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 7 (2007).
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begins at €5,000. In 2008 there were 59,192 new civil cases were filed. That
year the Landgerichte concluded 53,231 cases. In other words, the Bavarian
courts alone concluded more civil cases than all American courts together
conducted civil jury trials. The Bavarian Landgerichte as courts of first
instance held 50,827 hearings, of which 13,854 included the taking of
evidence. In the concluded cases, the courts issued contested judgments in
14,261 cases, i.e., 23.9 % of cases (not the 2% typical in America). Another
16,943 cases ended in court-supervised settlements (28.4%). The balance of
cases concluded with other forms of decisions, with default judgments,
transfers to other courts, and other dispositions. 324
American judges realize that, since the vast majority of cases do not go
to trial, they cannot rely on trials to provide litigants with “a feeling of
respect, voice and inclusion. Their impressions of judges and our justice
system—for better or worse—largely will be formed by their participation in
… calendar calls, and other settings, not trials.” 325
Cost. Trial has vanished for several reasons. One reason is cost. Even a
modest trial in a simple case, exclusive of comparable costs of pretrial, can
cost each side $20,000. Less modest trials in more complicated cases can
cost many times that amount. Since in the American system each side pays
its own lawyers, any recovery a plaintiff recoups is reduced substantially;
any victory a defendant wins is potentially pyrrhic.
Risk. Another reason that trials have vanished is risk. When stakes are
large enough—perhaps several hundred thousand dollars or more—while
expense may be tolerable, the risk may not be. The final decision, whether
by jury or by judge, is not well predictable, either of who wins or of
remedies awarded. Even the strongest of cases has can be lost by a misstep
in production or presentation. It is comparable to taking a chance in the
lottery. Moreover, the risk is not that of parties alone. Lawyers fear for their
reputations should they lose one of these rare battles. As one insider
observes: “And ever present is the thought … if I shoot craps, my
rep[utation] is mud and the client bids me and the many years of profitable
billing adios. Instead of a big time rep[utation], accolades, and a corner
office, I’m a shrub, earning a living, never trusted with another big one.” 326
Inaccuracy. Yet a third reason trials have vanished is lack of accuracy.
At trial there is always the possibility of the unexpected: the witness who
says too much, or says too little, or does not appear; the facts that previously
were unknown that surface only at trial; the new legal theory that suddenly
finds acceptance; the lawyer, party or witness with whom jurors finds
sympathy or spite; and so on. In the American form of trial, if the
324
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unexpected arises, often little can be done: the case must be resolved by
jurors as soon as possible, with as few adjournments as feasible. Fear of the
unexpected created discovery and nurtured is gigantic growth.
In place of trial, pre-trial discovery prevails. As we shall see, however,
discovery does not provide parties a day-in-court. Discovery is a private
affair where the parties’ lawyers have little to do with the judge and the
parties even less. In discovery parties are subject to inquisition-like
procedures.
1. Pretrial Process
The pretrial phase consists of pretrial conferences, discovery and pretrial
motions. Today, discovery, when it occurs, dominates. As we discuss below,
that was not the intention of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. They had in mind a process having greater resemblance to civil
law process
Since in today’s American scene discovery dominates, we address
discovery first and give it the greatest attention among pretrial devices. We
examine it at length in order to give readers an idea of just how extensive it
can be.
a. Discovery
Pretrial discovery, or negotiation in its shadow, is the reality of
American civil procedure. In pretrial discovery lawyers for the parties gather
facts of the case. In theory—but rarely in practice—they later present those
facts to a court at trial. Lawyers conduct discovery independent of the court
yet with the power of the court to compel participation; they examine not
only parties to the lawsuit, but third parties as well.
Discovery permits lawyers to “fish” for new grounds to hold defendants
liable. It helps them develop legal theories of the case. It does not limit them
to legal syllogisms. It allows them to conduct a practically unbounded
inquisition free of court control.
Some comparativists see discovery as part of American legal culture,
but in historical terms, it is a recent innovation. Only two generations ago, it
was not a routine feature of American litigation. Pretrial discovery was the
most notable innovation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938; it
was a striking and imaginative departure from tradition. Before 1938 there
had been only limited, special purpose, usually issue-focused discovery,
available only in some states. 327 When adopted nationwide, no one imagined
its present day scope. Discovery was to complement and supplement trial,
but not to substitute for it.
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Today discovery is routine and trial is exceptional. In a day of “notice
pleading” and of “vanishing trials,” in many cases discovery is American
litigation. Very few cases end in judgments after trial; more cases end in
what are called “summary judgments” (more on this below) after some
discovery has taken place. Many cases—perhaps the majority—have some
form of discovery. In the federal system, all cases are subject to mandatory
pre-trial disclosure. While the extent of discovery is a matter of debate, cases
conducted without discovery settle in the shadow of discovery.
Scope of Discovery. Discovery as practiced today gives parties license
to explore facts that underlie or are merely tangentially related to their
dispute. In practice, in the absence of meaningful judicial supervision,
parties inquire into affairs far removed from the matter in controversy.
According to the American College of Trial Lawyers Report, discovery is
“limitless.” 328 The Federal Rules authorize discovery of all matter “that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” 329 “Relevant information,”
according to the rule, “need not be admissible at trial, if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.” Moreover, for good cause and upon application, the court may
dispense with even the limp limitation of discovery to claims and defenses
and “order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action.”(Emphasis added.)
The restriction to matters that are “relevant to any party’s claims or
defenses” limits little, when claims and defenses are ill-defined in pleadings
(see Chapter 5). Moreover, lawyers easily get around that modest limitation
by stating multiple claims or by joining multiple defendants. Little in the law
discourages them from adding claims or parties or even imagining new legal
claims. The law allows lawyers to assert claims not presently recognized in
law so long as they have a “non frivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” 330
Little is safe from discovery. The only matters not subject to discovery
are: confidential communications between client and lawyer; certain
materials prepared for use at trial; and electronically stored information “not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” 331 Culling these
materials and approving their exclusion from otherwise permitted discovery
can be a major expense in itself. One of the few ways in which judges are
involved in discovery is to review those exclusions. In other words, judges
decide not what parties must disclose, but what they are allowed not to
disclose. It is a privacy advocate’s nightmare.
Supervision of Discovery. Discovery was designed to take place
without direct judicial supervision. Lawyers take depositions of witnesses,
328
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including depositions of third party witnesses, examine documents, and
exchange interrogatories all out of the physical presence of judges and
without prior court approval. Although lawyers enjoy the power of the state
to compel participation, the state takes no notice of what lawyers do in its
name until someone formally complains to the court.
Discovery rules anticipate a minimum of court supervision. While they
permit court intervention, they do not require it and, in practice, direct
judicial conduct of discovery almost never occurs. The usual judicial role in
pretrial discovery is to approve party plans, to determine deadlines, and to
decide occasional disputes about conduct of discovery. Lawyers, not judges,
decide which witnesses to call and which information to demand. The
judicial role is that of a keeper of the calendar.
Strategic Uses of Discovery. Professor Sunderland, the drafter of the
discovery rules, envisioned that pretrial discovery would eliminate issues for
trial. So if an applicable rule had six elements, discovery might make clear
that there was no material dispute between the parties on all but two
elements. Discovery would, he hoped, facilitate party agreement before trial
on which issues remained for determination at trial. He envisioned that
summary judgment motion might resolve other issues before trial.
The focus of discovery has not turned out as Sunderland expected.
While trial lawyers do use discovery to clarify issues at trial, most also use it
to develop their “theory of the case” or to develop new theories and to reach
other strategic and tactical objectives.
Discovery Supports Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is a
judicial determination, that with respect to specific issues or with respect to
the case as a whole, there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and
that the court may give judgment as a matter of law. Litigating lawyers use
discovery to support summary judgment motions. When they do, they use
discovery in the way Sunderland intended. We discuss summary judgment
below under pretrial motions.
Sunderland hoped that summary judgment would eliminate issues of all
sorts; today summary judgments serve principally to eliminate very weak
cases, or at least, very weak legal claims (i.e., parts of cases). In these cases
discovery may be able to establish that there are “no material issues subject
to genuine factual dispute.” But this is a high bar that moving parties can
vault over in few cases. Why? First, American procedure permits parties to
characterize their claims legally in a great variety of ways. Second, most
lawsuits turn on different understandings and evaluations of fact. Summary
judgment in many cases fails, or is not usable, because a competent lawyer
can conjure up an issue of material fact.
Discovery Supports Case Theory Development. A common use of
discovery is to assist lawyers in developing a theory of the case. A case
theory is a thematic story that lawyers write for jurors (and judges and the
press) to relate to. It includes the facts that form the elements of a cause of
action, but the cause of action lies in the background. The theory of the case
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makes the parties’ story comprehensible to non-lawyers; it puts the parties’
claims on a footing laymen can understand. It is considered the organizing
principle for all that the trial lawyer does.
Lawyers conduct discovery to prepare to present their parties’ versions
of disputed events. It is as if each party is writing its own screenplay for a
trial production. Discovery is the necessary background research for the
screenplay. At trial, should a trial occur, each side produces the screenplay
that its lawyers have written with help of discovery. Discovery used in this
way is deliberately duplicative: first gather evidence in discovery, then
present at trial the most favorable evidence collected.
Discovery helps lawyers determine which among several different
conceivable case theories is likely to be the strongest. It permits probing the
basis, strengths and weaknesses of the opposing side’s case theories.
As lawyers became accustomed to sweeping discovery, they adapted it
as a tool to develop case theories and to press process into previously
unreached regions. Now discovery is said to aid in private regulation of “the
social and economic fabric of the country.” 332 For lawyers who see
themselves as engaged in private regulation, discovery is an end in itself. It
is divorced from specific claims. They demand that adversaries not object to
discovery, but should facilitate mutual knowledge of all facts. 333
Case Theory as Substitute for Legal Syllogism. The “theory of the
case” has come to substitute for the syllogistic order of historic forms of
common law and code (fact) pleading. While no rule requires parties to
develop a theory of the case, practical needs of lawyers impel them to do so.
An American trial is “really a struggle between … opposing stories.” 334
According to Justice Antonin Scalia: “By and large I think it does work to
have each side take the best shot at presenting the truth in favor of that side’s
case and let the jury decide between the two.” 335
Tactical Uses of Discovery. Lawyers have a variety of tactical uses for
discovery, some envisioned by the drafters of the discovery rules and some
not. Uses include:
• establishing material facts that fulfill elements of one or more legal
claims asserted by their clients (the main original basis for
discovery);

332

STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET
IN CONTEXT 37-42, 152 (2006).

333

Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE

See, e.g., Mark Kosieradzki & Kara Rahimi, Keeping discovery civil, 44 TRIAL, No. 6, 30-31
(June 2008).
MARILYN J. BERGER, JOHN B. MITCHELL, RONALD H. CLARK & MONIQUE C.M. LEAHY,
PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 17 (2nd ed. 2007) (quoting
JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN, JOURNEY TO JUSTICE (1996)).
335
TRUTH ON TRIAL, 8 ANNENBERG ETHICS IN AMERICA at 53rd minute (Columbia University
Seminars on Media and Society, 1989, ISBN 0-89776-526-5)
http://www.learner.org/resources/series81.html?pop=yes&pid=198
334

151

Civilizing Civil Justice
•
•
•
•
•
•

2010-11-17

narrowing the issues in dispute between the parties to facilitate
conducting trials and to promote settlements without trials;
“pinning down,” that is getting parties and witnesses to commit to
particular positions and, in some instances, to admit particular facts;
evaluating and even undermining (“impeaching”) the credibility of
witnesses;
perpetuating evidence, that is recording evidence that may not be
available at trial;
influencing the other side to settle the case by demonstrating one’s
own resolve or by requiring it to disclose sensitive information that
it would rather not disclose (this is considered ethical); and,
grinding weaker opponents into submission by imposing on them
burdens they cannot meet (this is considered unethical, but is not
uncommon).

Freedom to shape discovery bestows on lawyers opportunities to pursue
procedural advantages that seem to some misuse. To win time, they order
unnecessary depositions or drag out necessary ones. To exert force on
financially weak parties, they direct burdensome discovery methods. The
opposing side must ordinarily carry those costs, because there is no routine
fee-shifting. The opposing party incurs aggravation, distraction and loss of
time that is never recompensed.
Freedom to shape discovery empowers lawyers to render some claims
worthless. A judgment for $10,000 is worse than worthless if accompanied
by discovery costs of $10,000. Some lawyers conduct discovery less for
party advantage and more for lawyer fees.
Discovery has many ends other than finding facts to fulfill legal rules.
Arguments of opposing counsel are fought in discovery. Witnesses are
questioned and documents examined in order to coach out admissions or to
find documents which support one's own point of view. The dream goal is an
oral or written admission of the entire case for one side (“smoking gun”) or
at least important parts. Much time is wasted searching for such admissions.
Lawyers use discovery to give shape to the case and to secure the
general outlines of their theory of the case. They try to pin potential
witnesses down. If a witness in a deposition in discovery says “A”, it is very
hard for the witness to say “B” later, including at trial. “Mr. Witness, are you
lying now, or were you lying then?” the inquiring lawyer will ask. In
deposition the testimony of witnesses is recorded word-for-word. The
lawyers write a “record” in this procedure, that in certain cases can later be
presented to the judge or that the lawyers can read to jurors. Faced with fatal
risks, only foolish lawyers fail to prepare witnesses for interrogation.
Lawyers drill witnesses on wording of answers; they remind them to answer
only exactly what is asked. They conduct practice interrogations recorded for
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review. Such preparation strikes foreign observers as strange; in many
systems it is
unethical. 336
b. Discovery Procedures
Required Initial Disclosure. All parties, without awaiting a discovery
request, must provide to all other parties: (1) names and contact information
of any persons likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses; (2) a copy or description of
all documents, electronically stored information and tangible things that it
has in its possession which it may use to support its claims or defenses; (3) a
computation of damages claimed by the party; and (4) a copy of any
insurance agreement that may provide coverage in the matter. 337 This
required initial disclosure is a relatively new innovation. It is considered
separate technically from discovery. It was hoped that it would expedite
cases; it does not seem to have worked out that way.
Planning discovery. The parties are required to confer “as soon as
practicable” to attempt in good faith to agree on a “discovery plan.” The
discovery plan must state parties’ views and proposals on six matters of how
they anticipate conducting discovery. 338 While the Federal Rules authorize
judges to be “managerial,” that is, to adopt an involved approach to lawsuits,
most judges are not managerial in most of their lawsuits. Reports to the
contrary are exaggerated.
After the parties, really their lawyers, have met on the discovery plan
and submitted it to the court, the judge determines deadlines to complete
discovery. From that moment the parties’ lawyers individually order—often
after prior consultation with other parties’ lawyers—discovery. They can
order the discovery of other parties to the lawsuit and even of third parties
not participating in the lawsuit, provided that they comply with the rules
governing discovery. For most forms of discovery, persons subject to
discovery “requests” must comply, unless they seek from the judge a
“protective order.” Lawyers are cautioned not to run to the judge with minor
disagreements regarding discovery.
The central role of the lawyers in discovery is reminiscent of the central
roles the lawyers had in special pleading in the nineteenth century. Then the
adversary lawyers through pleading agreed on the issue to be resolved by the
court. Today, discovery follows that same model. Different from those days,
however, is lawyers have the power of the court to compel testimony.
336
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c. Means of Discovery
There are four principal means of discovery:
(1) oral testimony (Rule 30 depositions by Oral Examination);
(2) viewing (for parties, Rule 34 Producing Documents, Electronically
Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering Onto Land,
for Inspection and Other Purposes; for parties and non-parties, Rule
30(b)(2) Producing Documents as part of Rule 30 Depositions by
Oral Examination);
(3) written responses (for all persons, Rule 31 Depositions by Written
Questions; for parties only, Rule 33 Interrogatories to Parties and
Rule 36 Requests for Admissions); and
(4) physical examination of persons who are parties (Rule 35 Physical
and Mental Examinations).
Once the parties’ lawyers have conferred on a discovery plan under Rule
26(f), each may commence his or her own discovery. Neither has to wait on
the other. 339 There are few limitations in discovery. One limitation is that a
person cannot twice be subjected to deposition by oral examination.
Limitations can be overcome by agreement or by permission of the court.
How to sequence discovery is a matter of each individual lawyer’s
preferences. Usually lawyers start by sending written interrogatories and
document requests to the opposing party to obtain basic information,
continue with evaluating those documents, and finally move on to the more
interactive forms of discovery, namely taking deposition testimony on oral
examination, first of opposing parties, then of third-party witnesses and
finally of experts. In the case of written interrogatories to parties and of
document requests, some courts provide standard forms that are
presumptively proper.
(i) Written Interrogatories to Parties
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each party may require the
other party to respond to up to twenty-five written interrogatories; with
permission of the court, each may demand more. 340 The other party must
answer each question in writing and under oath unless he or she objects to it.
While as American discovery methods go, this is a relatively inexpensive
means of discovery, its usefulness is limited, since the other party’s lawyer
prepares the answers and usually assure that the answers are not very
helpful.
339
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The Local Rules of the United States District Court for Maryland
provide standard form interrogatories. They allow plaintiffs to ask, inter alia:
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify any persons or entities whom
Defendant contends are persons needed for just adjudication within the meaning of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, but who have not been named by Plaintiff.
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all persons who are likely to have
personal knowledge of any fact alleged in the complaint or in your answer to the
complaint, and state the subject matter of the personal knowledge possessed by each
such person.
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If you have knowledge of any person
carrying on an insurance business that might be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment that might be entered in this action or to indemnify or reimburse the payments
made to satisfy the judgment, identify that person and state the applicable policy limits
of any insurance agreement under which the person might be liable.
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the facts concerning the matters
alleged in [paragraph ____ of your Complaint] [paragraph ____ of your Answer to the
Complaint] [your affirmative defense no. ___].
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If you contend that __________, state
the facts concerning such contention.

Standard Interrogatory No. 5 is designed to determine whether
defendant will claim that there is any other party that must be joined in the
action. Here, such a party might be DohSon Honda LLC (if not named
originally), or John Doh, Sr., or Doh Honda Distributing Co. Standard
Interrogatory No. 6 serves to identify individuals with knowledge of the
case. Its utility is somewhat limited if the plaintiff has served a minimal
complaint that alleges few facts. This catch-all search for possible witnesses,
however, should preclude the possibility that either party presents a surprise
witness at the last moment, since the obligation to disclose continues even
after the dates of the demand and of the other party’s response. 341 Standard
Interrogatory No. 7 helps the demanding party negotiate a settlement with a
clear idea of how much money is available. Standard Interrogatories 10 and
11 are to be the bases for interrogatories that help the demanding party better
understand the case, plan that party’s further discovery and build that party’s
theory of the case.
Roh’s lawyer Hahn could build on Standard Interrogatories 10 and 11 to
develop aspects of the case that on the facts stated are uncertain. In
particular, he could try to elicit from John Doh, Jr. information regarding
Doh, Jr.’s original request of Roh for money. What was the nature of the
business reversals? Since Hahn knows that Doh, Jr. is claiming the money as
a gift, he should inquire not only about what Doh, Jr. said when Roh
promised the money, but also about business dealings that Doh, Jr. was
having at that time. Hahn might also want to inquire into the knowledge and
341
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involvement of DohSon Honda LLC and of John Doh, Sr. in the transfer of
the money. Since Hahn might also inquire into the involvement of Doh, Sr.
in the business of DohSon Honda LLC to determine if there is a basis for
holding him, as a limited liability owner of the company, personally liable
for its debts. Hahn is largely free in when and how he poses the
interrogatories so long as he remains within the allotted number (25)..
Already here one sees the strategic and tactical possibilities that
discovery creates. If Hahn has named either DohSon Honda LLC or John
Doh, Sr. as defendants, he has greater opportunities to take discovery
directly from them. He also, by taking discovery directly from them, brings
to their attention—and their interest—the lawsuit. The additional cost to
Hahn and to his client is not high. Even if Hahn has not brought in DohSon
Honda LLC or John Doh, Sr. as parties, by including them in the scope of his
discovery demands, he generates additional work for John Doh, Jr.’s lawyer
and additional expense for John Doh, Jr. While those may be the nefarious
purposes for which Hahn widens discovery, they are not so obvious as to
appear abusive. The broad scope that discovery allows is broad enough to
allow him to inquire into these issues.
John Doh, Jr.—and, if they are parties, DohSon Honda, LLC and John
Doh, Sr.—do not have to take these attacks lying down. They can
counterattack with interrogatories and other discovery of their own. The
Court has its own standard interrogatories for them to use:
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify all persons who are likely to
have personal knowledge of any fact alleged in the complaint, and state the subject
matter of the personal knowledge possessed by each such person.
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all persons who have a
subrogation interest in any claim set forth in the complaint, and state the basis and
extent of such interest.
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Itemize and show how you calculate any
damages claimed by you in this action, whether economic, non-economic, punitive or
other.
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the facts concerning the matters
alleged in [paragraph ____ of your Complaint] [paragraph ____ of your Answer to the
Complaint] [your affirmative defense no. ___].
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If you contend that __________, state
the facts concerning such contention.

These standard interrogatories mirror those allowed plaintiffs. Standard
Interrogatory No. 3, which concerns damages, substitutes for No. 7
concerning insurance coverage.
Recall that John Doh, Jr. is enraged at his former fiancé, Rosa Roh. He
is looking for ways to get revenge. If there is any claim that he has against
Mary Roh that includes Rosa, he might bring it as a permissive joinder, that
is, a claim unrelated to Mary Roh’s claim against him. Perhaps he gave Rosa
a ring, which she has not returned, but that might be in Mary Roh’s
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possession. Even if there is no such claim that might involve both of them,
he would like to entangle Rosa in this suit to the extent possible to make her
miserable. While John Doh, Jr.’s lawyer might, to some extent resist those
efforts, such resistance is by no means sure. Depending upon how facts turn
out, such resistance may not even be required by ethical rules.
In formulating defense strategies for John Doh, Jr., his lawyer will look
for anything that might support the assertion that the money paid was a gift.
To that end, he might pose questions related to past gifts made by Mary Roh.
He might ask her about the relationship between her daughter Rosa and John
Doh, Jr. and about their pending marriage. He could inquire into the tax
returns of Roh, because federal law requires that givers of gifts pay a gift tax
on gifts above a certain amount ($13,000 in 2009). As with her adversary,
there is little that encourages Doh’s lawyer to moderate her demands and
much that pushes her to make discovery painful.
Interrogatories to parties often are just the salvo in what can become a
discovery war.
(ii) Requests for Documents
Each party may require the other party to make available for copying
any document, electronically stored information, or other tangible thing, if
the information or object sought is not privileged and is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense. 342 Information sought need not be admissible at
trial to be relevant, so long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence. 343 The party must specify the type of
documents sought, but does not have to identify the precise documents. This
is an example of the infamous “fishing expedition” permitted by American
civil procedure 344 and prohibited by the German Ausforschungsbeweisverbot
(prohibition of investigative evidence).
Such discovery is routine rather than rare in American litigation. Parties
in the United States often try to discover in their opponents’ warehouses a
single document that could clinch their case against the other. They look for
what is known as the “smoking gun.” That rarely do they find the smoking
gun does not daunt them in seeking for it. Even in days before electronic
discovery parties might demand production of hundreds of thousands of
pages of documents found even in foreign countries all in vain searches for
a smoking gun.
The Court’s own Standard Requests for Production of Documents allow
Hahn to demand of John Doh, Jr., and of any other party to the suit
(remember DohSon Honda, LLC or John Doh, Sr. might be parties):
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Standard Requests for Production of Documents
1. All documents referred to in your Answers to Interrogatories.
2. All statements [made in a writing signed by the party or made orally and
recorded or transcribed verbatim] which were previously made by this party and any of
its present or former directors, officers, or employees, concerning the action or its
subject matter.
3. All documents (including, but not limited to, correspondence, notes,
memoranda, and journal entries) which relate to, describe, summarize, or memorialize
any communication between you and [Name], or anyone known or believed by you to
have been acting under the authority of [Name], concerning the occurrence.
4. … [relating to expert witnesses]
5. All contracts or agreements entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant
concerning the occurrence or transaction.
6. All documents concerning your claim for damages or the methods used to
calculate such alleged damages.
7. All documents concerning any release, settlement, or other agreement, formal
or informal, pursuant to which the liability of any person or any entity for damage arising
out of the occurrence which is the subject matter of this lawsuit has been limited,
reduced, or released in any manner. This request includes all agreements by one party
or person to indemnify another party or person for claims asserted in this litigation.
8. All insurance policies under which a person carrying on an insurance business
might be liable to pay to you or on your behalf all or part of the damages sought in this
action.
9. All documents received from or provided to any other party to this action since
the filing of the Complaint, whether provided informally or in response to a formal
request. All documents referred to in the Complaint and other pleadings ….

The default rule of American discovery is disclosure. The lawyer for one
party demands disclosure and the lawyer for the other party must comply,
unless he or she has a valid objection. Valid objections are few. That
disclosure is burdensome is not a valid objection; disclosure must be unduly
burdensome to sustain an objection. Rarely is it. 345 If part of a request is
objectionable, the objecting lawyer “must specify objection to part of the
request and permit inspection of the rest.” 346 While courts have wide
authority to direct and limit discovery through “protective orders,” they do
not use that authority to routinely supervise discovery, but only
exceptionally on motion of a party. 347 In Germany or in Korea, before one
must turn one’s private papers over to the other side, a judge must issue an
affirmative order; in the United States, to prevent a private paper from being
turned over requires a court-issued protective order.
While lawyers may issue wide-reaching requests for discovery with
little fear of court intervention, that busy judges have little interest in
deciding discovery motions sometimes is productive of less disclosure rather
than more. Unscrupulous lawyers realize that they need not fully comply
with discovery orders if judges are not likely to favorably receive motions to
345
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compel discovery. The result is that the lawyers determine fairness of
process.
Only three types of documents are exempt from discovery without
protective orders: confidential communications between lawyer and client
(“attorney-client privilege documents”), certain trial preparation materials
(“attorney work product”), and “electronically stored information ... not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” 348 Culling attorneyclient privileged and work product documents from larger files can be
problematic and costly. Typically, as provided in the Maryland Standard
Requests, parties claiming exemption must assert the claim on document-bydocument basis. We reproduce the instruction in its entirety to demonstrate
the demands of American discovery:
2. Whenever in this Request you are asked to identify or produce a document
which is deemed by you to be properly withheld from production for inspection or
copying:
A.
If you are withholding the document under claim of privilege
(including, but not limited to, the work product doctrine), please provide the information
set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) and Discovery Guideline 9(c)(ii)(b), including the
type of document, the general subject matter of the document, the date of the
document, and such other information as is sufficient to identify the document,
including, where appropriate, the author, addressee, custodian, and any other recipient
of the document, and where not apparent, the relationship of the author, addressee,
custodian, and any other recipient to each other, in a manner that, without revealing the
information claimed to be protected, will enable this party to assess the applicability of
the privilege or protection claimed by you;
B.
If you are withholding the document for any reason other than an
objection that it is beyond the scope of discovery or that a request is unduly
burdensome, identify as to each document and, in addition to the information requested
in ¶2.A, above, please state the reason for withholding the document.
3. When a document contains both privileged and non-privileged material, the
non-privileged material must be disclosed to the fullest extent possible without thereby
disclosing the privileged material. If a privilege is asserted with regard to part of the
material contained in a document, the party claiming the privilege must clearly indicate
the portions as to which the privilege is claimed. When a document has been redacted
or altered in any fashion, identify as to each document the reason for the redaction or
alteration, the date of the redaction or alteration, and the person performing the
redaction or alteration. Any redaction must be clearly visible on the redacted document.
4. It is intended that this Request will not solicit any material protected either by
the attorney/client privilege or by the work product doctrine which was created by, or
developed by, counsel for the responding party after the date on which this litigation
was commenced. If any Request is susceptible of a construction which calls for the
production of such material, that material need not be provided and no privilege log
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) or Discovery Guideline 9(a) will be required as to
such material.
5. If production of any requested document(s) is objected to on the grounds that
production is unduly burdensome, describe the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery.

348
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In a modest case such as Roh v. Doh, document discovery might eat up
only a dozen hours. In a larger case, months of lawyers’ time and millions of
dollars in fees can be devoured. But with document discovery, sometimes
the battle has just been begun.
(iii) Depositions
Each party may take the sworn testimony upon oral examination
(“deposition”) of any person, including that of someone who is not a party to
the lawsuit. The party’s lawyer, without prior approval of the court, has
authority to compel attendance through an order known as a subpoena. 349 A
person who fails to comply with a subpoena is subject to sanction including
fine and imprisonment. This is so easily said in describing procedures in the
United States, and for Americans so easily read, that we remind American
readers how remarkable this authority is: a private lawyer, without judicial
approval, may compel attendance of a person in a private matter under threat
of fine and imprisonment by the state!
Lawyers use depositions to develop their theory of the case, to evaluate
potential witnesses and to pin down the testimony of witnesses. If later a
witness says something different—say at a trial—the lawyer can “impeach”
that later testimony by bringing out the prior testimony.
Lawyers usually hold depositions in their own offices or, when in
distant cities, in offices of colleagues. It is extraordinary for a judge to
participate in a deposition. Usually depositions are held before persons
authorized or appointed to “administer oaths.” 350 Typically that is a private
person, called a “court reporter.” The court reporter, however, only records
or transcribes verbatim the testimony of the witness; the court reporter does
not question the witness or resolve any aspect of the testimony. Objections to
questions are usually stated on the record and the witness is then instructed
to answer leaving to later resolution whether the information disclosed can
be used at trial. The party requesting the deposition bears the cost of its
recording; each party, however, pays for his or her own copies of transcripts
of the testimony. Typically that charge is several dollars a page. Ordinarily
each side orders its own copy.
That depositions often are long is a practical consequence of American
procedures. To spare all persons inconvenience, the Federal Rules provide
that no witness may be deposed a second time without permission of the
court. 351 That compels lawyers to use this possibly unique opportunity to ask
all questions that might conceivably be material in the case. That that will
include many questions not in the end relevant to decision follows from the
349
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interdependent nature we have already discussed of finding facts,
determining law and applying law to facts.
Depositions require substantial preparation and significant postdeposition review. Lawyers are advised to prepare “their” witnesses
beforehand. Typically that preparation should be at least as long as the
deposition itself. Lawyers are advised to prepare by having mock depositions
first. After a deposition is over lawyers may engage assistants to digest the
transcripts of testimony.
All of these preparations make depositions expensive, particularly when
lawyers journey to distant cities to participate in them. American lawyers do
not generally delegate taking testimony to other lawyers in distant cities.
Thus, even in pedestrian cases where only a few depositions are taken—say
only three, one from each party and one from one witness—and the matters
concerned are not complicated, one can expect twenty hours of lawyers’ time
(on each side), which when one adds travel time, accommodations, court
reporter fees, transcripts fees, fees for assistant time in digesting, produce
deposition expenses approaching or surpassing $10,000 for each side. In
high value cases, these numbers are many times that.
Today the Federal Rules recognize the burdens that depositions may
impose on parties. They therefore limit the number of depositions that may
be taken. Since limits are not proportionate to the amount in controversy, but
are numerical on a case basis, they do not protect parties in pedestrian cases
such as Roh v. Doh. In the cost of pedestrian cases they are practically
pathetic: each party, without court permission, may take no more than ten
depositions. Each deposition may last no longer than one day of seven hours.
That means, without court approval, the two parties in Roh v. Doh are
limited to 140 hours each in actual deposition time. With a like period of
time for preparation, they are limited to 280 hours on each side, or a total of
560 hours. At a modest charge of $300 per hour for lawyer time, the limit is
then $168,000: better than double the amount in controversy. And the
estimated maximum does not count the ancillary costs recording,
transcribing and digesting the testimony. Of course, that is only the
maximum allowed, and is not likely to be reached in a case like Roh v. Doh.
Yet a lawyer determined to run up costs could do it in such case to the
destruction of the other side’s claim. To make matters worse for the expense
conscious party, with court permission, the lawyers can take as many
depositions as the court is prepared to allow.
(iv) Expert Testimony 352
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We have kept Roh v. Doh simple and do not see in it an opportunity to
have the testimony of an expert. Experts are commonly used in civil
litigation particularly in larger cases. They are less common in the ordinary
cases that are the focus of this book. How they are used varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In the scholarly discussion of comparative procedure, the role of experts
looms large. 353 Perhaps this is because scholars pay more attention to the
“big“ cases, where experts are usual, than to ordinary cases, where experts
are uncommon. Perhaps it is because differences in how experts are chosen
and used are used are so great. It is said that explanation of American
practices to non-Americans causes “amazement... bordering on disbelief.” 354
Here we offer only a thumbnail description of differences. Elsewhere we
have discussed differences in detail. 355
In Germany and in Korea, experts are appointed by the court and are
neutral. The costs of experts are born, as are other court costs, by losers.
Ordinarily there is only one expert for one topic in a case. The expert is the
expert for the court and not for one party or for another. The expert acts as a
neutral interpreter of facts.
In the United States, usually each side picks, pays and presents its own
experts. The experts are practically advocates for their sides. Typically they
conference with the lawyers who chose them before they testify in
depositions or trials. Lawyers choose experts known to present their parties’
views. While American judges have long had authority to appoint experts for
the court, rarely do they exercise that authority.
d. Discovery in Roh v. Doh
In Chapter 3 our hypothetical Mary Roh met for the first time with her
lawyer Hahn. She has now returned to review the complaint that he has
drafted and to ask what is next.
Roh: OK. The complaint looks fine, counselor. So tell me, how long this is all going to
take?
Hahn: That’s hard to say. Most cases settle; they can be very short indeed. If we are
lucky, Doh will give in without putting in an answer. Nationwide, in the federal system,
the median time from filing to disposition is less than nine months. If, on the other hand,
Doh wants to drag this out, or if he just wants a trial, it could be a lot longer.
Roh: How much longer? How long would it take to go through trial?
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Hahn: If we were to file in the Eastern District of Virginia, not that long: maybe only ten
months. There they have what’s called the “rocket docket.” But in Maryland or in the
District of Columbia, you are looking at two years. We might get by with a bit less, since
this is a fairly simple case. But we have to do Maryland or D.C. We couldn’t really think
356
about Virginia, because we don’t have a good case for personal jurisdiction there.
Roh: So what’s coming? What do I have to look forward to?

357

[Discovery Plan]
Hahn: Even for a case as straight-forward as this, we will create a discovery plan. We
do that in all cases. It’s a kind of roadmap for collecting the evidence that we will need
to prove the elements of your case at trial. A discovery plan keeps us focused as we
move toward trial. It helps us set priorities in spending legal fees getting ready for trial.
Roh: So will Doh’s lawyer agree to that?
Hahn: The plan that I am talking about is just for us. It doesn’t limit Doh’s lawyer in any
way. All of this discovery is pretty much up to the parties. We can’t predict, for example,
how many depositions Doh’s lawyer will want and how long they will take. We are
required to confer with Doh’s lawyer to plan for discovery. In a case such as ours, that’s
likely not to mean much more than we agree on a deadline when all discovery has to
be completed. We can push for six months hete.
Roh: Is there no limit on the extent of discovery?
Hahn: Oh, no. Of course there is a limit. Each side can’t take more than ten depositions
without court permission. Each deposition can’t last more than one seven hour day.
Roh: Hmm, each side, ten depositions at seven hours each @ $300 an hour, that’s
already $21,000!
Hahn: In this case, we are not likely to have more than three or four depositions. And I
doubt that any will come close to lasting seven hours.
Roh: What are our discovery options?
Hahn: There are five types, but to save time, let me talk now only about the three that
we are sure to use: written questions (they’re technically “written interrogatories.” ),
document demands and depositions.
[Written Interrogatories and Document Demands]
Hahn: We use written interrogatories in part, to get information that will help our case,
but we principally use them to get leads for witnesses and information that we may not
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know about and to find out which witnesses and information the other side, here Doh,
plans to use to support its case. That way we won’t be surprised at trial, if he produces
a witness who claims to have been present when the loan was made, or says that you
later said to the witness that the money was gift.
Hahn: I will write the interrogatories, but both to save you money and to make sure that
Doh’s lawyer doesn’t object to what we ask, I will start from a form set that the court
provides. I am not allowed to ask more than twenty-five questions. But in a straightforward case like this, that will be enough..
Roh: I suppose that Doh will send us interrogatories too?
Hahn: You can be sure of that. But we will have thirty days to answer them. You will
have to do the answering. It’s quite serious business: It’s as if you were in court. You
will have to swear that your answers are true, like you were a witness in court. A false
answer theoretically could land you in jail for perjury..
Roh: Wow. I have to answer them myself?
Hahn: Not alone. I am allowed to help iin a few ways. Doh’s lawyer will send the
questons to me and not to you. I will look them over, While there are not many grounds
for you to refuse to answer, I will object to those questions that are out-of-bounds. Then
I will send them on to you.
Roh: What will I do with them?
Hahn: If you haven’t done so already, you will need to find anything that you have,
such as e-mails, letters, hard drives, CDs, flash drives, Blackberries, that relate in any
way to your claims in this case. Some of the questions are sure to ask for that
information. You will need it anyway to make sure that in answering the questions, you
do not inadvertently say something different than what the records say. So once you
find the records, you will need to review them all.
Roh: That doesn’t sound too bad. I don’t think that we exchanged more than an email
or two. I probably deleted them anyway. Basically, we had a conversation where he
asked for the money and then another conversation where I demanded the money
back since he hadn’t repaid as he told me he would.
Hahn: Not so fast. Doh is likely to ask you for any information you have about the
claim.
Roh: Didn’t I just tell you everything? What else is there?
Hahn: Basically you are going to have turn over anything you have that relates to Doh,
not just to this deal. His lawyer is likely to say, since you are claiming, if this is not a
loan, it was a conditional gift, their side needs to know all about your daughter’s
engagement with Doh. Did any of your emails talk about that? Do you do face-book?
Do you twitter? Doh’s lawyer will want it all. And just because you think you deleted a
message, does not mean that it’s not still on your hard drive.
Hahn: This is very important: don’t delete anything. That would get us into terrible
trouble.
Roh: Now I’m nervous. I’ve got to look through all this private stuff and turn it over to
Doh? And I’ve got to be sure my answers are all OK?
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Hahn. Yes. If there is something really sensitive, we could ask the judge for what is
called a “protective order,” either to avoid having to turn it over altogether or at least to
limit it to being viewed by Doh’s lawyer.
Hahn: As for worrying about getting your answers right, don’t. I will go over them with
you before we turn them over to the other side.
Roh: And that’s just one of the discovery options. What were the others?
Hahn: Document demands and depositions. In this case, since it is straight-forward,
we may serve our document demands with our written interrogatories. Once we have
the answers to the questions and get the documents, we will know better whether we
will need to get documents from anyone else and which people, if any, besides Doh
we will need for depositions.
Roh: Documents from other people? Like whom?
Hahn: Maybe from the bank.. Maybe from his dad. Maybe from their company, DohSon
Honda LLC. We can make third parties turn over documents.
Roh: I suppose you have to ask the judge to order that?.
Hahn: Not really. We have to get a subpoena from the clerk of the court, but we get
that in blank and fill it in ourselves.
[Depositions]
Roh: So we are now up to depositions? We have been talking about depositions, but I
am not sure what they are. Do we go to court for them? Does the judge ask witnesses
questions?
Hahn: No. You’re right in one sense: it is a formal questioning and answering. It’s like
being in court, in that you have to answer truthfully subject to penalties for perjury. But
depositions hardly ever take place in court or with a judge present. Usually, they take
place in a conference room in the office of the lawyer who asks for the deposition. So,
here, when your deposition is taken—and it almost surely will be—it would be in the
office of Doh’s lawyer in Maryland.
Roh: So whom will we depose?
Hahn: Certainly we will depose Doh. If Doh’s answers identify no other witnesses, we
won’t need other depositions. If they do identify other witnesses, however, we probably
will want to take their testimony in depositions before trial.
Hahn: If there is a third party, say Doh’s dad, your old friend John Doh, Sr., he can
bring a lawyer if he wants.
Roh: So depositions are public?
Hahn. No. While a witness can always bring a lawyer, and a party, like you or Doh, can
always attend, with or without a lawyer, that’s about it. Anyone else would have to know
beforehand. In a case like this, the only people likely to be in attendance are the
lawyers for both sides, the witness and the court reporter.
Roh: The court reporter? Who is that?
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Hahn: In theory, an officer of the court who presides over the deposition. In practice,
the court reporter is there to take down, verbatim, every word the witness or the
lawyers speak in the deposition. Court reporters prepare transcripts (for which they
charge handsomely) that are then given to the witness for review, correction and
approval.
Roh: So what happens at a deposition?
Hahn: If I am the one taking it, I get to ask the witness a lot of question. The witness
pretty much has rto answer them all. The witness is sworn, like in court, and has to
answer truthfully.
Roh: What is the purpose of a deposition?
Hahn: There are two main purposes. On the one hand, I want to know what the
witness will say at trial and which documents the other side will use. That way, I won’t
be surprised. On the other hand, once we know what we all plan to say, we may be
able to agree on what happened and settle the case, or at least see where we
disagree, so we can focus the trial on those issues.
Roh: What will Doh’s lawyer do when you are asking questions?
358

Hahn: Not much. Some lawyers say not more than “twiddling their thumbs.” Doh’s
lawyer’s principal role will be preparing Doh for the deposition. At the deposition, the
lawyer pretty much has to let me ask my questions. The lawyer can object, but Doh will
have to go ahead and answer.
Roh: So why would Doh’s lawyer bother to come to a deposition of their witness?
Hahn: Principally to get an idea how that witness would look in testifying at trial. Also to
make sure the witness does not slip up in answering questions.
Roh: Ok. They will take my deposition. What should I expect?
Hahn: I will prepare you beforehand. We will need to meet for half day to do that. It
might be less time than that; it might be more. We will review any documents that they
require you to bring. I will also go to the deposition with you—to keep them honest—
and I will object to any improper questions.
Roh: Can you give me a preview of the preparation?
Hahn: We will go into that at length. But there are three key points that I will stress over
and over again: (1) always tell the truth; (2) do not volunteer anything, and (3) always
listen carefully to the question and pause before answering it. For example, if Doh’s
lawyer asks you, “do you know what time it is?” Answer, “yes, I know what time it is.”
Do not volunteer that it is two o’clock. Listen for the trick or misleading question. If you
are unsure what a question means, ask to have it explained.
Roh: I suppose you will charge for the time in preparation?
Hahn: Yes.
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Roh: Ok. I am beginning to understand all this pre-trial discovery.. So when do I get
my day in court to tell it to the judge,.
Hahn: Not until the trial, if there is one.

e. Discovery’s Flaws
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that discovery has serious
flaws not only for efficiency, but for accuracy, fair hearing and access as
well. Some critics see those flaws as fatal. 359 While these flaws were partly
recognized in 1938 when the rules were introduced, the magnitude of their
effect has increased in time as inventors created copiers and emails and as
lawyers invented new uses for discovery beyond those planned by its
inventors. Here are some flaws that critics note:
Discovery’s extent is determined by the other party. Each party
determines for itself how much discovery to demand. There is a well-noted
asymmetry: the party that demands the discovery does not bear most of the
costs of compliance. There is little incentive for parties to forego discovery.
Discovery is duplicative. If trial does occur, discovery is wasteful:
witnesses testify twice, once in discovery and once at trial. That inefficiency
might not be fatal were applying law simple and were use of discovery
occasional. But applying law is rarely simple and use of discovery is routine.
Discovery multiplies issues geometrically. While the purpose of
discovery was to help narrow issues at trial, the reality is that it multiplies
their numbers in the process as a whole. Our discussions of pleading in
Chapter 5 and of law applying in Germany in Chapter 7 show that the
process of law applying is a back-and-forth one where one ranges from law
to facts and back again, as applicable law and facts being found are
compared one with another in preparation for an eventual subsumption of the
found facts under the governing law. American discovery denies this reality.
It compels lawyers pretrial to investigate all possible facts on all possible
legal theories. That could work only if from the outset there were only one
possible legal theory with but one class of facts that would fulfill a claim.
That was the assumption of common law pleading which in practice was
proven unworkable. Seventy years of experience with party-managed
discovery proves it unworkable.
Discovery broadens its reach to address the back-and-forth problem
of law-applying. The bifurcated system pushes lawyers to conduct such
discovery. To prepare for the concentrated trial, they prepare for all possible
issues. Since complaint and answer rarely substantially reduce issues before
discovery commences, the facts that need to be proven are not yet known.
Accordingly, requirements for discovery potentially are enormous. Lawyers
359
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seek to clarify all of the elements of all of the causes of action that might
govern. For example: a plaintiff raises four different claims. Each claim
contains five different elements. Already without reference to defenses or
supporting facts the lawyers have some twenty points to clarify in order to
prepare for trial. While resolution of one issue might dispose of all four
claims, ordinarily there is no way to achieve that resolution until all issues
have been discovered.
Discovery is extended by indeterminate law. Discovery would be
difficult enough were it certain which laws applied and what they mean, but
that is not the case in the United States. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook said it
well: “Legal uncertainty is the godfather of discovery abuse.” All too many
American rules, Easterbrook observes, “make everything relevant and
nothing dispositive.” “Lawyers cannot limit their search for information in
discovery, because they do not know what they are looking for. They do not
know when to stop, because they never know when they have enough.” 360
Discovery of this sort is not theoretical: it is a daily occurrence.
Discovery is disputatious instead of cooperative. The ideal of
discovery is cooperation: the parties with a minimum of judicial supervision
exchange information and evidence cooperatively. The ideal conflicts with
the adversarial reality of Anglo-American litigation. 361 Many American
litigators practice the famous aphorism of English law reformer Lord
Brougham: “an advocate in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst
them, to himself, is his first and only duty.” 362 Clients want to win. Where
they cannot win, many prefer delay to defeat.
Discovery rewards lawyers for using it. Nor is it hard for some
litigators to reconcile themselves to zealous advocacy. They are paid on the
basis of hours spent on a matter. The more they discover, the more they are
paid. It is not surprising that brief testimony of witnesses such as is common
in Germany or Korea, is unusual in American discovery. Whereas in
Germany or Korea often half an hour or even less may be all that is allotted
for a witness’s testimony, in the United States one figures testimony in terms
of half-a-day or days.
2. Four Perspectives on Pretrial Discovery
Discovery looms large in differences among our legal systems. As much
as any feature of American civil procedure it accounts for conflict between
360
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the United States and the rest of the world. Because of its importance, we
address four comments to pretrial discovery. First, we explain why American
law professors find it difficult to imagine a system of civil procedure without
pretrial discovery. Second, we discuss why many non-American jurists feel
little need to borrow American-style discovery for their own systems. Third,
we note that the historic perspective of drafters and proponents of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 which did not include changes in
American process practices as actually occurred. Fourth, we observe that the
drafters complemented their proposals for discovery with pretrial
conferences and pretrial motions for summary judgment possibly with civil
law alternatives in mind.
a. Contemporary American Perspective on Discovery
Some American law professors find absence of pretrial discovery in
foreign procedural systems such as in the German and Korean disconcerting.
Professor Stephen N. Subrin speaks for many when he says: “We do not
think that judges would ferret out negative aspects of our opponent’s case
and positive information to prove our own claims or defenses with the same
motivation and intensity that self-interest propels.” He acknowledges,
however, that the career judges one finds outside the United States might be
more reliable in this task than would be their politically-appointed or elected
American counterparts. 363
Professor Subrin and Professor Margaret Y.K. Woo observe elsewhere
how discovery “helps to ensure that even less powerful litigants lacking
initial information can commence suit and obtain the necessary proof in
support of their case. This is especially necessary in cases in which it is an
impoverished individual litigant who is suing a corporate defendant that
controls much of the relevant information.” 364 They acknowledge, however,
that perhaps such discovery is necessary only where “civil litigation serves
an expansive public function in regulating the social and economic fabric of
the country” and may not be required in legal systems that serve “mainly to
resolve individual disputes.” 365
In discussing American views of discovery, we remind readers that
while many American jurists—mainly trial lawyers and law school
professors—fervently support contemporary American discovery, many
other Americans—jurists and non-jurists—do not. The American legal
community does not speak unison on this issue. Many Americans, within
and without the legal community, oppose the practically unbounded
development of discovery that has developed since discovery was introduced
363
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in 1938. On the other hand, even Americans who oppose broad discovery,
are likely to wonder how non-American systems can get along without at
least some discovery to avoid surprise and to disclose material evidence held
by the other side.
b. Non-American Perspective on Discovery
Few jurists from civil law systems feel that absence of American-style
discovery is detrimental. Many regard American discovery as anathema and
its absence in their systems as virtue. 366 That one non-American jurist has
proposed in a thorough and well-argued study to adopt or at least to adapt
American discovery to civil law systems is remarkable for its possible
uniqueness. 367 Others, such as our co-author Professor Lee, are interested in
learning from American experiences in fact-finding to inform their own
country’s practices of fact-finding, but do not seek adoption of American
discovery.
Why do civil law jurists fear broad discovery and not lament absence of
even narrow discovery from their systems? Let us offer you our views: 368
They see broad discovery as destructive of the rule of law. Civil law
jurists fear broad American discovery for the same reasons that many
Americans do: it is a private inquisition. Professor Rolf A. Stürner, who is
too polite to use the term, speaks for many non-American jurists when he
describes American discovery with attributes reminiscent of the historic
inquisition:
[T]he pretrial discovery process is left almost entirely to the lawyers
and provides very broad possibilities for discovery without
requiring a substantial and specified complaint or defense; parties
and third parties have an almost unlimited duty to co-operate in
pretrial discovery proceedings by means of answering
interrogatories and depositions, production of documents and things
and entry upon land; failure to comply with any such order will be
sanctioned as contempt of court and causes procedural
disadvantages. 369
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As we have seen the principal purpose of civil procedure is
determination of rights and duties among private parties according to law.
Civil procedure serves, as Professors Subrin and Woo remark, mainly to
resolve individual disputes. For most of the world, its purpose is not to
provide procedures to investigate as yet undiscovered violations of rights or
to create new rights and duties. The former, investigation. is for the public
executive under rule of law control, while the latter, legislation (i.e., creation
of new rights), is for the legislature under political control. Neither control is
present in private litigation. Such use of civil procedure when not merely
incidental to dispute resolution conflicts with conceptions of the rule of law.
Only in the United States does one find a substantial constituency for
broader purposes of civil procedure.
They see better ways to accomplish narrow goals of discovery. The
original uses of discovery were to avoid surprise at trial and to give one side
access to evidence held by the other.
Surprise. In the German and Korean systems surprise is not a major
issue. Any problems of surprise are not so serious as to warrant an extensive
and expensive discovery system. The German system in most cases by its
ordinary working precludes surprise: the parties, in their pleadings, must
identify the evidence on which they plan to rely; the judge, before taking
evidence, must issue a formal decision stating the evidence to be taken and
which disputed facts if concerns. § 359 ZPO. The Korean system has the
latter but not the former requirement. In both systems, should surprise arise
in the course evidence taking, judges are obligated by their duty of
elucidation to provide the other side opportunity to deal with the surprise.
They may take a measure so simple as to adjourn the proceedings for a few
days or a few weeks.
Evidence held by others. That evidence necessary to one party’s case
may be held by another party who has no interest in disclosing it, is a
common problem in procedural systems. Jurists in Germany and Korea have
long recognized it as such. Few, if any, however, consider it such a serious
problem as to warrant intrusive American discovery. They see the problem
as an exceptional one that can be better dealt with in other ways.
In many cases there is no material, undisclosed evidence. It is a truism
of litigation the world over that many cases are determined by how one
views facts as much as by which facts one sees. An American, Thomas A.
Mauet, makes the point: “Litigation outcomes are usually decided according
to which party’s version of disputed events the fact finder accepts as true.” 370
In cases where there might be material, undisclosed evidence, there are
ways less intrusive and less expensive than American style discovery to
address the problem. These include:
1. Better rule drafting. How rules are drafted can make discovery
unnecessary. A common use for discovery in the United States is to
370
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determine the state of mind of a party, i.e., did a party act intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently. This is a subjective element; by
recasting a rule in objective terms, resort to evidence held by the other party
may no longer be needed. 371
2. Shifting the burden of proof. In civil lawsuits, ordinarily plaintiffs
have the burden of producing all the evidence necessary to establish their
claims of right. Should they require evidence held by the other party, if there
is no change in the ordinary rules, they will lose because the other side
refuses to disclose. Long an approach to dealing with this evidentiary
problem is to shift the burden of proof. A classic example is product liability
law in the European Union.
3. Requiring production as substantiation. Even without formally
shifting the burden of proof, judges in Germany and Korea can rely on the
duties of elucidation of judges and parties and on their own duties as judges
of evidence practically to force disclosure. Once one party establishes a point
prima facie, when the other side seeks to rebut it, the judge insists on that
party producing all evidence relevant to the question. The judge may have to
probe to find out what evidence exists, but having determined that it does
exist, if the opposing side fails to produce it, draw negative conclusions. 372
4. Enhance judicial authority to compel disclosure. In 2002 the German
Code of Civil Procedure was amended to give judges authority to require
plaintiffs, defendants and third parties to produce documents which either
plaintiff or defendant refers to. § 142 ZPO. Similarly, in Korea parties are
under an obligation to produce documents quoted in lawsuits. § 343 (1)1. 373
In part thanks to the international brouhaha over American discovery, in both
Germany and Korea today there is some discovery that did not exist before.
c. Historic American Perspective on Discovery
The Intended Purpose of Discovery. Americans owe modern day
discovery to dissatisfaction with the efficacy of framing fact issues for trial
under common law and code pleading. In both systems parties would appear
at trial uncertain of which issues they would have to meet; they might be
“ambushed” by the opposing party with some new issue or some
unanticipated witness. Recall that American pleadings have never required
parties to identify witnesses or other evidence. There was a felt need for
“some additional device or devices for the clarification of issues and for the
elimination of fake claims.” 374
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Professor Sunderland, the drafter of the original discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules, believed that “[m]uch of the delay in the preparation of a
case, most of the lost effort in the course of the trial, and a large part of the
uncertainty in the outcome, result[ed] from the want of information on the
part of litigants and their counsel as to the real nature of the respective
claims and the facts upon which they rest[ed].” 375 Sunderland envisioned
that through discovery the parties would develop facts sufficient to permit
summary judgment motions to dispose of cases—both strong and fake—
where there were no genuine issues of disputed material fact and otherwise
to facilitate clarifying issues for trial.
We have found nothing in the historic record that suggests that Professor
Sunderland, or any of his colleagues, intended for discovery to displace trials
or for lawsuits to go beyond the historic purpose of determining private
rights to resolve disputes.
Sunderland saw pretrial proceedings as complementing and not as
undercutting trials. Pretrial was to be the salvation of “elaborate and
expensive” trial proceedings. It would withdraw issues from the trial agenda
where historic pleading had failed. Sunderland saw the weakness of pleading
in failure to test factual allegations of the parties. The parties could assert or
deny whatever they chose. Discovery would test those allegations. Discovery
would indicate the “real points in controversy, in spite of pleadings which
confuse or mislead.” 376 It would assure litigants their day in court in a trial
following discovery. 377
Discovery as originally adopted was directed to disputed issues of
material fact and not to development of new claims. Until 1946, document
discovery was limited to things “which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action” and then only upon a showing
of good cause. 378 Depositions were of matters relating to the claims or
defenses of the parties. 379 Rule 27, which allowed for discovery prior to
commencing the action, was not appropriate to enable one to draw a
complaint. 380 In other words, discovery was to be directed to material
matters in dispute and not to development of new theories of recovery.
d. Civil law methods as utopian ideal for American pretrial?
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While an extensive survey of the historic record is beyond the bound of
this book, we think it worthwhile to point out that the vision of Clark and
Sunderland may have been closer to civil law approaches than is generally
supposed. While their vision reduced the role of pleading, it did not abandon
applying law to fact. Pretrial conferences and motions for summary
judgment were to substitute.
Both Clark and Sunderland saw framing issues as an important part of
procedure. Clark wrote of a choice between civil and common law methods.
The civil law method, he commented, is the simpler: “direct questioning of
the parties by the … judge;” the Anglo-American system was otherwise:
“development of the issues by the parties themselves by written statements
in advance of direct hearing of the parties. He endorsed moving American
procedure in the civil law direction: “[w]e tend towards the civil law system;
we shall probably not reach it for many generations, if at all.” 381
Sunderland envisioned that pretrial conferences and motions for
summary judgement would take over much of the work in framing issues. In
one proposal in Michigan made with Sunderland’s participation, the goal
was “the virtual elimination of pleadings, substituting a pretrial conference
as a means of determining the issue involved in the case.” 382 Backers of
pretrial conferences saw in them “greater potential for serving the public
good” than any of the other new developments. 383
Sunderland saw a role for judges in framing issues in the new pretrial
conferences. On the eve of implementation of the 1938 Rules he wrote:
“there is no reason the court should not itself take a hand in the investigation,
supplementing the proceedings and the discovery which the parties have
obtained, by direct interrogation of counsel or parties in the presence of each
other, with a view to eliminating issues through admissions or through the
withdrawal of allegations or denials, or by obtaining the consent of the
parties to the limitation or simplification of proof.” 384
Summary judgment, reformers hoped, would make the system
“efficient” by clearing out baseless claims. 385 They saw summary judgment
as a device to reach “speedy disposition of many cases” where there was “no
real cause of action or defense.” 386
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Had these devices been used as Sunderland and Clark had hoped,
American civil procedure might look a lot different today. Sunderland
recognized that he needed the support of judges to make these devices work.
When asked why he had not made pretrial conferences mandatory, he
replied—to laughter: “There is no use in making it mandatory because
nothing will be accomplished without the sympathetic interest of the judge,
and you can’t force him to be sympathetic.” 387
There is irony that neither pretrial conferences nor motions for summary
judgment received sympathetic interest. When Clark introduced his federal rules
to the American Bar Association, he recalled the “cold, not to say inhuman,
treatment” which the Field Code received from New York judges. 388
3. Pretrial Conferences
When the federal rules were adopted, it was hoped that pretrial
conferences would have considerable value in simplifying issues, guiding the
course of the trial, and in doing much “to eliminate the ‘sporting’ approach
to the lawsuit by securing the cooperation of the court and opposing counsel
for the more efficient disposition of cases.” 389 The concept of the pretrial
conference was new to their decade: it was based on experiences from the
early 1930s in principal drafter Sunderland’s home state of Michigan. Until
then the prevailing theory had been—following common law pleading ideals
and as continued with code pleading—that lawyers for the parties prepared
the trial without judicial involvement. While discovery is used more
frequently than the drafters of the Federal Rules expected, pretrial
conferences and summary judgments motions are used less frequently than
they expected. These two devices were to guide courts towards deciding
issues and to limit discover. In this subsection we address what pretrial
conferences have turned out to be. In the following subsection we consider
motions for summary judgment.
A pretrial conference today is an informal meeting of the judge with the
lawyers for the parties. The parties themselves are not normally present and
their appearance cannot usually be compelled. Pretrial conferences are
ordinarily held either shortly after pleadings are exchanged or just prior to
trial. In the former case, they mostly concern timing of discovery; in the
latter they work to schedule pretrial motions and to prepare for trial.
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Whether there is a pretrial conference in any given case is in the
discretion of the judge. Rule 16 authorizes, but does not compel judges to
conduct pretrial conferences. This means that practice in any one case is
dependent upon the judge assigned to that case. Practices vary widely in
frequency and substance. The training and organization of American judges,
moreover, is not especially conducive to development of common practices.
Today the most common use of pretrial conferences seems to be
scheduling or debating discovery. Judges discuss with the parties the dates
by which discovery must be concluded, or one party accuses the other of not
following the rules in some aspect of discovery. Amendments to Rule 16
since 1938 explicitly assign a scheduling function to judges: now judges
must issue scheduling orders setting specific deadlines for joining other
parties, amending pleadings, completing discovery and filing motions. 390
The conference itself, however, remains optional.
Another use for pretrial conferences is promotion of settlements. In
some cases judges uses pretrial conferences to persuade parties to settle.
Use of pretrial conferences to simplify issues—the principal purpose in
the minds of the drafters—has not attained the importance that they had
hoped for. That use seems a distant third.
The lack of importance of pretrial conferences is demonstrated by the
low level of attention they receive in manuals devoted to pretrial litigation.
Some authors omit the topic altogether; others who address the topic, tack it
on at the end of the book out of a feeling of obligation rather than out of
conviction that this “ill-defined” institution has importance. They ask: how
could a manual on pretrial litigation omit something called a “pretrial
conference”? They counsel: “Obviously, it is a good idea to attend a pretrial
conference if the court schedules one.” 391
Some judges use pretrial conferences vigorously in order to move cases
along. Depending on the judge, they may encourage faster discovery, issue
simplification or settlement, or all three. Vigorous use is known—sometimes
pejoratively—as “managerial judging.” Critics of managerial judging worry
that judges in their zeal to move cases along may deny parties their right to
be heard or may do them injustice. Scholars sometimes, incorrectly, compare
managerial judging to civil law judging. The goal of managerial judging is
conclusion of the dispute; the goal of civil law judging is likewise conclusion
of disputes but with the important difference, as we shall see in Chapter 7:
conclusions based in application of law to facts.
In the absence of effective pretrial conferences, American civil process
relies, as it always has, on lawyers working out among themselves the
material issues in dispute for trial. That it is not an entirely illusory hope; it
does happen in some cases. Typically in cases of successful lawyer issue
390
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framing, lawyers for both sides are competent and confident and their clients
are content to get from the court decisions according to law. Those lawyers
identify and focus on true issues; they limit trial to those issues and, as a
result, may shorten trial substantially, from say a week to a half day.
America’s law reformers had lawyers such as these in mind when they have
invested lawyers with issue-simplification. Were men angels, perhaps their
systems would have worked. But in the real world of American litigation,
lawyers do not learn to simplify issues. They are trained “to think that every
issue should be contested, every witness attacked, and every opponent
destroyed.” 392
4. Motions for Summary Judgment
Another feature of pretrial process is the motion for summary judgment.
Originally, it was conceived of as an issue simplification measure; today it is
more commonly used as a way to dispose of legally unfounded suits. As with
pretrial conferences, and most of modern day pretrial as routine measures, it
is an innovation of the first part of the twentieth century. Unlike pretrial
conferences and extensive discovery, it was in wide-spread use before
adoption of the Federal Rules.
A summary judgment is a form of judgment without jury. Since it does
not involve a trial, it does not include the same kind of findings of fact or
conclusions of law discussed in Chapter 7. Rather, it determines specific
issues of law or fact. As originally envisioned for the Federal Rules it was as
much tool to supplement pleading as a judgment of the case.
A party is entitled to summary judgment, either on the whole case or on
a specific issue, if it can “show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 393 The other side defeats the motion by showing that there is a
“genuine issue of material fact.”
Motions for summary judgment are reminiscent of common law
pleading: plaintiffs seeking summary judgment assert that they have alleged
all elements of a particular legal claim, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact about any of those elements, and that on these facts, they are
entitled to judgment. In other words, the law is clear, the facts are clear, and
applying the law to these facts produces the decision sought.
Either side may make a motion for summary judgment. Parties oppose
motions for summary judgment by raising a legal issue, a factual issue or an
issue of applying law to facts. In a testimony to the uncertainty of American
law, defendants are counseled against making summary judgment motions
for fear that judicial denial of their motions will educate plaintiffs on what
they need to show.
392
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Motions for summary judgment differ from common law pleading in
two important respects: unlike in common law pleading, parties opposing
summary judgment motions are not limited to challenging one point of law
or fact. They may raise as many challenges as they like. Second, motions for
summary judgment may involve proof of facts. In addition to the pleadings
each side may submit supporting affidavits (i.e., sworn statwements based on
personal knowledge), which may be supplemented by depositions and
answers and answers to interrogatories. 394 In determining summary judgment
motions, judges decide without hearing parties or witnesses but by
examining pleadings and by “interrogating the attorneys.” 395 Again we see a
lost opportunity to give parties a day in court: the proceedings are usually
written and without involvement of the parties themselves.
Summary judgment, reformers hoped, would make the system efficient
by clearing out baseless claims. 396
Their hopes were dashed. At first, summary judgments were rarely
granted, because the standard that the reformers set was was interpretted
restrictively. Now that standards have relaxed, summary judgment is under
attack for denying parties their day in court and their right to jury trial.
That summary judgment—even after standards have been relaxed—is
used only occasionaly, is not surprising. The rule requires that moving
parties show that there is no “genuine issue of material fact.” Since nothing
compels litigants to admit facts, motions for summary judgment are difficult
to win when opposed by opponents determined to show that the is an issue.
The rule provides scant support in facilitating assistance in that the
obligation to respond that it imposes requires only setting out “specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial.” 397 Even mediocre lawyers in all but the
simplest of cases ought to be able to raise an issue of disputed fact. Before
the 1980s, parties seeking summary judgment found it almost impossible to
meet the standard. In the mid-1980s the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of
cases that taken together are seen to invigorate the procedure. Even as
reinvigorated however, summary judgment can only deal with claims largely
lacking in merit and cannot deal with claims requiring complex application
of law to facts. 398 That limited use is said to deprive parties of the right to be
heard in a trial by jury.
Summary judgment does deprive losing parties of their day in court.
While they still are heard, they are heard only in the motion papers and
affidavits they are allowed to submit; judges decide, without ever personally
hearing parties or taking testimony of witnesses, that parties’ claims are
394
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without merit. 399
In denying parties a day in court, summary judgment procedure also
denies trial by jury. The justification is that the right to trial by jury extends
only to trial of issues of fact; where summary judgment is granted, the court
finds that there is no genuine issue of fact. Proponents of jury trial contend
that even that decision is outside the authority of judges and is reserved to
juries. 400

5. Trial
Had we published this book a century ago, we would have devoted the
American portion of Chapter 6 entirely to trials. Since then, practitioner
guides to trials have been replaced by guides to pre-trial, and student texts
have practically eliminated coverage of trials. 401 Now that trials are rare, we
limit our discussion to some major points. That Americans organize court
procedures around events that hardly ever happen is odd. That they do
demonstrates the iconic nature of trial. 402
There are two principal types of trials: trials with juries and trials
without juries (“bench trials”). In jury trials, as we discuss in Chapter 7,
juries decide issues of fact, while judges preside over the trial and decide
issues of law. In bench trials, i.e., non-jury trials, judges do it all.
The jury trial model dominates law-applying by civil judicial process.
There can be no bench trial if the parties do not waive jury trial. There can be
no summary judgment if there are facts for jurors to determine. Even when
parties apply the law to themselves by settling cases, they do so based on
their beliefs as to what jurors would decide.
Trial, from summoning of jurors at its beginning to delivering the
jurors’ verdict at its end, offers unscupulous lawyers ample opportunities to
distort the truth. 403
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T he J ury
A common law jury is a group of lay persons engaged to decide criminal
or civil cases. The jury is an institution of mythological proportions in the
legal lore of the United States. While other common law countries have
abandoned juries in civil cases and make sparing use of them in criminal
cases, American adoration of the institution of the jury is stronger now than
ever, even as actual use of juries is rarer than ever. 404
Americans value trial by jury, not because juries efficiently effectuate
law, but because juries invest the law with the people. A former President of
the American Bar Association praises juries as “democracy of the people and
for the people, as envisioned by the founders of this country.” 405 American
jurists do not deceive themselves: they see efficiency costs. Jury advocates
believe that benefits that juries provide for other value compensate for lost
efficiency. In criminal justice, that value is protection of individuals against
the state. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the United States Supreme
Court, contrasted the jury-model with an efficiency model of the civil law:
“There is not one shred of doubt … about the Framers' paradigm for criminal
justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the commonlaw ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority
between judge and jury.” 406 In civil justice the value of the jury is
amelioration of harsh law. Justice, later Chief Justice Rehnquist, observed
that the founders who advocated right to civil jury trial were “not animated
by a belief that use of juries would lead to more efficient judicial
administration; [they] believed that a jury would reach a result that a judge
either could or would not reach.” 407
Right to Trial by Jury in Civil Cases
The founders of the United States embedded in the nation’s fundamental
rights a right to jury trial not only in criminal cases, but in civil cases as well.
Article VII of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution provides
that “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
404
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by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.” Article 5 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Maryland preserves
the common law right of jury trial generally. Article 23 provides specifically
for civil proceedings that “The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in
civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, shall be inviolably
preserved.” There are similar provisions in other state constitutions.
The right to jury trial may be waived. If neither party requests
(“demands”) a jury, trial proceeds by judge alone. 408 The Maryland
Constitution explicitly provides that the parties may submit any issue to trial
by the court without the aid of jury. 409
The constitutional right is written in the language of eighteenth century
pleading: “fact” or “issues of fact.” The 1848 and 1938 reformers could have
used the scope of right to trial by jury to restrict jury decisions to specific
issues of fact (e.g., was it defendant who kicked plaintiff). They did not.
Instead of limiting juries, their handiwork tended to extend jury power and
authority. For example, while Rule 38 allows a party to specify an issue or
issues for jury trial, it provides that if the party fails to specify an issue, than
there is to be a jury trial of all issues.
American enthusiasm for jury trial is not unbounded. Long have
American jurists recognized that giving all cases jury trials “would
unavoidably render the dispatch of litigation perfectly impracticable ….” 410
Long have American judges refused to extend the constitutional right to jury
trial beyond its historic scope of actions at law, i.e., cases brougtht in courts
of law. When courts of equity were merged with courts of law—a process
that began before 1848 and continued as late as 1984 in Maryland—judges
restricted the constitutional right to actions at law. Already then jurists
foresaw that maintaining the distincton would create “much delay and
litigation.” 411
Use of juries has expanded beyond historic limits. Merger of courts of
law and of equity led to “equity conquering common law.” Juries decide
today where formerly courts of equity without juries would have decided.
Equity pleading and proceedures, created for courts without juries, are now
routine in all courts. 412 Contemporary American law reformers should bear
408
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in mind that contemporary customs are not constitutionally compelled. The
constitution right requires only that juries find facts; it does not require that
they apply law. 413
Jury Selection (voir dire)
Unlike judges, jurors in America are not on stand-by in the courthouse
waiting for parties to bring lawsuits to them for decision. Citizens are called
to serve as jurors to decide specific cases in which one or the other of the
parties has requested a jury trial. When a jury is constituted for a particular
case, that case is then held immediately in one proceeding concentrated on
successive days one after another with as few breaks as possible.
That jurors are selected to serve only for particular cases rather than
being on call and that they serve only in concentrated periods is a
continuation of practices that developed when communications were limited
and transportation difficult. That it continues today is a consequence of
inertia and of the compelled nature of jury service: involuntary jurors want to
complete their service as quickly as possible. In other countries, where there
are analogues to juries in lay judges, laymen are elected for terms and do
intermittent duty as the needs of cases require. For example, the German
system uses lay judges in certain commercial cases and generally in serious
criminal ones. These lay judges are on standby; 414 they serve five year
terms. 415 Their service is voluntary.
Choosing jurors for a particular case takes place in a specific stage of
trial practice known as “voir dire” (“to hear them say”). Court personnel rely
on lists of adults in the community to select randomly people for possible
jury service. Since there is no registration of residence requirement in the
United States, lists typically used are lists of registered voters or licensed
drivers. This can skew demographic representation and is sometimes
objected to.
In the course of voir dire potential jurors are questioned to determine
their suitability for jury duty. The questioning is not directed toward finding
jurors most suited to decide cases, but to weed out potential jurors who
might be biased against one party or another. Where there is a clear conflict
of interest, the judge may of his or her own motion “strike” that potential
juror for “cause” and most certainly will strike such a potential juror upon
motion of a party. In other cases, however, where there is no clear conflict of
interest and no explicit bias, a party may challenge a juror only if the party
exercises one of a limited number of “preemptory” challenges. A preemptory
challenge permits a party to strike a potential juror for no stated reason at all.
413
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Use of preemptory challenges based on grounds that violate equal protection
law (e.g., race discrimination), is prohibited in criminal cases. 416
Voir dire practices among the states and even within the federal court
system vary in how extensive questioning of potential jurors is and in how
questioning is shared among lawyers and judges. In some courts, lawyers,
out of presence of judges, interrogate jurors. Jurors subject to lawyers’
questioning sometimes feel that they are on trial. In other courts, lawyers ask
questions, but in the presence of judges. In still other courts, judges take the
lead in asking questions and permit lawyers to inquire only after the judges
are done. In some courts, questioners interrogate potential jurors
individually; in others, they ask questions only of panels of potential jurors.
Jury selection can play a major role in civil as well as in criminal cases.
It can become a “tug-of-war” between lawyers. 417 Yet the trend seems to be
toward more expansive rather than more limited voir dire. Opponents of
limited voir dire fear that asking only a few questions may cause lawyers to
miss potential bias. 418 The less limited voir dire is, however, the greater is
the possibility of using it for purposes for which it is not intended. Trial
lawyers readily acknowledge that they conduct voir dire not only to identify
potential jurors who are biased against their clients, but to find potential
jurors who might be biased for their clients and to begin to persuade
eventual jurors to decide for them and for their clients. 419 To help them do
this, trial lawyers engage consultants to identify those people who as jurors
might be likely to decide for their clients. 420 Even opponents of limited voir
dire ask: “can a good attorney stack the jury?” They answer: “yes.” 421
The search for unbiased jurors can become a race to the bottom. Judge
Seymour D. Thompson, who was one of America’s first jury trial experts,
acerbically compared the Swedish jury—”composed of men of the highest
probity, chosen by the electors for a term of years,” with the American
jury—”composed of men who are selected for the purpose of a single trial …
twelve dolts, selected because they are ignorant of the facts of the case about
to be tried, no matter how notorious .…” 422
Costs of Voir Dire
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Voir dire imposes considerable costs on individual cases, on the civil
justice system as a whole, and on individual jurors. One study concludes that
nationwide, in civil and criminal cases, jury selection on average requires
between 2.3 and 3.8 hours. 423 While that might not sound like a great deal of
time, it is a tax on every ordinary case that contemplates a jury trial. If jury
selection takes only three hours in court, that suggests that lawyers for both
sides will together devote ten to twenty hours to the process, or the
equivalent of several thousands of dollars. Lawyers commonly spend an
hour outside court for every hour they spend inside the courtroom To get full
value of voir dire, lawyers are advised not to do it alone, but to include a
colleague.
Besides the time lawyers spend on the project, judges and potential
jurors also participate. To obtain a jury of six, a court may summon twenty,
fifty or more potential jurors. In celebrated cases, the court may summon
hundreds of potential jurors. 424 Even in ordinary cases, resource
commitments may be high. In a relatively routine tort claim against the
police department, close to one hundred potential jurors might be
summoned. They might spend the better part of a day awaiting questioning
by a staff of ten lawyers, court personnel and the judge. All-in-all, perhaps
nine hundred hours could be devoted to selecting jurors for that one case.
That is one person working full time for half a year!
Why does the American legal system devote such resources to ferreting
out biased jurors? Are Americans by nature more biased than their
counterparts abroad? No. Americans are not especially biased, but as we
shall see, American juries are only loosely controlled by law so deciding
who decides the case can be outcome determinative.
Trial
The contemporary American trial is structured to permit each side to tell
its story; the judge is passive. In a nutshell, this is the sequence: the lawyers
for the parties begin their clienets cases with opening statements. Ín the
opening statements the lawyers tell the court, i.e., the judge and the jurors, if
this a jury trial, what they plan to prove to justify finding for their clients.
The lawyers set out a legal theory of the case, a factual theory and a theme.
Following the opening statments, first the plaintiff’s lawyer, then the
defendant’s lawyer, presents witnesses. After the presenting party questions
a witness, the opposing party is permitted to ask questions (“crossexamination). After both sides’ lawyers have presented their cases, they
make closing statements. The legal theory is only a part of the more
important larger theme: “the moral-political claim the case makes on the
jury’s sensibilities.” The judge then instructs jurors in the law and sends the
423
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out to decide the case. If trial is before a judge alone, the judge retires to
reach his or her decision.
Trial—in the two percent of cases where they occur—is where parties,
through their lawyers, finally get their day-in-court. At long last their
lawyers offer to the court the proof of their claims of right. Finally, they get
to have their lawyers present their view of how law applies to facts in their
case. Yet even in this end stage parties do not get to explain to the court why
they are complaining.
Taking Evidence
Lawyer Control of Testimony Taking. Lawyers for parties shape
trials. They determine the order of witnesses. They place the questions. Once
one side finishes with “its” witness, the other side “cross-examines” the
witness. In the view of the trial bar, judges should be silent. They should
accept repetition rather than restrict lawyers in presenting and questioning
witnesses. Think of Hollywood trial movies. Taking evidence is all part of a
play. Justice Scalia reminds us that play is “a very good word for what the
common law, adversary trial” is. 425
Just as good play directors coach their actors before performances, so
too do good trial lawyers coach their witnesses before trials. Just as good
directors guide their players with scripts, good lawyers write scripts to guide
their actors. Both good directors and good lawyers remind their subjects to
avoid rote memorization. Good lawyers advise their witnesses to use their
own words and to use their scripts only as guides. Lawyers want their
witnesses to give the impression that their testimony comes completely from
their own recollection, even if the truth sometimes is otherwise.
Cross-examination. To counteract coaching American civil procedure
offers the celebrated institution of cross-examination. Once crossexamination was said to be the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth.” 426 As trial has vanished, so too has cross-examination:
no trial—no cross. Hollywood can preserve its memory, but not its role.
Even in its heyday, however, cross-examination was often more a
steamroller that flattened truth than an engine that uncovered it.
One practitioner’s rule of cross-examination is that the cross-examining
lawyer should not ask a question that the lawyer does not know the answer to
beforehand. The lawyer should not be surprised by the answer of a witness.
Another practitioner’s rule is that the lawyer should pose only leading
questions. A leading question suggests its answer: e.g., “Mr. Witness, you
425
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work for the post office, don’t you?” The lawyer should not give the witness
opportunity to explain. The goal of cross-examination is “control” of the
witness’s testimony. Sought is nothing less than the “successful debilitation”
of the witness, or as colloquially put by one author, “cracking the egg.” 427
American cross-examination when it occurs can be brutal. Then its
focus likely is not a material point in dispute between the parties, but witness
credibility. American lawyers are advised to “set up” and “destroy”
witnesses. A basic technique to attack witness credibility is to confront the
witness with inconsistent statements. One litigator counsels: “Prior
inconsistencies, like rare coins, are not easily found. They must be
discovered or created.” They are discovered by searching the record closely:
by examining everything relevant that the witness has ever said. Prior
inconsistencies are created in discovery and at trial. In discovery, lawyers get
opposing witnesses to commit themselves to positions that they may later
contradict or retract. Lawyers prolong depositions and repeat questions to
encourage inconsistent statements. At trial, lawyers “lead” witnesses to
desired answers. They cut witnesses off rather than allow narrative answers.
They surprise witnesses to generate conflict. They look for weakness. With
one incorrect statement, they can impeach a witness who testified correctly
to ten facts.
Law of Evidence. Another expensive feature of American trials which
contributes to their expense and impending disappearance is the American
law of evidence. It has no exact counterpart in modern German or Korean
law. The American law precludes parties from offering certain evidence even
though material to disputed issues of fact. It bars the evidence, usually
because the evidence is thought unreliable or prejudicial. The best-known
example of precluded evidence is hearsay. Hearsay evidence is evidence of
an out-of-court statement which is offered in court to prove the truth of the
content. In our case, a witness might testify that she overheard Mary Roh
telling her daughter Rosa that the money she gave John Doh, Jr. was a gift.
The statement is hearsay and falls under the hearsay rule. It is admissible
only because it falls under an exception to the rule (here, an admission of a
party.)
The law of evidence controls juries. In bench trials, where there is no
jury, some judges do not apply evidence law strictly. They allow lawyers to
offer most any evidence, and then give it the value that they believe it should
have. Their practice is closer to the practice in Germany of free evaluation of
evidence.
Jury Manipulation
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Trials generally permit of many “dirty tricks.” Trials by jury are all the
more subject to deception. Above all criminal trials—where sanctions can be
severe—admit of and sometimes approve of defeating truth. 428 Since trials
are such unusual occurrences today, we do not detail how they permit
defeating truth, any more than we dwelt on how discovery, today’s
institution of choice can frustrate truth and justice. In this book aim to
describe how processes unfold when conducted properly.
Jury Instruction and Jury Decision
After the lawyers have presented their clients’ witnesses and concluded
their closing statements, the judge directs the jurors in the law and in its
application. That is, the judge orally instructs the jurors about the elements
of applicable legal rules.
The parties’ lawyers commonly propose the instructions. The judges
choose between their proposals piecemeal and amend and add to them as
they see fit. Before judges give instructions they must inform the parties’
lawyers of the substance of instructions and must provide them with
opportunity to object. 429 Drafters often rely on books of standard
instructions. Some of these books have official or semi-official status. Judges
read the selected instructions to jurors. While judges realize that jurors often
do not understand instructions, the law presumes conclusively that they do.
Instructing juries is not interactive; judges read instructions and jurors
listen. Should jurors have questions during the course of their deliberations,
they can submit these to the judges. Typically judges read back what they
read originally. Proposals to improve jury application of law to facts have
been modest. Even seemingly minor reform measures, such as giving jurors
printed copies of instructions, instructing them at the beginning rather than
the end of the trial in substantive law, allowing them to take notes during
trial, and allowing them to ask questions of witness, encounter stiff
opposition.
Americans take the present form of jury instruction for granted. They
little discuss what courts do not do to help jurors decide. For examples, at the
outset of cases, before party lawyers present their theories of the case, judges
rarely instruct jurors in what the law requires. They leave that insgtruction to
the end of the case, when both sides have had their say. At trial begin, and
along the way, judges tell jurors no more than the barest essentials of how
cases are conducted. During trial, they do not guide jurors in picking out
from conflicting testimony factual elements necessary to applying law to the
cases at hand. As witnesses testify, rarely do judges comment to jurors on
428
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credibility of witnesses. Even at trial end, judges’ instruct jurors only on the
bloodless bones of the law: the abstract legal rules. Above all they do not do,
as English courts do and as American courts once did, comment on the
alleged facts presented by the parties. 430 After jurors deliberate, they return
and deliver verdict. We discuss verdicts in Chapter 7.
B. Germany
In the courts everyone is entitled to a hearing in
accordance with the law.
Art. 103(1) Basic Law [Constitution]
of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949)
Much as Hollywood has given the world its picture of American
procedure, American law professors have given Americans a similarly
misleading picture of German civil procedure. The typical American view of
civil law civil procedure is an inaccurate comic-book caricature. For
example, Justice Antonin Scalia sees as the only alternative to the adversary
system an “inquisitorial system.” 431 American scholars, notwithstanding
Continental lawyers’ “vehement objections,” still adopt “inquisitorial” as a
“convenient shorthand” for civil law civil proceedings and see in them “an
official inquiry.” 432 Their picture is that of the “subsumption automat” or of
the slot machine justice of colorful critiques of a century ago. Some see in
the civil law judge almost a government toady who single-mindedly, lacking
a “creative role,” applies the law without “asking whether a syllogistic result
produces the kind of result the rule contemplates.” 433 “Their image is that of
a civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative
functions.” 434 They see a “core of professionally trained and closely
supervised” judges who maintain “tight control over the business of fact
430
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presentation” thus eliminating volatility and unpredictability, but at the
“expense of other values.” 435
The comic book picture of the civil law judge as grand inquisitor
mindlessly applying rigid rules without attention to equities of individual
cases is wrong. In the German civil justice systems, in each individual case
the judge decides whether to apply precise statutory provisions or to rely on
one of the “general clauses” of the Civil Code or other laws that authorizes
taking into account equitable considerations not directly covered by statutory
rule. 436
Rather than permit judges or administrators to depart ad hoc from legal
rules, the German ideal is to write rules that provide for valuing by judges or
administrators in individual cases. Well-written rules give rule-appliers
opportunities to take into account individual circumstances. They have
escape clauses that permit foregoing their application where application
would be inappropriate; they have general clauses that permit applying rules
to cases that otherwise might escape application. Writing escape clauses and
general clauses that are consistent with the rule of law is part of the
legislator’s art.
Article 20 of the German constitution (Basic Law) commands equitable
application of statutes. Its section 3 provides that the judiciary is bound in all
it does by “statute and justice” (Gesetz und Recht). In every case judges are
to be alert for a possible unjust applications of statutes.
1. The Nature of German Civil Process: Judgment as Goal of Process
The goal of German civil process is a judicial judgment. That goal keeps the
process focused on application of existing legal rules to facts in the instant case.
At the end of the process, what legitimates the outcome is a rational judgment
more than presentations in court. The individual elements required by statute to
establish a legal claim are the “spectacles” through which judges view cases.
What can be seen through the spectacles matters; everything else is irrelevant. 437
Freed from entertaining party presentation of competing stories, judges focus on
material points in dispute to find just those facts necessary for decision. From
beginning to end of process, rules of procedure direct parties and court to finding
facts necessary to fulfilling requirements of applicable rules.
Thus German civil process is not a drama in which lawyers write scripts,
produce plays and play roles. It is not a battle in which lawyers as champions
435
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compete against each other and judges watch for dirty tricks. On the other
hand, neither is it a government investigation into peoples’ lives. It is not
inquisitorial.
We cannot stress this point enough. Many American academics persist
in believing that the only alternative to the adversary system that they know
is an inquisitorial system of their imagination where judges conduct inquests
for the state and lawsuits become “pretext[s] for the realization of state
policy.” 438 That judges have more active roles in how proceedings are
conducted does not turn judges into inquisitors or lawsuits into inquisitions.
In German civil justice the state has no interest in whether plaintiff or
defendant wins the case. The state is interested that the party who wins the
case, whether it is plaintiff or defendant, is the party who, according to law
and justice, has the superior claim of right. When that is the case, peace is
maintained in society. Parties can work with one another faithfully according
to law secure in the knowledge, that should one party fail to follow the law,
the party can go to court for protection. Already a century ago some
Americans recognized these truths about civil law proceedings. 439
Contemporary German civil process is cooperative. It facilitates
reaching judgments quickly and cheaply based on substantive truth and law.
It is an explicit rejection of some process that predated the 1877 Code of
Civil Procedure, which had been based, like American process still is, on a
kind of “battle-between-the-parties” model. 440 In German process, parties
present to the court facts of the matter in controversy. The court structures
the dispute according to law in order to reach its own legal judgment or to
help parties to reach their own settlement. The Roman law maxim applies:
“da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius”—give me the facts, and I will give you the
[resulting] right. 441
German process is itself not subject to strict formal rules in order to
permit judges efficiently to determine whether a party, usually plaintiff, has
proven facts sufficient to authorize the court to order legal remedies. Judges
do not choose between two subjective presentations of one factual event—as
an American court might—but determine whether elements of a legal rule
are objectively fulfilled.
In German civil process judges are strictly limited by the matter in
controversy to materials presented by parties. They can do no more than
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pronounce legal rights applicable to the controversy. 442 They have no
authority to investigate. It is wrong to characterize German civil process as
investigative or inquisitorial.
In structuring lawsuits German judges identify legally material facts in
dispute. American lawyers recognize this activity as issue narrowing. It is for
them an activity largely the province of lawyers and not of judges. German
judges clarify more than just issues; they clarify what parties want. American
lawyers know no direct counterpart in formal process, but may recognize this
as an activity that they engage in when negotiating settlements. No one
knows better which facts the parties dispute and what the parties want than
the parties themselves. Accordingly German civil process involves parties in
lawsuits—it gives them voice—from the very first formal proceeding.
Judges work with parties to clarify those matters that are in dispute and
to separate them from those matters that are not in dispute. It can take 90%
of the time of the judge in the case just to find out from many inconsistent
statements what it is that the parties really want to say, what they are
contending, and what they think the case is really about. 443
That German judges work with parties does not turn judges into
inquisitors or convert private lawsuits into state-sponsored inquests.
Throughout the process judges take pains to give parties opportunity to take
positions on all material matters (Recht auf rechtliches Gehör—right to be
heard). There are no surprise decisions.
To be sure, German lawsuits are not football matches between two
opposing sides. They are not battles of champions. German judges do not
preside passively over football matches to count points and to make sure that
neither party plays dirty. That German judges are not passive does not make
German proceedings any less competitive.
For readers drawn to common law sports analogies, we offer one for the
civil law. A football match is only one of many kinds of competitive sports
contests. While American civil proceedings are likened to football matches
and American judges to passive football referees, we liken German civil
proceedings to athletics contests, such as high jump, where referees direct
contestants in their competition. The high jump is no less an adversary
contest because referees check contestants in for the competition, change the
order or location of events, direct contestants where to practice, tell them
what they must do, show them where they are to begin their jumps, signal
when they may begin, measure how high they have jumped, consider all
available evidence to reach a fair determination that contestants have—
442
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within the rules—cleared the bar, check all final measurements, measure and
raise the crossbar, inform contestants when they have failed to correctly clear
the high bar set, and determine whether they should have another chance to
clear the bar. 444
2. The Process in Outline
As we have seen, after reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the court
serves it on the defendant. At that time the court directs the parties either to
appear for a preliminary hearing (früher erster Termin, “early first
hearing”) 445 or to engage in a further written preliminary proceeding. 446 In
the ideal case, following these preliminary proceedings, the court determines
the case in a single, comprehensive, “concentrated” principal hearing
(Haupttermin). 447 Insofar as this occurs, it assumes that parties have been
able to develop all necessary factual information beforehand.
Preceding the main hearing, or preceding the preliminary hearing if the
court holds one, the court ordinarily confers with the parties on a possible
settlement of the case. 448 If settlement discussions fail, the court proceeds to
the main or preliminary hearing as the case may be. In the event that the
court conducts a preliminary hearing, it is not required to hold a subsequent
main hearing, but may accomplish the two together. 449 In the main hearing
the court introduces the matter in dispute. Then the lawyers for the parties
state what they are seeking. Usually plaintiff’s lawyer refers to the complaint
and reiterates the specific relief requested there. Typically defendant’s
lawyer refers to the answer and requests dismissal of the complaint. The
court then discusses the case with the lawyers and hears the parties
themselves. There is no prescribed order to these proceedings. 450 Following
these discussions, ideally the court proceeds in that same hearing to take
such evidence as may be necessary to establish or defeat the requests of the
parties. In fact, evidence taking often is deferred to a subsequent hearing or
is not ever needed.
The goal of the preliminary hearing—or of written preliminary
proceedings—is to identify the probably applicable legal rules, their
constituent elements, and which facts material to their application are in
dispute. Legal historians may note similarities to the oral pleadings of the
early common law when pleadings were oral. Determination of which rules
might be applicable is tentative. While the court is to direct attention of the
444
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parties first to the factual elements of those rules most likely applicable, the
parties are not precluded from returning to those rules not first considered
should it appear later that they are relevant. 451
In the preliminary hearing the court calls attention of the parties to those
facts material to possibly applicable rules on which the parties do not agree.
The court asks the party bearing the burden of proof for that element to
present the necessary proof. The court may also alert the other side that at
some point that, if the proposing party presents what it needs to, the burden
of proof may shift to it. No longer will it be sufficient to challenge the
proponent’s proof, but it will be necessary to bring its own affirmative
evidence. A classic example is product liability. 452 Once a plaintiff makes
certain showings, then it is up to the defendant to bring forward evidence
that rebuts that showing. This is one way the German system avoids resort to
discovery.
Process continues as a cooperative rather than combative undertaking to
refine the points in dispute through finding points of common ground on
which the parties can agree and to locate those points on which they
disagree. Only when facts are found to be material and in dispute does the
court—on party application—order taking of evidence; separate direction for
each item of evidence and for each witness is required. In German civil
process taking of evidence is secondary; hearing of parties is primary. It is to
the parties in person—and not to their lawyers—that the court directs its first
attention, either in the early hearing just discussed or in a main hearing to
which we now turn. 453
3. The Oral Hearing and the Right to be Heard
The main hearing is obligatory and oral. 454 It is the crucial core of German
civil procedure. 455 The Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties to conduct
their case orally before the court. The parties begin the oral hearing by
addressing their requests for relief to the court. They are to present their positions
on the legal controversy with respect to both fact and law. While they may refer
to documents, they are not to read from them. Parties, even when represented by
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counsel, are allowed—and sometimes required—to address the court. 456 The
court is not permitted to rest its decision in the case on matters not addressed in
an oral hearing.
Before the 1877 Code of Civil Procedure in some German states civil
proceedings were written. The Code of Civil Procedure prefers oral over written
proceedings. It reflects a decision that the oral proceedings better facilitate
factual clarification and case structuring. A list of benefits of oral proceedings
includes:
1. Truth-finding. Oral proceedings permit a better and immediate
impression of the presentations of the parties and of the testimony of
witnesses and experts. The court can, and frequently does require personal
appearance of the parties; parties cannot delegate that responsibility to their
lawyers.
2. Process expedition. By bringing the parties together for discussions
of the case and for testimony of witnesses a faster clarification of facts and
law is possible than is the case in purely written proceedings.
3. “Equality of Arms” (Waffengleicheit). Particularly in the lowest
court, where parties may not be represented by counsel, oral hearings even
the playing field. In all cases, however, the immediacy of the oral
discussions and the active participation of the judge makes possible
downgrading the importance of differing levels of presentation and
promotes basing decision more on the merits of the case.
4. Dispute resolution. In oral hearings judges facilitate settlement by
structuring the matters in dispute. Structuring the case helps the parties reach
a settlement of the case more expeditiously and more closely aligned with
their legal rights. The parties can see which rules will determine the decision
and which facts are essential. Some judges consider structuring one of their
most important judicial duties. The judge is to promote settlement at all
times during the case. Should promotion of settlement conflict with the
judicial rule, the judge may refer the parties to another judge for settlement
negotiations as such. 457
5. Public resolution. The public can attend and observe oral hearings.
The public cannot do that when proceedings are written. 458
Hearing of the Parties (die Parteianhörung)
Most features of German civil procedure have their counterparts in
American civil procedure; while those counterparts may have different foci or
function somewhat differently, parallels are nonetheless clearly recognizable.
The German Parteianhörung, the hearing of the parties, on the other hand, has
no counterpart in American civil procedure. In the hearing of the parties, the
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judge discusses the case directly with the parties and their lawyers. These
discussions are not evidentiary. They do not constitute taking testimony of the
parties. The judge clarifies the contentions of the parties and draws out the
material issues in dispute between them. In short, the judge does what historic
common law pleadings were, supposed to do: to ascertain the subject for
decision.
German civil procedure distinguishes between hearing parties and taking
their testimony for purposes of proof. The former is a requirement and feature of
every case; the latter is exceptional and usually occurs only if no other evidence
is available. The choice of words in German conveys the difference: the verb
anhören, as in Parteianhörung, means to listen; the verb vernehmen, as in
Parteivernehmung, means to examine. The physical setting in which the two
take place likewise demonstrates the difference. In hearing parties, parties sit
with their lawyers and discuss the case in free interchanges with judge and
lawyers. In taking of party testimony, on the other hand, parties are called to the
witness chair, seated between the two sides, instructed in their obligation to tell
the truth, may be sworn and are questioned formally by judge and lawyers.
A hearing of the parties personally is not mandatory; it may take place
through lawyers for parties. The Code provides, however, that the court should
on its own motion direct personal appearance of parties whenever personal
participation is likely to assist in clarification of facts. Even in that case,
however, if a party is at a great distance from the courthouse or there is some
other important reason not to presume a party’s personal appearance, the court
should refrain from such an order. 459
German civil procedure puts the hearing of the parties at the beginning of
the first oral hearing—right after their lawyers summarize their claims. The idea
is that the persons best informed about the facts of the case are, as a rule, the
parties themselves. And it is the facts of the case that are the focus of court
proceedings.460
Surprising as is it for readers from non-common law jurisdictions, at no time
do parties routinely in American civil procedure ever meet together with the
judge or jurors to discuss the case. While American civil procedure zealously
safeguards a right to a day-in-court, that right secures only formal presentation of
the parties’ case at trial or in written submissions of their lawyers to the court.
Both types of presentation have all the spontaneity and interaction of a scripted
press release. Moreover, most factual disputes must await resolution at trial; only
if there is no genuine issue of fact is there even possibility of “short-circuiting”
the cumbersome pretrial discovery. 461 Today, since trials have vanished, in the
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vast of majority of cases, parties never get to tell anyone other than their lawyers,
or their adversaries’ lawyers their side of the case.
In German civil justice hearing the parties at the outset of the case serves
important functions. These include: clarification of factual assertions of parties;
involvement of parties in process, thus allowing them to “blow off steam and
promoting their acceptance of the outcome; and facilitation of settlements.
Clarification of factual assertions is the most important of these. With
parties present, the judge can learn directly whether parties understand what
lawyers are saying on their behalf. From parties—the persons most likely to have
first-hand knowledge—the judge can garner a fuller understanding of fact
contentions. From the parties the judge understand can receive correction.
Discussions with lawyers alone lack the same opportunities for immediate
correction and supplementation. Lawyers for the parties may give a one-sided
version of facts in the case. Removing the lawyer filter reduces opportunities for
manipulation of proceedings and raises the standing of process in public
perception. 462
Discussions with parties can lead to a broadening of the field of factual
consideration. There may be more to the case than is apparent on the surface of
the pleadings. Here, judges must be careful that they do not cross the line and
consider matters that the parties have not placed before the court. German civil
procedure does not accept civil judges conducting investigations ex officio. 463
Beginning judges receive formal classroom instruction and training from
their colleagues in how best to hear parties. Different judges have different styles
in hearing parties. Most adjust their approaches to needs of individual cases. Best
practice avoids questions that focus on eliciting short, specific answers to
questions directly raising elements of the legal claim; best practice encourages
witnesses to state their testimony in unstructured narrative answers, i.e. free
statements of the case. Best practice, however, requires care that parties not be
allowed to wander too far from the subject of the lawsuit and thus squandering
everyone’s time. 464
To Americans accustomed to formal exchanges between judge and counsel,
the hearing of the parties to clarify issues is remarkable. By American standards,
these hearings are intensely interactive, comparatively cooperative, and
informal. 465 These discussions are neither American-style discovery nor
American-style trial. Their focus is on identifying material issues of fact that are
actually in dispute between the parties; it is not on uncovering unknown facts or
on proving known ones or on possible presentation of a narration later. The judge
probes potential claims and facts needed to support the claims. In essence, the
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judge turns to the party and the party’s lawyer concerned and asks: “Now on this
issue are you seriously going to dispute the fact?”
The Obligation to Elucidate Facts Truthfully (§ 138 ZPO)
When the judge turns to the parties with a question whether they intend to
dispute an asserted fact, they are not allowed to respond: so let the other side
prove it. Parties are not permitted the deft avoidance possible in response to
American written requests to admit. Section 138 ZPO imposes on parties a duty
of cooperation in clarifying the issues in the case. Section 138(1) ZPO requires
parties to give declarations concerning facts completely and truthfully; section
138(2) ZPO requires that they state their positions with respect to facts asserted
by the opponent.
Section 138(3) ZPO provides that an asserted fact is to be treated as
admitted if the other party is silent and fails to contest it. Section 138(4) ZPO
provides that only in limited circumstances does a declaration of lack of
knowledge serve to put a matter in dispute. Moreover, section 138(2) ZPO is
interpreted to require that a mere denial of fact is not sufficient to put a fact in
dispute. A party in most cases must explicitly contest the fact asserted, and if the
fact asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the party must
substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it. Thus, if in the course
of the hearing or already in pleadings, one party admits a fact asserted by the
other, there is no need to prove the fact. In relatively short order the judge can
inform the parties of the applicable legal rules and get their agreement on which
matters of fact are material to those rules and are in dispute.
The Right to be Heard (Recht auf rechtliches Gehör)
Clarification of which disputed facts are material presupposes that court and
parties have a good idea what the applicable legal rule is and what its elements
are. Section 139(2) ZPO recognizes this when it requires that the court call to the
parties’ attention any legal rule that it intends to apply.
Modern American and German civil process share an aversion to
surprises. The guiding principle of American process is: no surprises at trial,
no surprise witnesses and no surprise testimony. 466 Surprises undercut the
right to a fair hearing. How the two systems go about preventing surprises
helps understand differences between them. The American rule is directed to
lawyers and to surprise at trial. Parties have panoramic discovery so that they
may know all that there is to know about the case. If they fail to take
466
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advantage of this opportunity, they have only themselves to blame for
resulting surprises. If they fail to appreciate the significance of information
that they uncover, or fail to present that information to the court, the fault is
all theirs. If unthinking a plaintiff fails to present evidence on an element
material to the claim, the court on motion of the defendant will dismiss the
case halfway through trial for failure to prove a prima facie case without ever
giving plaintiff an opportunity to make up the oversight.
The German rule of § 139 ZPO, on the other hand, is directed to judges.
It fulfills the right to be heard guaranteed by the German constitution. The
rule requires that the court decide no material and disputed issue without first
giving each side an opportunity to address that issue. If a plaintiff overlooks
an element of claim, it is the judge’s duty to call that issue to the party’s
attention; if the judge fails in that duty, the forgetful party has ground for
appeal. The American practice of dismissing the case without giving
opportunity to address the overlooked issue violates fundamental human
rights guarantees. Civil justice is a process designed through a fair
proceeding to reach a materially just result. Allowing one party to win
because of the oversight of the other makes process a game and, might we
say, civil justice “uncivilized”?
Judge’s Duty of Elucidation (§ 139 ZPO)
Section 139 ZPO is said to be the Magna Carta of German civil
procedure. 467 It requires that judges discuss all aspects of cases with the
parties thoroughly. It eliminates surprises more completely than discovery
and does so without discovery’s costs in time and money. Section 139(2)
ZPO requires that the judge call to a party’s attention and give the party an
opportunity to comment on any non-trivial issue that the party has apparently
overlooked or has considered insignificant. The same applies where the
judge’s understanding of a point of fact or law differs from the
understanding of a party.
Authority for judges facilitating party presentations of their cases
predates the 1877 Code. Over time that authority, which once might be little
exercised in judges’ discretion, has been transformed to a duty 468 that
sometimes is seen as nearly absolute. 469 In its current formulation section
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139 imposes on the court the duty to clarify with the parties’ the intended
basis for decision before deciding. The section reads in English translation:
(1) The court is to discuss with the parties the relevant facts and
issues in dispute from a factual and legal perspective to the extent
reasonable and to raise questions. It is to cause the parties timely
and completely to declare their positions concerning all material
facts, especially to supplement insufficient references to the
relevant facts, to designate the means of proof, and to set forth
claims based on the facts asserted.
(2) The court may base its decision on a claim, other than a
minor or auxiliary claim, on a point of fact or law which a party has
apparently overlooked or considered insignificant only if the court
has called the parties’ attention to the point and given opportunity
for comment on it. The same provision applies if the court’s
understanding of a point of fact or law differs from the
understanding of both parties.
(3) The court is to call attention to the court’s inclinations
which exist with respect to those points which may be noticed on
the court’s own motion.
(4) [Guidance 470] according to this requirement [is] to be
communicated and documented in the record as early as possible.
Their rendition can be proven only through the content of the
record. Only evidence of forgery of the record can be received to
contradict its contents.
(5) If a party is not prepared to respond immediately to a
judicial request for clarification the court on the motion of the party
may set a time limit for further clarification by written argument. 471
Judges are to give guidance as early as need becomes apparent and whenever
they think that it might be helpful. Judges have freedom in how and when
they give guidance. They may give it in writing before hearings or orally
during hearings. In either case, judges are to include in the case protocol a
writing recording the guidance, if given orally, or the guidance itself, if
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given in writing. Judges are to serve the written record of the guidance on
the lawyers. 472
Many judges give guidance frequently, while others do not. Frequency
of use is largely a matter of judges’ personal styles. Judges who prefer oral
hearings often prefer oral guidance in order to intensify collaboration in the
hearings. Other judges prefer to give guidance before hearings in order better
to structure hearings. Lawyers need not await judicial interventions, but may
at any time ask judges for guidance. 473
While guidance has long been possible, originally it was not mandatory.
It first became mandatory in those courts where parties appeared without
lawyers. Today it is mandatory in all courts. The duty safeguards each
party’s right to a fair hearing. It protects the party from choice of a bad
lawyer or of a good lawyer having a bad day. At first blush it seems
superfluous when parties are represented by professionals. Can’t lawyers be
expected to know the elements of cases? Surely they can, but not all lawyers
are good lawyers and even good lawyers may not be able to anticipate the
direction of judges’ thought processes. Resolution of cases should not
depend upon which party is able, either through money, knowledge or luck,
to hire the better lawyer. 474
The obligation of judges to discuss cases fully with parties does not turn
judges into inquisitors. It does not authorize judges to investigate cases.
Parties still control whether cases continues and what evidence courts take.
Judges are to be neutral facilitators for both parties. 475
4. Taking of Proof
The court’s discussion of facts can obviate need to take evidence in whole or
in part. Should a party, in course of proceedings, oral or written, admit a fact
asserted by the other, there is no longer need to take proof of it. Should a party
assert a fact, if the other party remains silent, that party is deemed to have
admitted it. 476 The latter party’s denial ordinarily is not sufficient to put it in
dispute and to require taking proof. 477 The statute is interpreted to require that a
472
This is also necessary to avoided unfounded appeals, since there no verbatim transcript of
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party must explicitly contest a fact asserted to put it in dispute and, if the fact
asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the party must
substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it. 478 Thanks to such
structuring, many cases conclude without oral testimony of witnesses. This may
be true of well more than half of all cases filed.
When it comes to taking testimony of witnesses, German civil justice is justin-time justice. Judges take proof only on party request and only after a judge so
orders. 479
Where witness testimony is taken, framing issues helps focus and expedite
testimony that is taken. Judges are to order taking proof only when necessary to
convince them of the truth or untruth of particular facts that are disputed by
parties and that are material to their decision. Judges are not to take proof of
undisputed facts, facts generally known to them, facts presumed by statute to be
true until the contrary is proven, favorable facts established by the other party’s
submissions, disputed material facts established by undisputed facts, disputed
facts the truth of which the judge is convinced of without taking evidence, and
facts not necessary for the judgment (e.g., two alternatives for granting relief are
allowed and one is already acknowledged).
Judicial control of proof-taking promotes efficiency and protects privacy of
parties and non-parties alike. Process takes proof only when relevant to material
disputed facts. Parties to the lawsuit and non-parties as well are spared
unnecessary but expensive intrusions.
Judicial control of proof-taking does not prevent parties from insisting on
taking evidence that believe is relevant to deciding material issues in dispute.
Many German judges of first instance courts believe that a sure route to reversal
on appeal is rejection without strong justification of application to take evidence.
Such refusals count as a violation of the judicial duty of elucidation under ZPO §
139.
Witness Testimony
American lawyers can recoil at the idea that parties’ lawyers do not take the
lead in questioning witnesses. How are they to present their most persuasive
case? But in German process, judges are not looking to be persuaded to a
subjective position. Rather they need to know for their application of law,
whether a particular witness has information that supports or undermines their
objective determination whether a material fact in dispute needed to fulfill an
element of a legal rule is true or not.
The format of witness testimony is intended to facilitate objective
determination of fact by courts. In Germany, unlike in the United States, parties
are not to coach witness beforehand. Judges and lawyers are to meet witnesses
478
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for the first time in court. German judges believe, as American lawyers do too,
that information obtained at first questioning from witnesses is more likely to be
accurate.480 Again in Germany, and unlike in the United States, witnesses are not
to be asked leading questions that suggest answers, but are to be given openended questions. Finally, in Germany, and unlike in the United States, judges are
to direct witnesses toward material facts that are in dispute and are not to sit
silently while witnesses discussing other matters not relevant to determination of
the case.
Party Testimony
German civil process, as we have seen, historically has preferred hearing
parties as disputants stating their positions, rather than as witnesses testifying on
material disputed facts. The Code of Civil Procedure has intricate procedures that
govern taking party testimony. It brings them together in a special section: Title
10, Proof Through Party Testimony.481 While the historic preference remains, for
decades restrictions on party testimony to disputed matters of fact have been
relaxing. One factor contributing to this breakdown is increasing recognition that
often only parties know facts crucial to determination of lawsuits. Fairness
requires that both sides have opportunity to present testimony on material
disputed points, even when for one side, only party testimony is available.
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, although directed to other
nations’ proceedings, have accelerated this development. 482 As a result, in
Germany today, party testimony is no longer rare but routine.
Deferred Issue Decision-making
Case structuring and issue framing are powerful tools for efficient conduct
of civil justice, without the injustices of common-law single-issue pleading,
because German judges defer final decisions of individual aspects of cases until
they decide the case as a whole. German judges decide finally no issues before
their time. The critical moment in a German lawsuit is how law applies to facts
as of the date of the last oral hearing. German parties do not have to commit
irrevocably early in the lawsuit to a single theory of the case or to as single
governing rule. While judges are authorized to reject evidence for being offered
too late, and often do that, their enthusiasm for such expediting measures is
tempered by their ever-present § 139 ZPO duty of elucidation that guarantees
parties their constitutional right to be heard.
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While German judges do not finally determine issues until the last oral
hearing, along the way, they decide many issues tentatively. For example,
where one party has produced credible evidence that establishes a particular
fact required to apply a particular rule, and the other party has neither
impeached that evidence nor offered an alternative, the court may tentatively
take the element as having been proven. Consequently, it is not unusual for
lawyers to ask judges “how the court sees the case for the time being.” It is
proper for judges to let parties know where their cases are going. These
judicial comments are known as “process-directing court comments”
(prozessleitende richterliche Hinweise). They help lawyers assess chances of
winning and costs of continuing. 483 German civil justice thus works toward
eliminating surprise from process; courts are not to let parties overlook
matters material to their decisions. 484
German civil justice works to sequence issue deciding in a manner that is
both efficient and just. Often applicable legal rules cannot be read directly from
statute. Instead, it may be necessary to search statutes for rules, compare rule to
facts, to revisit statutes in light of facts, and to examine facts again in light of
rules. This process of going back and forth was identified in the first part of the
twentieth century and has since assumed a place in the description of law
application in Germany. 485 It means that in German proceedings the legal norm
as the basis of the claim can emerge for the first time late in the process. 486 It is
what American lawyers do to develop their “theory of the case.” 487
Fostering Settlement
At every stage of proceedings German judges are obligated to foster
settlement of the case or parts of it. 488 As in the United States, whether a case
settles is dependent upon particular interests and concerns of parties.
In Germany the process of preparing cases for applying law to facts
promotes settlement. As process proceeds, courts are structuring them for
eventual decision. Judges, as they clarify cases, inform parties which claims
are stronger and which are weaker; they identify the proof needed. Judges, in
helping parties see how their cases are likely to be decided, must do so
483
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without undermining parties’ confidence in judicial impartiality. 489 How
strongly judges signal to parties the direction of likely resolution in any
given case is a matter of style of individual judges as well as their
assessment of how such signaling would contribute to conclusion of the case
(both in speed and justice). Explicit signaling undercuts confidence in
impartiality; it can be counterproductive of settlement. While clear signaling
of probable loss sends a powerful message to potential losers to settle, it also
encourages likely winners not to settle. That message is reinforced by the fee
structure, which in the case of settlement, means not only that both parties
must now bear their own lawyer’s fees, they must now pay their lawyers an
additional settlement fee.
5. Process in Roh v. Doh
Roh and Doh control which matters the court considers, through their
pleadings, and which evidence it takes, through their applications, but the
court has charge of the process and determines when it considers which
matters. German court proceedings are less rigid than are their American
counterparts: there is no certain sequence of events. Contacts among judge,
parties and lawyers are less formal. They may contact each other without all
parties being present. In Germany information about case and parties can be
more freely exchanged than in the United States where there is greater
concern that one party speaking with the judge out of presence of the other
might compromise the judge’s impartiality. (Such suspect conduct is called
ex parte communication.)
In Chapter 3 Mary Roh met for the first time with her lawyer Hahn. She
has now returned to review the complaint that he has drafted and to ask what
is next.
Roh: OK. The complaint looks fine, counselor. So tell me, how long this is all going to
take?
Hahn: The timing is pretty predictable: I would be surprised if it lasted as long as six
months; it might be done in three.
Roh: Oh. You think Doh will give in?
Hahn: No. But the case is a simple one. It’s basically your word against Doh’s word. I
can’t imagine a judge in Munich letting it sit on his or her desk for more than three
months. So the judge needs to hear both sides. The judge will have our complaint
served and should schedule an early first hearing with thirty days. If it turns out that
Doh has no witnesses to name, the judge might even finish it that day.
Roh: Do I have to go to the hearing?
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Hahn: If you lived in Munich, in case like this, you probably would. In this case, since
Berlin is pretty far from Munich, the judge might not require that you come. If you want
the case ended fast, though, you should go. If the judge orders you to go, that’s
probably a sign that the judge thinks the case might be handled all in one hearing. If
that is so, I am inclined to go with you; otherwise we might engage a lawyer in Munich
to cover the hearing for me. Do you have a preference? If I go, we can get those costs
back.
Roh: If we get a local lawyer, won’t we have to pay that lawyer something? After we
have done that, will I really save much?
Hahn: It still would probably be a bit cheaper for you. A couple of hundred Euros.
Roh: I guess we can decide that when we see what the judge orders. So what should I
expect at the first hearing?
Hahn: When you get to the court, there will be places for you to sit outside the
courtroom. You may see Doh there. There might be other people. The case is public,
so anybody can come in to watch what happens. It’s not too likely that anyone else will
be there besides you and me, Doh and probably a lawyer for Doh. We will be told
beforehand and can confirm from the schedule posted just when and how long the
hearing will be. I would guess it will probably be an hour. If it is any longer than that,
that will be another sign that the judge wants to handle this all in one hearing.
Roh: What will it look like there? I have never been in a lawsuit before.
Hahn: It’s pretty relaxed. It’s not at all like what you may have seen in American
movies. We will be called into the courtroom by an announcement. The judge will enter;
we will stand as the judge enters. The judge will sit at a fairly simple table, not elevated
above the rest of the room, or if elevated, only slightly. The Munich court has only a
handful of the old ceremonial courtrooms with the fancy judge’s bench like you see in
U.S. films and the popular court shows. In front of the judge’s table there will be a table
for our side and a table for Doh’s side. In the vicinity there will be a chair for a possible
witness. Behind us will be a couple of rows of chairs for the public. The judge and the
lawyers will be in robes. The lawyer for Doh may be pulling the robe on just as we
come in. The judge may have on blue jeans under the robe. But the judge will be sure
to have on a white tie.
Roh: So what happens next?
Hahn: The judge will call our matter and make sure that everyone summoned is
present. The judge will ask any witnesses to step outside into the hall.
Hahn: The judge will then discuss the case with all of us. The judge will first state the
basic nature of the case That means here, that you are asking for €60,000 Euros back
on a loan or on a conditional gift.. Remember that the judge has already read our
complaint. The judge may speak directly to you or to Doh and ask you questions about
the case. If you want to ask the judge a question, and the judge is not speaking with
you, then tell me and I will ask the judge to let you ask.
Roh: What is the judge looking for? What is the judge going to ask me about?
Hahn: Basically, the judge wants to know what it is that you want from the court. The
judge will be looking to understand not only what you want, but will discuss with us the
possible legal grounds why you think you are entitled to the money. The judge will be
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looking to understand how we plan to prove your claim for the money. The judge will
turn to Doh and Doh’s lawyer to see why they think you are not entitled the money.
Roh: So the judge is already deciding the case?
Hahn: No. What the judge is doing is trying to find out what the court needs to decide
this case and what is available to help. The judge will also be interested in whether
there were any witnesses to your conversation with Doh when he asked for the money..
The judge will probe to figure out what you and Doh agree happened and about what
you disagree. For example, for the judgment, the court needs to determine that you in
fact paid Doh €60,000. Probably that can be handled perfunctorily. But suppose Doh
claims the money was never paid. Or suppose Doh says that all that money went to
DohSon Honda LLC and did not benefit him at all. Then the judge would have found a
material issue of fact in dispute between the two parties that the court will have to
decide.
Roh: OK.
Hahn: In the course of all this, the judge will speak freely with the lawyers and their
clients. They will speak nearly as freely with the judge. When one of us makes an
assertion that might be debated, the judge might turn to you or to Doh and say, you
don’t disagree with that, do you? If the judge does that, you must answer truthfully. But
I will let you know if I have a problem with your answering such a question.
Roh: Good.
Hahn: All of this should not take more than ten or twenty minutes. At the end of the
discussion, the judge will ask the lawyers to state their formal requests. We will say,
that our request is that the court order Doh to pay you the €60,000 plus interest. Doh
will say that our complaint be dismissed and that we pay costs.
Roh: I see.
Hahn: We will then be given an opportunity to state the gist of our cases. I will make
our presentation as full or as brief as seems appropriate in light of what the judge has
already done up to that point. Were the judge to ask us to make formal applications
before the judge discusses the case with us—and many judges do it that way—then I
might be inclined to state the case with more particularity. Even still, however, I will
make free reference to our complaint.
Roh: OK
Hahn: Insofar as Doh says anything in his answer or in the hearing with which we do
not agree, we need to be sure—at least if what he says is material tin the case—to
state what it is that we disagree.
Roh: Why is that? What does that mean?
Hahn: The judge will take as true anything that we do not dispute. The judge is looking
for what we lawyers call, all the elements of your claim. That’s why I said, if it’s
material, we need to take issue if the statement is untrue. Moreover, it is not sufficient
for us to say that we disagree. We must state why we disagree. We are supposed to
provide a factual basis for disagreement if there is one that we could be expected to
know.
Roh: So what’s the point of all this?
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Hahn: At the end, the judge should have a pretty good idea which rules apply to this
case and which facts need to be proven to establish our claim to €60,000. The judge is
likely to turn to me and say, “how counselor, do you plan to prove that?” After all, you
weren’t at the Rob—Doh meeting; indeed no one besides the parties was there.
Roh: And how to you answer?
Hahn: I will answer, I plan to prove the loan through the testimony of my client, Mary
Roh, as witness. I would like to request that you make a formal proof decision
(Beweisbeschluß) that the court take her testimony as witness. I will then state the legal
grounds for your testifying as a witness.
Roh: Hold on. Haven’t I just been telling me all about the case?
Hahn: Not as a witness. It used to be that we hardly ever allowed parties to testify as
witnesses. They were heard only as parties. Their statements could not constitute
proof. No, in cases like these, where there are no other witnesses, we permit parties to
testify. But then you will testify from the witness chair in front of the court, you may
sworn, and in general everything will be like a witness testifying. You won’t speak from
our table.
Roh: So does the judge grant the request?
Hahn: These days, in all likelihood. Although the judge will not do so until the judge
gives Doh and Doh’s lawyer a chance to disagree. But the judge then will likely grant
the request. Doh’s lawyer will probably place a similar request to take the testimony of
Doh. The judge will grant that request, too,
Roh: So will I have to testify then?
Hahn: It could be. If time is available, it may well be. But if either Doh or I have a
problem with that, we probably will arrange for testimony in a couple of weeks.
Roh: Would you please describe for me what that would be like?
Hahn: The judge will call you to the witness chair. He will explain to you that you must
tell the truth. You won’t be able to talk with me while you are testifying. The formality
will be greater than in the hearing.
Hahn: The judge will start by asking you open-ended questions. You can answer freely.
If you are not going in the direction the judge is interested in, the judge may ask a more
focused question. Again, however, the judge is expecting that you answer fully and not
with mere yes or no answers. In any case, do not answer just with a nod of your head.
Once you have given your answers, the judge is likely to ask some pointed questions
about the moment in which you and Doh agreed on the money exchange. The judge
will be looking for anything that might specifically establish this as a loan or conditional
gift. The judge also will be looking to see whether what you say that might establish
that should be believed.
Roh: So, I don’t have to worry about cross-examination from Doh’s lawyer like I see in
the krimis?
Hahn: Well, there is no American-style cross-examination, although we do have the
term in German now (Kreuzverhör), but what we have is not much like what you see in
television, at least most of the time. Doh’s lawyer and I both will be given a chance to
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ask questions. But if the judge has done a good job, the judge will have already asked
most important ones.
Roh: Good.
Hahn: As you go along in answering, do not be surprised if the judge from time to time
speaks into a dictating machine what your answers are. Unlike in the United States,
there is no one taking down word-for-word what you say. The judge is putting down the
gist of what you testify. From time-to-time, the judge is likely to ask you to repeat what
you said to make sure that the judge gets it right.

After this meeting Hahn files the complaint. The court reviews the
complaint, serves it, and sets a date for an early first hearing and receives
defendant Doh’s answer.
Roh v. Doh is not a complex case. The judge would try to resolve it in a
single hearing. In this case, where so much depends on creditability, the
judge would order the parties to appear personally. 490
Pre-hearing Settlement Conference
Prior to the first oral hearing, whether preliminary or main hearing,
ordinarily there must be a settlement discussion. 491 Usually it takes place at
the first meeting of court and parties.
Sometimes, even before the oral hearing, there are informal contacts
through the court about settlement. Perhaps, after the hearing date has been
set, one of the lawyers telephones the judge to change the date. The judge
might use this opportunity to talk settlement. The judge might ask: “do the
lawyers think that the parties want to settle? Is that a realistic hope? Are
there obstacles to settlement?”
Informal conversations such as these give judges opportunity to learn
information that may not be in the pleadings. For example, in this case, the
judge might find out that John Doh, Sr. was wiped out in the financial crisis
and that as result, DohSon Honda was sold and John Doh, Jr. lost his job.
Doh may not have the money to pay back to Mary Roh. The judge might
learn that Roh herself needs cash quickly. The judge could find out that
formerly flourishing relations between the Roh and Doh businesses have
come to an end, so that she need not concern herself with them in resolving
the dispute. For judges to learn the actual effect of the proceedings and of
their resolution on the parties helps judges better organize and conduct
process. It is not considered improper.
If the parties do not reach a settlement through such informal contacts,
the judge is required to raise settlement at the early first hearing. The
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discussion of settlement need not be clearly separated from the conduct of
the early first hearing itself, but may be folded into it.
Early First Hearing
When parties and their lawyers arrive for the hearing, the judge will
greet them and formally note their appearance in the record of the
proceedings. Many judges lay great weight on developing a good rapport
with the parties themselves. In well conducted proceedings, parties
participate personally as much as through their lawyers; it is they who will
decide whether to reach settlement, or to take the case to court judgment and
possibly to one or two appeals.
At the outset of the hearing the judge will try to put the participants at
ease. The judge will move directly to the possibility of settlement. The judge
will speak with the parties positively that the process gives them a great
chance, with the help of the court and each other, to put an end to the dispute
in short order. The judge will make clear at the beginning, however, that
under some circumstances the process could drag out a long time.
After that introduction, the judge will summarize the facts and the
dispute and in just a few words give the material positions, observations and
arguments of the parties to the lawsuit, which the parties already know from
their respective filings. In Roh v. Doh the hearing would proceed along the
following lines to say:
“It is the position of the plaintiff, Mary Roh, that she
demands repayment of a loan in the amount of €60,000,
while it is the position of the defendant, John Doh, Jr., that
the plaintiff gave him the money as a gift.”
The judge will then point out, that the process is concerned with clearing
up the question: “gift or loan,” and possibly, if a gift is found, whether
plaintiff has effectively revoked the gift. Since only one of the different
versions can be correct, in the end, the judge will counsel, the decision
comes down to which of the parties better convinces the court of its version
by producing evidence that court sees as plausible and trustworthy.
The judge might at this point give formal guidance to the parties and
protocol it in the record. Possibly, the judge might have given guidance
already before the hearing, in which case it would look as follows and would
be included in the record
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In the Matter of Roh v. Doh
Memorandum pursuant to § 273(1) Code of Civil Procedure
In preparation for the hearing to be held ......... 2011, the Court pursuant to § 273(1)
Code of Civil Procedure advises:
1. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the allocation of funds was a loan
under § 488 of the Civil Code; the defendant does not have to prove that its legal
basis was that of a gift under §§ 516 ff. of the Civil Code.
2. Should the Court not find the plaintiff’s evidence to be fully convincing does not
mean that the plaintiff must lose the case. In that event the Court, accepting
defendant’s position that the payment was a gift, must review whether the plaintiff
is allowed under § 530(1) of the Civil Code to revoke the gift on the ground of gross
ingratitude.
Signed
Jakob Jung
Judge of the Landgericht

The judge would then, if necessary, ask the parties and their lawyers,
whether they want to add anything to the facts as they have stated them. The
judge will note in the record any additions.
The judge will remind Roh and Doh that a judicial decision of their case
must be completely for one of them and completely against the other. Either
the transaction was a loan, or it was not; either it was a gift that was
conditioned, or it was a gift that was not conditioned. The judge will tell Roh
and Doh that they can avoid the risk of a total loss by reaching an amicable
settlement.
The judge will ask them, first plaintiff Roh, then defendant Doh,
whether each in principle could imagine an amicable settlement. If one of
them is open to settlement, the judge will welcome that and note it in the
record of the proceedings; if either rejects the idea of a settlement at this
early stage, the judge will ask why.
The judge has great freedom in carrying through the hearing. An
experienced judge will allow the course of settlement talks to be determined
by what Roh and Doh say, what they wish, which reservations and what
criticisms they have. At this stage the judge has many opportunities to keep
the conversation with the parties and their lawyers on track toward
settlement, to overcome difficulties and to encourage them bring make their
own proposals for settlement. If neither party puts forward a proposal, the
judge might formally make one. That judge will include that proposal as
further formal guidance that would accent the all-or-nothing nature that the
judge’s legal decision necessarily would have.
At this point, the judge might remind Roh and Doh of personal matters
not material to legal issues, e.g., their families’ long and still continuing
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relationship through sickness, injuries, set-backs and successes. Even if the
judge is unable to reach settlement in these discussions, the judge will gain a
information that helps evaluate the parties and judge the entire dispute. If the
settlement talk fails, because Roh and Doh are too far from each other in
their ideas of settlement, the judge must note that in the record of the case.
As part of structuring the case for decision or settlement, the judge may
focus the attention of the parties on the contract claim for repayment of loan
rather than the claim for restitution of a gift. As the judge clarifies the legal
and factual situation, which material facts are in dispute—legal or factual—
will become clearer. As which material facts are in dispute become clearer,
settlement may be facilitated, for the criteria that determine the outcome will
become more apparent.
Hearing and Evidence Taking When Settlement Fails
This is one case where the parties almost surely will be witnesses
despite the usual reticence to rely on party testimony. In Roh v. Doh either
party might call the other as witness. If they do not, this is the exceptional
case where the judge can himself call a witness not nominated by the parties.
It is available only to call parties and only if necessary to convince the judge
of the truth or falsity of a material disputed fact. 492
The judge will make a formal evidentiary decision (Beweisbeschluß) ex
officio to take the testimony of parties under the special authority provided in
order to be able to reach a conviction of the truth or falsity of the fact to be
proven (loan or gift, possibly also, whether gross ingratitude of the defendant
justifies revocation of a gift).
Before taking testimony party testimony, the judge will admonish each
party to tell the truth and instruct the party that in his or her testimony he or
she, like a witness, is under obligation to tell the truth, that he or she can be
required to give an oath, and that he or she is subject to punishment if he or
she intentionally or even negligently tells an untruth.
Experience teaches that every party, when formally testifying, at first
does not deviate from his or her own position (stated in the pleadings and
other filings). That makes it is the task of the judge to address peculiarities of
facts and ask parties about them. Here, for example, why should the asserted
conversation have taken place at the holiday party of the Honda dealers, why
were there no witnesses to the conversation, why was there no receipt, why
was there nothing in writing and no agreement about interest, why did Roh
demand repayment only after her daughter broke off the engagement with
Doh, what concrete use was Doh to make of the €60,000, and what use did
he actually make of the money? The parties’ lawyers are permitted to ask
follow-up questions.
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The judge is required to note the substance of the testimony of the
parties in the record of the proceedings. Unlike in American proceeding,
there is no verbatim transcript made.
The judge must also decide in a formal decision whether the testifying
party is to be sworn or be unsworn.
After taking the evidence, the lawyers must be given opportunity to take
a position on the testimony. They can give their views, which witness on the
basis of which circumstances the court should believe.
At this point the judge might, even if the judge has formed an opinion of
the truth, again attempt to reach settlement. Then Roh and Doh will still not
know and will be able only to guess how the judge would decide the case. At
every stage of the proceeding the judge is require to work toward an
amicable settlement. 493 The judge will again remind them, that since for each
party the dispute can end only in victory or defeat, they should think again
about settlement while they still control the case.
The judge will tell Roh and Doh that if the case does end in judgment, it
will not necessarily be over. They should think about what the future of the
case is likely to be. The loser in the first instance will probably—in view of
the large amount of money in dispute—seek a review of the case through
appeal on law and facts (Berufung) to the Court of Appeals
(Oberlandesgericht). The loser in that appeal might take a further appeal on
legal grounds (Revision) to the Federal Supreme Court. That means that the
dispute could still continue long into the future, the process through the
different levels of appeal would on account of the high amount in dispute
create significant costs, which the loser in the last appeal would have to pay
for the consideration of the case by all of the courts. 494 The final resolution
of the dispute would thus remain for the moment uncertain. Notwithstanding
Roh’s daughter breaking off her engagement with the younger Doh—the
background of the dispute—Roh and Doh well remain tied together until the
lawsuit is finally concluded. This certainly is not a satisfactory solution for
them.
Should there still be no settlement with mutual concessions to end the
dispute, the judge would ask the lawyers for their requests. If they request no
further taking of evidence, the judge would adjourn the hearing briefly, to
think about the judgment and its formal justification, reconvene the hearing,
and announce the judgment. The judge would have five weeks to write the
formal judgment and justification and serve it on the lawyers.

C. Korea
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However just and impartial decisions judges delivers,
Korean public does not shed suspicions, if the decision
making process takes place from the place where their
observation cannot reach: the office of judges. Seeing is
believing. They want to see the whole process of decision
making without any obstacles. That place is courtrooms.
Judge Tae-hoon Kang et al. (2008) 495
1. The Nature of Korean Civil Process
Korean civil procedure is an indirect transplant of the German Code of
Civil Procedure of 1877 and is typical of civil law systems generally: it has
nothing that common lawyers think of as a trial. 496 There is no single event
where lawyers for parties present to the court their theory of the case.
Instead, there are structured proceedings within which a court determines
whether plaintiffs’ assertions of fact satisfy requirements of a legal rule.
Over time and place the exact form of proceedings varies: contemporary
Korean proceedings are identical neither to their German relatives nor to
their Korean antecedents..
In the first decade of the twenty-first century Korea amended its civil
procedure. The differences were dramatic enough that Korean judges speak
of the “New Model” and contrast it with the “Old Model.” Changes needed
in existing law were sufficiently substantial to make adoption of the New
Model by no means certain. To overcome any conflict issue of New and Old,
the Korean National Assembly amended the Korean Civil Procedure Act.
The principal goal of the New Model is enhancement of public faith in the
judiciary and in court proceedings and increased transparency in
decisionmaking. Development of the New Model began at the instigation of
the Supreme Court of Korea already in 1995; it implementation was not
completed until 2006. The New Model does not adopt American-style
discovery or otherwise follow American procedure. In direction it follows
contemporary German civil procedure.
Earlier reforms of the Old Model. Earlier attempts at reform of the
Old Model focused on delay rather than on decision making. Much as recent
American attempts at reform did, the earlier Korean attempt fought delay
through use of deadlines without working to improve decision making.
Today the deficiency of the Old Model is seen to have been less delay and
more excessive division of proceedings into endless separate, short,
495
Judges Tae-hoon Kang, Seong-soo Kim, Yoon-sun Chang, Dong-jin Song, Yon-kyung Lee
and Eun-kyung Cho, Future of Civil Procedure, The First Judicial Symposium in English, 1 J.
KOREAN JUDICATURE 732, 739 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008).
496
See Tae-hoon Kang et al., Future of Civil Procedure, The First Judicial Symposium in
English, 1 J. KOREAN JUDICATURE 732, 736 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008).
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repetitive sessions. This splintering of proceedings produced delay and,
worse, made decision making inaccurate and opaque. 497 Proceedings piled
on proceedings with little indication of their direction, until at the end of all
proceedings, the presiding judge might say: “We will review the whole
document without any omission, then decide this case with care.” This delay
in consideration raised suspicion of improper evaluation. It made judging
into a black box, out of which came an unpredictable outcome. 498
The New Model. The solution of the New Model is “concentration” of
proceedings. By concentrating proceedings, not into one single event as in an
American trial, but into fewer, more focused sessions, parties can participate
better in proceedings and follow better the course of the courts’
decisionmaking. The Korean reform parallels the important 1976 reform in
German civil procedure. 499 While the New Model may not have been based
directly on the 1976 German reform, its implementation looked to practices
in Germany. 500 From the standpoint of this book, the reforms of the New
Model of Korean procedure in the twenty-first century parallel reforms of
German civil procedure in the twentieth.
Two key features of the New Model in addition to concentration are:
• Greater use of oral proceedings and less reliance on written
proceedings;
• Greater party participation through increased interaction
directly between court and parties and among the parties
themselves.
Oral Proceedings in the New Model. The New Model is to increase
transparency of decisionmaking. The new model promotes transparency by
permitting parties to see where proceedings are going and to predict their
outcome. The idea behind the New Model is: “Seeing is believing. [The
public wants] to see the whole process of decision making without any
obstacles. That place is [the] courtroom.” 501 Its motto is “the enhancement of
public faith in the judiciary through substantial court proceedings.” 502
Judge Hyun Seok Kim, Presiding Judge of the District Court of Busan,
has well made the case for the New Model. His explanation is a sound
platform for renewal and reform of civil procedure the world over. He states
the benefits of oral proceedings:
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[1] Maximizing court communication. … the proceedings
give the judges and the parties (attorneys) a chance to cast direct
questions about ambiguous or doubtful assertions and testimonies
on the spot, xo that they can even unearth the underlying causes,
motives or other unrevealed circumstances of dispute.
[2] Accurate understanding of complex litigation. Through
oral proceedings, a judge or panel can comprehend even the most
complex litigation which involves too many technical terminologies
that would otherwise be incomprehensible (just by reading the brief,
for example), but by oral explanation from parties and other people
concerned it is understandable.
[3] Helping the judge to make the correct decision. …
Because the judge is able to figure out the overall intentions of the
parties, he or she can appropriately evaluate the witnesses’
testimonies and appreciate the parties’ and witnesses’ manners
through the oral proceedings.
[4] Providing sufficient chances to making statements—the
Court as a listener. … [T]he parties can persuade the judges by
making persuasive arguments and presenting compelling evidence;
… the parties can reveal their real intentions and situations. A judge
should create an atmosphere where active communications and
arguments, rather than plain statements, can be made. A judge
should be a serious listener also.
[5] Helping parties to understand court procedure—the
Court as explainer. [T]he court can present and explain its opinion
and reasoning to the parties so that the parties can directly figure
out towards which direction the court procedure is going. “Court as
an explainer,” which is one of the core aspects of oral proceedings,
can enhance public trust in the judiciary.
[6] Fostering parties’ alternative dispute resolution. … oral
proceedings itself can be the most effective tool to find a way to
resolve disputes in ways that the parties exactly want, since a
reasonable alternative dispute resolution can be reached not by just
waiting for the parties’ reconciliation, but also by exploring
common understandings through oral exchanges.
[7] Improving foreseeability of case-outcome. [J]udges
would make their decisions relying on the finding from oral
proceedings and the parties would be able to predict what the results
of trial will be like. This means that the distrust on the court’s
decision could be minimized, since the parties will not argue that
they were not given enough chances for contentions or that they
were unable to foresee the reasons, when they lose their cases.
[8] Enhancing effectiveness of case management. Oral
proceedings help the judge to do his or her work more easily and
effectively, since they can remove meritless contentions from
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considerations and have the judge to concentrate on the remaining
substantial factors when making decision. So, it becomes much
easier to comprehend the case in detail and to set up a reasoning to
make a decision. …
[9] Implementing public disclosure. Oral proceedings is the
only way to accomplish public disclosure. …. 503
Party Participation in the New Model. Because of the heavy
incidence of pro se representation, party participation was never a stranger to
Korean civil procedure, but it was not an especially welcomed guest. The
Old Model discouraged judges from interacting directly with parties, for fear
that interaction might produce or suggest prejudice. The New Model, on the
other hand, encourages interaction between judges and parties and among
parties, even when those parties are represented by lawyers. Professor Moon
observes the expected benefits of increased party participation:
(1) The clarification of the factual situation goes more quickly
through discussions with the parties than with the lawyers, since the
parties know the factual situation better.
(2) The case can be more quickly and effectively settled with
the parties. The fact that the judge has immediately heard the
parties, diminishes the hostility of the parties.
(3) After having been heard immediately by the judge, the
parties usually satisfied with the resolution of the dispute, and
indeed, independent of whether they have won. 504
We turn now to details of how the New Model works.
2. The Process in Outline
Even before the New Model process in Korea was similar to process in
Germany and particularly similar to older German process. Now it is closer
still, particularly to contemporary German process. After reviewing the
plaintiff’s complaint, the court serves it on the defendant. At that time the
court directs the parties either to appear for a preliminary hearing, 505 or to
engage in further written preliminary proceedings. 506 While the New Model
does not require parties to substantiate their pleadings, as the German code
does, in preparation for the preliminary hearing, it requires defendants to
answer plaintiffs’ complaints with particularity. The Old Model had
permitted them to reply with a simple general denial. 507
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Preliminary Hearing
Until the New Model was implemented in 2006, the preliminary hearing
was neglected in practice. 508 Now it is preferred in principle. 509 At this
preliminary hearing, as in its German counterpart, the judge discusses the
case with the parties and with their lawyers, if represented, to simplify and
sharpen issues. The New Model looks to the presiding judge to make the
proceedings effective. 510
The goal of the preliminary hearing—or of the written preliminary
proceedings—is to identify applicable legal rules, their constituent elements,
and which facts material to their application are in dispute. The
determination of which rules might be applicable is tentative. While the
court is to direct attention of parties first to factual elements of rules most
likely applicable, the parties are not precluded from returning to those rules
should it appear later that they are relevant.
In the preliminary hearing the court calls attention of the parties to
material facts on which the parties do not agree. The court asks the party
bearing the burden of proof for that element to present necessary proof. The
court may also alert the other side that at some point, that if the proposing
party presents what it needs to, the burden of proof may shift to it. No longer
will it be sufficient to challenge the proponent’s proof, but it will be essential
to bring forth its own affirmative evidence.
Main Hearing (변론절차)
In the ideal case, following a preliminary hearing, the court determines
the case in a single, comprehensive, concentrated main hearing. Insofar as
this occurs, it assumes that the parties have been able to develop all the
necessary factual information beforehand. In practice, however, the court
does not always hold a preliminary hearing to get the whole picture of the
case. Moreover, in the event that the court conducts a preliminary hearing, it
is not required to hold a subsequent main hearing, but may accomplish the
two together.
In the moments immediately preceding the main hearing, or
immediately preceding the preliminary hearing if the court holds one, the
court ordinarily confers with the parties on a possible settlement of the
case. 511 If settlement discussions fail, the court proceeds to the main or
preliminary hearing as the case may be.
In the main hearing the judge introduces the matter in dispute and the
lawyers for the parties, or the parties themselves if proceeding pro se, state
508
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what they are seeking in the proceedings. Usually plaintiff’s lawyer refers to
his or her complaint and reiterates the specific relief requested there.
Typically defendant’s lawyer refers to the answer and requests dismissal of
the complaint. The court then discusses the case generally with the lawyers
and hears the parties themselves. There is no prescribed order to these
proceedings. Following these discussions, ideally the court proceeds in that
same hearing to take evidence as may be necessary to establish or defeat the
requests of the parties. Often evidence taking is deferred to subsequent
hearings.
Duty to Cooperate in Good Faith
From the preliminary hearing on through the lawsuit process is intended
to be cooperative rather than combative. Process is designed so that the
court, with cooperation of the parties, first frames the issues in dispute by
finding points of common ground on which the parties agree and by
identifying those points on which they disagree, and then proceeds to hear
the parties and take evidence on those material facts in dispute. 512 Section 1
of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes on the parties a duty to cooperate in
good faith.
Duty to Elucidate (석명의무) (§§ 136, 137, 140 KCPA)
In the legal process plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. That means, if
plaintiffs fail to prove facts that fulfill the legal rules on which they rely,
they lose. Defendants are not allowed, however, to lie back and say, “so
prove it.” They are subject to a duty of elucidation. They may be required by
the presiding judge, acting on his or her own motion, or at the request of
another party, to clarify the case. 513
The duty of elucidation also serves to eliminate surprise decisions. If the
presiding judge believes that a party has overlooked a legal matter, the judge
is required to give that party an opportunity to state an opinion on it.
The duty of elucidation also serves purposes similar to American
discovery to deal with situations in which evidence is, in large part, in the
hands of a party to an action. Its application is not limited to such cases as
environmental cases, product liability cases, and medical malpractice cases,
which may be generated in industrialized modern societies. The scope of its
application is wider than the area where “zone of risk” theory, “probability”
theory, and “prima facie evidence” theory are applicable.
The duty to elucidate may be imposed on the party who does not bear
the burden of proof after its prerequisites are found in the following order:
(1) The party who bears the burden of proof can explain the existence of
512
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reasonable foundation of his or her allegation. (2) Without that party’s fault,
he or she cannot prove the existence and scope of his legal right from the
viewpoint of an average person. (3) The opposing party is expected or is able
easily to provide information about them for the party who bears the burden
of proof. (4) If the three foregoing requirements are met, the party bearing
the burden of proof has a right to demand information from the opposing
party. The right is derived from section 1(2) Code of Civil Procedure which
prescribes that “The concerned parties and participants of litigation shall
perform the litigation sincerely and faithfully.” Should the opposing party
refuse to give the information to the party who bears the burden to prove it
despite the latter’s demand for it, the court determines whether it considers
the latter’s allegation to be true, depending on several factors such as the
former’s blameworthiness and importance of the information. 514
Taking of Proof
The oral hearing of the parties—and not witness testimony—is at the
heart of the New Model of Korean civil process just as it is in German
process. It is to be to the parties, above all when proceedings are pro se, to
whom the court is to direct it first attention. Only when facts are found to be
material and in dispute does the court—on party application—order the
taking of evidence, including the testimony of witnesses.
With the move to the New Model, the significance of evidence taking has
diminished in practice. 515 Only when facts are found to be material and in
dispute does the court—on party application—order the taking of evidence,
including the testimony of witnesses. The application is to state the facts that the
evidence is to prove. 516
In principle the lawyer for the party calling a witness is the first to examine
the witness. Then follows the lawyer of the other party. 517 After conclusion of
examination by the parties’ lawyers, it is the turn of the court. 518 This reverses
the order of German process. This general rule notwithstanding, the presiding
judge has latitude to structure the examination differently: at any time the
presiding judge may examine the witness; 519 may restrict questioning which is
redundant or irrelevant; 520 and, after consulting with the parties, may alter the
order of examination.521
That parties and not the court have first responsibility for questioning
witnesses follows American practice and departs from the German. It is the
514
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single most important continuing consequence of American influence on Korean
civil procedure. Yet with all the latitude allowed judges under the law, 522 and in
view of the high incidence of per se representation, party examination of
witnesses in Korean civil procedure is distant from American procedure; in cases
where judges make full use of their opportunities for intervention, questioning of
witnesses lies closer to German practice.
In Roh v. Doh, the case is likely to proceed rather in the way described in
Germany. After hearing both parties, the court should be in a position to make a
judgment. The court will announce the judgment. It will be required to provide
the judgment in writing within several weeks time. We discuss judgments in
Chapter 7.
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C H APT E R 7
J UDG M E NT S, A PPE A L S A ND O UT C OM E S:
DE C I SI ONS A C C OR DI NG T O L A W

Payment of Compensation
523
13th Century German Codex

Mary Roh has reached the end of the process. She and John Doh, Jr. are
in the courtroom for the last session. They hope that this will be their last day
in court together. They can and should expect a decision that day. The case
was not difficult. The judge has no special ground to delay decision; a jury,
if there is one, should not take much time to decide their case.
If it is in the United States, and if there is a jury, Roh and Doh will
fidget as the judge instructs jurors in their duties. The jurors will retire; Roh
and Doh will perspire. They will pace about the courthouse until the jurors
return. That is not likely to be in much less than an hour. Even jurors that
have made up their minds before leaving the courtroom, do not want to
return too soon. They want to show that they have deliberated carefully.
Since there is no way to demonstrate that in writing, they allow time for
deliberation to suggest it.
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If it is in Germany or in Korea, the judge should announce the decision
from the bench that day. German and Korean judges may have ready a draft
of the reasons that they will give; if they do, they may read from it. If they
are not ready with written reasons, they are required to summarize the basis
for their decisions orally and provide written reasons later. § 311(3) ZPO
(within three weeks); § 207(1) KCPA (within two or four weeks according to
case complexity).
Depending upon which facts the court finds, which law it determines
governs, and how it applies that law to those facts, the court’s judgment will
either acknowledge Roh’s rights or deny Doh’s liability. If the judgment
acknowledges Roh’s rights, it will order a remedy, e.g., Doh must pay Roh a
certain amount of money. The judgment is to be, in words of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, “according to the law of the Land.” If the judgment is
not according to law, Roh and Doh do not have to accept it. They may take
the court’s decision to a higher court for review and revision, that is, they
may take an appeal to an appellate court.
A. Judgments and Appeals Generally
When we speak of a decision according to law, we mean a judgment
that applies law to facts correctly. A judgment reached by tossing a coin, if
provided for by law, would be a decision made by legal process, but it would
not be a decision according to law.
The law referred to, the “law of the land,” is the state’s substantive law,
i.e., the general laws that bind all members of the community equally. A
decision according to law is correct when it correctly determines applicable
law, correctly finds material facts, and correctly applies that law to those
facts.
Correct application of law to facts is what Roh and Doh, Jr. are told to
expect. It is what rational members of the public want from their civil justice
system. It is not peculiar to particular systems of civil justice. Even jurists
who see civil procedure as controlled by culture grant that. For example,
Professor Oscar G. Chase observes: “[a]ll modern systems of adjudication
depend on the application of a legal rule to a set of facts.” Professor Chase
explains: it is the “model that we present to the public [of] our legal system.
We tell them that the results of court proceedings are dictated by the
application of law to facts ….” 524 Belief in that model impels people to abide
by law.
In this chapter we examine how courts of first instance in our three
systems apply law to facts in judgments and how appellate courts review the
work of courts of first instance both for accuracy in judgment and for
524
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fairness in process. Our consideration of appeal is concise and directed to
our hypothetical case. 525
We begin by addressing general issues of judgments and appeals. We
then examine each system seriatim to consider how that system treats both
judgments and appeals in order to reach decisions according to law.
1. Judgments
23.

Decision and Reasoned Explanation

23.1

Upon completion of the parties’ presentations the
court should promptly give judgment set forth or
recorded in writing. The judgment should specify
the remedy awarded and, if a monetary award, its
amount.

23.2

The judgment should be accompanied by a
reasoned explanation of the essential factual,
legal, and evidentiary basis of the decision.
Principle 23, ALI/UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND UNIDROIT(2004)

Giving Reasons (“Justifications”)
A judgment is a determination by a court of a dispute between two
parties. A few words suffice to resolve the dispute: “the Court finds that Roh
recover from Doh a stated sum of money” or “the Court finds Doh owes Roh
nothing.” Dispute resolution does not require that courts give reasons for
their decisions. We refer to giving reasons as providing a justification.
Giving reasons has many benefits for a legal system; not giving reasons has
many detriments. Above all, a justification provides legal process with
transparency and makes decisions predictable.
Justifications have three main audiences: the judges who write them, the
parties who are subject to them, and the appellate judges who review them.
Justifications work to assure that decisions are based on objective
application of law to facts. Judges who write justifications are forced to
provide coherent arguments for their decisions. Parties subject to justified
judgments are given reasons why decisions are reached and a basis to
challenge those decisions. Appellate judges are given grounds to review
525
We consider only appeals of final judgments after trial and not other appeals, e.g., American
interlocutory appeals, American appeals after decision of terminal motions, German
Beschwerde.
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decisions of lower courts for determinations of law, findings of fact and
applications of law to facts.
All three of our systems require that judges give reasons for their
decisions. German and Korean judges must state the “grounds” of their
decisions. American judges must “find facts specially” and state conclusions
of law separately, which in effect is much the same. 526
When American courts decide cases with jurors, they are not required to
justify their judgments. Jury decisions are among the most prominent
decisions rendered without giving reasons. In Taxquet v. Belgium, no.
926/05, of January 13, 2009, a panel of the European Court of Human Rights
held that lack of a written justification in a Belgian criminal case violated the
right of an accused to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Counsel of
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. The Court held that a criminal verdict was not sufficiently
justified when the jurors did not explain their decision in detail but only
responded to yes/no questions posed by the judge.
In German and Korean civil justice systems justification is an essential
element of the right to be heard. In the American system it is not an essential
part of a day-in-court. American scholars accept without criticism absence of
such a requirement. They assert that in some cases justifications make
decisions worse. They conduct cost-benefit analyses to determine when
justifications are desirable and when not. 527 To jurists familiar with
justifications, such arguments ring of rationalization. They conveniently
leave current jury practice undisturbed.
Predictability of Civil Justice
Justifications make process and results of process predictable. Justified
judgments validate their predictability.
As we discussed in Chapter 1, civil justice systems implement
substantive law. Certainty of application of law affects whether and how
people follow law. If application of law is uncertain, some people may
choose not to follow law, because they doubt that it will apply to them.
Others may be unable to follow law, because of they are not sure what it
requires. 528 Civil justice systems are certain when they predictably and
correctly apply law to facts.
Why Predictability Matters

526

See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).
See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition and the Nature of the Judicial
Function, 96 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1283, 1285 (2008).
528
See generally Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 44.
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Predictability matters because modern civil justice systems affect civil
society more through cases that they do not decide than they do through
cases that they do decide. Predictability of civil lawsuits is particularly
important for civil law, because parties choose to sue. For every case that is
brought, many more potential cases are not brought. Cases are not brought
because potential plaintiffs, based on predictions of what would happen were
the cases brought, decide to abandon their claims or to find other ways to
pursue their goals (e.g., self-help, informal complaint and agreement).
Potential defendants, when confronted with claims from potential plaintiffs,
based on their predictions of process, choose to settle rather than to contest
those claims. Even when parties do begin process, predictability remains
important. Many cases brought are settled after they are brought but before
process is concluded in final judgments. They too are settled or abandoned
based on parties’ expectations of how they would be decided were they to go
to judgment.
In all three of our systems, most disputes are resolved without lawsuits
and most lawsuits are concluded without judgments. Parties in all three
decide whether to begin lawsuits based on their assessments of how courts
are likely to handle their disputes. What this means is that in practice, in
most cases, application of law to facts takes place before lawyers are
consulted or in lawyers’ offices in discussions between lawyers and their
clients before lawsuits are brought.
The Calculus of Practical Predictability
Parties contemplating lawsuits have their own calculus of practical
predictability. While the aspiration of all of our legal systems is decisions of
lawsuits on their merits, decisions whether to sue are not determined by
merits alone. Parties care how decisions affect them practically. Their
calculus of practical predictability is pinned to how decisions affect their
individual situations and is colored by considerations besides merits alone.
A settlement takes two parties. In an ideal world, the applicable law, the
true facts and the correct application of law to facts are all clear. In that
world, the parties are under no external constraints and apply the law to
themselves without court intervention. Of course, we do not live in a perfect
world. Even when all elements of applying law to facts are clear and
undisputed, one party may be unwilling or unable to comply with law. Such
a party may choose not to comply until faced with imminent compulsory
application of law, or until given a discount on paying the claim, or until
faced with new expenses. That delay in satisfying a claim may harm the
party in right.
We discuss three aspects of practical predictability: predictability of
outcome, predictability of grounds for decision and predictability of process
costs.
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Outcomes. When one thinks of lawsuit predictability, one thinks of
liability. Was it predictable which party would win and which would lose?
Could one have foreseen that the court would decide that plaintiff had legal
right? Quickly, one realizes, however, that liability is only part of the
calculus of prediction of practical outcome . What does it mean to win? Did
the court, in holding for plaintiff, award plaintiff a few cents or a great deal
of money? Which outcomes should one have foreseen? What are the
collateral consequences of the court’s holding, for example, good or bad
publicity, adverse impact on future dealings with this customer or with
customers in general?
Reasons. Predicting outcomes is not all that there is to lawsuit
predictability. Why did the court decide as it did? One needs to know that, if
one is to take an appeal. One needs to know that, if one is to adjust one’s
conduct in the future to comport with the decision. For outside observers, the
reasons for decisions often are the most important part of predictability.
Outsiders want to know what they should do in conducting their affairs.
Process costs. Outcome and reasons leave uncounted the transaction
costs of lawsuits. Lawyers must be paid; courts require their costs. Who
bears these expenses materially affects process risks. Besides immediate
expenses lawsuits involve other costs for parties. Resources and energy
committed to lawsuits cannot be used elsewhere. While lawsuits are pending,
credit may be impaired and other matters delayed. Process costs and risks
often determine whether lawsuits are brought without regard to the
underlying merits of the claims.
Practical Predictability and Settlements
Although issues of predictability are similar in our three systems, they
play out differently in how cases are settled. Exactly how differently is not
known. Information about resolutions of disputes, both before lawsuits are
brought and after cases are commenced, is not available. 529 What we do
know about all three of our systems is that once cases are commenced, far
fewer American cases conclude in judgments than do German or Korean
cases. In the American federal system, the number of cases concluding in
judgments is a little above 1% (about 3300 out of 267,000 cases). In the
Bavarian system, it is about 28% (about 14,000 out of 50,000). Appreciating
and explaining these disparate numbers could fill volumes. In an
introductory book, we could not possibly do the topic justice. Yet, in a book
designed to give practical knowledge of the realities of litigation, we cannot
ignore it. In a discussion of the promises of the open courts clause, we need
pay it mind. We offer here three observations that may help appreciate and
explain this phenomenon, but for which we make no claim of accuracy.

529

See Clermont, Litigation Realities, supra note 529, at 1953.
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Expenses of litigation. The expenses of litigation are much higher in
the United States than they are in Germany or Korea. In America they may
equal or exceed amounts in dispute; in Germany and in Korea they are
usually kept proportionate to the matter in controversy. As we saw in
Chapter 3, expenses in the United States are borne separately by each party;
in Germany and Korea almost all are paid by losers. The American practice
means that “as soon as disputants enter the litigation process, they are clear
losers. … [B]y bringing lawyers into the mix … the parties consign
themselves to being worse off.” Under such a regime, the question is not,
why do cases settle?, but why do they get litigated? 530 In Germany and
Korea, where losers pay, parties dispute so long as their belief in a favorable
judgment exceed their aversion to risk of loss.
Risks of litigation. The risks of exorbitant judgments are higher in the
United States than in Germany or in Korea. American substantive law
frequently permits higher awards. American procedure entrusts those awards
to lay jurors, who may in effect make new law that is unavailable to
professional judges, or who may be more generous than professional judges
charged with maintaining equal justice under law. The American practice of
no indemnity for lawyers’ fees promotes making exorbitant demands to fund
expensive litigation while imposing no penalty (in greater risk of loss) for
asserting them. Since litigation is voluntary, even a slight risk of an
exorbitant judgment is enough to brow-beat risk averse parties into
settlement. The risk of exorbitant awards in the United States is sufficiently
serious to have spawned a new type of legal professional, the trial consultant,
a new organization for trial consultants, the American Society of Trial
Consultants, a new journal, The Jury Expert, and new work products, e.g.,
focus groups, mock trials and valuation studies. 531
Settlement as norm. Settlement has dominated American civil justice
for so long that it is now dubbed the “modal civil case outcome.” “[I]n the
usual course, settlement is our system of justice.” 532 The system depends on
“parties finding alternatives to using the system.” 533 In this world “reformers
are constantly seeking ways,” Professor Clermont writes, to get cases to
leave the system by “abandonment, concession or privately negotiated
settlement or by … arbitration, mediation [or] conciliation.” 534 Adding more
judges to decide more cases is thought would only encourage more
litigation. 535 The equivalent for health care reform would be to hope more
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people die or at least treat themselves at home without ever going to a
physician or entering a hospital.
Today’s reality of settlement instead of trial demands new measures.
American lawyers, in a way typical of their admired flexibility, are
responding with a new form of professional firm: the “settlement mill.”
These are “high-volume personal injury law practices that aggressively
advertise and mass produce the resolution of claims, typically with little
client interaction and without initiating lawsuits, much less taking claims to
trial.” 536 The world looks to the United States as leader in what is called
alternative dispute resolution. One day the world will realize the United
States has more need for alternatives because it’s judicial system works
poorly for many cases.
Readers may find pressing people to private dispute resolution a
repugnant step backward in time. Should society not just as well renounce
public schooling and public transit? Were not schooling and transit once
limited to the wealthy? Readers may ask, what are the consequences of
dispensing with public dispute resolution? If there is no longer a viable
public option providing neutral application of law to facts, what is left of the
rule of law? Will there be a return to a state of “liberty without law,” where,
as a popular nineteenth century American secondary school text book
described it, “a strong man might use a weak one as he pleased, or the
cunning man might cheat or circumvent another, and thus take away his life
or property, or make him the slave of his pleasures.” 537 Pressing people to
private dispute resolution is renunciation of the open courts promises of
decisions according to law. It is a poor apology for a dysfunctional civil
justice system. Yet it is one that has been made in the past. Indeed, it is
asserted that throughout much of American history potential suitors were
told that “litigation is something pernicious that ought to be discouraged.” 538
In this world readers may wonder, what is the purpose of courts? It is
not to apply existing law to facts to decide cases, but to create law so that
parties can apply the newly found or created law to themselves. A 100%
settlement rate would not work: “the system must adjudicate some cases in
order to pronounce the law.” 539 According to a model originating in what is
called the law-and-economics school, the American civil justice system
gives parties an opportunity to test the law (motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim) and an opportunity to test the facts (discovery). After that
testing, parties should resolve their issues themselves. They will go to trial
only if they are mistaken in their evaluations of the tests or their claims are
not governed by existing law. Americans, in this view, have “designed a
536
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pretty good system for letting all but the foolish and the trailblazers resolve
their disputes prior to trial.” 540
2. Appeals Generally
Losing parties in lawsuits are not a happy lot. Most feel that the court of
first instance got it wrong: it found facts falsely, determined law incorrectly
or applied law to facts erroneously. Appeals permit losing parties to ask
another court to take a second look at the case and to get right what the first
court—in the losing party’s view—got wrong.
While appeals are of intense interest to losing parties, they are not
essential to dispute resolution. Indeed, were dispute resolution the only goal
of civil justice systems, appeals might be dispensed with. Necessarily they
increase costs and, at least in short run, undermine efficiency. Yet appeals
are normal features of civil justice systems because, in the long run, they
contribute to making legal systems work better. System benefits of appeals
include:

540

•

Encouraging voluntary participation of parties in lawsuits.
Parties know that courts make mistakes; they more readily
participate in first instance proceedings and accept results of
those proceedings when they know that mistakes can be
corrected.

•

Encouraging self-directed judicial quality control.
Judges know that they make mistakes; they more fully and
fairly hear all parties and more carefully craft their decisions
when they know that their actions are subject to criticism and
correction.

•

Fostering consistent implementation of procedural rules and
consistent interpretation of substantive rules among all courts.
Rules, both procedural and substantive, sometimes require
interpretation for application. When all first instance courts are
subject to supervision by one higher court, their actions are
more easily kept consistent, thus promoting both predictability
and equal protection under law.

•

Filling gaps in law through occasional judicial lawmaking.
Disputes occasionally raise issues not governed by existing law
that require finding new law in the course of law applying.
When one appellate court has responsibility for that law

See Issacharoff, supra note 530, at 1274-1275.
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finding, all lower courts can more easily conform their
decisions to that one court’s law, thus promoting predictability,
equal protection and legitimacy of decisions.
•

Encouraging voluntary compliance with law generally.
People abide by law, in part, because they believe that law will
be applied to all correctly and equally. They more readily abide
by law when appellate courts oversee correct and equal law
application.

The first two of these benefits are individual case-oriented; the last three are
system-directed. 541 Appeals contribute mightily to legal certainty and
realization of the rule of law.
While appeals are common, they are not all of the same type. Some
appeals review entire cases; others consider only specific mistakes. The
former address all aspects of decisions below and ask, was that decision
right. The latter review only whether the court below made specific errors;
did the court make a mistake. Some appeals consider whether lower courts
correctly found facts; other appeals review only whether lower courts
properly followed all legal rules. Typically courts that review findings of fact
may themselves take proof, while those that only correct errors in following
legal rules do not.
Appeals thus differ in the attention that they give to individual-case and
system values. While this different emphasis is not necessarily a feature of
judicial hierarchy, it is easily observed there. Commonly systems of civil
justice have three levels of courts: courts of first instance, intermediate
courts of appeal, and courts of final appeal. All three of our systems do. As
one moves up the hierarchy of courts, the main mission of the court shifts
from the case before it to system values.
In courts of first instance in all three of our systems, the main mission is
decision of the case before it correctly. Courts of first instance take rules of
law governing the case as givens. Their job is to find facts, determine which
law is applicable and apply that law to the facts correctly. To find those
facts, they may take proof offered by the parties. The courts have
responsibility for the whole case. Their proceedings address all possibly
applicable legal rules and take account of all elements of those rules.
In courts of final appeal in all three of our systems, the main mission is
not decision of the individual case, but determination of legal system issues.
Courts of final appeal usually take as givens facts of the instant case as found
by lower courts. Their job is to decide specific issues of rule application and
interpretation that the case has raised and to evaluate the probable impact of
decision of those issues for the legal system as whole. Ordinarily courts of
final appeal do not, indeed sometimes may not, take further proof. The
541
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courts do not have responsibility for the whole case, but only for decision of
those specific issues.
In intermediate appellate courts, the main mission varies among our
three systems. Here the feature common to all is exposure to pressures of
these competing missions. Are the intermediate appellate courts to function
more like courts of first instance or more like courts of final appeal? Are
they to review the whole case below and worry about its outcome, or are
they to limit review to correction of errors made below? Are they to review
findings of fact and possibly revise them, even by taking new proof, or are
they to limit their examination to issues of law? While there are few
absolutes, as a general matter, intermediate American appellate courts,
especially those of the federal system, lean in the direction of the systemfocus of courts of final appeal, while German and Korean intermediate
appellate courts tend toward the individual-case focus of courts of first
instance.
It is important to keep the different missions of the different courts
distinct. Critics of judicial styles commonly confuse civil law decisions of
courts of first instance with opinions of common law courts of final appeal.
Such comparisons are misleading. Courts of final appeals consider only
specific legal issues and the effect on the legal system of the resolutions they
adopt. Courts of first instance find all facts necessary to fulfill all elements of
all legal norms in the cases before them. 542
B. United States
We discuss in this section judgments after trials and then appeals from
those judgments.
The United States has two principal forms of judgment. The one that
follows a bench trial mirrors German and Korean judgments. The other,
which follows a jury trial, is completely different from German and Korean
judgments. All forms of judgment, at least in conventional wisdom, pursue
the same goals of the open courts clause: accurate finding of facts and
application of law to reach decisions according to law.
We saw in Chapter 6 that summary judgment is a kind of American
judgment. It occurs without trial, that is, without court findings of fact.
Summary judgments are used most when facts are no longer in dispute. They
can also be used where one party asserts that there is no material issue of fact
in genuine dispute; use in such cases can be controversial. Ordinarily
summary judgments do not require justifications. 543 We do not consider
them further here.
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Appeals occur in more cases than in the few cases that go to trial. Some
appeals review summary judgment decisions. Others reexamine decisions of
preliminary motions that result in ending the litigation, such as dismissals for
lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a legal claim for relief. Others
review decisions granting or denying interim relief before trial, i.e., granting
or denying temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.
We begin with judgments of American courts of first instance after
bench trials, continue with judgments after jury trials, and conclude with
appeals of both types of judgments.
1. Judgments
An American judgment is an official recording of a court’s decision. It
determines rights of parties in a lawsuit. It consists of a caption that
identifies the parties and the lawsuit and a statement of the decision made
and the relief ordered. 544 Unlike German and Korean judgments, an
American judgment does not include reasoning of the court. It thus
corresponds to the Rubrum and the Tenor of German and Korean judgments.
The judgment is where American courts of first instance apply law to facts
of the case.
While an American judgment, formally defined, does not include
reasoning of the court, in the case of a judgment after bench trial, the
judgment is accompanied by a separate statement of reasons (“findings of
fact” and “conclusions of law”). In the case of a judgment following a jury
trial, there is no additional statement. For convenience, we refer to an
American judgment accompanied by a decision as a “justified judgment.” In
contrast, we refer to a judgment unaccompanied by a decision, i.e., a
judgment on a jury verdict, as an “unjustified judgment.”
Since parties themselves determine which kind of trial they have, they
also control which kind of judgment they receive. The rule is that a party
who has a right to jury trial, is entitled to and will receive one, provided that
the party acts timely. The right is absolute: the judge must direct a jury trial.
If, however, neither party timely requests a jury trial, trial is by judge alone.
In most private law matters seeking money damages parties have a right to
jury trial. The demand must be made at the very outset of the lawsuit. Even
if both parties do not have a right to jury trial, the judge may order one if
both parties agree. 545
Justified Judgments (Judgments after Bench Trials)

544
545
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In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and
state its conclusions of law separately.
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1)
Following bench trials judges are required to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 546 These findings of fact and conclusions of law together
constitute the decision of the court. The decision of the court justifies the
legal correctness of the court’s judgment. The decision determines law, finds
facts and applies law to facts. The judgment, together with the decision,
corresponds to what in German and Korean civil procedure is simply called a
judgment.
The ideal type of an American justified judgment is similar to the ideal
types of its German and Korean counterparts. The American decision is to
include five parts: (1) the nature of the action; (2) the facts; (3) the issues; (4)
the law and reasoning; and (5) the disposition. It is to be written in plain
language and should be the most condensed version of the relevant facts and
law possible. It should decide no more than is necessary to dispose of the
case. It should set forth only material facts. It should state facts in the past
tense and law in the present. 547
Findings of fact. A finding of fact is a declaration of an ultimate or
material fact that determines rights of the parties. If there is a stipulation or
admission of facts, no finding is necessary. A finding of fact should be made
on each material issue of the legal claim, since each is necessary to
determination of the rights of the parties. A finding of fact is drawn or
inferred from the evidence presented, including agreed, stipulated and
admitted facts, and is deemed essential to an understanding of the case or to
a determination of the rights of the parties. A finding of fact made from
disputed evidence requires evaluation of competing versions of fact. 548
Conclusions of law. Conclusions of law are reached by judges using
deductive reasoning that subjects material facts found to applicable law. A
conclusion of law is a statement of the law to be applied to the specific facts
in the specific case; it carries with it some form of legal consequence.
Conclusions of law taken together determine rights and duties of parties.
An American justified judgment, like its German and Korean
counterparts, carries through the syllogistic application of law to facts. The
process, contrary to widely held misconceptions, is not easy. Judge Joyce J.
George, well describes what it requires:
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Using this method the judge is forced to reason a step at a
time and to support each finding. This must be done before
moving on to the next step. Such an approach disposes of all
immaterial and insignificant matters that can clutter judicial
[reasoning]. Not all the facts involved in a case are necessary
either to a decision or to the law. Only those facts that could be
applied to the law are necessary. The step-by-step approach
compels a straight-line thought to a single acceptable decision
….
This step-by-step process is tedious. It requires the author
to select pertinent facts and to discard unimportant facts. Then
he must select the law to be applied to the chosen facts. The
labor, however, is well worth the time. After this process, the
judicial writing can be made to ring with clarity. Then no one
will be able to misunderstand the author’s thought process; it
will be apparent. 549
American justified judgments among themselves are less
consistent in form and style than are their German and Korean
counterparts. That is not surprising: they are rare rather than routine.
Writing judicial decisions is not an everyday task for American judges
the way it is for German and Korean judges. While all German and
Korean judges receive extensive training in writing judgments, few
American judges do. While German and Korean judges write a dozen or
more judgments in a year, American judges may write only one or two.
Unjustified Judgments (Judgments After Jury Trials)
… the clerk must, without awaiting the court’s direction,
promptly prepare, sign, and enter the judgment when:
(A) the jury returns a general verdict;
FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(1)
Judgment after jury trial is different from judgment after bench trial. The
jurors’ verdict tells no story. It does not state the facts the jurors found, the
law they applied or the legal reasoning they relied on. It is, as both Judge
Jerome Frank and Professor Sunderland said, “as inscrutable and essentially
mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi.”
550
The judgment after jury trial states names of parties and jurors’
549
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determination of parties’ rights (e.g., we find for the plaintiff in the amount
of $75,000) and no more. The clerk of the court, without the judge’s review,
enters the verdict as the judgment of the court.
2. Judgment in Roh v. Doh
A judgment on a general verdict in Roh v. Doh might look as follows:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Mary Roh,
Plaintiff
v.

No. ________________

John Doh, Jr.

Civil Action

Defendant
JUDGMENT ON A JURY VERDICT
This action was tried by a jury with Judge Jung presiding, and the jury has rendered a
verdict.
It is ordered that the plaintiff Mary Roh recover from the defendant John Doh, Jr. the
amount of $75,000, with prejudgment interest at the rate of __ %, post-judgment interest
at the rate of __%, along with costs.
Date: September 15, 2013
______________________________
Clerk of Court

There is no formal mechanism for jurors to disclose or for parties to
learn the reasons why jurors decided as they did. While judges may and, at
the request of a party must, ask jurors individually whether they join in the
verdict (“poll” the jury), there is no provision, let alone requirement, that
jurors reveal their reasons. 551 That there is great interest in those reasons is
shown by multiple media interviews and juror-written books that follow jury
verdicts in high-profile cases. 552 Talking informally with individual jurors
after the judge has formally dismissed them is the only way to learn their
reasons.
551
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3. Jury Decisions According to Law
Although jurors do not give reasons for their decisions, jurors are
expected to decide objectively and according to law. Judges instruct them
that “[i]t is your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them to
the facts as you determine them ….” 553 Jurors are to find all facts necessary
to fulfill all elements of applicable legal rules.
Jurors are not required to give reasons for their decisions because they
are thought not capable of doing so. In colonial times, many jurors were not
literate. Even today, many are not well educated. They are not are not
selected for their skills, as their German lay counterparts are, but as
representatives of all of society including the less well-educated. Even jurors
that are well-educated are rarely trained in law. To expect lay jurors, without
help to apply law, to facts as experts would, is unrealistic. Yet we are aware
of no extended discussion of providing jurors with legal assistants much as
Swiss courts provide legally-untrained judges with “court-writers”
(Gerichtsschreiber).
Judges are conscious of the duty of jurors to decide according to law.
They want jurors to decide according to law. Once jurors return a verdict,
there is not much that judges can do to change it. Their authority is limited
by the seventh amendment of the federal constitution and by similar
guarantees in state constitutions. The former mandates that “no fact tried by
jury shall be otherwise reexamined … than according to the rules of the
common law.” Consistent with that mandate, judges have developed ways to
promote decisions according to law in compliance with the open courts’
clauses. We discuss four:
(a) instructing jurors in finding facts and applying law (jury
instructions);
(a) focusing jurors on fact findings (special verdicts, jury
interrogatories, separate trials);
(a) restraining jurors from verdicts against law (judgments as of law
and new trials); and
(a) telling jurors what judges think of evidence presented (commenting
on evidence).
(a) Instructing jurors in finding facts and applying law (“jury
instructions”)
Jury instructions are a tribute to Americans’ devotion to the open courts’
promise of decisions according to law as well as a demonstration of their
553
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boundless faith in the potential of their fellow men. What could be more
noble than to hope that common men could learn to decide like lawyers after
a few minutes of instruction when potential lawyers are required to study for
three years before they are even allowed to take the examination to permit
them to practice as lawyers?
Judges are to give jurors formal instructions in every case. Toward the
close of the taking of proof parties propose instructions that they want the
judge to give. The judge decides which instructions to use, informs parties of
that choice and gives them opportunity to object. 554
At the end of the parties’ presentations and just before jurors exit the
courtroom to deliberate, judges read formal written instructions lecture-style.
There is no interaction: judges do not probe jurors for understanding of
instructions and jurors are not invited to ask questions. Judges take from a
few minutes to a few hours to read the instructions. Jurors, who had been
sitting passively listening to court proceedings for hours or days, sit
passively to take in all that the judge reads to them. The result is what one
might expect: jurors nod off into sleep as judges “drone on.” 555
Judges typically begin their instructions telling jurors of their duties and
advising them how to conduct deliberations, continue on to general legal
issues of method such as burden of proof, and drill down to elements of
claims made in the case. Judges tell jurors that they must find all elements of
a claim in order to decide for plaintiff. While practices vary, judges usually
give instructions orally. Some also give jurors written copies of instructions.
Jury instructions did not spring from some reform commission. They
grew out of the practice of judges commenting on evidence and telling jurors
which facts they had to find in order to hold for plaintiffs (see b below).
While judicial comments on evidence focus on facts, jury instructions are
directed to law and its application. They were unnecessary so long as jurors
only found facts and did not apply law to facts. The first major work devoted
to jury instructions was not published until 1881, that is, after the reforms of
mid-century had increased jury involvement in law applying. 556
Although judges introduced jury instructions to help untrained laymen
apply law, today “jury instructions are written and presented in a manner that
defy comprehension to those untrained in the law.” 557 This happened
because jury instructions became subjects for appeals. Appellate judges
parsed instructions to jurors to determine whether the judge accurately stated
the law. Trial court judges responded by using the very language of the
law—whether the text of statutes or words of the appellate court—to instruct
jurors. That placated appellate judges, but perplexed lay jurors. At this point,
554
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however, appellate judges lost site that the goal of jury instructions is to help
jurors apply law to facts. Today they acknowledge that instructions to jurors
may be “polysyllabic mystification,” but conclusively presume that jurors
understand the mysteries. 558
The American approach to helping jurors apply law is not the only
possible one or even the one that comes first to mind. There are other ways
that judges might help jurors find facts and apply law. Courts might train
jurors to act as judges on a regular basis. Judges might sit with jurors as
consultants and facilitators when jurors decide; when jurors have questions,
judges could answer them. The present American approach is a one shot
lecture on law just before jurors decide. It’s the legal process equivalent of
an air traffic controller talking down a passenger in charge of a pilotless
plane: “here’s what you need to know about aerodynamics, here’s how the
controls of your plane work, we wish you good luck and please report back
once you’ve landed with the results—over-and-out!” Why do Americans do
it this way? We suspect because the present way required no formal
institutional change; individual judges acting alone has only to modify
instructions that they were already giving.
(b) Focusing jurors on finding facts
If jurors only find facts, they need not be skilled at or instructed in
applying law. Special pleading at common law kept jurors focused on fact
finding and distant from determining law applying. There are several
different approaches available to judges today that work in much the same
way as did special pleading.
Special verdicts. In special verdicts judges instruct jurors to make a
“special written finding upon each issue of fact.” 559 Judges take the facts as
found by jurors, apply law to those facts and enter judgment. The drafters of
the Field Code recognized that their new approach had jurors applying law
more often than under common special pleading. They recommended that
judges use special verdicts. 560 Today law reformers again recommend greater
use of special verdicts in order to improve rationality of jury trials and to
restore law-applying to judges as much as possible. 561
Special verdicts on written questions (jury interrogatories). Closely
related to special verdicts are jury verdicts on written questions, also called
jury interrogatories. Here, judges submit to jurors, along with forms for a
general verdict, “written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the
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decision of which is necessary to a verdict.” 562 If jurors return answers to the
interrogatories that are consistent with each other, and with the general
verdict, the judge enters judgment on that verdict. If, however, jurors return
answers that are inconsistent with the general verdict, the judge may enter
judgment consistent with the answers, may return the case for further
consideration by the jurors, or may order a new trial. If the answers are
inconsistent with each other, the judge may not enter a judgment, but must
either return the case to the jury for further deliberation or order a new trial.
In effect, the written answers serve as a rudimentary justification of the jury
verdict.
Separate trials of issues. Judges are not required to consider all issues
that a case raises in a single trial before a single jury. “For convenience, to
avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a
separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, cross claims,
counterclaims, or third party claims.” 563 This rule permits judges to separate
out one issue from another to avoid making one finding dependent on the
other. It finds greatest use in separating out issues of liability from damages,
but could be used elsewhere as well. It has, however, found little application
in such other uses. 564 Because special verdicts take law-applying away from
juries, they are anathema to proponents of an extra-legal function for juries.
Despite their promises of improved accuracy, special verdicts, written
jury interrogatories and separate trials are little used tools. There is no
requirement that courts use any of them routinely or at all. Most judges use
them infrequently. Neither lawyers nor judges like them much. Lawyers
would rather that juries be freed to “do justice” than be constrained or guided
by law. Judges fear complexity from creating special verdicts and
complications in dealing with them when rendered. 565
Restraining jurors from deciding contrary to law
American judges have no general authority to revise erroneous decisions
of jurors. Judges may think jurors have decided in error, but in the usual
case, they are not free to override the jurors’ verdict and hold what they
consider correct. Nevertheless, judges have asserted in civil cases authority
to overrrule verdicts that are completely unfounded in law or evidence. This
is less a measure to maintain accuracy than a “a safeguard against irrational
behavior” on the part of jurors. It only “patrols the extreme outer limits of
rationality on the [jurors’] dominion.” 566
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This irrationality control exists in three forms: (1) motion for judgment
as a matter of law (made before jurors decide and formerly called a motion
for directed verdict); (2) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
(made after jurors have decided and formerly called a motion notwithstanding the verdict); and (3) motion for a new trial.
Judgment as a matter of law. Rule 51(a) allows a court, once a party
has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial, to grant a motion for
judgment on a claim or defense “if the court finds that a reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on
that issue.” The standard for granting the motion is high. The court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Unlike
in state courts, the court is to give the non-moving party an opportunity to
cure the defect. While the text of the Rule does not require a motion, practice
usually does. The Rule allows the court without motion to “resolve the
issue.”
Renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Rule 51(b) permits
a party to renew a Rule 51(a) motion up to ten days after trial if the court
denied the first motion. The standard for granting a Rule 51(b) motion is the
same as for Rule 51(a). Judges often prefer to delay decision of a Rule 51(a)
motion and decide the issue as a Rule 51(b) motion. This way, if jurors
decide the way the judge thinks they should, the judge will not have to
decide at all, both sparing judges’ time and preserving citizen involvement in
the case.
Motion for New Trial. Rule 59(a) permits a court to grant a motion for
new trial on some or all issues “for any reason for which a new trial has
heretofore been granted …”. This rule that incorporates common law
practice without naming the reasons is used mostly in the following
situations: verdict against the weight of the evidence, verdict in amount
awarded is excessive or inadequate, newly discovered evidence and
improper conduct affecting counsel, court or jury. The standard for granting
a new trial is lower than for granting judgment as a matter of law. It should
be granted if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. While the
judge should not substitute the judge’s view of the case for the jury, but only
if the judge is clearly convinced that the jurors were in error. The judge need
not, however, find the jurors’ verdict to have been irrational. 567 Granting a
new trial is, however, extremely costly. It requires redoing the whole
proceedings.
(d) Telling jurors what judges think of evidence (commenting on
evidence.)
In the nineteenth century American judges routinely commented on the
evidence offered by both parties before submitting cases to jurors.
567
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Sometimes judges stated how they thought jurors should find facts based on
that evidence. The practice was and still is common in England, but is rare in
the United States today. 568 Professor John Henry Wigmore, the icon of
evidence law, wrote that abandoning the common law practice of
commenting did “more than any other one thing to impair the general
efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of justice.” 569 Professor Sunderland
thought that “no single reform would have so wide-reaching and wholesome
effect in promoting the efficiency of courts and improving the quality of
justice.” 570 The practice is little used today because in the nineteenth century
American lawyers successfully fought it as an unwanted interference with
their efforts to persuade jurors. 571
4. Neglect of Syllogisms in American Law
Legal syllogisms make civil justice possible. They enable bringing
objective law and subjective fact together to determine parties’ rights and
resolve their disputes according to law in particular cases. Consistently
applied syllogisms promote equal protection under law. They provide
guidance to subjects of the rules. Syllogisms contribute to constraining
decision makers, parties and third parties. They make the rule of law
possible.
Syllogisms are the basis of applying rules in Germany, Korea and the
United States. But American jurists are ambivalent toward this centerpiece
of legal systems.
Academics, judges and practitioners do not like syllogisms because
syllogisms control legal decisions. Syllogisms limit the power of courts—
judges or jurors, often at the urging of practitioners or academics—to decide
cases the way they would like to decide them. If they could, a good number
of them would vote syllogisms out of the system.
Opponents of syllogisms rarely challenge syllogisms’ place in law
directly. Almost none criticize syllogisms as constraints on their own
freedom of action. Instead they offer up competing values which they
contend should routinely override syllogisms: doing justice in individual
cases, controlling government, and fostering democratic participation in
government. That these values are important, no reasonable proponent of
syllogisms would deny. That these values require routine rejection of
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syllogisms or that they cannot be achieved with syllogisms—indeed better
achieved with syllogisms—are other issues.
Few opponents of syllogisms appreciate fully and act consistently upon
the consequences of their opposition. If society eschews general laws
syllogistically applied, but relies for dispute resolution on sensibilities of
individual decision makers, then it is imperative that society give citizens
adequate opportunities for such individualization. The American jury is
hailed for the opportunities that it provides for individualization of justice,
control of authority, and participation of citizens in government. These
values are ill-achieved in abstract generality; they find realization in specific
application in particular cases. Yet the American civil justice system
provides a forum for only a small percentage of all disputes and gives only
one-in-a-hundred of those actually brought a jury trial.
Syllogisms will not disappear in the United States. Litigating lawyers
may wish to disavow them, but the public will not. Without syllogisms the
public and their counseling lawyers could not apply rules to themselves. The
public rightly expects judges to apply law and not to make law; it rightly
rejects runaway verdicts.
Proponents of syllogisms, on the other hand, also should appreciate the
consequences of their proposition. If society is to rely on general laws
syllogistically applied, those laws had better be good ones. Syllogisms are
formulated abstractly to apply generally. Their general application makes
imperative technical simplicity in application and substantive justice in
results. They should be sufficiently sophisticated to allow for exceptions.
That American statutes often fall short of these goals is not reasonably
deniable.
Attitudes toward syllogisms crystallize in views of the role of judges
and, especially, in the role of the jury: is the jury a fact-finding body that is
to follow the law or is it an institution that is to serve broader social purposes
that is authorized to depart from law? We address here four persistent points
of American process that we believe would be better considered were
syllogisms not neglected, but respected.
“Are juries really that bad?”
That is the question that Professor Clermont deftly uses to summarize
one long-standing debate that contrasts jury decisions with judges’
decisions. 572 The stereotypical view of a “biased and incompetent jury
system” is, Professor Clermont says, “elitist.” 573 He, and many others,
conclude that juries really are not that bad. They rely on empirical studies
first done in the 1950s and since reproduced, that in samples measured, in
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about four-out-of-five cases, lay jurors reach the same decision on liability as
would professional judges.
We have trouble with the characterization of 80% agreement as
felicitous. That might be tolerable in criminal cases where participation is
involuntary and where the consequence of disagreement is leniency, but we
think that it is inadequate in civil matters, where participation is voluntary
and where parties are as interested in the extent of liability as in the fact of it.
We also have trouble with using agreement between judges and jurors as the
measure of quality. What matters is whether judges’ or jurors’ decisions are
according to law. It is no comfort to the public or to the righteous litigant if
judge and jury agree on the wrong decision or never decide at all.
Even if jurors’ verdicts matched judges’ judgments one hundred percent
of the time on liability and one hundred percent of the time on the principal
amount awarded, they still would be deficient compared to the latter. Jury
verdicts would still be unjustified. They would not demonstrate that jurors
systematically found facts and accurately applied law. Verdicts would not
tell parties why they were wrong to litigate and not to settle. They would not
inform parties, or interested other persons, how to comport their conduct
with the law’s requirements. They would not permit appellate review for
accuracy. In short, so long as jury verdicts are unjustified, they are
inadequate.
Syllogisms are not simple. It is not elitist to think that jurors need help
in applying law to facts. Today, it is no longer out of contemplation that
jurors might give reasons. 574 It is misguided, on the other hand, to believe
that jurors should rely on receiving that help from lawyers for the parties
rather than from judges inclined to help jurors carry through subsumption of
facts under law.
“Theory of the Case—Wrecker of Law.”
That is how, one century ago, one perceptive lawyer characterized
the theory of the case, the salvation for subsumption then being newly
offered by trial lawyers. Today, theory of the case is ubiquitous. It is the way
that is supposed to help jurors—and judges—understand lawsuits. A guide
published by the American Bar Association for lay readers states: “The trial
is a formal hearing at which both sides present their theory of the case
….” 575 A guide published by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy for
professional readers captures the concept well in its first sentence: “At its
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most basic form, a trial is nothing more than the presentation of each side’s
version of a dispute.” 576
What is so bad about the theory of the case? It denies the syllogism.
Edward D’Arcy criticized the theory of the case for allowing “parties to
become involved in controversies not embraced within the issue.” 577 We add
that it forces passive decision makers, be they judges or jurors, to choose
between competing presentations. It makes judgments, which should be
objective applications of law to facts, into awards for the better story. The
American poet laureate Robert Frost is said to have cracked: “A jury consists
of twelve persons chosen to decide who has the better lawyer.” The ABA
Guide maintains that syllogisms remain: “The plaintiff will have to prove
each necessary element of his or her cause of action ….”). The reality,
however, is often they disappear.
“Jury Nullification—Law versus Anarchy”
Nowhere is rejection of syllogisms clearer than in the practice of jury
nullification. Jury nullification claims for lay jurors authority to decide
against law. In a democratic state such uncontrolled power to decide against
law contravenes the rule of law. That jurors have that power in criminal
cases has long been conceded; verdicts of acquittal are not reviewable.
Verdicts in civil cases are, however, reviewable to the limited extent that
they are manifestly against law. That jurors do not and should not have that
authority to decide against law has been consistently maintained. Judge
Lawrence W. Crispo stated the question succinctly: “Law versus
Anarchy.” 578 In a democratic state such uncontrolled power to decide against
law contravenes the rule of law.
The power of juries to decide against law is said to be one of the greatest
benefits of juries. Juries are said to be the citizen’s protection against
arbitrary government power. The argument, based on America’s colonial
heritage of juries protecting colonists against the English crown, is
anachronistic. Professor Sunderland countered it already in 1914:
[T]imes have changed and the government itself is now
under the absolute control of the people. The judges, if
appointed, are selected by agents of the people, and if
elected are selected by the people directly. The need for
the jury as a political weapon of defense has been steadily
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diminishing for a hundred years, until now [1914] the jury
must find some other justification for its continuance. 579
Sunderland’s argument is all the more persuasive when addressed to court
resolution of private disputes where dangers of arbitrary uses of government
power are minimal. Yet jury nullification is resilient; it has outlived
Professor Sunderland. It remains an ever present issue in discussion of the
role of the jury. 580
Managerial Judging: “Are We Getting Civil-ized?”
The historic role of the American judge is passive; lawyers lead process.
Reform proposals in recent decades call upon judges to be active. The report
of the American College of Trial Lawyers Report, for example, urges judges
to “have a more active role at the beginning of the case in designing the
scope of discovery and the timing and direction of the case all the way to
trial.” 581 Active involvement is dubbed “managerial judging.” It has had only
limited success.
Critics worry that managerial judging puts clearing dockets ahead of
declaring rights. They see it threatening the impartiality of judges by
involving them directly in case settlement. Many discern in it “some version
of the continental or inquisitorial model.” 582 Professor Thomas T. Rowe, Jr.
asks: “Are We Getting Civil-ized?” He keenly concludes that American
judges, when it comes to dealing with facts, are not moving in the direction
of what he calls “inquisitorial fact-finding.” 583
Managerial judging is not a step toward German syllogistic law
applying. It is a giant leap in the opposite direction. Managerial judging is
about “litigation control,” “case management,” and “docket control.” 584 It is
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not about clarifying what are the material issues in dispute between the
parties, deciding those issues under law and justifying decisions in
judgments. Professor Rowe, without referring to subsumption, links the
decisive change to the 1983 revision of Rule 12 providing for pretrial
conferences. The title changed. Before 1983 Rule 16 was headed, “Pre-Trial
Procedure: Formulating Issues.” Now the title is different: “Pretrial
Conferences; Scheduling, Management.” 585
German judges, too, are under pressure to clear dockets. Statutes,
justification and appeals, as we shall see, protect judges, to some extent
against those pressures. German judges put applying law ahead of docket
clearing. When involvement of judges in settlement discussions became
substantial, the Bavarian Ministry of Justice created a new institution: the
settlement judge. The settlement judge heads off the possibility of partiality
that troubles critics of managerial justice. 586
3. Appeals
In the United States the first appeal is of right. That means that a party
disappointed by a decision of the court of first instance need not make any
special showing to obtain review by the next level court. Free review from
the first instance decision is offered, because the purpose of the review is to
correct mistakes of the court of first instance. In a few less populous states,
that first review is the last possible, since those states have no intermediate
appellate court, but only one appellate court of last resort. In most states,
however, and in the federal system, a further review to a court of last resort
is possible when certain conditions are met. The purpose of that final review
is not the correction of error in the case at hand, but safeguarding the
integrity of the legal system as whole. That review usually requires
permission of one or the other of the courts to determine whether the case
presents an issue requiring appellate supervision, such as the court bellow
decided contrary to law or in conflict with other courts.
Filing fees for appeals from the United States District Court to the Court
of Appeals are modest: in 2010 the charge was $450 without regard to the
amount in controversy. Additional costs, however, can be substantial. These
might be printing the record or obtaining a bond to protect the interests of the
party opposing the appeal during the course of the appeal. The costs of legal
representation on appeal are borne by each party without regard to whether
the party who appeals is successful. An important question for every appeal
is whether it suspends the implementation of the first instance decision.
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Nature of Appellate Reviews
In American systems appellate review—both first and second—rests on
appealing parties identifying specific errors of law made by lower courts and
asking appellate courts to correct those errors. Appellate courts in the United
States do not review cases in their entirety to determine that they were as
whole correctly decided and reached correct decisions, i.e., that the court of
first instance correctly found facts, properly determined law, and correctly
applied law to facts.
Legal and practical obstacles stand in the way of full review. In
American systems, fact finding is reserved to jurors. The Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution limits appellate review of facts found to
reviews allowed by the eighteenth century common law. In effect all that
appellate court are allowed to do is to examine the record to see whether
there is some evidence from which jurors might have concluded that a
material fact had been proven.
The form of jury verdicts is a practical obstacle to review of the fact
findings of jurors. Since general verdicts state only a result, but no findings
of fact or conclusions of law, and give no reasoning, appellate courts cannot
review decisions closely. The higher court cannot know which facts the
jurors found to be true, how jurors understood law, or how jurors applied law
to facts found. All that appellate courts can do is to read laboriously through
trial records (recorded verbatim) to see whether were at least arguable bases
for the verdicts challenged.
While these limitations need not apply to reviews of judgments from
bench trials, appellate practice is based on expectation of review of jury
verdicts. Appellate courts do not, for example, themselves hear witnesses or
otherwise take evidence; they only review records of trials below.
Consequently practice in review of bench judgments is not as different from
review of jury verdicts as law would permit.
As result, even in the first review, appellate courts confine their review
to issues of law and do not revise findings of fact. They determine issues
such as whether courts below properly conducted proceedings, properly
instructed juries or correctly decided motions that disposed of or could have
disposed of cases based on undisputed facts. They review records to see if
there was some evidence on which jurors might have based their decision,
but do not inquire whether lower court decided cases correctly. 587
American lawyers rarely recognize the high costs that this restricted
review imposes. In the days before computers and photocopiers, parties
would expensively have the entire trial transcript set in type and printed. To
this day, they still provide to the court copies of any part of the verbatim
record potentially applicable for appellate judges painstakingly to read
587

See Mirjan Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
YALE L.J. 480, 515 (1975).
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through. Yet restricted review means that appellate courts usually cannot
themselves correct errors, but must return cases to lower courts for furthe
proceedings, including sometimes completely new trials.
Courts of Law Resort and Redundancy of American Appeals
In most American states and in the federal system, although parties are
denied even one review of factual findings, they get two reviews of legal
determinations. American lawyers rarely ask why there are two levels of
appellate review on law, since neither instance can correct factual findings of
the court of first instance or review a case as a whole. The unintended
consequence of a system of intermediate appellate courts is the phenomenon
of double appeals. Two level of appellate courts for law leads to two appeals.
If at first you lose your appeal, appeal again! It is a system from which only
lawyers profit.
The possibility of a second appeal in Roh v. Doh is low because the case
is in the federal system. In the federal system, a second appeal to the United
States Supreme Court is theoretically possible for questions of federal law,
including of federal constitutional law, but practically extraordinary. Since
Roh v. Doh is based on state law, no further appeal would be possible.
C. Germany
The judgment shall include: … 6. The grounds for
decision. … The grounds for decision shall contain a short
summary of the bases on which the decision in factual and
legal respects rests.
§ 313 Code of Civil Procedure
1. Judgments
“A German judgment is supposed to appear as an act of an impartial as
well as impersonal public authority furnishing the official and objective
interpretation rather than personalized opinions of the individual deciding
justices. . . . The typical German judgment . . . strives after the ideal of
deductive reasoning.” 588 It is designed to assure that the parties understand
the grounds for the court’s decision. Ideally the judgment will convince the
party who loses the lawsuit that that loss is the correct outcome. At a
minimum, the judgment should persuade the loser that the process was
rational. Parties affected by the judgment should be enabled to reproduce the
grounds for the decision. They should recognize that rational argumentation,
588

Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION
1, 26-27 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2nd ed., 2005).
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not arbitrariness, determined the judgment. In this way, the parties are
fundamental rights under the German constitution (Basic Law, Grundgesetz)
are fulfilled: the right under Article 3 to equal treatment under law and the
right under Article 103(1) to be heard. 589
Not only do judgments inform parties, they control judges. Judges who
subsume facts of cases under applicable rules incorrectly are subject to being
corrected on appeal. They demonstrate through their judgments their
understanding—or lack of understanding—of the contentions of losing
parties. They display, through the impersonal, even colorless, style of their
judgments, their neutrality. In theory judges should be fungible. 590
Elements of a Judgment
A judgment consists of a caption (Rubrum) that identifies the parties and
the lawsuit; a statement of the decision made and the relief ordered (Tenor or
Urteilsformel), which should be a sufficient direction to court personnel for
enforcement of the judgment; the findings of fact (Tatbestand); and the
grounds for the decision (Entscheidungsgründe), referred to here as the
justification.
The Tatbestand, as it appears in a judgment, is a short statement of the
parties’ legal claims and assertions of fact. The Code of Civil Procedure
provides: “In the Tatbestand the asserted claims and the supporting and
defending materials should be concisely presented only in their material
content with particular reference to the subject applications. For details of
the subject and of the matters in dispute, reference should be made to
pleadings, minutes and other documents.” 591 From the Tatbestand it should
be possible to discern quickly who is seeking what, from whom, on what
ground, and to determine which matters are in dispute and which are not.
The Tatbestand serves as a public record of the oral hearings. It should
include: the subject matter of the lawsuit, a sketch of the facts detailed only
insofar as necessary to establish clearly the subject of the lawsuit, the
589

See generally, James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It,
114 PENN STATE L. REV. 469 (2009).
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The judgment is central to German civil justice. It contributes both to accuracy of judgments
and to fairness of process. It is a rule of law control of judges’ actions and a quality control of
their decisions. German legal science gives the duty of justification and judgments close
attention. See, e.g., JÜRGEN BRÜGGEMANN, DIE RICHTERLICHE BEGRÜNDUNGSPFLICHT:
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE MINDESTANDFORDERUNGEN AN DIE BEGRÜNDUNG GERICHTLICHER
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN (1971); DELF BUCHWALD, DER BEGRIFF DER RATIONALEN JURISTISCHEN
BEGRÜNDUNG: ZUR THEORIE DER JURIDISCHEN VERNUNFT (1990); ANUSHEH RAFI, KRITERIEN
FÜR EIN GUTES URTEIL (2004). German legal education gives the skill of writing judgments
center stage in the first of the two year mandatory internship that follows university legal
education. Highly trained judges teach all prospective lawyers how to write judgments. See, e.g.,
WINFRIED SCHUSCHKE, BERICHT, GUTACHETEN UND URTEIL 34th ed. (2008) (1st ed. by
Hermann Daubenspeck, 1884); CHRISTIAN BALZER, DAS URTEIL IM ZIVILPROZESS:
URTEILSFINDUNG UND URTEILSABFASSUNG IN DER TATSACHENINSTANZ (2nd ed., 2007).
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evidence offered by the parties, the applications of the parties, relevant
history of the lawsuit, and specific references to the file. It should not
include: facts not necessary to the decision of the case, party statements
made in the proceedings that are no longer relevant, legal arguments of the
parties, statements of the law, nor normative evaluations of the facts. Silence
in the Tatbestand is understood to prove that no position was taken on the
point.
The justification furnishes the legal basis for the relief ordered or other
resolution of the case. Matters not relevant to the decision made or the relief
ordered do not belong in the justification. The justification is to evaluate and
subsume the concrete facts of the Tatbestand under the abstract elements of
the applicable rule. The Code of Civil Procedure provides: “The justification
contains a short summary of the consideration on which the decision in
factual and legal respects rests.” 592 In the normal case it should include the
following:
A statement of the result and the claims for relief;
A statement that the complaint states a cause of action (is schlüssig);
A statement that the claim is permissible, i.e., satisfies the prerequisites
for a lawsuit (e.g., the court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction) (is
zulässig);
A statement of the facts that satisfy the abstract elements of the
applicable rule;
A statement justifying the factual findings necessary for application of
the law; and
A statement of which facts are undisputed and which are disputed and
an evaluation of the evidence and resolution of the issue with respect to
disputed facts relevant to the decision.
2. Justification: Applying Law to Facts
The justification applies law to facts. It determines the facts of the
Tatbestand and subsumes them under the abstract elements of the applicable
rules. The process of applying law to facts is not a mechanical act of
mindless processing, but a mindful act of creative evaluation.
The justification follows a format that in clarity and brevity facilitates
understanding. It begins by stating the result of the lawsuit and by
identifying the determinative legal rule. It confirms or denies that the
plaintiff’s claim is permissible under procedural law and well-founded in
substantive law. For example, a typical justification might begin: “The
plaintiff’s action is in all respects permissible and well-founded. Pursuant to
§ 488 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Civil Code the plaintiff has a right
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arising from the loan agreement of April 15, 2011 to repayment of the loan
of €60,000.”
The justification then proceeds to address systematically the applicable
rule, its elements and, if the judgment denies plaintiff’s claims, all rules that
might support any of the claims. For each element of the rule, insofar as
necessary, the justification clarifies the legal definition of the element as it
relates to the particular case. Here the justification may interpret the
applicable statute, but only to the extent directly relevant to determining
whether the facts in the present case fulfill the elements of the statutory
norm. Abstract discussions of law have no place.
The justification then tells the factual story of the case. It focuses on
those facts material to decision of the case. Immaterial facts have no place in
the justification except as is necessary to understand the court’s decision.
The justification starts from undisputed facts. Where facts are disputed, the
justification evaluates the evidence that leads the court to decide as it does.
The justification does not discuss burden of proof other than with respect to
material facts in dispute. Once the justification has clarified material and
disputed facts, it subsumes those facts under the identified and clarified rule.
Duty of Justification Fulfilled in the Judgment
The German judgment fulfills the duty of the German judge to justify
the judge’s judgment. The general requirement of German law that a
decision to apply government power must be individually justified is
especially pronounced in judicial proceedings. Unjustified judgments
threaten the rule-of-law state; justified judgments tie the implementation of
the law in the individual case to the statute. They establish that application of
the law is an impartial application of the general rule to the specific case. A
deductive justification is thought essential to fulfillment of legal certainty.
The duty of justification is intended to enhance the quality of legal
decisions. In the first instance, it provides a foundation to review the
decision made. Just the knowledge that such a review is possible impels
decision makers to self-control. It requires them to base their decisions, or at
least the justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons (e.g., statutory
requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g., bias or prejudice). It pushes
them toward more careful handling of materials of decision, of fact finding
and of law determining and applying. Particularly compared to American
judges, who oversees proceedings as much as reach decisions, the duty of
justification imposes on decision makers the responsibility for outcomes of
procedure. Justification re not required, however, if both parties relinquish
593
their rights to appeal or if an appeal would not be permitted.
3. Judgment in Roh v. Doh and Assuring Open Courts Accuracy
593

§ 313a(1) ZPO.

252

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

Below we provide a judgment such as might be entered in Roh v. Doh.
Notice in particular how it provides transparency to decision thus promoting
decision accuracy.
Mary Roh v. John Doh, Jr.
_____________________________________________________
File No.:
Entered May 10, 2012

IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE
JUDGMENT
In the lawsuit
Mary Roh, Bismarkstraße 11, 10400 Berlin
Represented by Harry Hahn, Esq.

-against-

John Doh, Jr., Kaiserplatz 11, 84471 Munich
Represented by Betty Bahn, Esq.

For Repayment of a Loan
The 22nd Civil Chamber of the District Court Munich I, by District Judge Jung as single
judge, based on the oral hearing held April 30, 2012 issues the following:
Final Judgment:
I.

The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff € 60.000 and interest
of 5 % above Prime Rate from August 16, 2011.

II.

The Defendant bears the costs of the action.

III.

The judgment is provisionally enforceable upon posting of a bond
of 120 % of the amount enforced.

Tatbestand
The parties dispute the repayment of money in the amount of € 60.000.
Plaintiff and Defendant are independent merchants in the automotive section. Each of
them is a franchised Honda automobile dealer. Defendant’s father has been a close
friend of Plaintiff since they went to college together, and is the regional distributor for
Honda, who supplies the dealerships of both Defendant and Plaintiff. Defendant had
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been engaged to marry the Plaintiff’s daughter, but they broke up last summer.
On April 16, 2011 Plaintiff transferred €60.000 to Defendant’s company’s account with
the Deutsche Bank, Munich. This amount has not been repaid to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s position is that she transferred the money to Defendant as a loan. Defendant
has not complied with his obligation under the loan agreement to repay the money no
later than August 16, 2011. Defendant’s position to the contrary is that the disputed
amount was a gift of Plaintiff. Repayment by Defendant, let alone at a specific time,
was not agreed.
Plaintiff moves the Court,
to order Defendant to pay €60,000 and interest since August 16, 2011, in the
amount of 5 % above Prime rate.
Defendant moves the Court,
to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.
Defendant contests having made a loan agreement with Plaintiff. Rather it is that
Plaintiff rather gave him a gift. Presumably with her transfer of money Plaintiff wanted
to contribute to strengthening the relationship between Defendant and her daughter
and thereby further an eventual union of the families of two friends. A common future of
her daughter with Defendant, however, is now out of the question, since the daughter
has ended the relationship with Plaintiff. He was not at fault and therefore is in no way
obligated to pay the money back.
The Court took proof on the basis of its decision of August 15, 2011 by taking unsworn
testimony of both Defendant and Plaintiff as witnesses. Reference will be made to the
conclusions of the evidence-taking.
For further supplementation of the facts and of the dispute, reference is made to the
pleadings and their exhibits.
Grounds for Decision
The complaint is permissible and is in all respects justified. Under § 488(1) second
sentence of the Civil Code [BGB] Plaintiff has a claim against Defendant for repayment
of the loan in the amount of €60,000 pursuant to the loan agreement of April 15, 2011.
It is not disputed between the parties that Plaintiff transferred this amount to
Defendant’s company on April 16, 2011 and that the Defendant has not paid this
amount back to Plaintiff.
1.
On April 15, 2011 at the traditional spring party of the regional Honda distributor the
parties orally concluded a loan agreement on the basis of which Plaintiff was obligated
to place at Defendant’s disposal €60,000 as loan and Defendant was obligated on his
part to pay the loan back to Plaintiff no later than August 15, 2011.
Based on the oral hearing the Court is convinced that Plaintiff placed this money at the
disposal of Defendant only on the basis of the loan agreement.
The Court heard and examined Defendant and Plaintiff each formally as parties
regarding the controverted conversation at the referenced spring party. The Court saw
itself as bound to do so, because Plaintiff, who bears both the burden of presentation
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and the burden of proof of the asserted claim for loan repayment, under applicable
rules of proof, could meet that burden only through examination of the party opponent,
the Defendant (§ 445(1) Code of Civil Procedure). Defendant did not consent to
Plaintiff’s application to her examination as the party bearing the burden of proof (§ 447
Code of Civil Procedure).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized (e.g., its decision reported at NJW-RR
2006, 61ff. with further citations), that in such situations where a party to a confidential
conversation has no witnesses, the party must be given opportunity to introduce into
the proceedings her personal view of the conversation.
The parties in their examinations in the oral hearing orally confirmed their previously
stated positions. The evaluation of the proof of the party examinations (§ 453(1) 1 Code
of Civil Procedure) persuaded the Court that Plaintiff made her payment of €60,000 to
Defendant exclusively on the basis of the loan agreement with Defendant.
Under § 286 Code of Civil Procedure, which governs judicial free evaluation of
evidence, an assertion is proven, if the court is convinced of its truth, without thereby
setting requirements that can not be met. The basis of the evaluation is the entire
content of the hearing, all submissions, conduct, omissions, and personal impressions
of the participants in the process of taking proof.
It was plain to the Court that Defendant could not give a sound ground to explain why
Plaintiff would have given him a gift of such a large amount. It is undisputed that the
transfer of the money was to the corporate account of Defendant’s company. This
circumstance appears at least—in the absence of an further explanation, as is here the
case—to speak directly against the assumption of a gift. It must mean that the money
was also to benefit the business of Defendant’s company. The debits and credits of a
company’s bank account have special meaning for the company, above all under
accounting standards and in tax law. It would not be understandable, if a purely private
gift to the owner of a company would land in its corporate account, with all of the
substantial commercial and tax consequences that would have. The way the matter
was carried out, i.e., by transfer to the company account, speaks forcefully for
characterizing the payment as a loan.
What is more is that Defendant could not give a plausible ground for a gift. This is a
matter of a substantial amount of money. If Plaintiff really had in mind doing something
for the common future of Defendant and her daughter, obviously she would have told
her daughter Rosa about it, which undisputedly did not happen. If one assumes a gift, it
is not apparent why Plaintiff would wanted to support only Defendant unilaterally and
not also her daughter.
It was plain to the Court that Defendant, both in the hearing and in his testimony, was
unable to give precise details, but was able only to speak in general and conclusory
terms. In his statements he often failed to distinguish between descriptions of fact and
his evaluation of them. In sum, Defendant could not convince the Court that the
disputed amount was a gift of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, both in her statements and in the personal impression she
presented, convinced the Court that the complaint’s version of the case corresponds to
truth. Plaintiff testified that at the relevant time there was not the slightest ground for
her to give Defendant such a large amount of money. It was substantial to her. Rather,
at the spring party Defendant told her of his unexpected financial difficulty, that it arose
from the failure of an important customer to pay, and that it was completely
unexpected. Defendant implored her emphatically to loan him the money. Sure he
could have asked his father for the money at any time. Sure he could get short-term
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money in a number of other ways. But he wanted absolutely wanted to avoid, that this
sudden, but transitory financial difficulty, might disturb his father, who had placed great
trust in him. The money (€60,000) he would pay back as quickly as possible, and at
the latest, August 15, 2011. Defendant further said that he was asking her—the
Plaintiff—above all, because she had great trust in him.
In her declarations Plaintiff was clear and open. She freely acknowledged that she was
angry with Defendant, because he presented the matter otherwise and because he
had broken his promise to pay the money back. She was, however, able to detail the
entire course of events and to present them understandably. Her entire presentation of
the matter was believable and she herself was credible in her testimony. Based on the
personal impression of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conceive that Plaintiff, either out
of disappointment with Defendant or out of her disappointed expectations, could have
testified to untruths.
Defendant is therefore adjudged to pay back to Plaintiff the amount of the loan.

2.
The promised amount is, as sought, to bear interest. The Defendant has been in
default in repayment since August 16, 2011 (§ 286 (1) 2 Civil Code). The amount of
interest follows from § 288 (1) 1 Civil Code.
3.
The decision on costs is based on § 91(1) Code of Civil Procedure.
4.
The claim for provisional enforcement is based on § 709 first sentence Code of Civil
Procedure.
Jakob Jung
Judge Landgericht

At about 1500 words (one word for every forty Euros in dispute) the
justification is neither long nor short for cases of this magnitude. We have
tried to create in this translation the style of a typical German judgment.
This judgment is an example of how German judgments are crafted to
use clear, declarative sentences to explain why judges decide as they do. The
judgment states first the differing contentions of the parties. It identifies the
applicable law. It considers the proof to see whether it fulfills the elements of
the applicable rules. It explains why the judge chose to believe one witness
and not another.
Such a judgment may not be literature, but it is a clear statement
showing the path that the court followed to reach the decision that it did.
Should one or the other parties challenge the outcome, they will not be
reduced to arguing generalities. While they may argue that the court made
particular procedural errors (most commonly, failure to fulfill a duty of
elucidation), they will be able—indeed, they may be required—to point to
how those errors adversely affected the court’s substantive adjudication.

256

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

Such judgments are given in the majority of concluded cases. German
judges write dozens of such judgments each year. They can do that because,
as we saw in Chapter 3, they are trained to do it.
Writing good prose is not enough. While it is hard to imagine an
untrained American juror writing such a judgment, it is not easy to imagine a
well-trained American professional writing one either. American lawyers
focus on case theory rather than on thought process. A judgment states the
thought process used by the judge in the case. The judgment details the
judge’s route to decision; it states why at each point along the way, the judge
went down one path rather than another. An American theory of the case
presentation does not ordinarily permit departures from presented paths. Yet,
that is exactly what the law may sometimes require.
Living with the case and doing it justice: the judge as facilitator and guide,
not as manager or inquisitor.
A German judgment is possible because the judge who decides the case
has lived with it from its filing. Living with the case is an explicit
requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure. 594 The judge writing the opinion
must have participated in the hearings, i.e. beigewohnt haben, which
translates literally as “have lived with” the hearings.
As Americans ponder how more active judges might function without
undermining their system’s commitment to party presentation and judicial
neutrality, they should consider how German judges live with their cases and
do them justice: they guide cases toward resolution according to law. Let us
recall our discussion throughout this book of how German judges decide
cases.
German judges are not the inquisitors that Americans, unfamiliar with
German practices, believe them to be. German judges have no personal or
governmental interest in how they decide cases before them. Their interest is
that they decide according to right and statute to further the overall societal
interest in the rule of law and peace. Recall our discussion in Chapter 6
above.
Nor are German judges the managers that critics of American
managerial litigation fear their judges may become. They are not driven
single-mindedly, as legal ethics expert Professor Stephen Gillers said of
American judges, to “Wind up this dispute, let’s go on to the next
dispute.” 595 German judges do not rely on deadlines divorced from case
issues to expedite resolution of disputes; they do not demand that parties
complete preparation or presentation of case theories within artificially set
594
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TRUTH ON TRIAL, 8 ANNENBERG ETHICS IN AMERICA at 55th minute (Columbia University
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timelines. What they do is insist on is that parties substantiate assertions that
particular facts do or do not fulfill elements of legal claims.
German judges could not be the managerial judges that American jurists
rightly fear. The twin duties under which they work—of justifying their
decisions after elucidating their cases—do not permit it. While German
judges are under pressure to decide cases, they cannot decide and bury old
cases. They must find facts that establish legal bases for their decisions. If
they do not put those facts down in their judgments, appellate courts will
reverse them. If they decide without hearing all sides adequately on a
material point in dispute, appellate courts will themselves review that
element or return the case to them.
German judges function not as inquisitors or managers, but as guides
and facilitators of decisions according to law. Statutory law tells them where
they must guide their cases, while the duty of justification tells them how to
facilitate the trip and demands that they document that they have properly
completed it.
Look back on our discussions of pleading and process. Recall how
German judges act:
Pleadings: German judges review every case filed for compliance with
procedural and substantive prerequisites. They review all cases, not just
those parties object to, before they serve complaints. They determine
affirmatively, albeit preliminarily, that jurisdiction exists and that actions are
timely brought. If lacking, they give guidance. Jurisdictional rules are
straight-forward and permit expeditious application. They are not complex
and convoluted the way many corresponding American rules are. German
judges, before serving complaints, determine that complaints state plausible
grounds for relief. That is also not time consuming, because rules of
substantive law are codified: recognizing possible legal grounds for relief is
easy in most cases. Moreover, rules of procedure require that plaintiffs
substantiate claims for relief, not just with wishful assertions of facts, but
with offers of proof.
To American plaintiffs’ lawyers the world of German pleading universe
might sound a hell and to defense lawyers a heaven (or at least a safe haven),
but that is not so. Plaintiffs whose pleadings fail one or the other test are not
summarily dispatched from the courthouse; judges may ask them to make up
deficiencies. In other words, judges guide plaintiffs to right paths. Only if
plaintiffs are then unable to make necessary claims, do judges dismiss
complaints. Such dismissals are in everyone’s interest. They avoid
squandering court and plaintiffs’ time in useless litigation. They protect
privacy of potential defendants who are never served. They may spare
plaintiffs, who would most surely wind up on the losing side, the obligation
of reimbursing the side-not-served for its lawyers’ fees.
Preliminary hearings. Beginning with review of complaints, German
judges work to facilitate conclusion of the cases according to law. It is their
responsibility, as participants knowledgeable in law, to identify possibly
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applicable legal rules. As facilitators they discuss cases directly with parties
and not just with lawyers of the parties. In these hearings judges seek, as
they did with pleadings, not to evict parties with weak cases from the
courthouse, but to facilitate court resolutions of cases on the merits. Judges
are looking for the material issues in dispute, for these are the only issues
that they need consider.
Proof taking. Only after they have identified conceivably applicable
legal rules and determined which elements of those rules are material and in
dispute between the parties, do German judges turn to proof taking. Parties
are responsible for identifying proof. The parties are not, however, allowed
to impose on the other side the burdens of American-style discovery. They
cannot force participation. German judges facilitate taking proof of facts that
are material elements in dispute. They do not, however, allow parties to
inquire into matters not relevant to material elements in dispute. Again
German judges are guides and facilitators, for they help identify what parties
must prove. Where a party’s proof proves infirm, they do not exclude the
party or the parties’ claims from proceedings. What they do do is to postpone
further consideration pending production of necessary proof. Should a party
uncover the proof, if the judge has not decided that case already, the party
can return to court.
No surprises. German judges guide process to facilitate cooperation of
judges and all parties in determining whether facts exist that establish or
deny application of applicable legal rules. When courts and parties cooperate
in determining whether elements of legal claims are fulfilled, there are few
surprises. Decisions according to law require that judges give all parties
opportunity to be heard on all material issues in dispute.
5. Appeals
In Germany, as in the United States and in Korea, the first appeal, is as
of right. For very small matters (below €600), appeal requires approval of
the court. 596
The 2002 reform of German civil procedure introduced a completely
“new conception” of the first appeal. Previously, the first appeal anticipated
a trial de novo; virtually everything was done anew. Appeals were very
common. The formal parliamentary explanation for the reform bill rejected
this long-used approach both as uneconomical and as not required by the rule
of law. According to the explanation, the function of review now is “to
review the judgment of the first instance for its application of the substantive
law as well as the correctness and completeness of the determinations
reached and to correct any mistakes.” Under the new law, the appellate court
is required to accept factual findings of the court of first instance “insofar as
there is no clear indication of doubt of the correctness or completeness of the
596
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fact determinations material to the decision and therefore indication for a
new fact determination.” If there is such doubt, however, the court, as
before, may take new testimony and find new facts.
Whether the reform will change the scope of review materially remains
to be seen, but most commentators think that it will not. What remains the
same after the reform is the appellate court’s responsibility for the material
correctness of final judgments. The appellate court is not to search for errors
by courts below, but is to insure that judgments in their entireties are correct
and, when they are not, to correct the judgments. Now, rather than conduct
the proceedings of the case itself anew as the previously did, appellate courts
are to review trial court’ factual findings for correctness and to apply the law
to the facts as found. By focusing on how the trial court applied the law,
reforms are intended to enhance legal certainty. In any case, other aspects of
the reform seek to enhance legal certainty by helping cases conclude sooner.
Appellate courts are required to review all appeals when initially filed. They
are to dismiss, ex officio, appeals that appear to have no chance of success or
raise no legal issue of fundamental importance.
Although the 2002 reform sought to diminish the incidence of appeals,
the percentage of cases appealed remains high. Fees for appeals are base on
the amount in dispute. As with court costs generally, they are taxed to the
losing party.
D. Korea
A written judgment shall contain … 4. the grounds for
decision.
Art. 208(1) Civil Practice Act 597
1. Judgments
In form Korean judgments parallel their German counterparts. They
begin with identification of the parties and the lawsuit and with a statement
of the decision and of the relief ordered. They then give a short statement of
the parties’ legal claims and of their assertions of fact. Finally, they conclude
with a justification of the decision which applies the law to the facts. 598
The justification of Korean law is in essence similar to its German
counterpart. One substantial difference is that Korean court judgments are
restricted to giving judgment on the legal claims that the parties asserted. 599
597

The language is the same as in the original 1877 German Code of Civil Procedure, = § 274(1)
CPO (1877).
598
§ 208(1) KCPA. See Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 134-135,
reprint at 22-24.
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Korean Judgment in Roh v. Doh
Mary Roh against John Doh, Jr.
____________________________________________________
Judgment Announced by Seoul Central District Court May 10, 2012
Case Number:

Plaintiff Mary Roh
100 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul
Plaintiff’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Harry Hahn
111 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul
Defendant John Doh, Jr.
300 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan
Defendant’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Betty Bahn
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[Main Text of Final judgment]
I order that:
The Defendant pay to the Plaintiff ₩75 million plus 5% annual interest rate of
the said amount since August 15, 2011 until May 10, 2012 [date of
formal entry of judgment], and 20% annual rate of the said amount from
the next day of the date when the decision was rendered until the day
when Defendant fully pays back to Plaintiff the amount awarded.
II. Defendant bears the costs of the dispute.
III. The above is subject to provisional execution.

I.

[Gist of Plaintiff’s Claim]
Identical to the main text of final judgment

[Grounds]
1.

Basic Facts
The plaintiff and the defendant are each working as independent merchants in
the automotive industry. Each of them are Honda dealers. The father of
Defendant is a longtime and close friend of Plaintiff. Defendant’s father is
regional distributor for Honda automobiles. Defendant was engaged to be
married this upcoming June to the daughter of Plaintiff; she unilaterally broke of
the engagement in June of last year.
At the traditional spring party of Honda dealers held last year Plaintiff and
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Defendant met. The parties disagreed about what was said between them at
the party, but they agree that the next day Defendant transferred ₩75 million to
the account of DohSon Honda LLC, in which Defendant was the managerowner. On April 16, 2011 the amount mentioned above was transferred from
the plaintiff to DohSon Honda LLC’s bank account at Pusan Bank in Pusan.
.
September 7, 2011 Plaintiff asked Defendant to repay the loan which had been
due at the latest, August 15, 2011. However, Defendant refused to repay the
money, contending that he did not enter into a loan agreement with Plaintiff
and it was a gift to him. As a result, Plaintiff instituted the instant suit against
Defendant before the court.
On basis of Proofs No. 1 to 3, I found that there was a loan agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendant on April 15, 2011.
[Proof] Proofs No. 1, No. 2. And No. 3 Attached.
2.

Parties’ Arguments and Court’s Holdings

(1) Parties’ Arguments
1)

Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff is of the opinion that she transferred ₩75 million to Defendant as a loan. Plaintiff
argues that Defendant was obligated to repay the loan by August 15, 2011 and failed to
do so. Hence, Plaintiff claims Defendant should pay to Plaintiff ₩75 million plus 5%
annual interest rate of the said amount since August 16, 2011, until May 10, 2012 and
20% annual rate of said amount from the next day of the date when the decision was
formally entered to the day when Defendant has fully paid this judgment.

2)

Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant argues that the amount mentioned above was a gift for him and does not
need to be paid back to Plaintiff. Thus Defendant contends that the instant lawsuit
should be dismissed.
(2) Court’s Holding
It is not disputed that the plaintiff paid ₩75 million on April 16, 2011 to the
company owned by Defendant and that Defendant has not paid the money
back to Plaintiff within its due date.
The parties entered into an oral loan agreement on April 15, 2011 at the
annual spring party of the regional Honda Automobile dealers’ association,
under which Plaintiff was obliged to lend ₩75 million to Defendant and, in turn,
Defendant was obliged to pay the money back to the plaintiff no later than
August 15, 2011.
At the hearing, the Court was convinced that Plaintiff transferred the money to
Defendant’s company only on the basis of the loan agreement between the
parties.
The Court has examined both parties as witnesses in accordance with Article
293 of Korean Civil Procedure Act [KCPA].

262

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

In addition, the court noticed that the defendant could not name a really good
reason as to why the plaintiff gave that amount of money to the defendant for
a gift. It is undisputed that the transfer of payment to the DohSon Honda
LLC's business account was made by Plaintiff. This situation seems to mean
that the money should benefit the operation of DohSon Honda LLC. Hence,
the money cannot be a purely private gift for Defendant only on the basis of
the fact that he is the owner of the company.
Another factor is that the defendant could not present the Court a really
plausible reason for a gift. The amount the plaintiff transfer to the defendant’s
company is significant and high. Overall, the defendant fails to prove that the
disputed amount was a gift for the defendant. Thus, the court believes the
plaintiff's version of the truth.
3.

Conclusion

Thus, the defendant has obligation to pay to the plaintiff ₩75 million plus 5% annual
interest rate 600 of the said amount pursuant to the Korean Civil Code since August
16, 2011, until May 10, 2012, and 20% annual rate of the said amount pursuant to
the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (sosong
chokjin deong e kwanhan teokre beop), from the next day of the date when the
decision was rendered to the date when the Defendant has fully paid this judgment.
Thus, by affirming the plaintiff’s claim, the court holds the judgment mentioned on the
main text of the final judgment.
Jacob Jung
Court Judge

3. Appeals (상소)
In Korea, as in the United States and in Germany, the first appeal (항소)
is of right.
In Korea, as in Germany but contrary to the United States, the second
instance courts review not only issues of law but also factual issues. Hence,
appellants can submit additional evidence before the second instance courts.
This arrangement encourages plaintiffs and defendants alike to forego
lawyers in the first instance proceedings and appear pro se. They figure that
if they lose in the first instance, they can appeal to the second and, in effect,
have a new proceeding. They anticipate, what usually is the case, that they
will invest more resources in the second instance than they did in the first.
The fee schedule discourages appeals, even though the costs imposed
are eventually taxed to the losing party. The fees through the courts increase
regularly. As we saw in Chapter 5, the fee in the court of first instance in 0.5
% of the amount in controversy. In the second instance, it rises to 1%, and in
the third and final instance, to 1 ½ % of the amount in controversy.

600

Article 379 of Korean Civil Code.
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E. Roh v. Doh: Comparative Outcomes
We do not want to make the mistake that many make and confuse legal
decisions for actual outcomes. Diffeent systems may reach the same legal
conclusion, yet from the perspective of the parties, produce very different
outcomes. That is the case in Roh v. Doh.
Deciders in all three systems—be they judges or jurors—are likely to
reach the same decision in our hypothetical case based on how they assess
the parties’ credibility. The outcomes in the three systems, however, will be
different even if the legal conclusions are the same.
1. Can Roh lose while winning?
If the case goes to final judgment, if Roh wins, in the United States, she
will be lucky to recover one-half of her claim; in Germany or Korea, she will
recover nearly all of her money. If Doh wins, in the United States, he will be
lucky to have spent less than one third the value of his legal right for his
victory; in Germany or in Korea, he will have lost little of it. The following
tables show that:
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Roh Wins
If plaintiff Roh wins, she recovers:

Award
Less lawyer’s initiation fee
Less lawyer’s process fee
Less lawyer’s expenses
Less court costs
Less fast payment discount
Outcome-Roh recovers
NET RECOVERY % of claim

U.S.
Contingent
$ 75,000
free
25,000
ca. 5,000
loser pays
ca. 5,000
$ 40,000
53.3 %

U.S.
Hourly
$ 75,000
free
30,000
ca. 5,000
loser pays
ca. 5,000
$ 35,000
46.7 %

Germany

Korea

€ 60,000
[729] 601
loser pays
included
loser pays
none
€ 60,000
100.0%

₩75,000,000
4,250,000
1,050,000
included
loser pays
none
₩70,700,000
94.3%

U.S.
$ 75,000
free
30,000
ca. 5,000
ca. 2,500
ca. 5,000
$ 107,500
143 %

Germany
€ 60,000
[729] 602
5,614
no charge
1,668
none
€ 67,272
112 %

Korea
₩75,000,000
4,250,000
9,300,000
no charge
342,500
none
₩88,892,500
119 %

While defendant Doh pays:
Award
Plus lawyers’ initiation fees
Plus lawyers’ process fees
Plus lawyer’s expenses
Plus court costs
Less fast payment discount
Outcome-Doh pays
NET PAYMENT % of claim

For these tables, we assume: (1) for the United States, a contingent fee of 33⅓ % or an hourly fee
of $30,000 (100 hours @ $300 or a mix with more hours, some at a lower charge), with Doh’s
lawyer charging the same amount as Roh’s lawyer; (2) for Korea, Doh’s lawyer charges the same
Roh as set out in Chapter 3. The hour calculation for the United States is artificial and includes trial
time. Just how many hours will be required lies in the hands of the lawyers for the parties.
Depending upon how they choose to conduct the case, they can raise or lower the estimate
dramatically.

If Roh wins, in the American system, she will be lucky to recover half of
her claim. Because the German and Korean systems have variations of loserpays for costs, a winning Roh in those systems gets back most of her money.
In Germany, she gets back all of it. She is held harmless. In Korea, however,
Roh will not be held completely harmless. The lawsuit will cost her a little
more than 5%.

601
602

Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee.
Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee.
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The absence of a loser-pay system in the United States and the
significance for plaintiff of contingent fee representation are especially plain
when plaintiff Roh loses and defendant Doh wins. Then there is no
recovered principal to fund legal fees:
Doh Wins.
If plaintiff Roh loses, she pays out (not necessarily to Doh):

Award
Plus lawyer’s initiation fee
Plus lawyers’ process fees
Plus lawyer’s expenses
Plus court costs
Less fast payment discount
Outcome-Roh pays out
NET PAY OUT % claim

U.S. if
contingent
$0
free
free
ca. 5,000
ca. 2,500
none
$ 7,500
10 %

U.S. if
hourly
$0
free
30,000
ca. 5,000
ca. 2,500
none
$ 37,500
50 %

Germany
€0
[729] 603
5,614
included
1,668
none
€7,272
12.1 %

Korea
₩0
4,250,000
9,300,000
included
342,500
none
₩13,892,500
18.5 %

While defendant Doh, the putative winner, pays:
Award
Plus lawyers’ initiation fees
Plus lawyers’ process fees
Plus lawyer’s expenses
Plus court costs
Less fast payment discount
Outcome-Doh pays
NET PAY OUT % claim

U.S.

x

$0
free
30,000
ca. 5,000
loser pays
none
$ 35,000
46.67 %

Germany
€0
[729] 604
loser pays
included
loser pays
none
€0
0%

Korea

₩0
4,250,000
1,150,000
included
loser pays
none
₩ 5,400,000
7.2 %

When Doh “wins,” he still loses in the American system: his legal fees
likely will be one-third—possibly even more—of the total value of his legal
right. In the German system, on the other hand, he emerges from litigation
unscathed. He does not do quite as well in the Korean system, where he still
has to pay around 7% of the value of his claim.
Plaintiff Roh, on the other hand, is a big loser in the American system,
but only if she pays the hourly rate. She comes off relatively well if she is

603
604

Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee.
Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee.
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represented on a contingent fee basis. Then her lawyer loses; Hahn gets no
fee. She pays around $7000.
That the winner loses in the United States in a case like Roh v. Doh is
explained, but only in part, by absence of a loser fee system. The absence
does not, however, explain all of the pain that parties in American litigation
suffer. The loser in Roh v. Doh in Germany or in Korea, pays less in process
costs—which are for two parties—than the winner in the American case
pays for his or her own lawyer. In the United States, in our case, process
costs eat up half or more of the value of the right in dispute. The only winner
is the legal system itself. It takes the lion’s share of the right in dispute.
Total legal fees and process costs in the United States are several times what
they are in Germany or Korea. Combining the tables above demonstrates
that:
The Claim of the System of Civil Justice
If plaintiff Roh wins, the civil justice system takes in total:
Roh Wins
Roh wins less than claim
Doh pays more than claim
Total legal system charges
Charges as % claim

U.S. if
contingent
$ 35,000
37,500
72,500
96.7 %

U.S. if
hourly
$ 40,000
37,500
77,500
103 %

Germany
€0
7,272
7,272
12.1 %

Korea
₩4,300,000
13,892,500
18,192,500
24.3 %

If defendant Doh wins, the civil justice system takes in total:
Doh Wins
Roh pays
Doh pays
Total legal system charges
Charges as % claim

U.S. if
contingent
$ 7,500
35,000
42,500
56.7%

x

U.S. if
hourly
$ 37,500
35,000
72,500
96.7 %

Germany
€ 7,272
0
7,272
12.1 %

Korea
₩13,892,500
5,400,000
19,292,500
25.7%

Avoiding Legal Fees
In the United States parties can avoid painful legal fees if they agree,
formally or informally, to do so. Legal fees in the United States are usually a
product of how much time lawyers spend on cases. Lawsuit filings do not
automatically create legal fees as they do in Germany and in Korea. There,
once lawsuits are commenced, fee tables determine charges. There are only
limited opportunities to avoid legal fees. This fee phenomenon makes for
greater caution in commencing actions in Germany and Korea and for
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greater propensity in the United States to file just to see how the other side
will react.
We saw already in Chapter 3 that Roh’s lawyer Hahn hoped to keep fees
low by not bringing in additional parties, such as DohSon Honda, LL.C. or
John Doh, Sr. Other ways that Roh and Doh could manage to minimize fees
include: (a) agreeing to arbitration, possibly with a loser pays feature, or
agreeing to mediation; (b) going to trial without discovery; and (c) settling
the case, with or without discovery, but without trial. For obvious didactic
purposes, we did not have our parties do that.
Post-Filing Arbitration
Post filing mediation or arbitration are possibilities in all three of our
systems. Sometimes they are court sponsored. The Landgericht in Munich
has developed a program to encourage court-conducted mediation.
Mediation is a non-binding form of arbitration. The Munich program creates
special mediation judges, who mediate cases that are transferred to them by
the ordinary judges otherwise deciding the cases. The program uses special
mediation judges to avoid having mediation interfere with the functioning of
adjudication. This avoids the criticism voiced in the United States of
“managerial judging” (see Chapter 6, above), that judicial involvement in
mediation compromises judicial neutrality and the main proceedings’
adversarial nature. 605
No or Limited Discovery
Many American lawsuits involve little or no discovery. How much
discovery there is in any case, however, is determined by each party
individually. There is no formal provision for parties to agree not to conduct
discovery. That means that even if one party conducts no discovery, the
other may.
The hope of originators of pretrial discovery was that parties would use
it in moderation to focus trial on those issues that are material and that are in
dispute. That hope is realized in some cases. For pretrial discovery to work
well in this way, however, it should not itself create costs disproportionate to
the amount in dispute.
Once discovery gets going, it can be hard to limit it. If parties are
minded to go to trial, they want full discovery beforehand. Since few cases
ever to trial, it is a fairly sure bet that a case without discovery will be a case
without trial.

605

See generally, HARRIET WEBER, THESEN ZUM ZUSAMMENSPIEL VON RECHT, JUSTIZ UND
MEDIATION http://www.in-mediation.eu/wp-content/uploads/file/topsecret/2008_kongress_Weber.pdf.
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In Germany and in Korea there is likewise no opportunity for the parties
to forgo evidence taking. In those systems, however, judges already focus on
material issues in dispute. For lawyers to avoid taking evidence on those
issues requires that they concede them.
2. Unsettling Settlements
While in all of our systems, the majority of cases filed are concluded without
formal judgments, that does not mean that settled cases have substantially
similar outcomes in our three systems. We have not conducted studies
comparing settlements, but we doubt the proposition that they are similar.
Cases settle in the shadow of likely outcomes in litigation. Different
expected outcomes deliver different settlements.
United States. Process costs are powerful drivers to settlement in the
United States. Parties who do not want to sacrifice their resources to their
lawyers, should settle immediately, before spending money on lawyers’ fees.
Many economically-minded parties, if they fear no collateral consequences,
if they have no emotional entanglements in a case, and if they are not subject
to financial constraints, do just that. Many plaintiffs with strong claims hope
that their lawsuits will bring recalcitrant defendants to their senses without
need for proceedings beyond their formal complaints. That may have been
Mary Roh’s hope in this case.
Immediate settlement comes to mind in the reverse case as well: when
plaintiff’s claim is so weak that it is unlikely to be successful. It may be
nothing more than what is called a “nuisance claim.” Here, too, American
parties may settle. A dollar offered early in settlement is worth five dollars
offered later. If one can, one settles immediately, even if the case has little
substance. While it is distasteful to pay tribute when one is in the right, it is
practical. Unless a case is completely unfounded, thought should always be
given to a nuisance value offer. Sometimes, one can settle a case for no
more, or only a little more, than what it would cost to hire a lawyer to put in
an answer. Here Doh might have offered Roh $5,000. That would give both
plaintiff and plaintiff’s lawyer some money for little work.
A nuisance value offer would not likely work in Roh v. Doh. Plaintiff
has appealing facts; if she presents a reasonable witness, then chances of her
winning were a trial to happen, are good. Doh, Jr. and his lawyer know that.
If they are serious about settlement, their strategy might be to put in an
answer—to demonstrate willingness to contest the claim—then make a nontrivial settlement offer of say $10,000. An offer then of $10,000 would
signal willingness to engage in substantive negotiations. It could get
negotiations going to reach a settlement of $20,000, $30,000 or $40,000.
Roh would be hard-pressed to refuse an offer of $40,000. After paying her
lawyer and covering filing fees, on an hourly basis, she might have close to
half her $75,000 back. Since her lawyer would have done so little work, a
typical contingent fee agreement, might leave her with close to that much.
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Parties do not always look at lawsuits as cold economic propositions. In
our case we have suggested facts that might keep Doh, Jr. from seeking
settlement. Financially, he may not be able to pay. Emotionally, he is the
jilted lover who hates the plaintiff’s daughter. Practically, he has a friend
prepared to litigate below cost. These considerations are independent of the
parties’ respective claims of right and of the facts and law that undergird
them.
Once parties get going with discovery, settlement becomes more
difficult. While parties will then know more, they will have spent more
money. They will have invested in the lawsuit.
In Roh v. Doh discovery is unlikely to focus the parties. The case is
already straight-forward. Equally or more likely, either party might choose to
use discovery to create expenses for the other. Either might search for the
elusive admission of the other that the money was a gift or a loan. To that
end they might demand documents of each other and notice depositions not
only of each other, but of third parties as well. Either might use discovery to
develop a innovative “theory of the case” (e.g., DohSon Honda, LL.C., is the
appropriate defendant). Little stands in the way of a party who wants to use
discovery to increase costs of the other.
Germany. Settlement is less likely in Germany than in the United
States. Once the lawsuit is underway, there are few process cost incentives to
cut a deal. In fact, there is a special settlement fee that discourages
settlement. So long as a party is convinced that he or she will win, there are
few attractions to taking the case from the judge. Only if the process creates
external costs or if both parties fear that the judge may decide against them,
does settlement come onto the table.
Korea. In Korea, owing to the high incidence of pro se representation,
settlement may be less likely than in Germany. Costs are less a consideration
and emotions more. The moderating influence of external counsel is often
present only on one side or not at all.
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C H APT E R 8
C ONC L USI ON
TEN POINTS FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM
THAT PROMOTE JUSTICE THAT IS CIVILIZED

Justice according to law

[I]t is by comparison of our rules and practice with
those of foreigners, that we become fully sensible of what
is defective or excellent, and therefore of what is to be
cherished and upheld, or to be disapproved and abolished
in our institutions.
Caleb Cushing (1820)
Later United States Attorney General, declined
nomination to be Chief Justice of the United States 606

There is no country on earth, which has more to gain than
ours by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence. ... Let
us not vainly imagine that we have unlocked and
exhausted all the stores of juridical wisdom and policy.
Joseph Story
Justice of the United States Supreme Court
Dane Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Founder of American Law (1821) 607
606

The Study of the Civil Law, 11 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. 407, 408 (1820).
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Civil justice comes from the heart of mankind. It can fulfill expectations
and it can disappoint them. It can justify hopes and—in the best of cases—it
can resolve disputes for once and for all. Often it is the last place to which
people can turn for clarity about what is right.
Although civil justice is principally concerned with parties’ private
interests—seen as whole—it has an important social role. That role requires
that all people, without regard to their individual financial circumstances,
have access to courts. Civil procedure needs laws that people can
understand, can follow and can accept. It requires rules that are fair and just,
and thus are suited to bringing peace among adversaries. All parties, without
exception, must be able personally to present how matters in dispute affect
them individually.
Realizing the right to be heard is the central point of almost every
lawsuit: realization of the right determines when a case can be quickly, fairly
and justly resolved. The parties’ true concerns must not be allowed to
disappear in the fog of courtroom battle or in a haze of legal analysis.
Lawsuits must be structured for modern, effective dispute resolution, or else
they will not keep pace with a rapidly changing world. Constant
improvement is necessary lest civil procedure lose its stabilizing function
and the trust of those that rely on it.
***
By comparing legal systems among each other, one broadens one’s
perspective. One can consider what works elsewhere better and why. What
do I not like there? What am I trying to achieve here and what would I need
to do to achieve it? What would it cost in resources? While tradition is
important, willingness to consider new approaches is essential. That is life.
From new experiences come new insights. New knowledge challenges not
only legislators, but litigants, lawyers and judges.
It is a public responsibility of legal professionals to maintain minds open
to other ways. They should not be nationalists defending one nation’s
practices for no reason other than they are that nation’s practices. We
compare legal systems not as international pageants to find the most
beautiful, but to better our own legal systems. Whether this system or that
system is more elegant, or even whether it more accurate, more fair, more
efficient, less expensive or more accessible, are secondary to whether we can
find in the comparison better ways for particular legal systems.
607

Joseph Story, Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their
Anniversary, on the 4th September 1821, 1 AM. JUR. 1, 29 (1829), reprinted in JOSEPH STORY,
THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS: LITERARY, CRITICAL, JURIDICAL AND POLITICAL OF JOSEPH
STORY, NOW FIRST COLLECTED 405, 434-435 (1835) and in 1 JOSEPH STORY, THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 235 (1852).
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Lawyers, judges and legal academics have a special responsibility to
mind foreign legal developments. They exercise choice for the true
consumers of law, the public. They decide for others just what kind of legal
system a country has. The public has limited opportunity to change law and
legal institutions.
In almost every other field of organized human activity, failure to mind
foreign practices can lead to legal liability or lost market share. When a test
for AIDS was found in France, public health personnel throughout the world
rushed to implement it. Those who were slow to do so committed
malpractice. When Japanese manufacturers developed “just in time”
processes, businesses all over the planet copied the foreign techniques.
Those who were slow to do so were punished by the market.
Responsible lawyers, judges and legal academics should pay attention to
foreign law just as responsible physicians consider cures developed abroad
or successful businessmen mind foreign products and techniques. Perhaps
the day will come in America when those who look abroad for legal
solutions are not shunned, but are celebrated, as they are in Germany and
Korea. That will happen only when knowledge of foreign law is not thought
exotic, but essential to understanding America’s own legal system.
***
We began this book with the observation that our three systems of civil
justice have a common moral framework. They share the same goals and
values for civil justice: just decisions, accurate according to law, reached
speedily by fair and efficient process, with access for all. We noted however,
that many Americans have lost faith that their civil justice system can ever
achieve those goals, while most Germans and Koreans have not. The latter
strive to achieve their goals.
We have now seen, however, that American methods, the legal
framework, also are not so distant from German and Korean methods as
many Americans suppose. Our three systems share similar tasks and similar
approaches to dealing with those tasks of civil justice. While the means to
achieve those tasks vary, they have more in common than at variance.
Variations are more in degree than in kind. Civilized justice is justice
according to law. In all three systems, civil justice requires bringing law and
facts together. In all three, law and facts are starting points; in all three
applying law to facts to decide a case is the ending point.
Look at the mechanics. Before a court can decide a case, the court must
know which issues it has to decide. In all three systems the general course is
similar. Plaintiffs commence actions with complaints, which courts may
review—in Germany and Korea, which courts must review—for sufficiency.
Parties, with guidance of the court—with considerably more guidance in
Germany and Korea than in the United States—determine the issues for
decision. Before the court decides, it should give all parties opportunity to be
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heard on all material issues in disputes. Courts are expected to base their
decisions on syllogistic application of law to facts. Except when juries
decide with general verdicts, courts are to justify in writing their findings of
fact, conclusions of law and application of law to fact. When juries decide,
courts are to provide detailed written instructions, which juries are carefully
to consider. In all three systems, parties may appeal to have one or more
higher courts review the decision of first instance for the conformity of the
decision with law and the consistency of procedures used with normal
expectations safeguarding the right to be heard.
Principal differences in the ways of our respective systems lie largely in
how they share responsibilities for the tasks they undertake. The American
system entrusts case resolution principally to the unguided cooperation of the
parties and of the parties’ lawyers; judges keep their distance and are called
in only at the last moment to decide matters lawyers cannot resolve. The
German and Korean systems leave the parties in charge of definition and
disposition of disputes, but provide judges to facilitate the process of
resolution. German and Korean judges help parties identify material issues
and present disputed issues for court determination. That guiding function
does not transform German and Korean judges into the inquisitors that
common law mythology suggests. German and Korean judges help and not
hinder hearing of the parties. They do not act in ways inconsistent with
American process values. What they do from the start is to guide
proceedings toward reaching decisions according to law.
In our comparative presentation of the American, German and Korean
systems we looked at the different ways that each system seeks the best
possible outcome. We saw similarities and we saw differences in execution,
but the ways were mostly similar. Often the differences were more in
emphasis than in substance. From the many ways we have chosen ten to
highlight where we believe the German and Korean systems have
advantages. They are not distant from American experiences. Many are
already practiced in the United States. Some are conventional wisdom, some
are aspirational, and some are controversial. None is new. Americans can
emulate these practices without fear of introducing elements foreign to their
legal traditions. These insights are not exotic.
We offer these insights as ways for consideration in reform of American
civil justice. These are insights and not blueprints. We do not believe that
transplanting is likely or possible even were it desirable. We leave to another
day and to other proponents specific proposals that might incorporate these
insights in concrete proposals capable of political adoption.
1) Legal rules seek justice through statutes.
 Chapter 2. Thinking Like a Lawyer.
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Civil procedure is about applying rules. A system of civil justice can be
no better than the rules that it applies. Those rules should be just and
democratically adopted to assure legitimacy. They should be stated
beforehand in technically well-crafted syllogisms so that they are consistent
with each other and may be applied by the public to themselves.
German rules in substance are guided by a social market economy. In
form they are authoritative statute-based syllogisms. In application they
coordinate with other rules. Korean rules share many of these advantages,
although they are newer and Korean legislative techniques remain under
development. American rules often do not share these benefits. In substance
they may reflect special interests as much as public interest. In form they
may fail to be self-applicable. The existence of numerous law-making bodies
that do not coordinate with each other is productive of inconsistent
commands.
Americans know that laws should seek justice. That statutes
predominate and should predominate is not exotic. Already in 1886 the
American Bar Association resolved: “The law itself should be reduced, so
far as its substantive principles are settled, to the form of a statute.” 608
Today Americans live in an age of statutes. They are learning to deal with
statutes.

2) Civil justice is accessible independent of wealth.
 Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice

Civil justice is not theoretical, but practical. A system of civil justice
that is unavailable to many people is a failure. In Germany and in Korea
access to justice is largely assured. In Germany legal aid is granted as of
right; in Korea, pro se representation is routine. In the United States there is
no right to civil legal aid; only a small percentage of those in need receive it.
Pro se representation is more theoretical than routine.
Americans are now acting on what they have long known: equal justice
under law requires equal access to justice. Equal access is not exotic. In
2006, and again in 2010, the American Bar Association, following the words
of Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., the Association’s President and late Supreme
Court justice and resolved: “Equal justice under law is not merely a caption
on the facade of the Supreme Court building, it is perhaps the most inspiring
ideal of our society. It is one of the ends for which our entire legal system
exists...it is fundamental that justice should be the same, in substance and
availability, without regard to economic status.” 609

608
609

REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 74 (1886).
Resolution 104 (Revised), supra note 139, at 1.
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3) Those in right are not burdened with high litigation expenses.
 Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice

To resolve disputes process determines rights. If process is to make
those in the right whole, it should assess the costs of process to the losers
found to be in the wrong (“loser pays”). To keep process fair, reimbursable
costs must be limited and reasonable. In Germany and in Korea, losers pay
most of the costs of proceedings. Process costs are low and are proportionate
to amounts in dispute. Frivolous lawsuits are discouraged and uncommon. In
the United States, winners in routine cases, i.e., those in the right, must bear
their own costs. Process costs are high and may exceed amounts in dispute.
Frivolous lawsuits are a significant problem.
Americans know this logic of right. It is not exotic. That losers should
and do pay court costs is unquestioned in the United States. Controversial is
when losers should pay attorneys’ fees. Sometimes they do. Routinely, they
used to in some states. As Theodore Sedgwick, the founder of the American
law of damages wrote: “the losing party should pay all the expenses of the
litigation; this is a rule of inherent justice.” 610
4) Judges are professionals.
 Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice

Judges should be neutral and responsible to law and justice. Judging is
not for amateurs. It requires specific skills. Judging should be no more left to
those not trained for it than surgery should be left to barbers. In Germany
and in Korea judges are selected on merit and are trained as judges. In the
United States, on the other hand, judges are selected politically. They are not
trained as judges before assuming office.
Americans know about merit selection and about judicial education.
There is nothing exotic in either. For centuries they have debated the latter
and in recent years have promoted the former. They know that the taint of
campaign contributions calls into question whether judges are fair,
independent and impartial. 611
5) Trusted institutions coordinate civil justice.
 Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice
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THEODORE SEDGWICK, HOW SHALL THE LAWYERS BE PAID? OR SOME REMARKS UPON
TWO ACTS RECENTLY PASSED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE COSTS OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, IN A
LETTER TO JOHN ANTHON, ESQ. 10 (1840).
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Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., -- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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Civil justice is a public good just as are public health and public
education. It is too precious a commodity to leave in private hands unguided
by public accountability. Modern society demands of civil justice a quality
and quantity of systemic performance unattainable without public
responsibility. Just as public health systems should leave no patient untreated
and public education systems should leave no child behind uneducated, civil
justice systems should leave no gaps in law or practice that cause injustice.
In Germany ministries of justice are responsible for the just administration of
law. In Korea the Supreme Court is. In the United States, on the other hand,
no public authority has responsibility for administration of civil justice.
Government lawyers are lawyers for the government and not trustees of the
public good. Courts and court administrators are responsible for the
functioning of their courts but have few responsibilities or capabilities
beyond those functions. Lawyers and their bar associations focus on their
interests and those of their clients. They have neither authority nor resources
to provide for the public interest in civil justice.
Americans have long sought institutions to guide civil justice. Creation
of the United States Department of Justice coincided with creation of the
German Imperial Ministry of Justice in the 1870s. 612 The founding of the
American Law Institute in 1923 is sometimes attributed to a
contemporaneous article by Justice Cardozo praising European ministries of
justice. 613 The Administrative Office of United States Courts followed in
1939. In 2007 that bastion of the Common Law, the United Kingdom,
established a ministry of justice. 614 There is nothing exotic in the idea of an
American office for justice.
6) Jurisdiction is determined without litigation.
 Chapter 4. The Court: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law

612
Compare *** and ***. At about the same time Britain adopted the institution of the
professional parliamentary draftsman, whose function the German ministry has. American
jurists were quick to take note and urged comparable practices. See, e.g., Simon Stern, The
English Methods of Legislation Compared with the American, PENN MONTHLY, May 1879, at
336; FRANCIS WAYLAND, OPENING ADDRESS ON CERTAIN DEFECTS IN OUR METHODS OF
MAKING LAWS BEFORE THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AT ITS ANNUAL
MEETING, SARATOGA SPRINGS 13, 21, 27 (Sept. 5, 1881) (reported at length in N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1881, at 5).
613
See Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921) (citing two
contemporary works by Roscoe Pound); ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 736-37 (1959). The
creation of the American Law Institute is sometimes attributed to Cardozo’s call. See Kirsten
David Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of Justice?, 32 SO. ILL.
L.J. 173 (2007).
614
In the twentieth century, leaders of the bar observed the benefits of European-style
ministries of justice. In this millennium the United Kingdom has established its own Ministry of
Justice. See BRYAN GIBSON, THE NEW MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (2nd ed., 2008).
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Civil justice, like any public or private service, should be organized to
facilitate its distribution. Dispute resolution requires designation of which
court is competent to decide which disputes. Korea, as a unitary country, has
it easy. Germany and the United States, as federal systems, have it harder.
Germany, as part of the European Union, has it harder still. In Germany,
statutes answer questions of jurisdiction and applicable law clearly and
easily in routine cases. In the United States, it is otherwise. Resources and
time are squandered in predicting and determining which American court
should resolve purely American disputes.
Simple determination of jurisdiction is not exotic. It is not beyond reach.
America’s founding fathers provided the means to minimize jurisdictional
litigation: the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution. Justice Robert H. Jackson proclaimed that it is
“the foundation of any hope we may have for a truly national system of
justice, based on the preservation but better integration of the local
jurisdictions we have.” 615
7) Parties tell courts about their disputes.
 Chapter 5. Pleading: Structuring the Matter in Controversy
Courts need to be told what parties want them to decide. In Germany
and in Korea the parties in their pleadings guide courts to material matters in
dispute by setting out the facts that they wish the court to consider. By law in
Germany and by practice in Korea they identify evidence to be relied upon
and by otherwise substantiating claims made. Courts review pleadings for
sufficiency of the case claimed at the outset of the proceedings. In the United
States parties in their pleadings give notice of their claims but provide little
information about the underlying matters and what about those matter is in
dispute. They do not identify evidence and usually do little to direct courts to
material matters in dispute. Courts review pleadings only on party request.
Americans know that courts can not decide if they do not know what to
decide. That is not exotic. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require only notice pleading, other American systems have required parties
to tell about the facts. That is not exotic or threatening. The Field Code of
1848 required that the complaint give “[a] statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and
in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended.” 616 It is what they propose today: “a process that begins to
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Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1945).
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An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this
State, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, § 120(2).
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narrow and focus as soon as a legitimate claim is filed.” 617 They are
returning to the first lesson lawyers learned in the nineteenth century: “In the
course of administering justice between litigating parties, there are two
successive objects,—to ascertain the subject for decision, and to decide.” 618
8) Judges work with parties to prepare cases for decisions
according to law.
 Chapter 6. Process: The Right to Be Heard

Civil justice determines rights; civil procedure should not be contest.
There should be no surprises. To assure that there are no surprises, civil
process should let parties know what courts will decide. Courts should tell
parties which elements of their claims are present, which are missing and
which are disputed. They should give parties opportunity to be heard on all
disputed issues. In Germany and in Korea judges have affirmative duties to
assure that parties are heard. Judges speak with parties early in litigation. In
the United States, where judges have no comparable duties, parties are not
always heard on material matters. Judges remain passive. Often they never
speak with parties. Trials are vanishing.
For courts to cooperate with parties to frame issues has long been a hope
of American procedure. As we saw above, the drafters of the federal rules
had in mind cooperation in issue framing as subject for pretrial conferences
and not scheduling of discovery. Professor Sunderland wrote that the court
should take a hand “supplementing the proceedings and the discovery which
the parties have obtained, by direct interrogation of counsel or parties in the
presence of each other, with a view to eliminating issues through admissions
or through the withdrawal of allegations or denials, or by obtaining the
consent of the parties to the limitation or simplification of proof.” 619
9) Judges oversee taking evidence.
 Chapter 6. Process: The Right to Be Heard

In Germany and in Korea, courts conduct cases. Judges take evidence
when needed for decision of disputed matters material to claims of right, but
only then. Judicial oversight assures that evidence taking is within bounds.
In the United States, lawyers are in charge of process of pre-trial. There is
little judicial oversight of what lawyers do with the power and under the
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Kourlis et al, supra note 247, at 246.
HENRY STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 1 (1824).
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Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV.
215, 218-219 (1937).
618

280

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

authority of courts. Lawyers are guided by their interest and by client interest
and not by justice or law.
Judicial supervision of evidence taking was not exotic in American
history. It was called trial. Presence of the judge was, Justice Scalia reminds
us, what made American justice adversarial and not inquisitorial. 620 Until
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 1938, judicial supervision
of evidence taking was the rule of civil justice. The Supreme Court stated it
succinctly: “‘the judge is always present at the time of the evidence given in
it. … This direction and superintendence [is] an essential part of the
trial.’” 621
10) Courts base their judgments on law and explain them.
 Chapter 7. Judgments, Appeals & Outcomes: Decisions According to Law

Courts should decide disputes according to law. Even children want to
know why parents decide as they do. Written justifications validate correct
decisions. They facilitate appellate review of the accuracy of those decisions.
In Germany and in Korea judges tell parties why they decided as they did.
Parties know which facts judges found and why. They know which law
governed and why judges applied it as they did. If parties find fault with how
judges decided, the justification is the basis for review by a higher court. In
Germany and Korea that court can supplement or determine anew the first
court’s decision. In the United States justifications are exceptional. Rarely do
cases go through trial. Of those that do, jurors’ verdicts have no written
justifications. Parties are left to guess why jurors decided as they did. They
cannot know which facts the jurors found nor how jurors applied law to
those facts. Appellate courts can only review the record for whether the rules
of procedure were followed and whether the evidence produced created a
possible basis for jurors’ decisions.
Justifications are not exotic in American law. When courts decide cases
after trials without jurors, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 requires that
judges provide what amount to in law and practice justified judgments.
***
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McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. at 181 n.2, quoted note 314.
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 14, 16-17 (1899)(quoting respectively Lord Hale,
History of the Common Law, chapter 12 (5th ed.) and Judge Sprague in United States v. Bags of
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Almost everyone takes the political history of his or her own
country for granted. We are taught it by our parents, we learn it in
school, and we experience it in our lives. The political history of
other countries, we know less well, if at all. What we do know may be
wrong or over-simplified.
Systems of civil justice do not live outside their own times. They are
affected by historic changes. They have their own histories independent of
political history. Because in this book we refer to these changes, we
reference them here through a series of tables and notes. We know that the
civil justice systems that we describe today will be different tomorrow.

A. United States

Out of many, one
E pluribus unum
Great Seal of the United States (1782)

United States Time Table
1776
1787-1791
1848
1861-1865
1872
1938

Declaration of Independence;
Maryland Declaration of Rights
United States Constitution & Bill of Rights
Field Code of Civil Procedure in New York; merger of courts
of law and equity in New York
National division, North and South: Civil War
Federal Conformity Act: disunity in civil procedure
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; unity of civil procedure in all
federal courts; merger of equity and law rules
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In the United States, political unity was achieved earlier than in
Germany and in Korea. Thirteen American colonies of Great Britain
declared their independence on July 4, 1776. They fought a war of
independence until the British withdrew in 1783. Governed at first under the
Articles of Confederation, they replaced these with the Constitution of 1789
and the Bill of Rights of 1791 (i.e., the first ten amendments to the
Constitution of 1789).
Political unity came at a price: legal disunity. The Constitution of 1789
recognized and perpetuated a non-uniform law of slavery. To abolish that
non-uniform law of slavery the country fought a bloody Civil War (18611865). While that war led to abolition of slavery, and implicitly to rejection
of the idea that individual states might have fundamentally different social,
economic, or political systems, it did not lead to legal unity.
To this day most American law is made by individual states and local
governments. While Americans think of this as a necessary feature of
federalism, Germans know that it is not, for in Germany’s form of
federalism, national laws govern in most basic areas of law. In the United
States, national laws remain exceptional; states and local laws are the rule. In
the United States, although state and local laws are very similar, they are not
uniform. 622
Civil procedure is no different from the rest of American law: mostly it
is state law, but state rules of civil procedure which are very similar. Most
state procedural rules are variations on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Here we study the Federal Rules. That American rules vary from state-tostate, remarkable as it is, is less remarkable to Germans than the existence of
completely separate systems of state and federal courts. We discuss this
phenomenon in Chapter 4. In Germany, with one minor exception, courts of
first instance and courts of first appeal are state courts. Federal courts exist
only as courts of final appeal to make sure that state courts apply federal law
correctly.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only in federal courts. Until
1938 when the Federal Rules came into force, federal courts had separate
federal rules to apply only for special forms of proceeding (e.g., admiralty
and equity cases). In most cases, federal courts used state procedural rules.
Under the so-called Conformity Act of 1872 they applied the procedural
rules of the states in which they were located. So a federal court sitting in
Baltimore applied Maryland rules, while a federal court sitting in nearby
Philadelphia applied Pennsylvania rules. This meant that lawyers in one city
622
See James R. Maxeiner, Uniform Law and its Impact on National Laws Limits and
Possibilities, U.S. National Report, in 2 MEMOIRS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, GENERAL AND NATIONAL REPORTS OF THE 1ST INTERMEDIATE
CONGRESS. THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM LAW ON NATIONAL LAW: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES
(2010).
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could—at least in theory—count on procedural rules being the same without
regard to whether they went to the federal or to the state court in their city.
On the other hand, it meant that lawyers who specialized in matters before
federal courts had to familiarize themselves with different rules when they
went to federal court in another state. The Federal Rules of 1938 made
practice easier for those lawyers who practiced in different cities (mostly
lawyers for larger interests), but more difficult for lawyers who practiced in
both state and federal courts in one city (mostly lawyers for smaller
interests).
The burden of legal disunity has increased over time. That increase is
related to the growth of commerce in the nineteenth century. When the
Constitution was adopted in 1789, coordination of laws of the several states
was not a major issue. Long-distance travel in 1789 was rare; interstate
commerce was minor. But within a century, all that had changed; merchants
carried on trade in every state. Already by the 1830 and 1840s the growing
economy demanded laws and procedures that were more rational and more
predictable and more often uniform. With the end of slavery and of the Civil
War, those issues acquired increased vigor and urgency.
Throughout the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the
twentieth century American reformers sought to build a rational legal system
of systematic statutes that judges might apply syllogistically. They
championed “codification”—not the mere collection of statutes—but the
systematic integration of bodies of substantive law. They sought to write
procedural law that would facilitate rather than undermine application of
substantive rules to fact. Their efforts, in the case of substantive law, mostly
failed of adoption; their reforms in procedural law were adopted (the “Field
Code” and “code pleading”), but did not work as hoped, and led to
subsequent reforms, which likewise did not work as well as hoped (the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and “notice pleading.”). 623 We now discuss
America’s three attempts at civil procedure that fell short of the goals of the
open courts clause.
History of American Civil Procedure—Three Tries for Reform
While the American political system has been stable since the end of the
Civil War era in 1876, the same is not true of American civil procedure.
Throughout its more than two hundred year history American civil procedure
has vacillated from one extreme to another—from formality to flexibility—
in one attempt after another to create a system that might satisfy the
promises of the open courts clause: accuracy, fairness, access to justice and
efficiency. All attempts to fulfill those promises have fallen short of the goal.
From the earliest days popular dissatisfaction with civil justice has been and
623

See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 44, at 530-534. See also Leubsdorf, supra
note 57, at 53.

284

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

remains endemic. The classic critique is that of Roscoe Pound at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association in 1906, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. 624 One hundred years later
those days look to some Americans as the good old days. 625 The history of
American civil procedure is the story of three cycles of attempted reforms all
of which fell short of hopes. 626
Each cycle brought a new approach to civil procedure. The first try was
that of “common law pleading.” It came to the United States from England
in the late eighteenth century; it was brought by the generation that formed
American law and which included Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor
James Kent. The second try was “code pleading” of the mid-nineteenth
century. It started life as the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848,
which was drafted by the prominent practitioner, David Dudley Field, Jr.
(the “Field Code”). The third try was “notice pleading” of the mid-twentieth
century. Its source was the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938, which
were drafted by two law professors, Charles E. Clark, then Dean of Yale
Law School, and Edson R. Sunderland of the University of Michigan.
Three times the story is the same. Each cycle begins with belief that the
new system of procedure can apply law to facts rationally: that it will
produce decisions according to law. To be sure, there are pessimists, noncooperators and even opponents of the new procedure. Soon, however, hopes
are dashed. Flaws in the conception of the new system and failures of
individuals to work together to overcome those flaws, result in unsatisfactory
performance. Process is encumbered by delay, expense and uncertainty. The
now less-than-new system produces decisions not in accord with either law
or with justice. Minor fixes are attempted, but system still fails to work well.
As collective memory of the last cycle fades, agitation for change gains
strength. Finally, a new reform is adopted.
The first try in the early nineteenth century put in clear contention the
issues of form versus flexibility and of decision according to law versus
decisions ad hoc. It was what Professor Langbein calls a “Struggle for
Learned Law.” 627 Proponents of a formal system recognized that the
complexity of modern society requires legal rules and legal procedures of
comparable complexity. Unwritten folk law—common sense lacking legal
624
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ABA REP. 395 (1906), which has been reprinted and commemorated many times. Pound’s
critique is as compelling today as it was then. See James R. Maxeiner, 1992: High Time For
American Lawyers to Learn From Europe, or Roscoe Pound’s 1906 Address Revisited, 15
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (1991).
625
JOHN B. OAKLEY & VIKRAM D. AMAR: AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A GUIDE TO CIVIL
ADJUDICATION IN US COURTS 26 (2009) (“At the outset of the twenty-first century, the
adversary system of adjudication is not as perfectly realized as it may have been a century
before.”).
626
See the bibliographic notes in Appendix II, below.
627
John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
547, 566 (1993).

285

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

rules—is inadequate to govern the myriad of transactions among men; men
need rational rules to guide them by stating rights and duties.
That first try was successful insofar as reformers did establish a learned
American law. It fell short, however, in establishing a system that routinely
fulfilled the promises of the open courts clause. Critics charged that the
contrary occurred. According to one judge the forms of civil procedure
became “the fruitful mother of the rankest injustice.” 628
When the system faltered, instead of replacing it, the bar first made
excuses for it. The public expected too much of civil justice. Better that
people steer clear of lawsuits altogether. Professor Stephan B. Presser sees
the idea that litigation is “something pernicious that ought to be
discouraged” as a recurrent theme in American legal history. 629
The United States may now be coming to the end of the third cycle.
What is different at the end of this cycle, however, is that many American
lawyers now openly question the values of the open courts clause or at least
doubt the achievability of those goals. Some wonder whether decisions can
ever be made accurately, fairly and promptly according to law routinely. The
authors of the College of Trial Lawyers’ Report seem to be among them for
they would be content were American procedure to produce “reasonably
prompt, reasonably efficient, reasonably affordable resolution. 630
Other American legal scholars are still more skeptical. Some question
whether determination of rights is the goal of civil justice and whether
accuracy should be the appropriate measure of their legal system. These
scholars emphasize process in civil lawsuits. They maintain that process, and
participation in it, and not legally accurate determinations of right, is the
better measure of civil procedure. Their view is tantamount to a return to
primitive law.
Another group of scholars, who accept supremacy of determination of
rights over process, nevertheless, are so disappointed by the performance of
the public system of civil justice, that they see in the public system mostly an
incentive to encourage parties to find better ways to resolve disputes
privately, outside the system, through settlement or other extra-system
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ROBERT WILLIAM WELLS, Observations on the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts of
Justice of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER ADDRESSED
TO THE “METROPOLITAN” (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEM.
REV. 477, 482, 486 (1847).
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Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical and
Ideological Perspective, Paper Presented to the 10th Summit on Legal Reform, at 1 (U.S.
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means, such as arbitration or mediation (“Alternative Dispute Resolution—
ADR”).

“Trans-substantive” Civil Procedure
For much of American history American civil procedure has suffered
from a lack of unity not only among the states, but within courts of
individual states and within courts of the federal system as well. There were
separate procedures for what had once been separate courts of “law” and of
“equity.” The former, legal rules, differed markedly from the latter, equity
rules. 631 Uncertainties in which procedural rules applied produced much
injustice. Merger of law and equity was a central element in the reforms that
culminated in the 1848 New York Civil Procedure Code and in the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The reformed rules applied to all cases
whether previously characterized as legal or as equitable.
American civil procedure scholars characterize this single form of rules
as “trans-substantive.” They mean that for all civil lawsuits, regardless of the
substantive law underlying the claims (“case-type”) or the size of the case
(“case-size”), the same procedural rules should apply. Today federal
procedure and most state procedures are “trans-substantive.” 632 These transsubstantive rules infused equitable procedures into many matters formerly
subject only to legal rules.
American Civil Justice and Public Law Litigation

Private actions to recover penalties for the
government are known as qui tam actions or
as “whistleblower” lawsuits

The use of equity procedures in the trans-substantive codes permitted
accommodation of new types of litigation and of larger cases than had been
previously possible under older legal procedures. Scholars point to antitrust,
civil rights, consumer protection, products liability and class actions
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For example, a right to jury trial existed only in the former.
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An essay on Adjusting
the “One Size fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U.L. REV. 377, 378 (2010).
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generally as litigation facilitated by the liberal pleading, joinder and
discovery rules of the trans-substantive procedure. 633
Some American civil procedure scholars suggest that this transsubstantive nature of American civil procedure limits the value of
international insights for American law reform. They suggest that these
newer uses of civil procedure make American civil procedure fundamentally
different from foreign procedures. They suggest that incorporation of
insights drawn from foreign systems difficult and, at best, benign and at
worst destructive.
American civil procedure scholars see American courts making and
enforcing public law norms as exceptional. They observe that American civil
justice engages private parties to enforce and even to make public law norms
through litigation before independent courts. For example, Professors
Stephen N. Subrin and Margaret Y.K. Woo of Northeastern University
School of Law, assert:
The role of civil litigation in America is somewhat
different perhaps from its role in other countries, and it
defines the character of our system. Rather than simply
seeking courts to resolve private disputes (the conflict
resolution model) Americans have relied on relatively
open access to court and private civil litigation to be at the
heart of a great deal of the enforcement of our public law
(the behavior modification or social control model). With a
mistrust of big government and intrusive states, the
American public has (probably more than most other
countries) relied on private litigation rather than solely on
state-controlled litigation or state regulatory agencies to
enforce our public values. 634
Professor Paul D. Carrington observes similarly:
[D]iscovery is the American alternative to the
administrative state. We have by means of Rules 26-37,
and by their analogues in state law, privatized a great deal
of our law enforcement, especially in fields such as
antitrust and trade regulation, consumer protection,
securities regulation, civil rights, and intellectual property.
Private litigants do in America much of what is done in
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other industrial states by public officers working within an
administrative bureaucracy. 635
Other scholars make a similar distinction in discussing litigation as a
means of law reform. 636 They usually point to the classic example of the
famous 1954 Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 637 which overturned the Supreme Court’s earlier approval of racial
segregation in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Fergusson. 638 Since Brown,
generations of students have gone to law school seeking reform through
litigation. As amended in 1983 Federal Rule 11 approves law reform through
litigation, when it excludes from sanctions for frivolous law suits, claims not
based on existing law, so long as a claim is based on a “nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.” 639 Today, the American Bar Association in a
layman’s guide to dispute resolution touts changing the law as a benefit of
America civil procedure. 640
The suggestion is that foreign civil justice systems are not relevant to
American civil justice reform because making and enforcing public law
through private litigation requires American-style pleading, joinder and
discovery. Deficiencies in trans-substantive civil procedure must be accepted
if American civil justice is to fulfill its public law functions. These functions
are, Professor Carrington says, a part of American culture hardly subject to
change. 641 Changes now, Professor Subrin says, would be “too deep an
assault on the historic role of civil litigation in our country.” 642 They are
believed absent in foreign systems.
We do not accept these arguments.
First, American scholars overstate the case for American exceptionalism.
They state their conclusion that foreign systems do not use private litigation
before independent courts to make and enforce public law norms as truisms
635

Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997). See also PAUL D.
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also Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay: Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005).
636
See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Litigation Explosion, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA at 189 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, ed., 2008).
637
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
638
163 U.S. 537 (1896). The NAACP’s first major success was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
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THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM 117 (2007) (“a lawsuit offers the litigants an opportunity to change
the law, and to create legal precedents for similar cases that follow.”)
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without grounding them in observations of specific legal systems. In fact, in
Germany and in Korea, private litigants bring lawsuits before independent
courts and play an important role in enforcing social norms such as antitrust,
civil rights, consumer protection and product liability. American scholars may
overlook this activity because most of it takes place before specialized courts.
643

We noted in Chapter 3 that Germany, 644 and to a lesser extent, Korea,
have specialized courts. In Germany they include constitutional courts,
administrative courts, 645 social courts, 646 labor courts, 647 fiscal courts and a
patent court. Korea has a constitutional court and administrative courts. 648
Private litigants bring most of the cases before these independent courts. 649
Collectively specialized courts in Germany handle more than 900,000 cases
a year. That is about three-quarters as many civil cases as the ordinary
German courts handle (about 1.2 million). It is more than three times as
many civil cases as the American federal courts (about 275,000) handle. 650
643

We note that American proponents of the public law argument err in comparing only that
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Reimann & Joachim Zekoll, eds., 2nd ed. 2005);
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In the United States almost all of these cases would count as civil matters;
many would be deemed within the class of private enforcement of social
norms. In Korea, one argument against introduction private attorneys general
is that presently private parties’ cases before administrative courts
challenging public decisions serve much the same function as direct actions
against polluters. 651 Despite the small bar, Korea has a cadre of active public
interest lawyers. 652
Moreover, in Germany and Korea, the ordinary courts themselves have an
important role in social rights enforcement. In Germany through private
litigation they help enforce antitrust, competition and consumer protection
law. 653 In law reform and law making, in Germany and in Korea, they have a
modest role in creating private law and a traffic-conducting role in creating
public and international law. In the case of the latter, when issues of
constitutional implicated, the ordinary courts refer questions to constitutional
courts. There, private parties argue the legal issues before these independent
courts, where they are resolved and the cases returned to the ordinary courts. In
Germany, private courts act similarly in matters of European Union law.
If ever the United States was exceptional is using private litigants before
independent courts to carry out public law tasks, a 2007 joint GermanKorean symposium suggests a different future; the title says practically
proclaims it: “Utilization of Private Parties in Fulfillment of Public
Responsibilities.” 654 Differences that exist are not grounds for ignoring
foreign experiences, but for studying them for insights into all worlds. 655
Were it true that foreign civil justice systems had no role in public law
making and enforcement that still would not be ground to ignore foreign
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civil justice. One should not assume that such uses are immutable in
America or that such trans-substantive procedure will be forever present.
Whether public law uses of civil procedure are a good thing, is
controversial in the United States. Some Americans object that they take the
courts out of their accustomed role as applier of law to fact. Professor
Carrington himself makes this objection. 656 Other scholars object that private
attorneys general are not an effective way to enforce public law 657 Still
others doubt that litigation is effective in bringing about law reform and
social change. 658 So long as such public law use is controversial, foreign
insights remain relevant.
Assuming that these uses of civil procedure are desirable does not require
retention of the trans-substantive model. For three decades Professor Subrin
himself has questioned whether one form of civil procedure should apply
without regard to case-type or case-size. Moreover, historically seen, transsubstantive procedure has not always been the norm for private actions before
independent courts to enforce public law. So-called qui tam actions, many
private actions for a public penalty or forfeiture, were not subject to either legal
or equity rules, but to rules formerly used by courts of admiralty and of the old
English Court of the Exchequer. 659 To this day, the federal rules include
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture
Actions. Should Americans chose to return to separate rules for public law
actions, foreign experiences are particularly relevant.
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B. Germany

Unity and justice and freedom
For the German fatherland!
660
German National Anthem (1841/1952)

Germany Time Table
1793-1794
1805-1814
1864-1871
1871
1877
1933-1945
1945-1955
1949-1990
1990

Prussian codes
French occupation; end of Holy Roman Empire; French
codes imposed in many German states
Wars of national unification
National unification (without Austria); legal unity
Code of Civil Procedure (CPO now ZPO)
Nazi dictatorship; rule of law abolished
Allied occupation
National division, East and West; legal disunity
National re-unification; legal unity restored

In 1789 when the American Constitution entered into force and the
French Revolution began, Germany consisted of hundreds of independent
principalities associated in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.
Within those states there was a loose legal unity in both civil law and civil
procedure under what was called “the common law” based on law of Roman
origin. That legal unity was shaken already in 1793 and 1794 when one of
the largest states, Prussia, adopted new and enlightened codes of civil
procedure and of general law.
In 1805 France invaded Germany; in 1806 the Holy Roman Empire
ended. France imposed on those German states that it controlled its own new
and enlightened codes, including the Civil Code of 1804 (the “Code
Napoleon” or Code Civil) and the Code of Civil Procedure of 1806 (Code de
660

“Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit/Für das deutsche Vaterland!,” beginning of the third verse of
August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Lied der Deutschen (1841).

293

Civilizing Civil Justice

2010-11-17

Procédure Civil). 661 Legal disunity in Germany increased. The subsequent
defeat of Napoleon in 1814 did not lead to unity; those states on which
Napoleon had imposed the enlightened French codes did not abandon them.
Legal disunity continued until political unity was achieved in 1871 and even,
at first, thereafter. But in the following twenty-five years, the German
legislature adopted codes that achieved legal unity: first the Code of Civil
Procedure of 1877 (Civilprozeßordnung = CPO, in modern German,
Zivilprozessordnung = ZPO) and in 1896 the national civil code
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch = BGB), which entered into force on January 1,
1900.
In 1933 the National Socialist (Nazi) party gained power. Within in four
months it established a dictatorship and abolished the rule of law.
In the Second World War (1939-1945) the Soviet Union, the British
Empire and the United States defeated Nazi Germany. Together with France,
they occupied Germany. In 1949 two German states were created in parts of
the territory of defeated Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (“West
Germany”) and the so-called German Democratic Republic (“East
Germany”). Pre-war Germany east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers (Silesia,
East Prussia and Pomerania) was transferred to Poland or to the Soviet
Union in perpetuity. The division continued until 1990, the year after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, when the two German states united.
West Germany was and Germany today is a democratic, federal, rule-oflaw state; West Germany restored the legal system that existed before the
Nazi dictatorship. East Germany was an authoritarian, centralized
Communist state subject to control of the Soviet Union. It kept its population
from fleeing only by building the infamous Berlin Wall. Instead of the rule
of law, East Germany had “socialist legality” on the Soviet model. In 1989
East Germany collapsed; in 1990 West Germany absorbed East Germany as
five federal states in an enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. Legal unity
was restored when West German laws were extended to former East
Germany.
The Social Market Economy
While the new West German state restored the old legal system, it did
not restore the old political and social order. West Germany adopted a more
democratic and more social order. That social system was shaped by a group
known as the neoliberal, Freiburg or ORDO school; it embraced a
competitive economic system. The neoliberals considered a competitive
economic system not only more efficient, but also more democratic. They
emphasized the positive role of the state in maintaining an economy in which
661
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the competitive system is maintained by government measures (taxes,
currency regulation, credit policy, etc.) while at the same time subjecting the
state fully to rule of law safeguards.
The social market economy continues today not only as the hallmark of
united Germany but as the core of a united Europe that largely espouses
principles of a social market economy. The legal methods by which the
German legal system has implemented this social market economy have
renewed relevance. It is a political system that is—in contrast to the
American—avowedly social. It is a system where all people have health
insurance and few, at least compared to the United States, are incarcerated.
History of German Civil Procedure—Refining a Good Choice
In contrast to modern American civil procedure, German civil procedure
has not swung wildly from one extreme to another. Today’s Code of Civil
Procedure is the direct descendent of the Code of 1877. The procedures of
1877 worked well. Amendments since 1877 have made process more
flexible, more efficient and more just, but have not dramatically changed it.
They reflect—especially since 1949 and the creation of the Federal Republic
of Germany—a more democratic and more social state than in 1877. 662
The Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 was the national consolidation and
implementation of reforms that occurred in several German states, above all
in Prussia and in Hannover, beginning in the eighteenth century. The Code
of 1877 was a rejection for all of Germany of the procedure of the antiquated
“common law.” Common law procedure had earned for German procedure
the appellation “inquisitorial” in the Anglo-American world. German
common law procedure was largely non-oral, non-immediate and secret.
Oral statements had to be recorded in writing to count. Judges decided cases
based on written records and without involvement in preparation of cases or
in hearings. Non-immediacy was thought to safeguard impartiality, since it
prevented parties from influencing judges improperly. Strict rules of
evidence determined which evidence judges could consider and how they
had to evaluate it. 663 German civil procedure in the Code of 1877 is marked
by opposites of common law procedure: it is oral, it is immediate, and it is
public. It eschews formalism, such as strict rules governing evidence; instead
it evaluates evidence “freely,” i.e., it gives evidence weight appropriate to
circumstances.
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Nazi Takeover of German Civil Justice

Nazi Logo for Justice (1933-1945)

More than two generations after the end of the Nazi dictatorship,
American comparativists, when they advocate learning from German civil
procedure, hear the retort: “Before you go on telling me any more about the
virtues of German civil procedure, please explain why they had Hitler and
we did not.” 664 To younger people, particularly those who know Germany
today, such views are out-of-touch with reality. The crimes of the Nazis lie
generations back in history. Still, today and for generations to come, those
twelve dark years will haunt study of Germany and of German institutions.
We cannot ignore the question.
Thoughtful people wonder whether the evils of Nazi Germany should
disqualify the German legal system from consideration as model for other
systems. They think as follows: however fine German civil justice may be
today, it failed to foil Nazi crimes. They surmise that the German legal
system was integral in bringing about Nazi crimes. They fear that whatever
thinking animated the Nazi system, must have infected German civil justice,
both before and after the Nazi regime. The argumentation is faulty, as we
now explain.
The German legal system was not responsible for the Nazi take-over.
While the Nazis took care to clothe their take-over in legal terms, might, not
right, took over. 665 Politics, not legality, triumphed. The system that failed
was the political system; the Nazi party never received a majority in a free
national election.
The Nazis took over the civil justice system as thoroughly as they took
over the government. Immediately upon Adolf Hitler’s taking power January
30, 1933 the Nazi regime began to “coordinate” (gleichschalten) the German
justice system just as it did all other aspects of public life. It dismissed large
664
John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the U.S., 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
545, 554 (1995).
665
See IRENE STRENGEM, MACHTÜBERNAHME 1933—ALLES AUF DEM LEGALEM WEG? (2002).
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numbers of politically unacceptable judges, prosecutors, professors and
apprentice jurists from their positions. It suppressed or absorbed professional
associations and professional publications. It subordinated the states, their
courts and their ministries to central Nazi authority. It established special
courts to try political prisoners and special prisons (the first concentration
camps) to hold them. It demanded loyalty oaths from those judges,
prosecutors, lawyers and professors that remained in their positions.
The Nazi “legal system” did not build on German legal traditions or
grow out of it: the Nazi system rejected German legal traditions. Already in
March 1934 Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, one of those later executed for
the 1944 attempted overthrow of the Nazi regime, wrote in a private letter
that the German jurisprudence that he had learned—founded on “a concept
of abstract justice and humanity”— had less than fourteen months after the
take-over only “historical interest;” its “legal methods, put to the test and
strengthened over centuries,” would need decades to be pulled from the
ruble.” 666 By 1939, Karl Loewenstein, a renowned German-American law
professor, wrote from an American refuge in the United States in his book
Hitler’s Germany: “[i]n no other field of human activities” did the Nazis
“more completely revolutionize” German traditions than in law. 667
To speak of a Nazi “system of law” is misleading. Hitler governed
according to the “leadership principle” (Führerprinzip) and not according to
statute. If ever there was a government of men and not of laws, the Nazi
regime was it. Not only did Nazis not build on past law, in the area of civil
justice, they left no new law. Although they began preparation of a new civil
code (styled a “People’s Code” Volksgesetzbuch), 668 they did not have time
to complete it. They made no substantial changes in the Code of Civil
Procedure; changes that took place under their rule had been programmed
before they came to power or were temporary measures to deal with wartime
conditions. Rather than change civil justice laws, they relied on convinced
Nazi judges 669 and on formal letters to those less convinced. 670
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For the Nazi regime, the civil justice system was largely irrelevant. 671
The regime did not trust even the eviscerated rump of the former system that
remained. 672 To implement its terror, it largely looked elsewhere for more
trustworthy servants, to the police, to the army, and above all, to its own
forces, the secret state-police (Gestapo) and the S.S. It carried out its most
heinous crimes in extermination camps distant outside Germany against
people it had first rendered stateless. 673
Still, there was no shortage of academics—many newly appointed—
willing to clothe the new regime with “legal theory” and able to fill the new
legal journals with “a colorful mix of irrational fantasies, self-debasing
declarations of submission, and traditional dogmatic jurisprudence with a
ready (positivist) acceptance of the new order.” 674 Their work testifies to the
irrelevance of the legal system in those terrible times.
When the Allies occupied Germany they immediately repealed many
Nazi laws. Above all they put out of force public laws: criminal law and
racial laws. They had no need to change substantially the Code of Civil
Procedure or most other laws addressing civil justice.
Since the capitulation of the Nazi regime in 1945 Germans have sought
to make up for the crimes of the German state (Wiedergutmachung) and to
come to grips with the nation’s Nazi past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung).
With respect to the latter attempt to understand the past, Germans asked the
questions that Americans wonder about today: did German legal methods
contribute to the Nazi takeover?
671
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In the immediate post-war years the German legal philosopher, Gustav
Radbruch, asked whether German legal theory prevailing before 1933 (i.e.,
positivism and giving first attention to statutory law) had facilitated the Nazi
takeover of the legal system. 675 While Radbruch had not been compromised,
those who had been were quick to assert that their acts were justified by
positivist theory of following Nazi laws. The fault lay with the Nazi
lawgivers and not with the compromised judges. 676 Today, the thesis that
German positivism led to Nazism is rejected. Fault is found not with the
legal methodology, but with the ideological beliefs of the jurists who
remained in office. 677
We do not believe there is reasonable ground not to find insights in German
law.
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ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 229-234 (Christian Joeges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, eds., 2003), citing
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Formalism and Anti-Formalism in French and German Judicial
Methodology, in THE DARKER LEGACIES, at 205, 221-224. See also MICHAEL STOLLEIS,
RELUCTANCE TO GLANCE IN THE MIRROW: THE CHANGING FACE OF GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE
AFTER 1933 AND POST-1945 (2002), reprinted in THE DARKER LEGACIES at 1.
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C. Korea

Taegeuk (태극)
Symbolic depiction of Yin and Yang
used on Korean National Flag (1882)

Korea Time Table
Before 1876
1876
1904-1905
1905-1945
1912
1945-1948
1948- present
1950-1953
1960
1987
2002
2008

Kingdom of Jos ŏn (“Land of Morning Calm”)
Opening of Korea to Japan and the West
Russo-Japanese War over Korea
Japanese protectorate, then occupation
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, based on German Code of
Civil Procedure
Allied occupation
National division, North and South, legal disunity
Civil War (Korean War)
Civil Procedure Act, based on Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure
Constitutional revolution
Korean Civil Procedure Act Amendment
Korean Civil Procedure Act Amendment Following the
Revisions of 2005, 2006, and 2007

For the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century Korea, known
as the Kingdom of Josŏn (Chosŏn), was closed to the Western world. In
1876 Japan forced the opening of Korea, which ushered in a thirty-year
period of western influence on Korean law. Until then, Korean law had been
based on traditional Korean thought and largely influenced by Confucianism
from China. For a time among western legal systems, the influence of
American law was strongest, but incompatibility with Korean social
conditions led to Korean preference for Continental law, first for French law
and then for German law. Korea’s first modern court organization act was
based on the German Court Organization Act [Gerichtsverfassungs] of 1877.
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At the turn of the twentieth century, Russia and Japan competed
for hegemony over Korea. In 1905, Japan, following victory in war
against Russia, asserted control. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea.
Japanese rule of Korea was harsh and brutal; it was a colonial
occupation that suppressed Koreans and their culture. It imposed
Japanese law on Korea. It brought law into disrespect, since law was a
tool of the occupiers. To this day the occupation burdens relations
between Korea and Japan.
In 1945 the United States and the British Empire defeated Japan
and ended the Second World War. The United States occupied Korea
south of the 38 th parallel of latitude and the Soviet Union, which
entered the war against Japan only in the last days of the war,
occupied Korea to the north. The United States military government
sought to “de-Japanize Korean law by replacing Japanese influences
with American law, [but] without much success.” 678
In 1948 separate states were created in the two occupation areas.
In 1950 the northern state, occupied by the Soviet Union, invaded the
southern state, occupied by the United States. War continued until
1953, when an armistice was reached. The two states remain
antagonistic. The northern state, the so-called People’s Democratic
Republic of Korea, is Communist and perhaps the world’s last
remaining totalitarian state. We give it no attention in this book.
Despite superficial appearance that the two Korean states are an
Asian analogue to the two German states, that assumption is
misleading. Not until October 1987—just two years before the fall of
the Berlin Wall in November 1989—could one correctly draw such
parallels. Unlike West Germany, until 1987 South Korea was not a
democratic rule-of-law state. One party and one man rule prevailed.
That came to end in 1987 with a peaceful, constitutional revolution.
In 1987, for the first time in Korea’s history, a Korean constitution
was made through democratic procedures. Since then Koreans have
has successfully worked to make the constitutional revolution a
reality. 679
Modern and Traditional Korean Law
Korea’s culture is not European. Korean legal scholars have considered
whether they might recreate a uniquely Korean law inspired by traditional,
678

Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 SO. ILL.
U.L.J. 71, 72 (1997).
679
See T OM G INSBURG , T HE P OLITICS OF L EGAL R EFORM IN K OREA , IN L EGAL
R EFORM IN K OREA 1 (Tom Ginsburg, ed., 2004); Chang-rok Kim, Where is the
Korean Legal System Going?, in L AW IN A C HANGING W ORLD : A SIAN A LTERNATIVES
11 (Morigiwa Yastutomo, ed., 1998); D AE -K HU Y OON , L AW AND D EMOCRACY IN
K OREA : D EMOCRATIC D EVELOPMENT SINCE 1987 (2010).
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Confucian law. The challenge that they face is that traditional Korean law
and practices existed in a pre-industrial era. Korea has changed dramatically
through industrialization and political modernization. It is one of the twenty
largest economies in the world. Coincident with that growth is a tremendous
upsurge in litigation that bespeaks preferences for dispute resolution
according to law over more informal methods drawn from the Confucian
heritage. 680 Korean scholars see little future in a return to traditional Korean
law. They see adoption of such a system as having worse
consequences than adoption and development of a foreign system.
They recommend development of the existing system with an eye to
contemporary needs. 681 They are sufficiently satisfied with the job
that they are doing in adapting those models foreign to Korea to see a
role for presenting Korean law as a model for other legal systems. For
example, each year the Korean Supreme Court provides training
programs in English and other language to more than a hundred
foreign judges to introduce them to the law and judicial system of
Korea.

Civil Procedure—Realizing the 1987 Rule of Law Revolution
Korea did not have an established system of civil procedure of its
own until 1960. Korea’s independence from China was not recognized
until 1895 and was followed within ten years by Japanese domination
that lasted until 1945.

680

See Ahn, Influence, supra note 678, at 84; Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J.
KOREAN L. at 109, reprint at 1; Wan-Ho Lee, Kurzer Abriß über koreanisches Recht in
Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD GROßFELD ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 687 (Ulrich Hübner & Werner F. Ebke, eds. 1999) (summarizing the results of a
survey published in Korean in 1996 noting changes in attitude between 1965 and 1993).
681
Moon-Hyuck Ho, Korea und das deutsche Zivilprozeßrecht, in DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEßRECHT UND SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN 448, 465-466 (Walther J.
Habscheid, ed. 1991).
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The origin of contemporary Korean civil procedure is an indirect
transplant of German law. In 1912, two years after annexation, Japan
imposed its Code of Civil Procedure of 1890 on Korea. In system and
language the Japanese code of 1890 was essentially the German Code
of Civil Procedure of 1877 and shared its virtues. American
occupation authorities judged the German-based, Japanese-imposed,
Korean judicial system positively: “the structure of the judiciary was
a serious, well-regulated affair, and was administered by competent,
excellently trained personnel.”
After liberation, the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended in Japan prior to 1945, continued to apply in Korea. Only in
1960 did Korea adopt its own law, the Civil Procedure Act (referred
to here as the “KCPA”). Even it, however, is in material content a
translation of the Japanese code and therefore a descendant of the
German. Not until the constitutional revolution of 1987 did Korea
turn in earnest to civil procedure.
Foreign Influences on Contemporary Korean Civil Procedure
Since 1945 three modern foreign legal systems have vied for
attention in Korea: the Japanese, the American, and the German. The
Japanese and the American systems made their marks through historic
occupation and contemporary economic importance; the German
system has competed through the strength of its ideas and through its
affinity to the Japanese system without the historical baggage of the
Japanese occupation.
Considering that much of Korean law originates in Japanese law,
the influence of contemporary Japanese law in Korea is modest.
History and language explain this limited influence. More than two
generations after the hated occupation ended, looking to Japan for
legal inspiration, remains sensitive and even disconcerting. Learning
Japanese, when already one must learn English, is an additional
burden. Korean and Japanese jurists are as likely to converse in
English as in Korean or Japanese.
The influence of the United States on Korea has been and is
substantial. Koreans say that the U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1948
“Americanized” Korea. 682
The influence of American law has not been as great as American
influence in general, but it has been pervasive in some areas. Korean
constitutions imitate the American. Korean courts import American
constitutional concepts. Korean constitutional law textbooks include U.S.
682

Chongko Choi, South and North Korean Law: Comparison and Unification, in
RECHTSREFORM IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA IM VERGLEICH, 273, 278-279 (Thomas
Würtenberger, ed., 2006);
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Supreme Court decisions; Korean scholars write many articles on the U.S.
Supreme Court and translate others. 683
The influence of American law on Korea is intensified by the
economic might and global cultural dominance of the United States. It
is magnified by dominance of English in global commerce. English is
first foreign language for most Korean students. Where the older
generation might and did study in many countries, the younger
generation is likely to go to an English-speaking country, and
especially to the United States. 684 Korean bar examiners recognized
the dominance of English when they made knowledge of English
mandatory for bar admission and dropped as acceptable alternatives
knowledge of any other language. The Korean Supreme Court puts
knowledge of English first in communication between Korean judges
and the world. 685
Rejection of American and Renewal of German Influence?
In the late twentieth century Korea flirted with American models
in civil procedure. Attempts to introduce Korean variations of
American cross-examination and class actions were unsuccessful. 686
This should not be surprising: some members of the American military
government in Seoul in the immediate post-war years recognized that
German law was more compatible with the Korean system than was the
American. 687
For all the cultural influence of the United States in Korea,
Korean civil procedure owes little to American law. After looking
closely at American procedure, Korean reformers turned back to
familiar concepts of German procedure. Notwithstanding dominance
of the English language, the influence of German civil procedure on
Korean law remains dominant. 688 Knowledge of German law is
common among jurists. For example, eleven of the thirteen members
of the Special Committee for the Civil Code Amendment formed in
683

Ahn, Influence, supra note 678, at 73, 79.
See Sang-Hyun Song, Korean Students in U.S. Law Schools and Foreign Students
at Seoul National University Law School, 18 D ICK . J. I NT ’ L L. 467 (2000).
685
See, e.g. Byung-dae Park, Keynote Speech, The First Judicial Symposium in
English, 1 J. K OREAN J UDICATURE 726 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008).
686
Moon-Hyuck Ho, The Reception and Transmission of Civil Procedure Law Experience in
Korea and Important Points to be Considered, in THE RECEPTION AND TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL
PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY, LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL EDUCATIONAL
ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN PROCEDURAL LAW (Masahisa Deguchi & Marcel
Storme, eds. 2008).
687
See Chongko Choi, Western Jurists on Korean Law: A Historical Survey, 2 J. KOREAN L.
167, 182-184 (2002),
688
See Gyooho Lee, Is Comparative Law and Economics Viable as a Comparative Approach to
Korean Civil Procedure?, 5 KOREAN J. L. & ECON. 85, 86-87, 118 (2008).
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1999 studied law in Germany; only three had studied in the United
States. Of the eleven who studied in Germany, five had taken doctoral
degrees there, that is, Dr. jur. law degrees, the equivalent of Ph. D.s
in law. To put that number into American perspective, perhaps ten
American-born law professors have done that.
Korean constitutional law demonstrates the strength of German
procedural law and legal methods. When Korea embraced American
constitutional principles in 1987, it adopted forms of constitutional
adjudication that are closer to German forms than they are to American one.
In particular, Korea introduced a separate constitutional court. 689
In the major revision of 2002 to the Korean Civil Procedure Act, Korea
returned to the German system for ideas. The Korean reforms of the first
decade of the twenty-first century reform are reminiscent of earlier German
reforms in 1924 and 1976 in their emphasis, respectively, on oral hearings
and on concentrating process. 690
Thus today Korea has essentially the German code of civil
procedure and is updating it to the contemporary version. While
Korea does not have German practice in every respect, this has little
to do with Korean national legal culture resisting a foreign culture,
and everything to do with national institutions that have different
capabilities (e.g., fewer lawyers and judges than in Germany) and
with those institutions being slow to follow German reforms.

689

Ahn, Influence, supra note 678, 77, 86. See also Woo-young Rhee, Democratic Legitimacy
of law and the constitutional adjudication in the Republic of Korea, in LITIGATION IN KOREA
135 (Kuk Cho, ed., 2010).
690
See Moon-Hyuck Ho, Zur Reform des koreanischen Zivilprozessrechts im Jahr 2002, in
RECHTSREFORM IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA IM VERGLEICH, 87 (Thomas Würtenberger, ed.,
2006); Kim, Oral Proceedings, supra note 290, 7 J. KOREAN L at 53, rerprint at 32.
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B I B L I OG R APH I C NOT E S

A. Introductions to Legal and Civil Justice Systems
B. Critiques of American Civil Justice
A. Introductions to Legal and Civil Justice Systems
We identify here mostly book-length general introductions to our legal
systems in general and to our civil justice systems in particular.
Introductions to the American Legal System
There are several English-language works written as introductions to the
American legal system for foreign readers or for American non-lawyer
readers. They have the benefit that they address the whole system as such,
while also giving a chapter or more over to civil justice. Recent ones include:
ALEXANDER DÖRRBECKER, INTRODUCTION TO THE US-AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM FOR GERMAN-SPEAKING LAWYERS AND LAW STUDENTS (2 vols., 2nd
ed, 2005); JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2000); FUNDAMENTALS OF
AMERICAN LAW (Alan B. Morrison, ed. 1996); INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
nd
OF THE UNITED STATES (David S. Clark and Tuğrul Ansay, eds., 2 ed.
2002); ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & PETER L. MURRAY, LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES (2nd ed. 2007). There are similar German-language works. More
recent ones include: DIETER BLUMENWITZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS ANGLOAMERIKANISCHE
RECHT: RECHTSQUELLENLEHRE, METHODE DER
RECHTSFINDUNG, ARBEITEN MIT PRAKTISCHEN RECHTSFÄLLEN (7th ed.
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2003); PETER HAY, U.S.-AMERIKANISCHES RECHT: EIN STUDIENBUCH (4th
ed. 2005). Books in Korean include [to be added].
Introductions to American Civil Justice
A recent English language introduction to American civil procedure for
foreign readers is JOHN B. OAKLEY & VIKRAM D. AMAR, AMERICAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A GUIDE TO CIVIL ADJUDICATION IN US COURTS (2009). A
reasonably recent work is GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO,
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION (1993). Of the shorter
introductions for American law students, one which commends itself for
readers of this book because its authors place the contemporary American
system in historical and comparative context is STEPHEN N. SUBRIN &
MARGARET Y.K. WOO: LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT (2006).
There are several German language introductions to American civil
procedure. Relatively recent books include: URIKE BÖHM, AMERIKANISCHES
ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (2005); PETER HEIDENBERGER, DEUTSCHE PARTEIEN
VOR AMERIKANISCHEN GERICHTEN (1988); DIETER G. LANGE & STEPHEN F.
BLACK, DER ZIVILPROZEß IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN: EIN PRAKTISCHER
LEITFADEN FÜR DEUTSCHE UNTERNEHMEN (1986) (also appeared in English
privately printed by the authors’ law firm under the title CIVIL LITIGATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GERMAN COMPANIES, 1985);
ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, PROZESSFÜHRUNG UND –RISIKEN IM DEUTSCHAMERIKANISCHEN
RECHTSVERKEHR
(2004);
HAIMO
SCHACK,
AMERIKANISCHES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (3rd ed. 2002); WILLIAM
SCHURTMAN & OTTO L. WALTER, DER AMERIKANISCHE ZIVILPROZEß (1978).
Of these works, that by Schack is the most academic, while that by Schütze
is the most provocative. Professor Maxeiner has published an article length
introduction: James R. Maxeiner, Die Gefahr der Übertragung deutschen
Rechtsdenkens auf das U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozeßrechts, RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 1990, 440. Books in Korean include
[to be added].
Introductions to the German Legal System
Since the accession of the United Kingdom to what is now the European
Union, a number of English language introductions to German law have
appeared. None, unfortunately, are by Americans. These include: HOWARD
D. FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LEGAL LANGUAGE (2nd ed.
1999); NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS
(3rd ed. 2002); INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW (Joachim Zekoll and
Matthias Reimann, eds., 2nd ed. 2005); GERHARD ROBBERS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW (1998) (this book is also available in
German). The book edited by Zekoll and Reimann includes an excellent
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introductory chapter by Reinhard Zimmermann, director of the Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Private Law in Hamburg, titled
Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture. Books in Korean include
[to be added].
Introductions to German Civil Justice
English language readers are fortunate to have a comprehensive English
language introduction to German civil procedure. It is a product of
collaboration between American and a German experts in civil procedure.
PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004). Only a
few years before a shorter work by two German scholars appeared in
English: HARALD KOCH & FRANK DIEDRICH, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
GERMANY (1998). It is somewhat dated by reforms in 2002. The Zekoll and
Reimann book just mentioned includes a fine one chapter, fully up-to-date
introduction by Astrid Stadler and Wolfgang Hau titled The Law of Civil
Procedure. Several out-dated older works deserve mention for the
comparative insights they bring. The second volume of E.J. COHN, A
MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW (2nd ed. 1968) has an excellent chapter on
German civil justice. Three excellent older articles are: Benjamin Kaplan,
Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil
Procedure, Parts I and II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958, 1959), and
Benjamin J. Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the Comparison of
Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 409 (1960). Books in Korean include [to be
added].
Introductions to the Korean Legal System
There is one such work in German: EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS KOREANISCHE
RECHT (Korea Legislation Research Institute, 2010). Its coverage of civil
justice is brief. There is, as yet, no general introduction to the Korean legal
system in English. The closest that there is, is a guide for foreign
businessmen. INVESTMENT IN KOREA: GUIDE TO KOREAN LAWS AND
REGULATIONS (Office of International Legal Affairs, Ministry of Justice,
1999).
Introductions to Korean Civil Justice
There is no introductory book devoted to Korean civil justice, but the
book LITIGATION IN KOREA (Kuk Cho, ed., 2010) includes two excellent
articles on the topic, both originally published in the Journal of Korean Law,
as well as articles on related matters of criminal and constitutional litigation.
The two articles and their original publications are: Hyun Seok Kim, Why do
We Pursue “Oral Proceedings” in Our Legal System?, 7 J. KOREAN L. 51
(2007); Youngjoon Kwon, Litigating in Korea: A General Overview of the
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Korean Civil Procedure, 7 J. KOREAN L. 109 (2007). Professor Lee’s book,
now not entirely up-to-date, helps fill in gaps. GYOOHO LEE, IN SEARCH OF
THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM: REFLECTIONS ON KOREA’S CIVIL
PROCEDURE THROUGH INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (J.S.D.
dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis, 1998), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656205. The guide for businessmen mentioned in
the previous section, includes a 23 page chapter on dispute settlement. In
recent years Korean scholars have published many relevant articles in the
English or German languages. Home to many of these articles is the Journal
of Korean Law, which is available through Hein Online. We have referenced
some of these in the text. Finally, there is a large conference volume
published by the Supreme Court of Korea which has much material in
English of interest. Also to be noted are two books by Chongko Choi: LAW
AND JUSTICE IN KOREA, NORTH AND SOUTH (2005) and LAWYERS IN KOREA
(2008).
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B. Critiques of American Civil Justice

691

The Benefit of Going to Law
TWO Beggars travelling along,
One blind, the other lame,
Pick’d up an Oyster on the Way,
To which they both laid claim :
The Matter rose so high, that they
Resolv’d to go to Law,
As often richer Fools have done,
Who quarrel for a Straw.
A Lawyer took it strait in hand,
Who knew his Business was
To mind nor one nor t’other side,
But make the best o’ th’ Cause,
As always in the Law ‘s the Case:
So he his Judgment gave,
And Lawyer-like he thus resolv’d
What each of them should have ;
Blind Plaintif, lame Defendant, share
The Friendly Laws impartial Care.
A Shell for him, a Shell for thee.
The Middle is the Lawyer’s Fee.
Benjamin Franklin, in
Poor Richard, 1733. An Almanack.
It is a commonplace to say that the American system of civil justice fails
to meet public expectations. Many have said that before us. We list many of
691

Illustration by John Tenniel, from LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (AND
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 76 (1899 ed., 1st ed. 1871). The illustration, of course, was not
written for the verse.
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them here in annual chronological order. This list is meant to be an
extensive, but not an exhaustive list of separate publications mostly calling
for civil justice reform. With a few deliberate exceptions, it does not list
publications on criminal justice, publications limited to jury issues, or
articles. Its listing of bar association reports is only representative; it but
scratches the surface of reports issued
1789 to 1848 (From the Constitution to the Field Code)
[1799] Of the Defects of the Judiciary, WILLIAM GRIFFITH [attrib.], EUMENES: BEING A
COLLECTION OF PAPERS, WRITTEN FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXHIBITING SOME OF THE MORE
PROMINENT ERRORS AND OMISSIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW-JERSEY Nos. XXIX et
seq. (1799).
[1802] A NEW ARRANGEMENT OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE, OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND:
PROPOSED (1802).
[1803] THOMAS BARTON [attrib.] OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRIAL BY JURY: WITH
MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS CONCERNING LEGISLATION & JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
PROFESSOR OF THE LAW; ... BY AN AMERICAN (1803).
[1805] JESSE HIGGINS [attrib.], SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES, OR THE REFORMATION OF
LAWSUITS; AND JUSTICE MADE CHEAP, SPEEDY, AND BROUGHT HOME TO EVERY MAN’S DOOR
(2nd ed., 1805).
Did the conventions, by which these principles were established, mean nothing by all
these fine words? …. For surely no man will pretend that this declaration [of the
open courts’ clause] has been realized. Id. at 23.
[1807] WILLIAM DUANE, EXPERIENCE THE TEST OF GOVERNMENT: IN EIGHTEEN ESSAYS
(1807).
[1809] REFLECTIONS UPON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA BY A CITIZEN
(1809).
[1819] FERRIS PELL, A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL POLICE OF THE STATE OF
NEW-YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1807, TO THE YEAR 1819 (1819).
[1822] HENRY DWIGHT SEDGWICK, THE ENGLISH PRACTICE: A STATEMENT, SHOWING SOME
OF THE EVILS AND ABSURDITIES OF THE PRACTICE OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, AS
ADOPTED IN SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE STATE OF
NEW YORK … BY A LOVER OF IMPROVEMENT (New York, 1822).
[1826, 1839] James Kirke Paulding, The Perfection of Reason, in JAMES KIRKE PAULDING, THE
MERRY TALES OF THE THREE WISE MEN OF GOTHAM (1st ed. 1826, 2nd ed. 1839).
[1827] HUGH D. EVANS, AN ESSAY ON PLEADING WITH A VIEW TO AN IMPROVED SYSTEM
(1827).
[1836] DAVID HENSHAW, AN ADDRESS, DELIVERED BEFORE AN ASSEMBLY OF CITIZENS FROM
ALL PARTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AT FANEUIL HALL, BOSTON, JULY 4, 1836 (1836).
[1838] THEODORE SEDGWICK, JR., A STATEMENT OF FACTS IN RELATION TO THE DELAYS AND
ARREARS OF BUSINESS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, WITH SOME
SUGGESTIONS FOR A CHANGE IN ITS ORGANIZATION (1838)
[1839] GUILIAN C. VERPLANCK, SPEECH WHEN IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE IN THE SENATE
OF NEW-YORK, ON THE SEVERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW
AND THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM (Albany NY, 1839)
[1840 TO 1848] David Dudley Field, Jr., various shorter pieces reprinted in SPEECHES,
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (3 vols., 1884 to 1890).
[1847] Robert William Wells, Observations on the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts of
Justice of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER ADDRESSED
TO THE “METROPOLITAN” (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEM.
REV. 477, 482, 486 (1847).
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[1847] Memorial of the Members of the Bar in the City of New-York, Relative to Legal Reform
1, Doc. No. 48, 2 N.Y. ASSEMBLY DOC. (Feb. 9, 1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 261 (1884).
[1848] FIRST REPORT OF THE PRACTICE COMMISSION (Feb. 29, 1848), extensively excerpted in 1
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 262, 273
(A.P. Sprague ed., 1884).
[1848, 1850] WILLIAM RICHARDSON DICKERSON, THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS (pseud.) EXPOSING
TO THE PUBLIC, FOR THEIR BENEFIT, THE MAL-PRACTICES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LAW, .... (1st ed. 1848, 2nd ed. 1850).

1849 to 1905 (From the Field Code to Pound’s Address)
[1851, 1879 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS [BENJAMIN R. CURTIS, N.J. LORD & R.A.
CHAPMAN, COMMISSIONERS) APPOINTED TO REVISE AND REFORM THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), commentary portion reprinted in 2 A
MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 149-50 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879)
“[We are] working under what can hardly be called a system of procedure, and
which every well-informed lawyer condemns ….” Id, at 2.
[1855, 1871 et al.]SAMUEL TYLER, REPORT ON PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY OF THE
COMMISSIONERS, APPOINTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, TO REVISE,
SIMPLIFY AND ABRIDGE THE RULES OF PRACTICE, PLEADINGS, FORMS OF CONVEYANCING, AND
PROCEEDING OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE (1855) (critical of new code pleading), largely
reprinted as an introduction to Samuel Tyler, HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1871 TO 1919).
[1858] McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 524 (1858).
[1876] G.T. Bispham, Law in America, 1776-1876, 122 N. AM. REV. 154, 185-86 (1876).
[1879] ARPHAXED LOOMIS, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK SYSTEM OF LAW REFORM IN
PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS (1879).
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Interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today compromising the basic
legal rights of countless thousands of Americans and, imperceptibly, corroding the
very foundations of constitutional government in the United States.
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learn health habits. But in my opinion, the visitors are right to make them. In this
nation we have invested more energy, attention, concern, and resources than has any
other place on earth in an effort to upgrade judicial administration. That the
investment has left us far short of perfection is an obvious understatement and a fact
that is no secret abroad. Id. at 798.
The pluralistic American system of civil justice remains the wonder of the world of
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paradoxes. It is often sluggish and irrational. As an instrument for resolving disputes,
its greatest redeeming feature is that it stands alongside our system of criminal
justice, where its warts seem beauty marks by contrast. It will improve; it must. Id. at
819.
[1971] LEONARD DOWNIE, JR., JUSTICE DENIED: THE CASE FOR REFORM OF THE COURTS
(1971).
[1972] THE WORK OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TRIAL COURT DELAY APPOINTED BY CHIEF
JUSTICE DONALD R. WRIGHT ON MARCH 26, 1971 TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF TRIAL
COURT DELAY IN CALIFORNIA, AND BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 1, 1972 (1972).
[1972] BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY
YOUNG ADVOCATES (1972).
[1973] ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: HOW OUR ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF LAW VICTIMIZES
US AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE (1973).
[1975] COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975).
[1976] THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (Murray L. Schwartz,
ed., 1976).
[1977] MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE: TOO MUCH FIGHT? TOO LITTLE TRUTH?
EQUAL JUSTICE? (1977).
[1978] THOMAS W, CHURCH, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PRETRIAL DELAY: A
REVIEW AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978).
[1978] HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN & BERNARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (2nd ed.
1978).
[1979] THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin &
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